



**INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION  
WESTERN AND CENTRAL AFRICAN OFFICE**

**Second Meeting of the APIRG Communication Navigation and Surveillance Sub Group  
(CNS/SG/2) DAKAR, 22-25 May 2007**

**Agenda Item: Review of procedures to investigate and follow up on non receipt  
of Flight Plans**

(Presented by ATNS – South Africa)

**SUMMARY**

This paper presents the results of a survey of non receipt of flight plans, conducted in one FIR and is intended to highlight an issue which may be affecting the Collision Risk Assessment.

Action by the Sub Group.

**References: AFI RVSM Functional Hazard Assessment(FHA),**

**1. Introduction**

1.1 Hazard AH core 12 reflects that consideration was given to the lack of ATC co ordination and that elimination of the risk was not possible due to human error. How ever the risk could be controlled and reduced by means of various mitigations and actions as recorded.

1.2 Hazard AH core 16 reflects that the non receipt of flight plans by the accepting ACC was considered and that elimination of the risk was not possible due to human error. How ever the risk could be controlled and reduced by means of various mitigations and actions as recorded.

1.3 The question that needs to be asked is at what stage does the amount of flight plans not received, give cause for concern?

**2. Discussions**

2.1 The results of an adhoc survey conducted at the Johannesburg ACC regarding the non receipt of ATC Flight Plans concerning Regional or International flights, revealed the following:

- Over the period January 2006 to mid June 2006, there were a total of 899 flight plans not received by the ACC.
- Of this number, 99.7% or 897 incidents of non receipt of the Flight Plan was queried. There were two instances where the non receipt was not queried.
- In 95% of the queries, or in 857 of the cases, no response was received to the query directed to the station where the flight originated from. 42 responses or 5% of the missing flight plans were received following a query.



- In 99.8% of the cases where the flight plan was not received, ATS/DS resolved the situation. There was one instance where ATS/DS was not utilized on communicating details of the flight concerned.

2.2 Taking into account the amount of flight plans not received for traffic entering the Johannesburg FIR, this same flight had to pass through at least one other FIR before arriving at the Johannesburg FIR boundary. Thus one other FIR or sector was affected by the non receipt of the flight plan. If this non receipt of information is multiplied by the amount of FIRs through which the flight passed, the problem is compounded and the possibility of at best a reduction in separation, or at worst a accident occurring due to the error of ATC coordination not taking place, is increasing. Any one of these occurrences, will as has been experienced, contribute to the RVSM TLS not being met.

2.3 The cause of the non receipt of the flight plan needs to be reviewed and the necessary mitigation must be put in place in order to reduce as far as possible the phenomenon, thereby contributing to the situational awareness of the ATC as well as contributing to a safer environment, not only with the current vertical separation in place, but also in the RVSM environment.

### **3. Action Required**

3.1 The Task Force is invited to:

- a) Note the amount of missing flight plans recorded by one ACC.
- b) ‘ Consider the repercussion of a error occurring in the failure to communicate, information regarding a flight for which no flight plan has been received, including the contribution to reductions in separation and thereby to the RVSM TLS not being met.
- c) Discuss the need to conduct a survey within the AFI region in order to understand the extent of the problem and to identify the causes for such instances; and
- d) Decide on the methodology to be utilized in order to conduct such a survey.