



North American, Central American and Caribbean Directors of Civil Aviation

### **ARMS – Anti RPAS Multisensor System**

### INDRA



#### Agenda Item 6.3 - P/08

NACC/DCA

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# ARMS

## Anti RPAS Multisensor System



### Indra



June 2019

### Some concepts about drones, UAV, UAS, RPAS

Multiple terms, different categories and performance with multiple applications

Different UAS groups classified by maximum weight, operating altitude, speed, etc (micro, mini, low and high end tactical, strategic)

	<b>UAV</b> Unmanned Aerial Vehicle	<b>UAS</b> Unmanned Aerial System	<b>RPAS</b> Remote Piloted Aircraft System
Weight	< 20 Kg	200 Kg	> 14 Tn
Altitude	40-150 m	< 3.600 m	< 18 kms
Speed	50-70 km/h	180 km/h	> 500 km/h
Autonomy	< 40 min	4-6h	> 20 h

### Multiple applications




Ref – "Plan Estratégico para el desarrollo del sector civil de los drones en España 2018-2021", Ministerio de Fomento, España



### ... but not always so great

UAS/RPAS have become a **real and significant threat** for **infrastructures and people** due to their **malicious or errant use** 



By Danielle Furfaro, Larry Celona and Natalie Musumeci

September 22, 2017 | 2:48pm | Updated

### We are facing a new kind of threat, and growing



Bloomberg



#### Drone market is evolving fast

Technology improves and threat is increasing, **automation** and higher **sophistication** are the main challenge:

GPS-denied navigation Swarm coordination Extended range and duration Heavier payloads

### Multiple illegal and malicious uses

Espionage and Intelligence

Transport of explosive and biological payloads

Air Traffic Interruption

Security Systems must be adapted according to the **threat evolution** 

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Note: Data is through September 2017

ource: Federal Aviation Administration

### Civil aviation is NOT immune to this threat



"The drone scare at Gatwick airport that closed the runway for 33 hours shortly before Christmas cost over £50m."


"Around 1,000 flights were cancelled during the busiest week of the winter for outbound departures from Gatwick"

https://www.independent.co.uk/travel/news-and-advice/gatwick-drone-airport-cost-easyjetrunway-security-passenger-cancellation-a8739841.html

Faced with this type of threat, **different** weaknessess and deficiencies in procedures, operations and systems were and are evident

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### And what is the role of an antidron systems (C-UAS)?





Operation Modes

Different operation modes implies different challenges to be faced



#### Waypoints


GNSS waypoints navigations (i.e.: GPS)




### **C-UAS ARMS** Operational Concept

ARMS is based on three key features: **Simple, Adaptable and Flexible** 


Ready to face present and future threats






### C-UAS ARMS Operational Concept

Each scenario **requires specific considerations** (civil vs military, fixed / mobile / portable)






### C4ARMS – Command and Control

Simple and intuitive interface				
<b>GIS</b> based Interface	<b>Ruled</b> based alarm and reactions	Manual, timed or automatic countermeasures		
Multisensor data <b>fusion</b>	Automatic and / or manual control of optronics	PlayBack tool		
<b>Drawing tool</b> to define areas	Automatic trace tracking	Events <b>log and</b> reports		

Powerful Command and Control system providing an **unified interface** for assets protection



### C4ARMS – Command and Control



Powerful Command and Control system providing an unified interface for assets protection, supporting the complete C-UAS process from threat detection ...



### C4ARMS – Command and Control




... until the activation of the available and suitable countermeasures

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
### Detection

#### ACTIVE Radar based



### PASSIVE

Radiofrequency analyzers, detection and location of RF datalinks. Specialized detector for DJI UAS





• Multilateration and Goniometry using technologies based on RF fingerprinting analysis. Geolocation of both UAS and operator

• **UAS Detector** specialized in DJI drones, providing information such as model, position, speed, heading, height, pilot location, ...


### Active Detection: MidRange y LongRange Radars

#### Ku band radar

- FMCW low power
- 360°, 60 rpm
- International recognition
- 1<sup>ª</sup> position Mitre Challenge



Detection ranges Micro UAS (RCS=0.01sqm) **3Km** 



Detection ranges Micro UAS (RCS=0.01sqm) +5Km


#### X band radar


- FMCW low power
- 360°, 30 rpm
- Extended range



### **Passive Detection**

#### **RF Detection**





- Passive detection based on radiofrequency analysis
- Simultaneous detection of **Uplink and Downlink** communications
- Goniometry and Multilateration
- UAV and operator **geolocation**
- Identification of (10Km), G16 (20Km)
   (Data Base)
   (Data Base)
   (10Km), G16 (20Km)
   (10Km), G16 (

- Full **integrated** in C4ARMS
- 100% detection of DJI UAS:
   75% of marketshare
- Maximum detection ranges (aprox.): Suitcase (5Km), G8 (10Km), G16 (20Km)
- UAS Information: identifier, model, UAV and controller position, heading, height, etc

#### DJI Aeroscope

- DJI UAS Detection
- Full integration with ARMS



### **Recognition and Tracking**

#### Electro Optical Surveillance System (EOSS)


- Based on high-quality and precision **Infrared (IR)** and **Daylight** cameras, IR based **videoanalytics**
- Analysis and confirmation (or doble confirmation) of detections provided by active and passive sensors
- Selectable configuration, several camera models, such as:
  - Indra CYCLOPS, advanced 3<sup>rd</sup> generation MWIR cooled
  - FLIR HRC family MWIR cooled
  - Other different uncooled models
- Positioner with 360° Azimuth range and wide elevation range





#### **Optronics system**

- Infrared and daylight
- 360° PTZ
- Wide FOV
- Day: Standard/HD




### Countermeasures

Countermeasures are based on **jamming (disturbance) or deception** of signals used by dron in both communications and navigation

#### DATALINKS (C2, VIDEO) JAMMING

#### **GPS JAMMING/SPOOFING**





### Countermeasures: Jamming

#### Software Radio Based (SDR) based Countermeasure System

- Inhibition focus on: RPAS communications (C2, datalinks) and GNSS bands.
- Different configurations: **Omnidirectional, Sectorial and Directive** Jamming.
- Fixed, Mobile (transport) and Portable versions.
- Highly adaptable thanks to its **SDR core**:
  - Jamming range: 70MHz to 6GHz.
  - Generation of **fully programmable** signals based on **multiples types of waveforms** (white noise, chirps, used-defined arbitrary, etc).
  - Highly configurable in number of signals and frequency bands to be jammed.
  - Configuration of **multiple inhibition profiles** (different waveforms, bandwidth, bands, etc). Power control to adjust the inhibition range.
- Rule based automatic and manual activation modes.

#### **SDR Jamming**



#### Sectorial & Omni Jammer

- Sectorial and Omnidireccional
- Fast switching
- Range: **+5Km**



#### **Directive Jammer**

- High directive jammer with high performance camera (Indra CYCLOPS)
- 360° coverage based on PTZ positioner
- High range: +8Km



#### Portable Jammer

- 2 sectorial antennas
- Fast battery replacement
- Range: +3Km





### Countermeasures: GPS Spoofing

Deception based on fake GPS signal.

- Real-time GPS signal generator focused on supplanting GPS L1 signal.
- Capabilities:
  - Generation and transmission of **Civil C/A** (Coarse / Acquisition) code of GPS signal in L1 band (1575.42 MHz).
  - Emulation of real GPS satellite constellation.
  - Generation rate of **10 positions/second**.
  - Inhibition of other GNSS signals.
- Some features:
  - Full interaction with ARMS main detection sensors.
  - Omnidirectional or Directive antennas.
  - Power control.
  - Different use strategies.

#### **GPS Spoofer**

- GPS L1 C/A code
- GLONASS jammer
- Up to 16 satellites





### Some ARMS Configurations

#### Elements for fixed deployment



#### Sectorial & Omni Jammer Directive Jammer



### **Operational Experience**



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### Key ideas for Civil Aviation (1)

- Facing this challenge is not easy and requires to apply the principle "The best is the enemy of the good".
- The longer it takes to define and adopt solutions, the greater the risk becomes.
- Independently of the use case, unfortunately, 100% effective C-UAS technology does not exist, it is
  necessary a trade-off between performance and investment considering the balance between the most
  probable and the most dangerous threat.
- The best C-UAS strategy is based on:
  - Adaptation "One configuration does not fit all the operational scenarios".
  - Colaboration among different sensors/effectors.
  - **Redundancy** in number and location.
- Airport environments presents **multiple specific and unique challenges** to the use of C-UAS technologies.
- It is necessary specific regulation, overcoming legal restrictions (including use of spectrum), clarifying scenarios, terms of use and authority for supporting the deployment of C-UAS systems, both detection and countermeasures.

### Key ideas for Civil Aviation (2)

- It is necessary to establish **common protocols and procedures** in order to face this kind of threat (Key for Seamless Sky Strategy).
- Under C-UAS Framework, **Situational Awareness and Neutralization demand different and complementary analysis** because their impact is clearly different.
- At least, as first step, let's consider **situational awareness** (threat detection, identification and tracking).
- UAS neutralization with jamming in an airport environment could be evaluated in scenarios with runway closed for ops. This action would permit an operation impact much lower in time compared to a scenario with an operations interruption without neutralization of the UAS.
- Multiple **key questions** demand deep analysis and answers, such as i.e.
  - What is the **trigger** to take a counter-UAS action?.
  - What counter-UAS **actions** could be authorized?
  - Who may decide and take these counter-UAS actions?.

