



SECOND HIGH-LEVEL CONFERENCE ON AVIATION SECURITY (HLCAS/2)

Montréal, 29 to 30 November 2018

Agenda Item 1: Aviation security threat and risk context

DRAFT CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AGENDA ITEM 1

(Presented by the Secretariat)

1. DISCUSSION

1.1 As a starting point in its deliberations, the Conference took stock of the latest developments in the threat environment faced by the international civil aviation network, with a particular look at improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and the insider threat. The Conference noted the continued value and relevance of the ICAO Risk Context Statement (RCS) as a tool to assist States to assess the risks their respective civil aviation system and operators may face, and implement measures commensurate with those risks.

1.2 In discussing the issue of insider threat, the Conference stressed that such a threat was a matter of great concern and should urgently be addressed by all stakeholders. In effect, failing to implement robust and sustainable measures aimed at mitigating the risk associated with the insider threat compromises the aviation security system in its entirety by enabling the circumventing of airport security measures, such as those in place at passenger screening checkpoints.

1.3 A number of approaches and measures were discussed as possible ways to mitigate the risk posed by insiders. The Conference, keeping in mind the critical importance of setting a robust baseline in the form of strengthened Annex 17 Standards, was of the view that the implementation of security culture regimes can help address the insider threat as part of a multi-layered approach to the issue. While the insider threat often materializes from the exploitation of staff and their privileged access to secure areas and sensitive security information, employees remain the first layer of defence against suspicious activities within aviation premises. As they play a key role in mitigating the threat through their commitment to aviation security, their vigilance and overall security awareness, the Conference agreed that a multi-layered approach to the insider threat should be considered by the Aviation Security Panel – including the regulatory measures described in WP/16, such as enhanced background checks and elements of randomness and unpredictability.

1.4 While the Conference widely expressed its support for the strengthening of Annex 17 provisions to better mitigate the risk posed by insiders, including the implementation of 100 per cent screening of persons other than passengers, some participants cautioned against an overly prescriptive approach and called for more risk-based and outcomes-focused measures to combat the threat. The Conference, therefore, agreed to refer the matter to the Aviation Security Panel so that it can provide the relevant ICAO governing bodies, as a matter of priority, with appropriate and timely recommendations in that regard.

1.5 In considering the issue of the sharing of aviation security information, the Conference recalled that Assembly Resolution 39-18 urges States to adopt the principles of international cooperation,

which include respect for the spirit of cooperation defined in bilateral and/or multilateral air services agreements and the recognition of equivalent security measures. To that end, the Conference supported the need for States to enter into collaborative arrangements, such as bilateral and/or multilateral agreements, taking into account the provisions of Annex 17 on international cooperation, in order to help make informed decisions to effectively and efficiently address new and emerging threats, and avoid unilateral and/or uncoordinated implementation of security measures. It was also highlighted that the sharing of aviation security information between States helps develop and implement sensible and cost-effective security measures.

1.6 The Conference further agreed that such collaborative arrangements for the sharing of information should include, to the extent possible, elements related to audit results and associated corrective action plans. Finally, the Conference noted that States should leverage existing mechanisms to share information of a non-confidential nature, such as the ICAO Point of Contact Network (also referred to as the AVSECNET).

2. CONCLUSIONS

2.1 The Second High-level Conference on Aviation Security (HLCAS/2) concludes that:

- a) global terrorism and security threats against international air transport operations continue to exist and need to be addressed;
- b) the threat posed by insiders through the exploitation of staff and their privileged access to secure areas and sensitive security information continues to represent a real concern, as terrorist groups are reported to actively look for insiders to assist in their attempts to target civil aviation;
- c) the integrity of security checkpoints and the effectiveness of security measures applied to passengers is undermined when staff can circumvent a checkpoint without being subjected to screening and security controls. Failure to address the insider threat could result in a displacement of threats such as the one posed by improvised explosive devices (IED), and therefore greatly impair mitigation efforts;
- d) the sharing of appropriate and relevant aviation security information on new threats, together with the implementation of effective mechanisms to exchange such information, are essential to facilitate the development of coordinated measures aimed at mitigating such threats to civil aviation in a global and harmonized fashion; and
- e) bilateral or multilateral agreements regarding the sharing and protection of sensitive aviation security information can provide a legal basis for facilitating the communication of aviation security threats, risks and vulnerabilities between States in a timely fashion.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS

3.1 The Second High-level Conference on Aviation Security (HLCAS/2) recommends that:

- a) States refer to the ICAO Global RCS as a useful tool to assist stakeholders in developing evidence-based risk assessments and in identifying possible mitigating actions;

- b) the ICAO Council, taking into consideration the advice from its Aviation Security Panel, expedite the development of strengthened Standards and Recommended Practices in Annex 17 to deal with the insider threat, based on a multi-layered approach;
- c) States and industry ensure the effective implementation of regulatory measures aimed at addressing the insider threat, so as not to compromise the global aviation security system, taking into consideration those measures outlined in WP/16;
- d) States and industry promote an effective security culture among their aviation workforce and raise public awareness to help further address the insider threat; and
- e) States enter into collaborative arrangements for sharing security information about threats, risks and vulnerabilities in order to enhance the effectiveness of aviation security measures, address security gaps at the national, regional and global level, and avoid unilateral and/or uncoordinated implementation of security measures.

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