



DGP-WG/20-IP/2
16/10/20

**DANGEROUS GOODS PANEL (DGP)
WORKING GROUP MEETING (DGP-WG/20)**

Virtual Meeting, 19 to 23 October 2020

Agenda Item 8: Other business

**REPORT OF THE THIRD ICAO/UNIVERSAL POSTAL UNION (UPU) CONTACT
COMMITTEE MEETING**

(Presented by the Secretary)

SUMMARY

The third meeting of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)/Universal Postal Union (UPU) Contact Committee was held virtually on 22 and 23 June 2020. The report of that meeting is presented in the appendix to this information paper.

APPENDIX

**REPORT OF THE THIRD ICAO/UNIVERSAL POSTAL UNION (UPU) CONTACT
COMMITTEE MEETING**

POSTAL OPERATIONS COUNCIL
Committee 1 (Supply Chain Integration)
Postal Security Group (PSG)
ICAO–UPU Contact Committee
Report of the third ICAO–UPU Contact Committee meeting
Report by the Chair

1 Subject	References/paragraphs
Report of the ICAO–UPU Contact Committee virtual meeting held on 22 and 23 June 2020.	§§ 1 to 83 and Annexes 1 to 4
2 Decision expected Take note of the report.	§§ 1 to 83 and Annexes 1 to 4

I. Opening of the meeting and adoption of the agenda
(POC C 1 PSG ICAO–UPU CC 2020.1–Doc 1.Rev 2)

1 As the meeting host, the Director of the UPU International Bureau's Postal Operations Directorate, Mr Bousseta, welcomed the delegates to the first virtual meeting of the contact committee and thanked the committee members for their cooperation during this difficult global pandemic in pursuit of the goals relating to the committee's objectives. He provided a brief update on the UPU's continuing work during the crisis, which included the launch of an operational continuity unit within his directorate focusing on maintaining mail flows and security within the postal supply chain. The unit has continued to work transversally within the International Bureau and with member countries and external stakeholders, including ICAO, to help find solutions to transport challenges resulting from the continuously changing world situation. Mr Bousseta provided an update on the initial phased return to the office for IB staff, with a projected start date of 6 July 2020. This will be the first step of the return to normality and the eventual resumption of physical meetings for members and external stakeholders. He highlighted the importance of UPU security standards S58 and S59 in emergency and disaster situations such as the pandemic. With respect to the proposal made by Poste Italiane under agenda item 9, he encouraged the committee to foster open discussion to strike a balance between protection and production. He concluded by thanking the Co-Chairs from the United States of America and South Africa and the ICAO co-secretariats.

2 The UPU Co-Chair from the United States, Mr Daniel Brubaker, introduced himself to the group and welcomed the participants. He said he regretted that a physical meeting could not be held in Berne, but that he was very much looking forward to meeting everyone in person next year. He recognized the personal and professional challenges facing the committee members in such turbulent times and wished to establish an open and understanding dialogue among all committee members.

3 The ICAO Co-Chair from South Africa, Mr Nico Smit, greeted the members and acknowledged the challenges facing everybody during the pandemic. He stressed the need to maintain open lines of communication between the UPU, ICAO and the membership in order to find a suitable and effective path to recovery and to ensure the safety, security, continuity and sustained growth of the supply chain.

/ 4 The UPU Co-Chair asked the members to follow the guidance on virtual meeting etiquette, reproduced / in Annex 1, to help to efficiently accomplish the committee's goals over the following two days. Referring to the agenda timetable in Annex 2, he informed the members that agenda items 8 and 11 had been moved to the second day of the meeting to allow adequate and focused discussion on the topic of lithium batteries. The committee adopted the agenda as proposed.

II. Report by the Co-Chairs

a *Report of the second meeting*
(POC C 1 PSG ICAO–UPU CC 2020.1–Doc 2a)

/ 5 The UPU Co-Chair referred to the virtual approval process (see Annex 3), which applied to specific / documents on the agenda. All comments received prior to the meeting for those documents are provided in Annex 4. Since, under the virtual approval process, the members had not commented on or revised the report of the meeting held on 12 to 14 February 2019 in the allotted time frame, the committee took note of and endorsed the report as it stood.

b *Report of WebEx meeting (ICAO and UPU secretariats)*
(POC C 1 PSG ICAO–UPU CC 2020.1–Doc 2b)

6 Since, under the virtual approval process, the members had not commented on or revised the report on the WebEx meeting held on 8 August 2019 in the allotted time frame, the committee took note of and endorsed the report as it stood.

III. Comparison of ICAO Doc 8973 and best practices with UPU S58/S59

(POC C 1 PSG ICAO–UPU CC 2020.1–Pres 3)

7 Since, under the virtual approval process, the members had not commented on or revised the comparison of the ICAO Aviation Security Manual (Doc 8973) and best practices with UPU S58/S59 in the allotted time frame, the committee took note of and endorsed the document as it stood.

8 Providing a brief summary of the comparison between the documents, the representative of the ICAO secretariat said that the comparison had been necessary as updates had been made to ICAO Doc 8973 since the previous comparison in 2016. He confirmed that the majority of the gaps identified between Doc 8973 and UPU S58/S59 had been resolved in the update to Doc 8973 which was completed in 2019. He highlighted specific areas for continued convergence, including access control, personnel, screening procedures and approval of certified entities. Overall, he considered that the documents had been aligned. Continued coordination was needed to ensure a correct path forward before any additional amendments were made to either document.

9 The IB welcomed the coordination between the secretariats in seeking to align the documents, and encouraged continued cooperation to ensure a comprehensive safety and security profile.

IV. Updated S58/S59 certification process

(POC C 1 PSG 2020.1–Doc 16a)

10 Since, under the virtual approval process, the members had not commented on or revised the updated S58/S59 certification process in the allotted time frame, the committee took note of and endorsed the document as it stood.

11 The PSG secretariat provided a brief summary of the updated S58/S59 process, which had been endorsed at the POC PSG 2020.1 meeting. As part of efforts to harmonize UPU security standards, the S58/S59 standards were aligned with both the National Civil Aviation Security Programmes (NCASP) and the

World Customs Organization (WCO) Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) certification system. Details of the alignment were provided in document POC C 1 SB 2020.2–Doc 4b, endorsed by the UPU Standards Board for submission to the UPU Postal Operations Council (POC) for final approval. Once approved, the document will serve as a baseline for the revised certification process, which includes an evaluation of equivalency status for designated operators (DOs) currently holding NCASP/regulated agent or AEO status.

V. Online prohibitions query tool

(POC C 1 PSG ICAO–UPU CC 2020.1–Pres 7)

12 The representative of the Customs Group (CG) secretariat provided an overview of the UPU prohibitions query tool, an online search tool based on the Customs Declaration System (CDS) prohibited and restricted articles compendium. The compendium is accessible to all member countries, whether or not they use the CDS. Currently, entries are available for 191 member countries, 99 of which have provided specific entries for the compendium. DOs can link to the query tool from their own websites to inform postal customers about mailing restrictions on a country-by-country basis.

13 According to the CG secretariat, a number of steps can be taken to improve the tool, including harmonizing descriptions. The compendium entries, of which there are 8,500, are currently available in English only. The possibility of translating them into other languages is being explored. Consideration is also being given to establishing a standardized approach for all members signatory to international treaties, such as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, to ensure that such information is included in the prohibitions database for a better customer experience.

14 During a real-time demonstration of the query tool, information was retrieved on batteries, restrictions and matters related specifically to the United Kingdom.

15 The UPU Co-Chair asked whether the tool could incorporate ICAO technical instructions (TIs) to assist with the mitigation of dangerous goods within the postal supply chain. The representative of the CG secretariat confirmed that this functionality would be explored in the future. Currently, the need to account for separate modes of transportation (surface, marine) was making the incorporation of TIs problematic.

16 The ICAO secretariat representative complimented the CG secretariat representative on an excellent presentation and said that the query tool would help to ensure the proper control of dangerous goods within the postal supply chain. She asked whether the tool was primarily geared to DOs or postal customers. ICAO also offered to assist with the future development of the tool, particularly in the areas of dangerous goods and harmonization with TIs.

17 The CG secretariat representative said that the target group had initially been DOs but had been expanded to include postal customers at the request of UPU members to raise awareness among mail senders of precisely which items were permitted in the post. He welcomed ICAO's offer to assist with the enhancement of the tool.

18 The IB also thanked ICAO for its willingness to help to develop the tool.

VI. Results of survey on DOs accepting equipment containing lithium batteries

(POC C 1 PSG ICAO–UPU CC 2020.1–Pres 8)

19 The secretariat representative provided an overview of the survey, which had been jointly approved by the committee members. The survey had been disseminated both physically and electronically in an effort to maximize the number of responses. The responses, received from approximately 30% of DOs, allowed for an initial analysis of DOs' handling of dangerous goods. It was observed that relatively few DOs (32) had equipment containing lithium batteries (ECLB) certification. The secretariat asked what the group could do to promote the certification process for those DOs which did not currently have or did not plan to seek ECLB certification. The group was also asked to consider how the committee could create a communication link between the civil aviation authorities (CAAs) and DOs regionally and internationally to ensure the safety and security of the mail stream.

20 The UPU Co-Chair said that thinking out of the box was essential during the coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic if the committee was to come up with creative ways of providing training and enriching knowledge on ECLB certification. He cited the staging of virtual meetings as an excellent example of the kinds of method that could be employed in the future.

21 Based on his country's experience, the postal representative from the United Kingdom wondered whether the lack of interest in ECLB certification could be explained by the amount of work involved in fully understanding and accounting for other items classed as dangerous goods. He added that while the work was difficult, the result was worthwhile.

22 The secretariat said that the next step in the process would be to communicate with the DOs that were planning to seek certification, and with those that were not, in order to better understand both the rationale for their decisions and the status of those DOs, with a view to identifying the best way forward.

23 ICAO thanked the UPU for conducting the survey to aid understanding of the issue. It noted that there was currently no mechanism to determine whether a DO was transporting other permitted dangerous goods in addition to ECLB and asked how the UPU ensured that those DOs which did not have ECLB certification received the necessary training to mitigate the induction of dangerous goods into the supply chain.

24 The UPU secretariat representative said that the UPU provided training on dangerous goods through Trainpost, which could be accessed by all DOs, and that access to such training was tracked. She added that training sessions were held throughout the year on a regional basis, and that UPU S58/S59 security certification included a requirement to conduct training on-site, but noted that the process of enhancing and tracking training could be streamlined.

25 The Co-Chair thanked the UPU for conducting the survey, which had stimulated conversation and brought important issues to the fore. He proposed that the survey be redistributed to track the development of the DOs. The UPU Co-Chair agreed.

26 The IB recalled that joint airline–Post workshops had been conducted for all regions in 2019 after the need for collaboration between CAAs and DOs had been identified at the committee's last meeting. ICAO and the UPU worked together to provide dangerous goods training, facilitated by the ICAO dangerous goods instructor, to improve DOs' knowledge. The workshops identified awareness as a key factor for DOs seeking certification. DOs relied on the support of their CAAs in this regard. Collaborative efforts should therefore be continued, whether by virtual or other means.

27 The representative of Deutsche Post said that International Air Transport Association (IATA) counterparts did not know which requirements needed to be met to obtain regulated agent status. He would like IATA to be admitted to the committee or involved in the present discussion in some way.

28 The secretariat said that the IB staff and the ICAO co-secretariat were aware that additional communication was required between the committee and IATA and were exploring ways of establishing links with that organization.

29 The ICAO member from Brazil said he was grateful to the UPU for conducting the survey and had found the results interesting. He underlined the importance of training in establishing closer relationships between CAAs and DOs but pointed out that training alone could not resolve the difficulties encountered by DOs in developing training in line with their own responsibilities. Indeed, he noted that, although the ICAO TIs outlined the procedures for CAAs to approve lithium batteries for transportation by post, DOs still struggled to develop their own procedures for accepting ECLB, particularly in less developed regions. To overcome such challenges, greater collaboration was required among all players: CAAs, DOs, IATA, ICAO, operators and the UPU. The first step was to raise awareness, which had already been done in some regions. The second was to increase collaboration to clarify the steps involved in obtaining ECLB certification and accepting dangerous goods in the postal chain. An additional step could be to work more closely with CAAs and DOs to develop common training and procedures. The initial phases of that work would be challenging but necessary to ensure strong foundations. He stressed the need to achieve progress in this area, particularly given the steady increase in the volume of undeclared dangerous goods in the post.

30 The ICAO member from the Australian CAA asked why the number of ECLB certifications was so low. She provided a perspective on the current situation in Australia, where a dangerous goods programme had

been rolled out and strong ties had been forged between the CAA and DO since ECLB certification was granted in November 2012. Because of this long-standing relationship, the volume of undeclared ECLB and dangerous goods and the frequency of other airmail-related incidents in the country were low. She wondered how other countries could be encouraged to establish similar relationships between their CAAs and DOs. A better understanding of the risks involved and greater collaboration between CAAs and DOs would help increase understanding and facilitate discussions, but data was required to support those discussions.

31 According to the ICAO member from Australia, data was an important factor in establishing a genuine understanding of risks and global events. Perhaps the next survey could include a request for specific data from CAAs (and DOs, if available) on incidents involving lithium batteries and airmail. The data could then be collated to develop a better understanding of DOs' situations in order to assist them in making informed decisions, with due regard for the risk and likelihood of incidents occurring.

32 The representative of the Swiss CAA thanked the UPU for conducting the survey and committee members for their valuable contributions. Noting the close cooperation between the Swiss CAA and DO, she said that difficult and complicated procedures could be acting as a barrier and stressed the need to understand which processes were being implemented and precisely where challenges were arising for DOs. Safety and security were of the utmost importance and DOs needed to have procedures in place to identify dangerous goods in mail. Where such procedures existed, they could be enhanced with a view to achieving certification. This should be feasible for all countries.

33 The ICAO member from Transport Canada suggested that the committee utilize the measures that were already in place and re-examine the training programme, which had been developed on the basis of a conference held in Washington D.C. She asked whether there were parallel provisions in the UPU Convention and the ICAO Convention regarding the requirement for training on dangerous goods. The secretariat confirmed that article 19 of the UPU Convention contained such a requirement (see www.upu.int/UPU/media/upu/files/UPU/aboutUpu/acts/manualsInThreeVolumes/actInThreeVolumesManualOfConventionMaj1En.pdf).

34 The representative of the United States of America highlighted the need to streamline the certification process and strike a reasonable balance between protection and production, and asked whether a centralized reporting database could be established within the UPU Postal Technology Centre (PTC) to ensure accurate reporting and correct analysis of dangerous goods in the postal supply chain.

35 The secretariat supported the proposal for a centralized reporting system for dangerous goods, which had been discussed at the second meeting of the Contact Committee. It was in the interests of both the UPU and ICAO to bring the discussion to a successful conclusion and to improve safety.

36 The UPU Co-Chair asked how the United Kingdom compiled its statistics on lithium batteries. In response, the representative of the UK said that it had an agreement with its CAA to permit certain dangerous goods in the domestic mail chain. Items that could not be sent internationally were removed at a screening centre and shipped to a central examination facility, where the actual contents of the parcel were determined. Items that did not comply with international mailing regulations or national regulations were then returned to the sender, while compliant items were returned to the mail stream.

37 The representative of the Transport Group (TG) secretariat highlighted the challenges posed by the established rules of CAAs. He wished to have an accurate contact list for all CAAs that could be shared with UPU members to help to establish a channel of communication between DOs and CAAs. ICAO said that its public website contained a list of all member states and points of contact for dangerous goods (see www.icao.int/safety/DangerousGoods/Pages/Dangerous-Goods-National-Authority.aspx). However, there was no publicly available list of points of contact for security matters. ICAO would examine the possibility of making that list available to the UPU and DO counterparts and would report back to the committee in due course.

38 The IB suggested that an expert team be established to examine the current requirements for postal operators to obtain ECLB certification, and to identify and analyze the difficulties encountered in achieving certification, with a view to providing a comprehensive report at a future committee meeting. The UPU Co-Chair agreed to establish the expert team and asked whether any committee members wished to volunteer. The CAA of Brazil, the CAA of Australia, the DO of the UK (Royal Mail Group), the DO of the United States (United States Postal Service), the ICAO secretariat and the UPU secretariat volunteered.

VII. Equipment containing lithium batteries

(POC C 1 PSG 2020.1–Doc 11)

39 Poste Italiane gave a presentation on its proposal to update UPU Convention Regulations articles 19-002, 19-003, and 19-007 to enable postal operators to transport items containing lithium batteries (UN 3091 and UN 3481) with equipment under packing instructions (PIs) 966 and 969, section II, and within equipment under PIs 967 and 970, as part of efforts to harmonize the abilities of express couriers and postal operators to meet emerging e-commerce needs and to ensure that customers received the same service from Posts as they currently did from express couriers.

40 With reference to ICAO Annex 18, Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air, the need was identified for each contracting state to take the necessary steps to ensure the safety of items being transported by air.

41 The Poste Italiane representative said that DOs currently needed to have CAA certification to send any type of lithium batteries, while couriers did not require CAA certification to send lithium batteries either with or within equipment, which gave express couriers a competitive edge (it should be noted that express couriers control their own supply chain and use cargo aircraft to transport goods). Poste Italiane had been ECLB certified since 25 February 2020. Information would be provided to the UPU in due course to enable the IB to update its list of ECLB-certified DOs.

42 Referring to the decision of 2011–2012, which permitted only ECLB packed within equipment in the postal supply chain, ICAO observed that batteries packed within equipment were better protected than those packed with equipment. The PI had been updated to account for the perceived flexibility in its interpretation to ensure a safer shipping environment for lithium batteries. Poste Italiane's proposal would need to be presented to the Dangerous Goods Panel (DGP) before any changes could be made to UPU regulations. ICAO offered to present a paper at the DGP virtual meeting to be held in September 2020. The proposal could be presented to the DGP by either the Italian CAA or the UPU. The committee could subsequently discuss the DGP's comments.

43 The UPU Co-Chair agreed with ICAO's proposal to refer the matter to the DGP.

44 The Co-Chair welcomed the clarification provided by ICAO and fully supported its proposal.

45 The IB also supported ICAO's proposal.

46 The ICAO member from Transport Canada said that Poste Italiane's presentation contained some errors. Noting that packages containing up to four cells or two batteries could be sent in the post without bearing any particular mark, and that batteries packed within equipment benefited from a level of protection that had been sought by the DGP in 2010, she invited Poste Italiane to verify the accuracy of the information on slide 5 before the presentation was submitted to the DGP.

47 The ICAO member from Brazil (ANAC) supported the proposal to refer the matter to the DGP and agreed with Canada's comments. He pointed out that lithium batteries posed a high risk to air operations and that dangerous goods had only been permitted in the post for social and medical reasons and where it was in the public interest. However, most lithium batteries fell under a different category, i.e. business.

48 The ICAO member from Australia (CAA) supported the comments made by ICAO, Canada and Brazil, and noted that the PI was susceptible to abuse. Based on prior experience, caution should be exercised in this arena.

49 The United Kingdom DO representative said that social customers' parcels often contained items that were non-mailable or were improperly packed and did not comply with the established rules.

50 The United States DO representative suggested that the issue could be resolved by providing intra-continental transport via surface or marine modalities. Article 19-001 provided for the use of ground/sea transport for the intra-continental supply chain. Using this type of modality to conduct a pilot project on safety and data capture to determine the current failure rate for batteries being transported could potentially pave the way for the air shipment of such items.

51 The UPU Co-Chair signalled his interest in the use of surface modalities to balance the safety concerns with business needs.

52 Poste Italiane insisted that the rules regarding the transport of lithium batteries did not need to be changed to be in alignment with the UPU regulations. DOs could follow the same procedures as were required for all PIs, which express couriers were permitted to implement.

53 ICAO said that while UN 3481 referred to lithium batteries packed both with and within equipment, the PI had been developed for safety reasons. In their capacity as operators, express couriers were required to undergo full dangerous goods training, whereas DOs were not. ICAO proposed that Poste Italiane confer with the Italian CAA and amend the paper as needed before the upcoming DGP.

VIII. Update on Annex 6 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Operation of Aircraft) and how it affects postal operators

(POC C 1 PSG ICAO–UPU CC 2020.1–Pres 10)

54 The representative of the ICAO co-secretariat provided an overview of the update to Annex 6 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Operation of Aircraft) and how it affects postal operators. A new chapter (chapter 15) had been added to Annex 6 (Cargo Compartment Safety). It encompassed two main elements: specific safety risk assessments to be conducted by operators, and key information to be communicated by manufacturers with regard to fire protection. The amendment was made by the cargo safety sub group (CSSG), composed of experts from the ICAO DGP, Flight Operations Panel and Air Worthiness Panel, who worked together to determine how best to mitigate the risks posed by the carriage of cargo by air. Following its approval by the ICAO Air Navigation Commission (ANC), the amendment was circulated to all 192 ICAO member states for consultation in accordance with the provisions governing the development of ICAO standards. Guidance Doc 10102 (Guidance for Safe Operations involving Aeroplane Cargo Compartments) was developed concurrently to ensure proper implementation of the annex amendment. ICAO will make the document available once it has been published.

55 Whilst the original mandate for the CSSG referred specifically to “cargo” operations, it became apparent as the work progressed that the provisions should seek to address *all* items that may be transported in an aircraft cargo compartment. Although the transport of lithium batteries as cargo had been identified as a major safety concern, it was important to ensure that the safety risk assessment conducted by the operator considered the risks associated with *any* item transported in the cargo compartment, irrespective of whether it was contained in cargo, baggage or mail.

56 The Airworthiness Panel also developed an amendment to Annex 8 (Airworthiness of Aircraft) to complement chapter 15 in Annex 6. It requires aircraft documentation to include a summary of the standards that were considered in the certification of the aircraft as per its design, with particular reference to cargo compartment fire protection. The ICAO secretariat provided information on the ANC’s Safe Carriage of Goods Specific Working Group (SCGSWG), recently established to enhance flight safety by identifying known risks related to the carriage of goods and developing mitigation strategies.

57 The IB asked for clarity on ICAO’s use of the term “Operator” in Doc 10102, chapter 5. ICAO confirmed that “Operator” referred solely to the air operator.

58 The alignment of ICAO and UPU documentation was paramount, particularly when taking into account the actions being addressed in regards to airmail. The IB requested that the UPU take part in the meetings of the SCGSWG to ensure the alignment was successful. ICAO said that the work of the SCGSWG and its membership was directed by the ANC and that the SCGSWG would liaise with the DGP, whose meetings the UPU attended.

IX. Rejected mail items and e-commerce dangerous goods initiatives

(POC C 1 PSG ICAO–UPU CC 2020.1–Pres 11)

59 The representative of the United States gave a presentation on rejected mail and e-commerce items in the post and the possible solution that it was developing through an initiative spearheaded by USPS. He stressed the need for collaboration to ensure the safe transportation of dangerous goods, and the importance

of working closely with international air carriers while navigating IATA, UPU, ICAO directives and national legislation, which combined to create a complex environment. According to the United States, USPS began tracking air carrier rejects in 2015. While dedicated staff at international service centres throughout the US were responsible for entering such incidents, they had not done so consistently. Nevertheless, an increasing number of incidents had been reported from 2015 to 2019. The majority of incidents reported pertained to packages bearing a mark and containing lithium batteries that were presumed to be non-mailable, resulting in rejection by air carriers. Other commonly rejected items included aerosols, which were generally easy to identify and remove from the supply chain based on their packaging. Flammable combustible liquids such as perfume and nail polish were also increasingly being detected.

60 According to the US representative, as air carriers carried out x-ray screening, more shielded items were being detected, rejected and returned to USPS, even though the majority of those items were generally mailable. He referred to the comments of the UK representative the previous day regarding the challenges associated with continual automated screening. Creative solutions were needed to mitigate these types of rejection. Non-hazardous liquids also continued to be an issue. Although they were mailable internationally, some air carriers had made a business decision to not carry liquids, thus exacerbating the difficulties faced by DOs.

61 Many internationally shipped items were from online marketplaces and were improperly transported in the post by sellers. USPS had begun entering items onto the e-commerce HAZMAT Reporting System (eHRS), including the details of individuals listing non-mailable items to be shipped through the mail stream. Since the inception of the eHRS, around 3,000 entries had been referred back to online marketplaces so that the offending listings could be vetted and removed. Fireworks were a major concern for the United States with Independence Day approaching. In an effort to evade marketplace controls, many sellers used misleading terminology in their listings, e.g. describing fireworks as “firework labels”. Many sellers, when contacted, said that they believed they were complying with regulations because they had seen similar listings and items for sale.

62 Flammable liquids that could come into contact with other improperly packed and mailed items were a cause for concern. In the United States, such items caused approximately one fire per month in the postal supply chain. Corrosives, particularly mercury, continued to be an issue for USPS. Such items were also being sold on lesser known marketplaces.

63 The representative of the United States cited examples of the damage caused by dangerous goods that had been improperly entered or shipped via USPS. People continually found ways to evade supply chain controls that were designed to ensure safety. The risk had grown over the years and customers continued to be ignorant of the dangers that these items posed. A video of a lithium battery improperly admitted for international transport was played to demonstrate the risks that dangerous goods posed to the supply chain. The United States reminded the committee that safety was a joint responsibility.

64 The ICAO representative thanked the United States for the presentation, highlighted the importance of utilizing this information in a training context, and asked whether the information on dangerous goods incidents was being fed back to the UPU for centralized analysis.

65 The secretariat said that the establishment of a centralized database for reporting security/safety incidents had been discussed, but that DOs did not currently provide such information. The UK CAA and Royal Mail Group had provided such information over the past few months and the IB had examined it with the PTC to explore how to create a centralized database for analysis and identification purposes. The UPU secretariat encouraged all DOs, particularly USPS, to provide it with information on these incidents to help to create the database, which would supplement the committee’s efforts to increase safety. The UPU Co-Chair voiced his support for the creation of a centralized database.

66 The Co-Chair complimented the United States on an interesting and informative presentation. The increased volume of lithium batteries in the mail stream was important to note. He stressed the importance of cooperation among all parties in this regard.

X. IATA–UPU CC transport activities to implement flows 7 and 8 of the UPU EAD global postal model
(POC C 1 PSG ICAO–UPU CC 2020.1–Pres 12)

67 The representative of the TG secretariat provided an update on the activities of the IATA–UPU Contact Committee relative to flows 7 and 8 of the UPU EAD global postal model (GPM), noting that this information had been presented the previous week in both the TG and PSG meetings. A brief reference was made to emerging regulatory challenges at the national and regional levels, and to the implementation of the GPM in conjunction with internal and external stakeholders as a means of overcoming those challenges. Attention then turned to the EAD Steering Committee within the UPU, in particular the progress made towards deliverables under the goals relative to the GPM. A list of four alternatives for the conversion of CARDIT messages to electronic cargo messages was successfully drafted and IT tools were prepared. As a result of the global pandemic, the pilot projects for implementing the conversion methodology could not be completed. Thus, there was still a need for physical pilots. The committee members discussed the risk assessment status at length and IATA accepted that not all countries will provide assessment complete messages. The committee agreed that DOs will provide an applicable regulations flag with a single code within CARDIT messages by March 2023, in line with regulatory requirements. The specific definition of required regulations needed to be finalized within the group before a document could be sent to the Standards Board. Additionally, the UPU EAD compliance check functionality developed by the PTC was provided to aid members' understanding of the ability of the DO dispatch system to ensure that only items with appropriate data were dispatched.

68 The ICAO representative expressed that organization's willingness to work with IATA and all other stakeholders to assist in the development of guidance on business protocols to describe a process whereby the origin Post receives a "do not load" (DNL) message after handing over a consignment to the carrier. PLACI was a national requirement and not an Annex 17 security standard. There were currently no plans to further develop it into an ICAO standard.

69 The representative of the secretariat said that the UPU interpreted PLACI in much the same way as ICAO, i.e. as an additional security requirement to be utilized on a case-by-case basis. The IB held the view that PLACI had been launched to address the "bomb in the box" scenario and was not a standalone aviation security procedure.

XI. IATA–UPU Mail Safety Guidelines
(POC C 1 PSG ICAO–UPU CC 2020.1–Doc 13)

70 Since, under the virtual approval process, the members had not commented on or amended the IATA–UPU Mail Safety Guidelines in the allotted time frame, the committee took note of the guidelines as they stood.

71 The secretariat provided an historical overview of the guidelines, including the creation of the IATA–UPU Expert Team, during the PSG 2019.1 meeting, which had initiated the bulk of the work on the guidelines. The expert team had identified a number of discrepancies, such as the lack of centralized mail safety documentation protocols within IATA; reviewed the dangerous goods training material on the UPU Trainpost portal to ensure its adequacy; and highlighted a lack of communication between IATA and CAAs, and DOs and CAAs, as well as the need for a solution to increase communication across the board.

72 The expert team member from the United States provided information on the current guidelines and thanked the UPU and IATA for their support in creating the document. The document was not intended to update or amend any regulations; rather, it provided robust safety guidelines to ensure that current regulations were correctly and accurately followed and enforced. The document covered four key concepts: training, safe and secure supply chains, national aviation authority implications, and safe operations airside and landside. These concepts were broadly reviewed by the United States. Some members commented that a focus had been laid on security rather than safety. Suggestions were made on how to amend the document so that it adequately addressed safety.

73 ICAO provided an update on the status of its dangerous goods training. The next edition of the TI (operational from 1 January 2021) contained a significant revision with respect to dangerous goods training, which incorporated a competency-based approach. The revision followed the identification, in safety reviews, of a lack of safety personnel at specific locations. The table referring to DOs remains in the updated TI; however, ICAO will examine the removal of the table based on its member states' feedback on the update.

74 ICAO asked whether the UPU could specify which DOs had chosen not to seek ECLB certification and how that information could be communicated to the CAAs.

75 The secretariat said that only a list of ECLB-certified DOs was available and could be accessed via the UPU's public website (see www.upu.int/en/Universal-Postal-Union/Outreach-Campaigns/Dangerous-Goods). There was a need for better communication and understanding of the certification process among DOs and their corresponding CAAs, which the committee was in a unique position to facilitate. The IB said that there had been increased communication between DOs and CAAs as a result of the cooperation established at the last committee meeting. The Brazilian CAA representative was commended for promoting cooperation, along with other CAA members, during UPU training sessions in 2019, and helping to rectify issues around communication and understanding.

76 The United Kingdom asked how the automated screening process referred to in the guidance would accurately separate dangerous goods from those which appeared to be dangerous but were in fact innocuous.

77 The United States said that this would be a constant challenge and that more work and training were needed to effectively mitigate such threats. The ultimate goal was to implement wide-scale screening with a view to removing dangerous goods from the post.

XII. Joint WCO–UPU expert team to resolve operational ambiguities of the UPU EAD global postal model

(POC C 1 PSG ICAO–UPU CC 2020.1–Pres 14)

78 The CG secretariat provided a synopsis of the work done by the joint WCO–UPU expert team to resolve operational ambiguities of the UPU EAD global postal model. The group was formed in 2017 and has successfully accomplished the majority of the work required to achieve its objectives. The focus of the group is on GPM flows 3 and 4. The problem that the expert team is attempting to resolve is how to convey both the result of an advanced risk assessment to the origin DO and the response from the origin DO. Steps were taken with the cooperation of the UPU Standards Board to create additional technical standards to properly communicate GPM flows 3 and 4. CUSRSP refers to flow 3 and the initial assessment and response communication provided by destination customs, while ITMREF refers to flow 4, where the destination Post passes on to the origin Post the referral notification received from the destination Customs operator. REFRESP refers to flow 4+, where the origin Post passes on to the destination Post the additional action/procedure conducted based on flow 4. CUSITM refers to flow 4++, where the destination Post passes on to the destination Customs the action/procedure plan. The definition of timelines for these messages is critical in order to ensure the unimpeded flow of mail. Data interchange aspects also need to be taken into account with regard to electronic data interchange messaging. The Post-to-Post channel has been clearly defined within the UPU. In the future, Customs and Posts need to organize themselves to ensure a 24/7 service commitment and define a compatible IT architecture to accommodate the large volumes of items being screened. If IT systems fail, manual processes must be resumed. Electronic messaging responses should be escalated through the referral process, and referrals should only be received on an exceptional basis.

XIII. Impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the level of risk to aviation security with a special focus on air cargo and mail

(POC C 1 PSG ICAO–UPU CC 2020.1–Pres 15)

79 The ICAO focal point provided an update on the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the level of risk to aviation security with a special focus on air cargo and mail. The Working Group on Threat and Risk (WGTR) of the ICAO Security Panel meets periodically to assess risks to civil aviation from a security perspective, with the last update being released in February 2020. Since the most recent assessment did not reflect the COVID-19 impact, the Aviation Security Panel requested an update. It should be noted that the risk level is significantly different for passengers and cargo. According to the WGTR, the impact of the pandemic on aviation security is uncertain: the current low number of regular operations and the widespread nature of the disruption may have temporarily limited terrorist capability, but it is also likely to have increased vulnerabilities. On the other hand, air cargo continues to operate at high capacity: the increased number of cargo operations together with the fact that the world is more dependent than ever on cargo systems across all modes, to continue the movement of essential and emergency supplies during the pandemic, could make air cargo more of a target for terrorists. If a terrorist attack were successful, the impact could be greater now than it might be

under normal circumstances. Therefore, efforts and resources should be directed to closely monitoring threat levels (especially those related to air cargo and insider threats), while vulnerabilities arising from current disruptions should be reduced as far as practicable, in both time and scope.

80 The UPU Co-Chair thanked ICAO for the presentation and acknowledged the difficulties facing the air industry, with the pandemic compounding the pre-existing crisis.

XIV. Any other business

81 There was some degree of uncertainty around the scheduling of the next physical meeting, given the pandemic. The location will be Berne, as previously agreed, but the members were unable to set a date. The secretariat suggested that the UPU and ICAO secretariats and both Co-Chairs re-evaluate the global situation at the end of the year to determine appropriate dates for the next committee meeting. A tentative decision was made to hold the meeting in May 2021.

82 The Co-Chair praised the extensive collaboration and communication during the meeting and thanked all participants.

83 There was no additional business. The UPU Co-Chair closed the meeting.

Berne, 14 July 2020

Co-Chairs: – United States of America
Represented by Mr Daniel Brubaker
– South Africa
Represented by Mr Nico Smit



Virtual Meeting WebEx Etiquette:

In the interest of expediency, the Co-Chair requests you abide by the following virtual protocols. As the meeting may have many participants please mute your microphone and do not use video unless you are provided the floor by the Chair.

If you would like to provide an intervention, please virtually raise your hand and use the chat box to provide the name of the country you represent along with your written comment. The Secretariat will then inform the Chair that “Country A” has provided an intervention and the Secretariat will recite the comment aloud. This intervention will then be addressed, as the Chair deems appropriate, and the floor will be granted by the Chair to the original country providing the intervention for any follow up as necessary. The Chair will then ask the members if there are any additional comments. Additional comments will be acknowledged as described above, after the virtual raising of your hand and provision of a written comment in the chat box.

This meeting will be recorded and a link to the recording will be provided in the final minutes.

Title:	ICAO UPU CC
Location:	WebEx
Date:	22-23 June 2020

Monday, 22 June 2020

Start	End	Time	Item	Contact
2:00 PM	2:25 PM	0:25	Opening of the meeting/adoption of the agenda/agreed endorsements (Agenda Item 1 & 2)	D. Brubaker (co-Chair)/N. Smit (co-Chair)
2:25 PM	2:45 PM	0:20	Comparison of ICAO Doc 8973 and best practices with UPU S58/59 (Agenda Item 3) (Agenda Item 4 - comments addressed)	A. Oquillas Munoz/ D. Wilkes
2:45 PM	3:15 PM	0:30	Online prohibitions query tool (Agenda Item 7)	J. Garcia (IB)
3:15 PM	3:45 PM	0:30	Update on Annex 6 (Agenda Item 10)	ICAO Focal Point
3:45 PM	4:00 PM	0:15	Break	
4:00 PM	4:20 PM	0:20	IATA-UPU CC Transport activities (Agenda Item 12)	J. Bojnansky (IB)
4:20 PM	4:40 PM	0:20	IATA-UPU Mail Safety Guidelines (Agenda Item 13)	V. Desiderio/USA
4:40 PM	5:00 PM	0:20	Discussion/Wrap UP	D. Brubaker/N. Smit (co-
5:00 PM				
		3:00		

Tuesday, 23 June 2020

Start	End	Time	Item	Contact
2:00 PM	2:10 PM	0:10	Opening of meeting	D. Brubaker (co-Chair)/N. Smit (co-Chair)
2:10 PM	2:25 PM	0:15	Results of survey on DO's accepting equipment containing lithium batteries (Agenda Item 8)	D. Wilkes (IB)
2:25 PM	3:25 PM	1:00	Equipment Containing Lithium Batteries (Agenda Item 9)	Post Italiane
3:25 PM	3:40 PM	0:15	Coffee Break	
3:40 PM	4:10 PM	0:30	Rejected mail items and eCommerce DG Initiatives (Agenda Item 11)	V. Desiderio/USA
4:10 PM	4:30 PM	0:20	Joint WCO-UPU expert team to resolve operational ambiguities of the UPU EAD global postal model (Agenda Item 14)	J. Garcia (IB)
4:30 PM	4:50 PM	0:20	Impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the level of risk to aviation security with a special focus on air cargo and mail (Agenda Item 15)	A. Oquillas Munoz
4:50 PM	5:00 PM	0:10	AOB: TOR, Next meeting date TBD and location (IB, Bern) (Agenda Item 16)	D. Brubaker/N. Smit (co-Chairs)
5:00 PM				
		3:00		



Virtual ICAO UPU CC Approvals

Following the decision to hold a virtual meeting in place of the originally scheduled ICAO UPU CC due to the current Covid19 pandemic, an on-line review and approval process of Documents requiring the committee members to take notes or provide comments will be used for the documents uploaded to the ICAO-UPU CC 2020.1 folder in the UPU Documents portal via the following link:

<https://documents.upu.int/Pages/Default.aspx?RootBodyID=3&BodyID=3&Year=2020>

If you do not currently have access to the documents portal, you may register via the following link:

<https://support.ptc.post/gui2/do/system/measureFont;page=B01AA74C8D9C23C24AD9D3F2FAFDC02D0000>

All comments should be provided via email to the secretariat at security@upu.int for consolidation. The deadline for comments will be 12 June 2020.

A Comments Resolution Table will be created after the deadline and distributed before 22 June 2020.

Agenda Item	Item Name	Document	Comments Received	Designated Operator	Representative	Date	Comment
1	Agenda	POC C1 PSG ICAO UPU CC 2020.1-Rev2	No				
2	Report of 2nd meeting and Webex	POC C1 PSG ICAO UPU CC 2020.1 - Doc 2a; POC C1 PSG ICAO UPU CC 2020.1 - Doc 2b	No				
3	Comparison of ICAO Doc 8973 and S58/S59	POC C1 PSG ICAO UPU CC 2020.1 - Pres 3	N/A				
4	Updated S58/S59						
5	Certification process	POC C1 PSG CC 2020.1-Doc 16a					
6	Removed		N/A				
7	Removed		N/A				
7	Online Prohibitions query tool	POC C1 PSG ICAO UPU CC 2020.1- Pres 7	N/A				
8	Results of DG Survey	POC C1 PSG ICAO UPU CC 2020.1- Pres 8	N/A				
							<p>Royal Mail are concerned with this proposal as it does not clearly set out what is required. Is the proposal a paper for endorsement by the UPU to then lobby ICAO to affect a change to the carriage of lithium batteries with equipment in the mail, this tabled proposal therefore being the first step in this process. This is slightly more complicated than the proposal outlines. The ICAO Technical Instructions permit lithium ion and lithium metal batteries in equipment subject to review and approval of the DPO's respective CAA. Extracts below: 2.3.2</p> <p>d) lithium ion batteries contained in equipment (UN 3481) meeting the provisions of Section II of Packing Instruction 967. No more than four cells or two batteries may be mailed in any single package; and</p> <p>e) lithium metal batteries contained in equipment (UN 3091) meeting the provisions of Section II of Packing Instruction 970. No more than four cells or two batteries may be mailed in any single package.</p> <p>2.3.3</p> <p>The procedures of designated postal operators for controlling the introduction of dangerous goods in mail into air transport are subject to review and approval by the civil aviation authority of the State where the mail is accepted.</p> <p>2.3.4</p> <p>Before a designated postal operator can introduce the acceptance of lithium batteries as identified in 2.3.2 d) and e) they must have received specific approval from the civil aviation authority.</p>
9	Equipment with LiBat	POC C1 PSG 2020.1 - Doc 11	Yes	Royal Mail Group-UK	Martin O'Brien	03.juin.20	
			Yes	Japan Post	Sakae Kambayasi	05.juin.20	<p>The document does not suggest a way forward. I believe it necessary to consult with the ICAO and the IATA in advance concerning the proposal to expand the scope of admissible dangerous goods. We should note, in particular, that the ICAO Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air would have to be amended to implement the proposal.</p>
			Yes	Deutsche Post	Michael Hurdaleck	05.juin.20	<p>Are the proposed amendments of UPU Convention Regulations in line with existing ICAO/IATA Regulations ?</p>
							<p>Thank you for your comments regarding agenda item 11. This proposal is the first step in the process which would be followed by discussion at the virtual ICAO-UPU Contact Committee Meeting on 22-23 June to determine how to move forward with ICAO.</p> <p>Thank you Sakae for your comments, you are correct. Originally, we were to discuss this item in the ICAO UPU CC in March 2020. Due to the postponement of the contact committee, I have included it in the PSG and also the contact committee on 22-23 June. Agenda Item 11 will also be discussed during the ICAO-UPU Contact Committee from 22-23 June as agreement/alignment would be needed with ICAO Regulations before moving this proposal forward.</p>

		Yes	Sing Post	David Chng	As para 2.4.2 of DGR currently only allows Post to transport lithium batteries installed in equipment meeting the provisions of Section II of Packing Instruction 967 and 970, is it possible for POC to unilaterally decide to amend our UPU Convention regulation to include PI 966 and 969 that will also allow Post to transport lithium batteries packed with equipment While I am supportive of this proposal, I am curious whether this proposal can even be discussed without first engaging IATA/ICAO to amend para 2.4.2 of DGR.	Agenda Item 11 was originally scheduled to be discussed at the ICAO-UPU Contact Committee meeting in March, however the meeting was postponed due to the pandemic. So, we are presenting first at the PSG and will then bring it forward to the ICAO-UPU CC June 22-23
10 Update to Annex 6	POC C1 PSG ICAO UPU CC 2020.1- Pres 10	N/A				
11 Rejected Mail Items	POC C1 PSG ICAO UPU CC 2020.1- Pres 11	N/A				
12 IATA-UPU CC activities	POC C1 PSG ICAO UPU CC 2020.1- Pres 12	N/A				
IATA UPU Mail Safety	POC C1 PSG ICAO UPU CC 2020.1 - Doc 13					
13 Guidelines	POC C1 PSG ICAO UPU CC 2020.1- Pres 14	N/A				
14 Joint WCO UPU ET	POC C1 PSG ICAO UPU CC 2020.1 - Pres 15	N/A				
15 Impacts of C-19 on Aviation						
16 Any other Business						

12	Removed		N/A
13	Removed		N/A
14a	Removed		N/A
14b	I buy real campagin	POC C1 PSG 2020.1-Doc 14b	
15	QSF	POC C1 PSG 2020.1-Pres 15	N/A
	Update on S58/S59		
16a	Certification Process	POC C1 PSG 2020.1-Doc 16a	
16b	Latin America	POC C1 PSG 2020.1-Pres 16b	N/A
16c	CPU	POC C1 PSG 2020.1-Pres 16c	N/A
16d	APP	POC C1 PSG 2020.1-Pres 16d	N/A
16e	Update to S58/S59	POC C1 SB 2020.2 Doc 4b	