

CYBER SECURITY AND RESILIENCE SYMPOSIUM

TOWARDS A RESILIENT AVIATION CYBERSPACE

AMMAN, JORDAN | 15-17 OCTOBER 2019



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Nick Lawrence-Taylor Qatar's Aviation Cyber Security Guidelines





Overview

- Background
- National Policy and Task Force
- Aviation Cyber Security (ACS) Guidelines Initiative
- Penetration Testing
- Main Challenges
- Future Development
- Summary





Background

- 2015: QCAA introduced aviation cyber threats to NCASP as a possible method of attack
- ICAO Ann 17 – Amendments 13 and 14 incorporated new SARPs related to cyber threats:
 - **4.9 Measures Relating to Cyber Threats**
 - 4.9.1 (Standard)
 - 4.9.2 (Recommendation)
- 4.9.1 (formerly a recommendation) became a standard in the latest amendment to Ann 17
- Gradual addition of more SARPs related to cyber threats are likely in the future



Background cont'd

- The transportation sector is critical for Qatar's security and prosperity
- Recognition that every aspect of today's aviation sector is affected by ICT
- Acknowledgment of the distinction between AVSEC expertise and technical cyber security expertise
- Qatar needed to develop an aviation cyber security policy and associated strategy:
 - to satisfy the new Annex 17 SARPs
 - improve aviation cyber security resilience and awareness
 - develop and implement suitable protective measures to mitigate against potential cyber vulnerabilities.



National Policy and Task Force

- In 2016, the QCAA in partnership with the Ministry of Transport and Communications(MoTC) established an aviation cyber security task-force
- Task Force purpose:
 - gather strategic information regarding aviation cyber security
 - develop a best practice approach
 - conduct a comprehensive assessment of interconnected critical areas within Qatar's aviation ecosystem



ACS Guidelines

- Approach
 - Joint consultations between MoTC and QCAA
 - Industry consultations to understand the business
 - Reference to published international standards and guidelines (Aviation Sector)
 - Closed review of the draft guidelines with stakeholders
 - Review of the draft guidelines by an international consulting organization



ACS Guidelines cont'd

- Encompasses the general CIA Approach
 - Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability
- Proposes the 360 Degree approach
 - Predict, Prevent, Detect, Respond
- Assists the aviation sector to identify and adopt secure best practice and effective cyber hygiene
- Integrates with MOTC's National Information Assurance Policy (NIAP)
 - The NIAP is based on the principles of Information Classification and Baseline controls
- Aligns with International standards and best practices.
- Developed with direct support from:
 - Qatar Ministry of Transport and Communications (MOTC)
 - Cyber Security Sector (Q-CERT)
 - Qatar Aviation Stakeholders:
 - Qatar Airways
 - Hamad International Airport (HIA)
 - QCAA Air Navigation Department (ATC)



ACS Guidelines cont'd

- Some of the main areas which were assessed:
- QCAA Air Navigation Department
 - Air Traffic Control (ATC)
 - Communication and Navigation Surveillance (CNS) & Air Traffic Management (ATM) systems
- Airport Systems
 - Flight Information Display Systems (FIDS)
 - Baggage Handling Systems
- Airline/Aircraft/Airport Systems
 - In-Flight Entertainment systems (IFE)
 - Reservation System



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ACS Guidelines Cont'd

- Specific to Aviation Security
- Now an appendix to the Qatar NCASP
- Publicly available via the QCAA website
- Dynamic “live” document



Penetration Testing

- Penetration Testing forms an essential element of Qatar's aviation cyber security strategy
- To help identify potential vulnerabilities and progress development of the ACS guidelines, Q-CERT performed Pen Tests on the QCAA's secure and public websites
- Pen Tests are very effective – but have some limitations
 - Expensive for industry
 - Scope of Pen Tests (on aviation systems) not fully defined
 - Lack of resources and expertise (pertaining to aviation)
 - Complex in nature – requires high level coordination and approvals
- QCAA plan to expand Pen Testing across various aviation specific systems



Main Challenges

- Dynamic, fast moving, evolving nature of cyber security makes effective mitigation challenging
- Scope definition – difference between broad ICT (which is generally well protected) and critical aviation systems
- Stakeholder acceptance
- Some industry resistance
- Raising awareness



Future Development

- Extending stakeholder support and capacity building
- Technical assistance with the support of existing MoU/MoC
 - Currently UK, US, Australian Governments
- Develop internal QCAA cyber security capacity
 - Training, participation in global events, recruitment, stakeholder engagement
- Introduction of general regulations related to ACS
 - Expansion of the ACS Guidelines, NCASP and national policy
- Expand Penetration Testing
 - Aviation systems, software, websites and potentially aircraft systems
- Regulatory oversight functions
 - Audits, tests, inspections, exercises, desktop activities



Summary

- Qatar needed to develop an aviation cyber security capability
- ACS guidelines were developed, disseminated to industry and are now publicly available
- Qatar's cyber security strategy is dynamic and subject to continuous review
- Qatar will continue to seek industry, intergovernmental and international input and assistance



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Availability

- ACS Guidelines are available on the QCAA public website:

www.caa.gov.qa

Located at: Media Center → All Publications → Guidelines

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Thank You

