



International Civil Aviation Organization

Seventh Symposium and Exhibition  
on ICAO MRTDs, Biometrics  
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


# Authenticating Travel Documents: Challenges and Good Practices

Bill Russell  
Vice President, Mount Airey Group, USA

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# What's on the Chip?



# Doc 9303 Context of MRTD Validation

Over 90 States now use Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) data elements to protect MRTDs.

*Section IV, "PKI for Machine Readable Travel Documents", in Vol. 2 of Doc 9303*

## What is needed to validate MRTD authenticity?

- The Document Security Object (SO<sub>D</sub>)
- Country Signing Certification Authority Certificates (C<sub>CSCA</sub>)
- Document Signer Certificates (C<sub>DS</sub>)
- Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs)
- Master Certificate Lists
- ICAO PKD and access to other country repositories
- Policies governing each State



## Why are so few States validating MRTDs?

- Must already have  $C_{CSCA}$  for State,  $C_{DS}$ , and CRLs
- Systems to validate PKI data must be able to process multiple algorithms
- Data must be obtained from all around the world
- PKI data changes continually, which requires live updates
- Collection systems must protect against bad PKI data
- Border inspection systems should not connect to the internet
- Inspection of PKI authenticity must be fast
- Policies vary widely from State to State
- Validating Doc 9303 components includes:
  - Verifying data groups using  $SO_D$  and  $C_{DS}$  from MRTD
  - Constructing certificate chain from  $C_{DS}$  to a trusted  $C_{CSCA}$
  - Checking revocation status for  $C_{DS}$  using CRL
  - Performing X.509 certificate checks based on RFC 3280/5280



# Issuer Responsibility Recommendations

- Ensure that publication of travel documents conform to Doc 9303
- Establish known intervals for publishing PKI data elements
  - Certificate Revocation Lists
  - Document Signer Certificates
  - Master Certificate Lists (coordinated between groups)
- Publish all PKI data elements in a publically available LDAP directory
  - ICAO PKD
  - State border directory
  - Commercial border directory
- Identify points of contact that can be notified if there are technical problems with published PKI data elements

# Inspection Design Recommendations


- ICAO Public Key Directory (PKD) interface support
- LDAP directory interface support
- Configurable X.500 directory precedence for data sources
- Centralized service for e-Passport Document Signer Certificates
- Extended algorithm support, unnamed ECDSA curves & RSA-PSS
- ICAO Master Certificate List management support (coordinated)
- Blacklist capability for explicitly untrusted signers
- Ability to configure grace policies specific to each State
- Multi-tier authentication process to maximize security
- Multi-person security controls to avoid single points of failure
- Secure audit trail

# Policy & Configuration Options by State

- What root authorities ( $C_{CSCA}$ ) are allowed for each State?
- Is a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) required?
- Will unanticipated document signers ( $C_{DS}$ ) be allowed?
- What grace periods will be allowed for revocation lists?
- What certificates have been explicitly blacklisted?
- Where should PKI data be obtained for each State?
- How frequently should data be refreshed for each State?
- Which data sources have priority?
- How frequently will data be updated?
- Who are the primary and secondary points of contact
  - To report an issue such as an expired CRL?
  - To receive update notifications from?



# Multi-Tier Authentication Design



- 1 Securely administrate policies
- 2 Pre-screen PKI data from internet
- 3 Pre-authenticate document signers
- 4 Publish authentication results to border
- 5 Read travel document
- 6 Authenticate travel data ( $SO_D$ )
- 7 Authenticate signer ( $C_{DS}$ )
- 8 Display results



# Robustness & Performance Testing



**Authentication of e-Passport data should meet your Border Inspection Peak Load estimates.**

**Keep in mind:**

- With global e-Passport participation the ICAO PKD *might grow to* 20,000 document signer certificates, however there are currently less than 2,000 document signer certificates in the PKD.
- The IATA projects 3.3 billion international air passengers in 2014; or about 100 transactions/second if every international traveler was processed by one server.
- Individual transaction times of 100-200ms can be processed in parallel to other e-Passport checks, making the authentication time negligible.

# Questions?



**Paul Townsend**  
**Director of Cybersecurity**  
[ptownsend@mountaireygroup.com](mailto:ptownsend@mountaireygroup.com)  
(Office) +1 240 285 9596  
(Mobile) +1 301 908 0293

**Bill Russell**  
**Vice President, Mount Airey Group**  
[brussell@mountaireygroup.com](mailto:brussell@mountaireygroup.com)  
(Office) +1 703 327 2573  
(Mobile) +1 571 334 1671

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