

BEA Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la sécurité de l'aviation civile

BEA's Analysis Methodology


ICAO Accident/Incident Investigation Workshop Oficina Regional NACC de la OACI – Mexico City 24 July 2015

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






You have the facts...

- 1 Factual Information
 - → 1.1 History of the flight
 - → 1.2 Injuries to persons
 - → 1.3 Damage to aircraft
 - ➡ 1.4 Other damage
 - → 1.5 Personnel information
 - 1.6 Aircraft information
 - → 1.7 Meteorological information
 - → 1.8 Aids to navigation
 - 1.9 Communications
 - 1.10 Aerodrome information
 - → 1.11 Flight recorders
 - → 1.12 Wreckage and impact information
 - → 1.13 Medical and pathological information
 - → 1.14 Fire
 - ➡ 1.15 Survival aspects
 - → 1.16 Tests and research
 - → 1.17 Organizational and management information
 - → 1.18 Additional information
 - → 1.19 Useful or effective investigation techniques





Annex 13 / Appendix FORMAT OF THE FINAL REPORT

International Standards and Recommended Practices



Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation

Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation

This edition incorporates all amendments adopted by the Council prior to 23 February 2010 and supersedes, on 18 November 2010, all previou editions of Annex 13.

For information regarding the applicability of Standards and Recommended Practices, see Chapter 2 and the Foreword. 2 Analysis:

"Analyse, as appropriate, only the information documented in 1. — Factual information and which is relevant to the determination of conclusions and causes and/or contributing factors."



Doc 9756/Part IV - Reporting




- Facts should be discussed and analysed in order to determine which events contributed to the accident.
- The analysis part should contain an evaluation of the evidence presented in the factual information part
- The reasoning must be logical and may lead to the formulation of hypotheses which are then discussed
- The discussion in the analysis should support the findings and the immediate and systemic causes of the accident






Systemic Issues

The Analysis should look into systemic issues









Based on ideas from Risk management / SMS

Risk Management

What are our risks?

Are they acceptable?

If no, how to mitigate them?


Investigation analysis


What were the risks in that situation?



How were they supposed to be mitigated?

What can we learn about the robustness of the measures that were in place?







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Definitions

Accident


- → Annex 13 definition
- Event that caused damages and that you want to prevent from occurring again in the future
- → Occurrence categories: LOC-I, CFIT, RE....
- Loss of control point
 - Start of a sequence that will lead to the accident if no recovery measures are successfully applied
 - → Reached during an Incident, but then it does not go further












- Before starting:
 - ➡ Have a solid factual base
 - Elaborate the first draft of an accident/incident scenario








- Identify and define the limits of the system
 - Ex: Aircraft + Crew
- Identify and define the limits of the operational situation
 - Phase of flight
 - Conditions of flight
- Describe the preoccupations of the actors
 - What risks are linked to the operational situation, how are they managed?
 - Personal preoccupations





Hindsight bias


The inclination to see past events as being more predictable than they actually were; also called the "I-knew-it-all-along" effect.






Hindsight bias

The past may seem obvious!!










- Apply the accident model to the event in question
 - Determine the accident or the most credible outcome in case of an incident
 - Determine the loss of control point
- Describe the safety principles: Control, Recovery, Mitigation
 - Regulations, Certification requirements
 - Manuals, Procedures
 - Design specifications
 - Best Practices
 - Habits
 - Expectations from human performance








- Build the accident scenario
 - Assess the effectiveness of the safety principles
 - The scenario should contain the loss of control point
- Spot the safety principle(s) that <u>did not</u> work as planned
 - Failures
 - Poor performance of the principle
- Spot the safety principles that <u>did</u> work as planned, but
 - were not sufficient to prevent the accident
 - were not used during the accident sequence








- Understand how human performance could have been affected by the operational context:
 - SHELL model: interactions of an actor with his/her environment
 - Do not focus only on deviations from the "norm". Ex: "The probable cause of this accident is the failure of the flightcrew to detect and remove ice contamination on the airplane's wings..."
 - Explore whether the expectations of the safety model were compatible with "human nature": are they realistic with regards to human capacities, performance, variability and reliability?
- Look at the organization who "owns" the safety principles that did not work as planned:
 - Constraints
 - What knowledge did they have when they elaborated the safety principle?








- Look at similar events to determine if the differences (step 4) were already identified earlier
 - Other accident reports, databases (ICAO, Operators, Manufacturers)
 - but also scientific research, analysis from experts...
 - Get an idea whether the situation was new, marginal or somehow frequent
- Assess the robustness of the safety principles against the known, predicted or actual
 - contexts
 - technical & human behavior
- If a safety principle worked in most cases and the accident can be considered as isolated, then actions can be recommended to reinforce the selection of personnel, or treat violations...
- Otherwise, recommend to re-adjust the safety principles to better cope with actual behaviors








- The analysis is an iterative process
- Work with a team
- Involve Subject Matter Experts





Report Drafting





Example: Runway Overrun

 performance calculations Stabilized approach Parameter monitoring RO 	e crew detects that the naining runway length is ufficient PS Iked landing	 Obstacle-free environment EMAS Safety belts ON Emergency services available Evacuation
The principles that did	1 not work as n	langed are the sub-
headings of the Analy	1	iannieu are the sub-
→ 2.2 Landing perform	·	S
→ 2.3 CRM		
2.4 Remaining runw	vay awareness	
 2.5 Airport obstacle. 	/EMAS	×



Thank you for your attention



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