



HIGH-LEVEL CONFERENCE ON AVIATION SECURITY (HLCAS)

Montréal, 12 to 14 September 2012

Agenda Item 3: Combating the insider threat

THE REALITY OF AND MITIGATING INSIDER THREAT

(Paper presentation by the African Civil Aviation Commission (AFCAC))

SUMMARY

This paper presented by AFCAC on behalf of African States seeks the endorsement of the Conference on the work done by the Aviation Security Panel on strengthening Annex 17 of SARPs, particularly Standard 4.2.6.

Action: The High level Conference on Aviation Security is invited to endorse the conclusion and recommendation in paragraph 4.0.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Having attended some of the meetings where discussions were held on the effect of Insider threat, African States are of the opinion that there is a need to combat this menace of insider threat using a consistent global approach. This will mitigate security breaches or acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation at Airports.

1.2 The fight against terrorism and other acts of unlawful interference has been focused mostly on passengers with less attention being directed at the threat posed by airport workers as 'insiders'. The reality of this threat needs to be acknowledged to ensure proactive mitigating measures.

2. THE REALITY OF THREATS FROM INSIDERS

2.1 It is worthy to note that security breaches committed at most Airports have the direct or indirect involvement of airport staff. These include pilfering of passenger baggages, surveillance of sensitive areas, disclosure of confidential or sensitive security information, bypassing of security checkpoints, weapon smuggling and the like.

2.2 Thus, insider vulnerabilities represent real concern that need to be addressed, particularly in view of all the other measures that have been put in place to mitigate the risks from passengers, cargo, hold and hand baggage at our airports.

¹ French translation provided by AFCAC

2.3 It has been observed that the perpetrators of unlawful acts often look for the weakest link in the security chain of defence of which airport employees could be one, as they have detailed knowledge of the operational procedures and weaknesses of the system. These could be easily exploited by disgruntled elements to perpetrate acts on unlawful interference.

2.4 Airport workers have opportunities of having access to Security Restricted Areas (SRA) and could be used to smuggle weapons or place items to be used to perpetuate acts of terrorism and sabotage at the airside or even on the aircraft.

3. MITIGATING THE THREAT FROM INSIDE

3.1 Comprehensive background check of all personnel selected for hire/employment at an airport needs to be carried out by the relevant State's security agencies based on risk assessment. In addition, re-vetting of airport workers such as cleaners, duty free shop personnel, catering staff and concessionaires must be carried out frequently in order to mitigate collusion to commit acts of unlawful interference.

3.2 Furthermore, airport workers need to be subjected to 100% screening measures, similar to that of passengers whenever accessing the Security Restricted Areas (SRA) of the airport

3.3 Evaluation of the remuneration of airport workers to determine whether this is commensurate with the work environment vis-à-vis access to the essential needs of life (such as food and water) is important.

3.4 Prompt payment of airport workers' wages and other incentives, are key to mitigating threats posed from the inside.

3.5 Constant dialogue between staff and employers to address any area that may instigate distrust and lack of confidence, are necessary.

4. ACTION REQUIRED

4.1 The meeting is invited to endorse the outcome of the Aviation Security Panel on strengthening Annex 17 of Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs), particularly Standard 4.2.6 as a common and consistent global approach to deal with the Insider Threat

— END —