International Civil Aviation Organization

Seventh Symposium and Exhibition on ICAO MRTDs, Biometrics and Security Standards

ICAO Headquarters, Montréal, Canada
12 - 15 September 2011

ICAO Sub-Programme on Evidence of Identity

**Mauricio Siciliano**
**ICAO MRTD Programme**

- Why?
- What?
- Who?
- When?

Evidence of Identity

Evidence of Identity

ICAO Standards & Specifications

- ICAO-compliant TD the best and most secure
- Using more technical and physical security features
- Difficult to forge and harder to get
- Increase the reputation of TD

ePassport most secure passport ever issued

- Increased use of data bases:
- Linking births & deaths
- Linking of government data bases
  ◦ Legal issues / data protection
- Social footprint - Interviews
- Use of biometrics to prevent multiple applications
- Automation of biometric checks

Improvements in Issuance Procedures

Biometrics in Issue Process as well as in Document

- ePassport most secure passport ever issued, however
  - Not many readers deployed
  - Does not prove identity but seals ID
  - Not many ePassports protected by PKI security
  - No distribution of keys to verify and authenticate

- In general, Poor National identity management
  - Establish identity
  - Confirm citizenship
  - Assess entitlement

Current Weaknesses

- Counterfeit documents
- Theft of blank documents
- Malfeasance, nonfeasance, corruption
- NOT inspecting ePassports in the proper manner
- False identity-using genuine evidence obtained improperly to obtain a genuine document
- False identity-using manufactured evidence of support to obtain a genuine document
- False identity-using lost or stolen already-issued genuine documents
- Multiple issuance/multiple identities

Threats

- Criminals will always pick the <u>weakest link</u>:
  - Document security
  - Issuing procedures
  - False identity
- Threat changes as technologies & procedures develop
- Threat varies from country to country
- Weak identity management processes undermine the integrity of highly secure travel documents.

Threat to MRPs and eMRPs

2006

- Identity Fraud = 31%
- Docum. Fraud = 54%
- Remainder = 15%

Document Fraud

ID Fraud

2009

- Identity Fraud = 71%
- Docum. Fraud = 29%

Document Fraud

ID Fraud

Threats - Identity Fraud

- TAG/MRTD 19
- ICAO Assembly and Resolution
- Secretariat Support

"Towards Better Practices in National Identity Management"

Evidence of Identity – What?

- Provide a full and comprehensive perspective on factors to be considered and the nature of sources to be consulted to develop a complete perspective for <u>entitlement</u> and <u>document adjudication judgements and decisions</u>.

- Include documents and bring the attention all of the other accompanying ways in which the Evidence of Identity considerations should be viewed.

Purpose

- The **scope** is to provide States with guidance on Evidence of Identity foundation to properly and uniquely identify individuals for the purposes of issuing trusted travel documents and contribute to overall security worldwide.

Scope

- Means used to verify these components include civil registration, social footprint, foundation (source) documents
- Includes the use of technological and electronic tools to uniquely verify the TD bearer's identity, such as PKI, PKD, biometric algorithms et al.

Scope

IS NOT about the full spectrum of Identity Management, but rather these components for establishing identity:

1. Identity Exists	2. Person Links to Identity	3. Person Uses Identity
Objective A To determine that the identity exists (i.e. that the identity is not fictitious) **Objective B** To determine that it is a living identity	**Objective C** To determine that the applicant links to the identity **Objective D** To provide confidence that the applicant is the sole claimant of the identity	**Objective E** To provide confidence of the applicant's use of the identity

Scope

Evidence of Identity

TR intended to be used by:

- Full spectrum of identity management;
- Issuing, inspection, police, immigration authorities, and those engaged in other document entitlement endeavours
  - This include issuers of driving licenses, cards of national identity, voter registration and others.

Purpose

Designed for:

- Those involved in civil registry and other vital records-related database activities
- Those related entitlement functions, birth and death, marriages and divorces, and other civil registry matters.

Purpose

Evidence of Identity

- Assist States to properly and uniquely identify individuals
- Establishment of identity and validation of identity for security purposes
- Avoid identity fraud
- States to take action
- Development of the TR

Conclusion

Step 1 - Client requests service

Step 2 - Agency undertakes EOI process

Step 3 - Service delivery

Client record creation

Generic EOI **establishment of identity** processes

Applicant requests service from agency

Applicant provides required EOI information

Discrepancy, exceptions & investigations processes

Client provided with document and/ or key to use for subsequent service requests

Agency creates client record

Agency checks applicant's use of identity in community

Check client database(s) for existing application records

Examples: Driver licence, Healthcare Card, Electoral Roll Record

SAMPLE
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Natacha Sample

- Thank you for your attention

  ◦ Mauricio Siciliano
    ICAO MRTD Programme