

# AIM awareness through safety promotion


Global AIM Santo Domingo 2018 Dominican Republic 22-24 May 2018

> Dennis Hart Head of SWIM Unit, EUROCONTROL 22/5/2018

## Safety in AIS/AIM: a function of data quality



#### Aeronautical Data Chain






Safety lesson dissemination



# Awareness about importance of AIM – through safety promotion

 At Eurocontrol AIM/SWIM Team collaborative workspace a thread created with the incident/accident reports where the aeronautical data and/or aeronautical information products (e.g. AIP, charts, NOTAM, etc.) were considered among the findings, contributory factors and/or safety recommendations



### A333, Kathmandu Nepal, 2015

EUROCONTROL

www.skybrary.aero/index.php/A333,\_Kathmandu\_Nepal,\_2015

 Airbus A330-300 on a scheduled passenger flight from Istanbul to Kathmandu touched down at a higher than normal rate of descent at destination in very poor day visibility with the landing gear partly on the grass before leaving the runway completely. The aircraft was extensively damaged and subsequently declared a hull loss. Impact damage was caused to lighting and signage.



Aircraft Final position in the Grass area between Taxiway C and D



Initial touchdown points of Left and Nose landing Gears

### A333, Kathmandu Nepal, 2015



www.skybrary.aero/index.php/A333,\_Kathmandu\_Nepal,\_2015

- AIM-related findings and safety recommendations:
- that CAA Nepal must ensure that there exists an effective and efficient coordination between aeronautical information services and aerodrome authorities.
- that CAA Nepal must ensure that raw aeronautical information/data are provided by the aerodrome authorities take account of its accuracy and integrity requirements for aeronautical data as specified by ICAO Annex 15 and its Aeronautical Information Service Manual.
- that CAA Nepal must ensure that there exists a proper planning for works to be accomplished before disseminating such information through Aeronautical Information Services with full understanding of its gravity.
- that CAA Nepal should keep track of the AIRAC update cycle when cancelling an AIP supplement.



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## CL60, Lexington KY USA, 2006

www.skybrary.aero/index.php/CRJ1,\_Lexington\_KY\_USA,\_2006

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- Description: Bombardier Challenger CL600 crashed after attempting to take off from the wrong runway.
- AIM-related findings and Board Member statement:
  - Because of an ongoing construction project, the taxiway identifiers represented in the airport chart available to the flight crew were inaccurate, and the information contained in a local notice to airmen about the closure of taxiway was not made available to the crew via ATIS broadcast or the flight release paperwork.
  - 'Inaccurate Airport Chart' and 'NOTAM missing in dispatch release'






Runway 22 hold short line

#### MD87 / C525, Milan Linate, 2001 www.skybrary.aero/index.php/MD87\_/\_C525,\_Milan\_Linate,\_2001



Description: Boeing MD-87 departing on a scheduled passenger flight in thick fog in daylight collided at high speed with a Cessna Citation taxiing for departure on a non scheduled passenger flight. The MD-87 failed to get airborne and continued along the ground until it impacted, still at high speed, a ground handling building. Both aircraft caught fire and were destroyed.



Photograph 1 - Aircraft trajectories.



Photograph 2 - Boeing MD-87 path after the collision.



Photograph 9 - S4 marking and ICAO pattern B runway - holding.



Photograph 10 - S5 marking and ICAO pattern B runway - holding.

#### MD87 / C525, Milan Linate, 2001 www.skybrary.aero/index.php/MD87\_/\_C525,\_Milan\_Linate,\_2001




AIM-related findings and safety recommendations:

- Markings that existed on TWY were not duly reported on AIP Italy. Consequently this was not reflected in Jeppesen and SAS Flight Support documentation.
- White flashing lights, positioned at TWY intersection with RWY described on AIP Italy official charts had been deactivated and substituted by unidirectional alternate green/yellow lead lights to guide exit from RWY and entrance to TWY. Official documentation showed none of these changes.
- official documentation failing to report the presence of unpublished markings that were unknown to air traffic controllers, thus preventing the ATC controller from interpreting the unambiguous information from the Cessna crew, a position report mentioning S4;

#### Safety recommendations

- The national competent Authority, to ensure that all required information to operate safely is contained in the AIP Italy and updated as needed.
- The state of airport Visual Aids of all domestic airports as well as the published taxi procedures shall be checked and found to be in accordance to published AIP.



# Obstacle and terrain related incidents and accidents (safety promotion) <sub>3</sub>

- 2013 Sweden
  - A miltary aircraft of the type JAS 39 Gripen passed a mast at very close range when flowing low (30 metres). The lateral clearance was assessed to be approximately 10–20 metres. The mast was not recorded in the chart documentation used.

Statens haverikommission Swedish Accident Investigation Authority

RM 2015:02

#### Safety recommendations

Recommendation to the Government:

 to clarify responsibility for the obstacle database and responsibility for the Aeronautical Information Service and ensure that measures are taken as soon as possible with the purpose of ensuring that both existing and future information on obstacles for the needs of both civil and military aviation fulfil the quality requirements and other requirements laid down in the ADQ regulation. (*RM 2015:02 R1*)

Recommendations to the Swedish Transport Agency:

- to take measures as soon as possible e.g., in the form of information or regulatory initiatives – in order to address aviation safety with regard to the existing quality of obstacle data and the marking out of obstacles. (*RM 2015:02 R2*)
- to use its authority to issue regulations for reporting obstacles and to take measures to ensure that the information on all new obstacles fulfils the quality requirements imposed in the ADQ regulation. (*RM 2015:02 R3*)







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