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The ePassport: What's Next?

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International Organization for Standardization (ISO)

Strengthening Aviation Security through Improved Traveller Identification



Presentation Overview

Part 1

- ICAO Traveller Identification Program (TRIP)
- Overview of the current ePassport
- Developments to technology

Part 2

- International specifications

Part 3

- Technical demonstration



Part 1: ICAO TRIP


- The ICAO Traveller Identification Program (TRIP) promotes the efficient, timely and reliable confirmation of traveler identities.
- ePassport technology contributes to improving traveller facilitation by providing authorities with a secure, fixed and verifiable identity that can be leveraged in the travel continuum.
 - The digital inclusion of the holder's biometric and biographic data can be leveraged in automated schemes at the border.
 - The use of a public key infrastructure to protect this data assists in preventing fraud and/or manipulation.






Part 1: ePassport Current State

- International technical specifications to support global and interoperable ePassport issuance are defined in ICAO Doc 9303.
 - ePassports contain a contactless integrated circuit (i.e. chip) that allows the document to securely store the holder's biometric and biographic data.
- The ePassport's capabilities provide States with possibilities to automate various border management processes.
 - With the use of the ICAO Public Key Directory (ICAO PKD), border management authorities can perform an authentication of a travel document and, in turn, rely on the data stored on the chip.
- Automation does have its limits, as border control authorities use other information in the ePassport (i.e. travel history, visas, and observations) to make decisions on entry or passage.





Part 1: ePassport Current State






Part 1: Context

- In response to interests to further secure and facilitate travel, ICAO's New Technologies Working Group (NTWG) has commissioned a sub-group to explore the policy and technical framework for the next generation of the ePassport.
- With direction from the ICAO NTWG, the sub-group explored changes to the ePassport that were:
 - Backwards compatible and complementary to the current generation ePassport;
 - Optional for all Member States; and
 - Supportive to the broader TRIP Strategy.



Part 1: ePassport Developments

- Logical Data Structure 2 (LDS2) is an **optional** and **backwards compatible** extension to the ePassport chip.
- LDS2 extends the use of the ePassport through the addition of applications to securely store visas, travel stamps, and additional biometrics, after the document has been issued.
- LDS2 applications operate independently alongside the LDS1 ePassport application.





Part 1: LDS2 Applications

1. Electronic Travel Stamps

- Standardized content and format, and protection from tampering.
- The benefit of adding this travel data in digital format include: greater consistency; enhanced security; and ease of access and viewing.

Drawbacks/Limitations

- Not all States may choose to implement this application, which could result in some stamps stored in the chip (and manually added) and others just being manually added.
- Tracking/monitoring concerns.



Part 1: LDS2 Applications

2. Electronic Visas

- Application will allow for electronic visas to be added to the document almost instantaneously, bolstering client service and reducing the costs associated with designing, shipping, and storing visas/travel stamps.
- Adding the visa directly to the document also reduces the need to rely on databases containing this information, which could facilitate transit travel, support third party validation, and mitigate the impacts of network outages or connection errors.

Drawbacks/Limitations

- Syncing with embassy and port of entry systems
- Managing certificates of expired and/or revoked visa entries.
- Storage limitations



Part 1: LDS2 Applications

3. Additional Biometrics

- The ability to add secondary biometrics (iris and fingerprint) post-issuance provides States with more choices in national policy regarding secondary biometric storage and trusted traveller programs.
- In instances where the photo of the holder can no longer be used, States could add an updated photo of the holder, which could result in fewer replacement passports being issued, less unnecessary delays at border control, and more dependability on facial recognition.

Drawbacks/Limitations

- Exposure to greater privacy risks
- Privacy frameworks for data collection and storage
- Investments in additional biometric capture and storage



Part 1: Potential Advantages of LDS2 ePassports

- Extending the functions of the ePassport would create added opportunities to automate passenger and document processing at controlled points in travel.
- LDS2 ePassports will include the ‘missing’ information that is needed to systematically clear passengers using automated border clearance (ABC) technologies
 - Standard, reliable and protected travel data can be leveraged to perform an on-the-spot, systematic analysis of the risk that travellers present, and detect unusual travel patterns; disconnects between entry and exit stamps; and attempts to alter travel data.
- The possibility of being able to streamline various processes could improve the flow of passenger traffic, allow States to redirect attention to more high-value activities, and provide States with opportunities to make better use of investments in border clearance infrastructure.



Part 2: International specifications

ICAO Doc 9303 - 7th edition

1. Introduction
2. Specifications for the Security of Design, Manufacture and Issuance of MRTDs
3. Specifications common to all Machine Readable Travel Documents
4. Specifications specific to TD3 size MRTDs, Machine Readable Passports
5. Specifications specific to TD1 size MRTDs, Machine Readable Official Travel Documents
6. Specifications specific to TD2 size MRTDs, Machine Readable Official Travel Documents
7. Machine Readable Visas
8. Emergency Travel Documents
9. The Deployment of Biometric Identification and Electronic Storage of Data in MRTDs
10. Logical Data Structure
11. Security Protocols
12. Public Key Infrastructure for Machine Readable Travel Documents



Part 2: Logical Data Structure

LDS1

- Data Group 01 - Machine Readable Zone
- Data Group 02 - Encoded face
- Data Group 03 - Encoded fingers
- Data Group 04 - Encoded irises
- Data Group 05 - Displayed portrait
- Data Group 06 - Reserved for future use
- Data Group 07 - Displayed signature or usual mark
- Data Group 08 - Data features
- Data Group 09 - Structure features
- Data Group 10 - Substance features
- Data Group 11 - Additional personal details
- Data Group 12 - Additional document details
- Data Group 13 - Optional details
- Data Group 14 - Security options for secondary biometrics
- Data Group 15 - Active Authentication public key info
- Data Group 16 - Persons to notify

VISA RECORDS

TRAVEL RECORDS

BIOMETRICS



Part 2: Logical Data Structure

Visa Records

- Issuing State
- Document Type
- Place of issuance
- Valid from - Valid until
- Number of entries
- Document number
- Type/class/category
- Additional information (endorsements: duration, limitations, and fees paid)
- Name (full name)
- Primary Identifier (surname)
- Secondary Identifier (given name)
- Passport number
- Sex
- Date of Birth
- Nationality

VISA RECORDS



Part 2: Logical Data Structure

Travel Records

- Type of stamp (entry, exit, other)
- Visa approvals, refusals, and revocations as applicable
- Destination State
- Travel date
- Inspection authority
- Inspection locale
- Inspector reference
- Authenticity token
- Result of inspection
- Mode of travel
- Duration of stay
- Conditions holder is required to observe whilst in issuing

A large, light-colored key graphic is centered on the page. The key's shaft points to the right, where it meets a dark orange rectangular box. Inside this box, the words 'TRAVEL RECORDS' are written in white, uppercase letters. A dark orange circle is also centered within the box, overlapping the text.

TRAVEL RECORDS



Part 2: Logical Data Structure

Additional Biometrics

- Limited to Face, Finger, and Iris
- Re-issuance of existing LDS1 biometrics possible (updated biometrics)
- Additional data accompanying biometrics (f.i. to support frequent traveler programs)



BIOMETRICS



Part 2: Protocols

Data authenticity / integrity

- Passive Authentication

Copy / Clone protection

- Active Authentication
- Chip Authentication

Access Control / Communications encryption

- PACE

Read / Write authorization

- Terminal Authentication



Part 2: Protocols

Authorization matrix

Description	Read	Write/Append	Update	Delete
Electronic Visas	1.	2.	n/a	n/a
Travel Records	1.	2.	n/a	n/a
Additional Biometrics	2.	2.	2.	2.


1. All States / defined Organizations. Default allow policy with selective denial.
2. Defined States / Organizations. Default deny with selective allow.




Part 2: Public Key Infrastructure

Signature PKI

eMRTD issuing authority



LDS2 authorized data writing authority







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





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
Part 2: Public Key Infrastructure

Authorization PKI

LDS2 authorized data reading authority


eMRTD issuing authority

LDS2 authorized data writing authority





Part 3: LDS2 Demonstrator





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