



FACILITATION PANEL (FALP)

FIFTH MEETING

Montréal, 31 March to 4 April 2008

Agenda Item 3: Other amendments to Annex 9

CREW MEMBER CERTIFICATES

(Presented by the International Council of Aircraft Owner and Pilot Associations)

(IAOPA)

SUMMARY

IAOPA supports the ongoing implementation of Standard 3.67 of Annex 9 and sees the voluntary application for Crew Member Certificates (CMCs) as an important tool for crew members to properly identify themselves in order to obtain faster and easier access to international airports.

IAOPA views the CMC as the standard tool to be used in identifying flight crew members engaged in international operations to governmental authorities and their computer tracking systems.

Action by the FAL Panel:

The FAL Panel is invited to take action as outlined in paragraph 3.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Access to, from and within international airports today carries restrictions for flight crew members if they cannot properly identify themselves to immigration, other officials or to the various governmental systems used to track overall security of aviation.

1.2 For authorization of flight/crew/passenger/baggage and other information to be given to computer systems of Public authorities by a flight crew member there is currently no system in use.

1.3 Current airman certificates, which usually are print-outs of computer records that do not include a photograph of the holder, are easy to copy and illegally alter.

1.4 As outlined in working paper 23, presented to FAL 12 in Cairo in 2004 by the ICAO Secretariat, the Crew Member Certificate (CMC) traditionally has been considered an identification document that could be presented in lieu of a passport and a visa. The FAL Panel at its fourth meeting in April 2002 initiated a study group which arrived at the conclusion that the CMC should not be presented as a travel document to replace the passport but used as an identity document to signify *exemption* from a visa requirement.

1.5 ICAO Annex 9 makes no reference to any other crew identification document than the CMC. Thus, the stated problems for a crew to identify themselves in order to gain easy and swift access to airports and aircraft are real if the CMC also cannot be envisaged as an identity document for security purposes.

1.6 IAOPA believes that the CMC should serve as both a crew identity document (card) for the purpose of obtaining exemption from visa requirements and as an identity document (card) for security and access purposes. [With access we include authorization data to be communicated by computer card readers for internet access to government computer databases when performing required aircrew duties]. If not, the crew will have to obtain various identification documents (cards) based on specific needs, adding to cost and complexity.

1.7 It is understood that for the CMC to serve as a security document enabling facilitation a background check must be conducted. However, background checks vary widely in depth and complexity from country to country, depending on the requirements of the various national security agencies. Unfortunately, the level of investigation imposed by these checks lacks international uniformity and often impinges on a number of privacy issues.

1.8 The main beneficiaries of government security investigations are the State conducting the inquiry and its citizens, not the individual being checked. Therefore, IAOPA believes that the costs associated with any background check be borne by the State conducting the check. The individual crew member should not have to cover the costs of proving his or her innocence to the satisfaction of the State.

1.9 Any identification system can result in very high costs for collection of data of the individuals, production of identification cards, validation and verification of the cards and systems for revoking them/making them invalid. IAOPA sees the necessity of using existing systems under control of governments in order not to burden the State, the card holder or his/her employer with the high costs involved in obtaining and maintaining such a CMC system.

1.10 An acceptable cost for a CMC should be the same as obtaining a similar standard governmental issued identity card. Our intention is that the CMC also shall be considered a valid identity card which can substitute as any other government identity card that be required. The result will avoid duplicates by having additional features included in a *single card* at no extra costs to the individual.

1.11 If national borders are crossed, passports are sometimes not required although normally each individual must be able to proof identity and citizenship. For this purpose, among others, a national identity card can be issued by a Contracting State. In this case the State takes responsibility for the entire chain of creating and maintaining the identity card system and providing the infrastructure for verification and validation.

1.12 If a national identity card meets ICAO doc 9303 part 3 it will benefit worldwide standardization and global interoperability, allowing for cross-utilization of resources. Importantly, the identity of the holders can be confirmed by using the same equipment and systems used in the inspection of travel

documents. In fact, several Contracting States already produce national identity cards meeting ICAO doc 9303 part 3.

1.13 For citizens belonging to the European Union, traveling inside the common passport area (Schengen) an identity card meeting ICAO doc 9303 issued by a governmental agency fulfills the requirement for identification.

1.14 IAOPA recognizes the work carried out in the ECAC Working Group on Facilitation and their endorsement taken in Paris 27-28 February 2008 of ten key principles of the CMC.

2. CONCLUSION

2.1 IAOPA favours the use of existing CMC SARPs and has identified the potential of having one worldwide accepted system and tool for the identification of flight crew members.

2.2 Because several Contracting States already have good technical and administrative capabilities, they should lead the way in demonstrating how to institute a modern CMC identity system.

2.3 Where a Contracting State has already taken steps to incorporate Doc 9303 part 3 in their identity card system, then any CMC issued by this State shall meet this standard.

2.4 If a Contracting member State already has taken steps to incorporate biometrics into their identity cards, it is our opinion that any CMC issued by such a State shall include these features as well.

2.5 Contracting States shall recognize just *one* identity card, the Crew Member Certificate, as sole means for a flight crew member to prove identity both to personnel and systems in international air transportation.

3. ACTION BY THE FAL PANEL

3.1 The FAL Panel is invited to:

- a) note the strong support from IAOPA and its 480,000 members for the voluntary Crew Member Certificates (CMC) in line with Annex 9 standard 3.67 as an effective tool in international air transportation for the identification of crew allowing for the introduction of measures and systems that will facilitate international flights and expedite access to and inside international airports.
- b) encourage Member States to improve the benefit of CMCs by promoting their acceptance worldwide.
- c) consider the following change and additional text to Standard 3.70 of Annex 9:
 - i) 3.70 Adequate control shall be placed on the issuance of CMCs and other official crew identity documents to prevent fraud, for example, a background check and certification of employment or aircraft operator status of an applicant prior to issuance, controls on blank card stock, and accountability requirements for issuing personnel.

- ii) consider the introduction of a new Recommended Practice 3.70(x) to Annex 9 as follows:

3.70(x) Recommended Practice.—*If any fee is charged for control on, or the issuance or renewal of CMCs, the amount of such fee should not exceed the cost of operation.*

- iii) consider the introduction of a new Standard 3.68(x) to Annex 9 as follows:

3.68(x) If a Contracting State already produces an identity card meeting the specifications as set forth in ICAO Doc 9303, Part 3, then any CMC issued by this State shall meet these specifications.

- iv) consider the introduction of a new Recommended Practice 3.68(y) to Annex IX as follows:

3.68(y) Recommended Practice.—*If a Contracting State already produces an identity card, which includes biometrics, meeting the specifications as set forth in ICAO Doc 9303, Part 3, then any CMC issued by this state should also contain biometrics.*

- v) consider the introduction of a new Standard 3.73 to Annex 9 as follows:

3.73 If a Contracting State requires a crew member to identify himself electronically while accessing computer systems of Public Authorities in order to carry out required flight duties relating to international air transportation, then such electronic identification shall only be required by the use of a CMC meeting the specifications as set forth in Doc 9303, Part 3.

- vi) consider adopting the following Recommendation:

Recommendation

It is recommended that a study group, consisting of experts in ICAO Annex 9 (*Facilitation*) together with experts in ICAO Annex 17 (*Security*), recognizing the work already achieved, develop and report to the FAL Panel recommendations necessary to ensure global interoperability how to utilize the CMC as the only tool for flight crew identification.