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Evidence of Identity: Breeder Documents and Beyond

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Why Care?

- *A false passport in the hands of a terrorist is as dangerous as a bomb* ... US 9/11 Commission
- From the Migration Policy Institute: The proliferation of counterfeit breeder documents continues to be a "major cause for concern," because the government so far has tended to focus on "front end" forms of identification like driver's licenses and passports.
 - * Arrests in Pakistan of a father and son allegedly having used a a stolen identity to establish the communications network for the Mumbai terrorists.
 - * One of the accused Dubai assassins was in possession of a genuine German ePassport.

We Must Care

- Over the past several years, many nations of the world have invested time, money and great expectations in enhanced travel document programs, especially in machine readable ePassports employing biometrics.
- By all accounts, the current generation of ICAO-compliant travel documents is the best and most secure the world has ever known. The travel document community can take great pride in these accomplishments. However, there is a threat that affects virtually all issuing authorities that can undermine, or indeed, subvert this important work: national identity management, that is, the kinds of documents, civil registry systems and other media and ways that are used to verify and/or validate an applicant's identity.
- Currently, much of the judgments that countries reach regarding issuance of travel documents are based in large part on the representations of the applicant in validating their bona fides.
- At the recent Seventh ICAO Symposium, speaker after speaker called for improvements and concerted effort on addressing and improving this situation.

Breeder Documents

- Breeder documents are the fundamental physical evidence accepted by national authorities to establish a *prima facie* claim to an identity.
- The international travel document community is finally calling for a global focus on this problem to improve the foundations on which the world's travel documents rely.
- This has now been an ICAO TAG-accepted work item and efforts are well underway.
- After this presentation, my intent is that "breeder documents" will mean much more to identity management, indeed the "beyond" of the title of this presentation..

Identity Documents

Travel Documents



- **International treaty**
- **Globally interoperable**
- **Well organized multilaterally**
- **Existing systems and guidance**
- **Security features**
- **Founded on premise of machine readability**

Breeder Documents



- **No international foundations**
- **Unlimited number**
- **No systems, no guidance, no generalized handbooks and above all, no interoperability**
- **No systems of security or other guardian features**
- **No Standards**

The Threat

- Although look-alike fraud is still quite common, it is expected that the use of biometrics will help to impede this type of crime. Over the next few years, a large number of identity, travel, residence and other identity documents will contain a biometric identifier that will enable verification, within an automated environment, and remotely if desired.
- We live in an increasingly global context that more and more relies on high-quality identity documentation, which includes all underlying civil and administrative systems and processes.
- Although we have taken extensive and successful steps to improve the quality of identity documents, there remains to be addressed the foundations upon which these documents ultimately reside. This includes the documents themselves as well as the registries and other databases that form the cornerstone for verification.
- These kinds of improvements have resulted in an increasingly prevalent global shift *from document fraud to identity fraud*, bringing even greater pressures on document issuing programs.

Heightened Intensity

- In addition to introducing improved security features and biometrics with chip technologies, many countries have also moved from a decentralised to a centralised personalisation system. This change allows issuing authorities to apply high-quality personalisation techniques in an extremely cost-effective manner and respond quickly to the latest developments in the area of document fraud.
- The introduction of new security features, production methods and personalisation techniques has made the most recent generation of identification documents more difficult to forge.
- Moreover, increasing emphasis on staff training has increased the likelihood of a forged or counterfeit ID document being detected.

More Than Ever Before

- The threat of an individual presenting a genuine passport that was issued on the basis of false evidence of identity documentation is very real.
- In today's document issuing environment, presentation of these false documents and false claims of entitlement will be rewarded with a travel, residence or identity document that has far more credibility than ever before, a document that in many countries contains a chip with biometric information of the bearer.
- Today's documents contain advanced security features of great capability and when present, generally attest to the veracity of the documents themselves, and, hence, the bearer.
- With the advances that have been made in the documents themselves, there is a much quicker and widespread presumption on the part of inspection authorities to "accept" the legitimacy of the documents and thereby, the bearer.

Databases and Civil Registries

- As well as the documents themselves that are the “usual suspects” used by applicants for travel documents, such as birth certificates, cards of national identity and driving licenses, often, though not universal, the information that is captured in these and other breeder documents also resides in a database of national content.
- While the existence, quality and ease of accessing such databases and civil registry systems vary dramatically from country to country, increasingly governments have been focusing on these sources of information in addition to the documents themselves or in some cases in lieu of some documents.
- Though this is a very useful approach to verifying the legitimacy of entitlement claims, there are sometimes limitations of a legal or privacy nature that impedes the use and utility of these databases.
- Some countries are beginning to link these civil registry data sources, for example birth and death records, to serve as automatic checks and verifications. This initiative seeks to acknowledge the importance of these secure sources of information and to offer suggestions on their use in addition to the documents themselves.

Establishing Identity

- The claim to an identity is tested by the national authority checking:
 1. what does the applicant “know” about the identity that is claimed;
 2. who “is” the applicant;
 3. what does the applicant “have” to support the claimed identity.

National Civil registry

- In managing identity for the benefit of their communities and citizens, National Civil Registration and passport issuing authorities must:
 1. Establish identity;
 2. Confirm citizenship;
 3. Assess entitlement.

Social Footprint

- Testing what the client “knows” about the identity they are claiming will usually involve completion of an application form, information which can be checked at an interview.
- Corroborating checks may extend to confirmation that the claimed identity is actually being used in the community – a process sometimes described as checking the social footprint or social context.
- The concept of a “living identity” puts all the factors into perspective.
- Identifying and articulating better practice in this area is a task identified in ICAO’s long term concept of Vision.

Introduction of Biometrics

- Checking who the applicant “is” will usually involve the collection and comparison with prior records of unique biometric information; for passports, photographs and signatures have been the traditional biometrics.
- With ICAO’s development of the ePassport, digital facial and/or fingerprint and/or iris images allow automation of biometric comparisons at issuance and at border clearance.
- And in this regard, it **MUST** be noted that the documents must be inspected and the electronic security tools used.

The Message

- One of the primary messages (for now) of this presentation is in the testing of what applicants “have” to support their claim to a particular identity.
- The civil registration and identity documents which accompany an application (that the applicants “have”) for a travel document or the application for an identity card which entitles passport issuance are generally referred to as breeder documents.
- However, NOW we want to broaden the concept beyond documents, and broaden the message from this presentation.

Components of an Operational Model

- The three components for establishing identity involve:
 1. **Evidence** that the claimed identity is valid, i.e. that the person was in fact born and, if so, that the owner of that identity is still alive.
 2. **Evidence** that the presenter links to the claimed identity – i.e. that the person claiming the identity is who they say they are and that they are the only claimant of the identity.
 3. **Evidence** that the presenter uses the claimed identity – i.e. that the claimant is operating under this identity within the community.
- This is the model for the **Evidence** of Identity.

Current Work

- A Work Paper regarding the evidence of identity was presented to the ICAO TAG and approved for development
- A work group has been established and a comprehensive Table of Contents has been developed to guide the work toward a TR
- Work group volunteers have submitted draft inputs for aggregation into the initial draft
- Among a number of specific areas covered, examples:
 - * Social Footprint
 - * Birth Certificates
 - * Civil Registries

Framing Some Best Practices


A Start

- Adherence to specific guidelines will provide a higher level of confidence in presenting individual's identity.
- Accept only original documents or copies certified by the issuing authority of the particular document.
- Accept only documents that are currently valid - a valid document is one that has an expiry date that has not yet passed.
- Accept only full birth certificates
- Unless confirmation of long-term name usage is required, only accept evidence of 'use in the community' documents that are less than one year old.
- Require at least one form of trusted photographic identification, preferably issued by a Government authority.
- Require documented evidence of any name change - (e.g. property deed, marriage certificate, or a statutory declaration).
- Where the authenticity of a particular document is in any way questionable, verify the authenticity of that document with the issuing authority.

Summary

- One size does not fit all
- Use risk assessment and management
 - Direct-passport fraud
 - Indirect-financial transactions, elections and other uses of false identity documents
- Verify identity-related data against source data and with a trusted referee
 - Birth and death
 - Tax and property deeds
 - Privacy considerations must be in the conscious forefront
- Human resources: Greatest strength and greatest weakness
 - Issuers that provide services with moderate to high identity-related risk should provide their staff with document examination training and will have to determine for themselves how in-depth this training should be and whether it should be provided by internal staff or by an outside specialist.
 - As a minimum, new frontline staff should be trained to recognize the types of documents that they will most frequently be presented with and shown what features to look for when examining them; constant updating is a must-do challenge.
- Monitor activities on a continuing and regular basis
- Remember that biometrics are a TOOL
 - Personal appearance
 - Living identity
- Stay tuned to the ICAO initiative

*Thank you for your
attention...*



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