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WORKING PAPER

SIXTH MEETING OF THE AVIATION SECURITY AND FACILITATION REGIONAL GROUP (AVSEC/FAL/RG/6)

ICAO NACC Regional Office, Mexico City, Mexico, 6 to 10 June 2016

Agenda Item 9　　　　**Other Business**

AIR CARGO SECURITY

(Presented by United States)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Recognizing that there is no "one-size-fits-all" approach, this paper discusses ongoing developments in air cargo security, including data- and intelligence-based risk approaches, International Civil Aviation Organization Standards and Recommended Practices, advanced cargo information, and mutual recognition of cargo security regimes.

Action:	Suggested action is presented in Section 3.
Strategic Objectives:	• Security & Facilitation

1.　　　　Introduction

1.1　　　　The global trends in air cargo supply chain security will involve the development and implementation of risk-based frameworks and initiatives that include:

- • Mitigation of risk through comprehensive targeting;
- • Mutual recognition of common commensurate national standards; and
- • Further development of initiatives that minimize impact to operations al disruptions within the cargo supply chain.

1.2   While all these initiatives are generally distinct in their purpose, they all share a common foundation – each requiring a significant degree of partnership and commitment between Host Governments and industry that includes and information sharing to the extent possible. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) remains committed to this ideal and looks forward to establishing new partnerships while emphasizing existing ones.

2.   Discussion

2.1   International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standard 4.6.4 and 4.6.10 (Annex 17, Amendment 14):

> ***4.6.4*** *Each Contracting State shall ensure that enhanced security measures apply to high-risk cargo and mail to appropriately mitigate the threats associated with it.*

2.2   The issuance of Amendment 14, 4.6.4 resulted in an increase of air cargo security controls globally. TSA incorporated a risk-based approach by conducting the following:

- •   Implemented enhanced screening methods for cargo designated as high risk;
- •   Established risk-based methodology to determine appropriate screening protocols to shipments and shippers.

2.3   Many national authorities are reviewing the feasibility of implementing security controls earlier in the supply chain. Through a supply chain security approach, national authorities may mitigate the potential for bottlenecks at air carrier cargo facilities.

2.4   TSA encourages sharing best practices

> ***4.6.10*** *Each Contracting State shall ensure that, where screening of cargo and mail is conducted, screening is carried out using an appropriate method or methods, taking into account the nature of the consignment.*

2.5   The Contracting State should determine the appropriate security controls to be applied to any given consignment. The appropriate screening of cargo should be conducted in consideration of the commodity in order to effectively detect the existence of prohibited items that could endanger the aircraft. These measures should be designed to deliver effective security while facilitating the movement of cargo through the entire secure supply chain.

2.6   TSA has developed performance specifications and requirements for screening equipment in consideration of cargo commodity in accordance with internal TSA processes. A list of approved equipment includes: Non-Computed Tomography Transmission X-ray devices, Explosives Trace Detection devices, Electronic Metal Detection devices, and Explosives Detection Systems. In addition, carbon dioxide monitors for the detection of stowaways on all-cargo aircraft are also included. This list is distributed to the regulated entities and updated as necessary.

2.7   **Advance Cargo Shipment Information:** The United States has instituted Advance Cargo Information efforts via the Air Cargo Advance Screening (ACAS) pilot; a joint effort between TSA and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). TSA involvement with ACAS expanded in the aftermath of the October 2010 Yemeni incident, in which terrorists introduced improvised explosive devices into printers being transported on all-cargo aircraft. Immediately following the Yemeni incident, TSA expanded its presence at the CBP National Targeting Centre. ACAS pilot currently includes voluntary participants from multiple nodes in the supply chain to include the express integrated carriers, passenger air carriers, freight forwarders, and all-cargo aircraft operators. TSA and CBP are receiving advance cargo security filing data from pilot participants in over 230 countries with over 200 million shipments processed from pilot participants. Industry participants are also voluntarily providing a subset of data elements through requirements from the CBP Trade Act of 2002.

2.8   **Formal Mutual Recognition of Existing Air Cargo Security Programs:** The National Cargo Security Program (NCSP) recognition process has been a key initiative for TSA and industry to meet the Congressional mandate to ensure 100 percent screening of all cargo inbound to the United States on board passenger aircraft. Although originally developed for passenger operations, TSA has expanded its recognition process to include all-cargo operations.

2.9   The TSA NCSP recognition process involves a comprehensive review of a country's aviation security procedures. The comprehensive review specifically covers six key pillars of the supply chain, which are identical to the supply chain security concepts within the ICAO Aviation Security Manual (Doc 8973). These six pillars are:

> 1)   **Facility Security** requires that cargo handling and storage facilities have physical barriers and deterrents that guard against unauthorized access.
> 2)   **Personnel Security** requires cargo entities to have processes in place to vet prospective employees and contractors and to periodically check current employees with unescorted access to passenger air cargo during and after screening.

3) **Screening** requires regulated entities screen cargo through the application of technical or other means, which are intended to identify and/or detect weapons, explosives, or other dangerous devices, along with articles or substances that may be used to commit an act of unlawful interference. Air carriers follow requirements regarding acceptance and screening of cargo transferring or transiting to the United States.

4) **Training** requires that cargo entities appropriately train all personnel who screen, handle screened cargo, or perform other duties related to air cargo screening/preparation/storage.

5) **Chain of Custody/Transit Procedures** requires methods/procedures that prevent and deter unauthorized access to cargo while stored or in transit between facilities prior to loading aboard aircraft.

6) **Quality Control/Compliance and Oversight Activities** require that authorized entities involved in air cargo security meet certain requirements to participate in the security program and are routinely audited by appropriate authorities identified by the Host Government to ensure the ongoing fulfilment of those requirements.

2.10 **Risk-Based Approaches to Security:** With an understanding that risk mitigation is achievable in an efficient manner in the global supply chain, States and industry partners have consistently recognized that the vast majority of air cargo poses a low (or no) risk to the security of the air cargo system. Developing methods to identify low-risk cargo can ensure a quicker, more efficient and streamlined process while focusing limited resources on those elements that may pose elevated risk. Recent efforts and initiatives in this area include:

- Establishing parameters and definitions for high-risk cargo;
- Piloting the use of advance air cargo shipment information;
- The use of explosives detection canines in the air cargo environment; and
- Mutual recognition of State's air cargo security regimes.

2.11 Effective December 3, 2012, TSA and industry met the requirements of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Act, requiring 100% screening of cargo uplifted on passenger aircraft inbound to the United States. TSA does so through a risk-based approach.

2.12 Way ahead: The global trends in air cargo supply chain security will involve the development and implementation of risk-based frameworks that include:

- Mitigation of risk through advanced information targeting;
- Mutual recognition of commensurate national standards; and

- Further development of initiatives that increase security and minimize operational disruptions within a secure supply chain.

2.13   While all these initiatives are generally distinct in their purpose, they all share a common foundation – each requiring a significant degree of partnership and commitment between governments and industry that includes information sharing to the extent possible. TSA remains committed to this ideal and looks forward to establishing strong new partnerships while emphasizing existing ones.

3.   Suggested action

3.1   The Forum is invited to note the content in this paper and encourage Contracting States to strengthen the overall security posture for the cargo supply network given the volume of cargo both originating and transiting the region.

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