



Cybersecurity of UAS: Medium Risk Operations in Brazil

Second Unmanned Aircraft Systems – Remote Piloted Aircraft Systems
Implementation/Regulation Workshop (UAS/RPAS/W) for the NAM/CAR/SAM
Regions


28 September 2021

- Brazilian UAS Regulation
- Cybersecurity and Safety Concerns
- Open Problems
- Conclusions

Brazilian UAS Regulation

- In 2017 ANAC published the RBAC-E nº 94
- This regulation has established operational rules, airworthiness requirements, pilot licensing, UAS registration criteria, etc.
- 86,000 drones are registered at the ANAC database, of which 36,000 were reported as commercial (professional uses)


Brazilian UAS Regulation



UAS Airworthiness in Brazil

- ANAC has divided UAS into 3 groups: Class 1, Class 2, and Class 3
- Class 1 \geq 150 kg;
- Class 2 above 25 kg and below 150 kg
- Class 3 above 250 g and below 25 kg
- There are also distinctions between VLOS and BVLOS, and above or not 400 ft AGL

UAS Airworthiness in Brazil



- ➔ There is no UAS Class 1 certified until now
- ➔ There are nine (9) models approved through the Design Authorization Process



Arator 5B / 5C

Manufacturer: XMobots
(Brazil)

Operations: E/VLOS (2
km) up to 2.000 ft AGL
or BVLOS (5 km) below
400 ft AGL

A5B: Authorized
08JUN2018

A5C: Authorized
07APR2021



eBee Classic/Plus/X

Holder: Santiago&Cintra
(BR)

Manufacturer: Senselfy
(Switzerland)

Authorized operations:
BVLOS (5 km) below 400
ft AGL

EBEEC/EBEEP: 15APR2019
EBEEX: 19JUL2021



Echar 20D

Manufacturer: XMobots
(Brazil)

Authorized operations :
BVLOS (30 km) up to
6,000 ft AMSL

Authorized 10MAR2021



RPAS-112

Manufacturer: Energias
(Brazil)


Authorized operations:
BVLOS (7,2 km) below 400
feet AGL

Authorized 10JUN2021



Cybersecurity and Safety Concerns

- For Class 1, certified UAS, we expect to use standards as RTCA DO-326A, DO-355 or DO-356
- For UAS Class 2, and Class 3 (BVLOS or above 400 ft), Medium Risk, the cybersecurity is addressed through safety assessment analysis which should cover intentional and non-intentional interferences and their effects
- For UAS Class 3 (VLOS and below 400 ft), Low Risk, there are no airworthiness evaluation. The Cybersecurity is not considered today for those aircraft



Cybersecurity and Safety Concerns

- Cybersecurity is a concept not fully understood by the applicants
- Extensive use of COTS (Commercial Of-The-Shelf) components
- UASs are migrating from point-to-point connections to over the Internet
- Lack of guidance or guidelines focused on UAS cyber

Cybersecurity and Safety Concerns

- JARUS (Joint Authorities for Rulemaking on Unmanned Systems)
<https://jarus-rpas.org/>
- SORA (Specific Operations Risk Assessment)
- SORA objectives:
 - * Avoid fatal injuries to third parties on the ground
 - * Avoid fatal injuries to third parties in the air
 - * Avoid damage to critical infrastructure

Cybersecurity and Safety Concerns

- ➔ Cybersecurity analysis needs to achieve the SORA objectives?

- ➔ SORA objectives:
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




C-I-A triad

Common Cyber-Threats

- GPS spoofing
- DDoS
- Communication Spoofing
- GPS Jamming
- Malware Infection
- Communication Jamming



- System Architecture Overview
- ConOps Description
- Identify the Assets
- Identify and Rate the Threats
- Risk Acceptance or Application of Mitigations
- Life Cycle procedures

Open Problems

- The airworthiness requirements and operational rules are not harmonized yet
- There are no guideline or guidance to perform UAS cybersecurity risk assessment
- We have different ConOps, operational scenarios, manufactures etc. A unique solution to address all cyber cybersecurity concerns seems far from current stage
- Artificial Intelligence (AI) will probably increase the cyber-attacks

Open Problems

- Should we consider cybersecurity of UAS Open Category?
- Which standards from industry can we use in UAS?
- Does the operator need some training?
- UAS ATM will move from voice to data coordination. What is the impact of such change? What are the cyber concerns related with?
- What will be the impact of UTM, 5G or full automation?

- ANSI, in its Standardization Roadmap for Unmanned Aircraft Systems, states that “Cybersecurity is a critical safety concern that must be addressed in the design, construction, and operation of UAS.”
- ENISA, its document Artificial Intelligence Cybersecurity Challenges - Threat Landscape for Artificial Intelligence, calls attention to problems as lack of robustness and vulnerabilities of AI models and algorithms, attacks against Cyber-Physical Systems (as drones and self-drive cars), data manipulation, Distributed DoS attacks, adversarial model interference and manipulation, etc.

- JARUS WG6 is developing a document do address cyber concerns related to SORA methodology
- The SORA Annex E (Cyber) was available to external consultation in June/21. Currently, the team is on adjudication process of the comments, and It is expected that in the next JARUS plenary the document will be released.

- Cybersecurity is a hot and challenging topic for UAS
- CAAs and Standard Organizations have identified the problem but, up to now, we do have a solution that fits to our needs
- ANAC has not certified UAS under certified category yet. Therefore, today we are not sure if standards like RTCA DO-326A, DO-355 or DO-356 will be enough to address all the concerns of such operation

- From the Design Authorization Process, medium risk, we realize that for complex ConOps, is missing a guideline/framework to perform the security risk assessment
- Cyber-threats are not so unlikely, specially in urban environments
- JARUS SORA, and specially Cyber Annex E, are useful to tailor the assessment and requirements
- We need to develop some studies to pavement the way for more challenging uses of UAS



ANAC

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