



PKD Services and Architecture



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Trust Decisions



- **Verification of signature on passport validates that data in passport has not been tampered**
- **Does not automatically guarantee who put in the data**
- **Path Validation of the signing certificate crucial to ensuring the identity of the issuer**



Trust Decisions



→ For path validation:

- Trusted CSCA exchange
- Master Lists published in PKD are excellent means to ensure trust in CSCA

Country C

- Country A

- Country B

Country A ML

- Country A

- Country B

- Country C

Country B ML

- Country A

- Country B

- Country C

OTHERS HAVE THE SAME CSCA



Trust Decisions



→ For path validation:

- Check CRL as part of signature validation
- Check PKD frequently for latest CRL
- If country publishes CRL on a web site, check that site frequently



Trust Decisions



→ Reliability of DSC

- Any certificate issued under the CSCA can sign a document
- Document Signer - has intent and authorization to sign travel documents



Trust Decisions



→ Sources of DSC

- PKD
- Received through bilateral exchange – exchange mechanism needs to secure
- Harvest from passports presented at Border



PKD Concept



A Global Trust Exchange






Current Services of the PKD


- **Document Signers and CRLs of Participants**
- **CSCA Registry – Yellow Pages for the Passport Issuance Agency of the Participant**
- **CSCA Master List – List of CSCAs used by Participants**
- **Compliance website to check DSC/CRL/ML against Doc 9303**



Architecture



ICAO PKD Operator DC - Singapore



ICAO PKD Operator DC - Bangkok




PKD Architecture



- **Two locations – connected through redundant MPLS connection – Synchronised in real time**
- **4 directories each location + 2 backup directories**
- **Upload is the only directory that can be accessed by the internet. Copy of data from Upload to Staging directory handled by software**
- **All other directory access requires VPN**
- **Download accessible through LDAP proxy servers only**



PKD Architecture



- **Montreal Operations office**
- **Can only connect to Netrust datacenter through VPN**
- **CSCAs of Participants are maintained in HSM**



Process Flow



- **Import of CSCA into HSM at Montreal**
- **Upload of DSC/CRL/Masterlist by participant**
- **Verification and Approval**
- **Publish to live**
- **Download – Participant and non-participant**



Import of CSCA



- **Country sends Thumbprint through Email/Fax**
- **Representative carries CSCA. Country sends details of representative to ICAO for verification**
- **Personnel involved - Three Security Officers, one IS person, one Operator + Country representative**



Upload by Participant



→ Authentication using 2-way SSL

- Country generates CSR. Sends to Netrust.
- Netrust signs using a root used only for issuing credentials for PKD access.
- SASL external mechanism.

→ Login monitored - each wrong login sends sms to 6 personnel within Netrust

- Details of account attempted and IP address of the user


→ If three attempts exceeded, account is locked out

Upload by Participant

➔ **Access limited to creating entries in a restricted area**

- Every entry created/modified is copied automatically to an archive system with date/time, creators name and modifiers name. Hence, an audit trail of the access (write only).

➔ **Read access for CSCA registry**





PKD

- dc=CSCARegistry,dc=pkdUpload
 - c=FR
 - c=GB
 - c=JP
 - c=AU
 - o=EMRTD Authority
 - cn=Brian+sn=FFROST
 - c=NZ
 - c=US
 - c=CA
 - c=KR
 - c=SG
 - o=EMRTD Authority
 - cn=Chek Fran+sn=TAM
- c=DE
- c=AU,dc=pkdWrite,dc=pkdUpload
 - o=CRLs
 - o=Country Upload Officers
 - cn=AU Uploader1
 - o=Certificates
 - o=CSCAMasterListLite
 - o=CSCAMasterList
- dc=pkdDownload
 - dc=data
 - dc=CSCAMasterList
 - dc=CSCAMasterList(PKD Participants)
 - ou=download
- c=AU,o=Downloaders,dc=pkdDownload
 - cn=AUDownloader1
 - cn=AUDownloader

Attribute	Value
o	AUSTRALIAN PASSPORT OFFICE
street	DEPARTMENT of FOREIGN AFFAIRS and TRADERG CASEY...
sn	FFROST
telephoneNumber	+61 2 6261 1236
mail	brian.ffrost@dfat.gov.au
facsimileTelephoneNumber	+61 2 6261 1038
objectClass	top
objectClass	person
objectClass	organizationalPerson
objectClass	inetOrgPerson
cn	Brian
title	Executive Officer
description	Supervisor: John OsborneDirector,PASSPORT SYSTEMS A...



Verification and Approval



→ Monitoring engine

- Checks entries every hour
- Checks the DN of the DSC/CRL and entry against interface specs
 - Participants will be using an automated solution. Error indicates a red flag.
 - Check if the country in the DN is the same as the tree.
- Sends signed email to country acknowledging receipt
 - In house fraud can be detected.



Verification and Approval



→ Approval

- Cool down period of 4 days between sending receipt email to country and approval - no cool down for CRL.
- Country can request to stop further processing of entry
- Request entered in system by ICAO operators
- Automatic email sent to countries regarding action taken



Publish to live



- Every 6 hours, an automatic batch examines all entries that are approved.**
- Entries Copied to live, creates LDIF, calculates checksum.**
- Email sent to country informing of entry in live.**



Download



→ Web based access – anybody can download

- only complete ldif can be downloaded.

→ Participants use LDAP access to download

- Either full LDIF or can do ldap query.
- Authentication is username+password over SSL
- Main concern is quality of service, not access control.



Download – non-participants



→ Accessible at

- <https://pkddownloadsg.icao.int>
- <https://pkddownloadth.icao.int>

→ Script prevention measures in place

→ Version number is listed and file is available for download

→ Checksum available at

- <https://pkddownloadsg.icao.int/ICAO/pkdChksum.jsp>
- <https://pkddownloadth.icao.int/ICAO/pkdChksum.jsp>

→ Soon, law enforcement of non-Participants will be able to automate download as well



DR planning



→ Scenario analysis of the impact of Disasters. Classified into three categories

– OUTCON 1

- Single component failure
- No external impact
- No loss of data integrity

– OUTCON 2


- Single component failure
- Slight external impact
- Possible loss of data integrity

– OUTCON 3

- Significant external impact
- Possible service outage
- Significant possibility of loss of data integrity.



National PKD





Trust Decisions



→ Other checks necessary at terminal

- DSC subject name and Issuer subject name belong to the same country as passport presented




Management of Trust



- **In country authoritative source for own DSCs**
- **Automated download from PKD and validation of own country data**
- **Automated import of PKD contents to local repositories**
- **Secure import of CSCAs - ceremonial**
- **Secure import of DSCs/CRLs received through diplomatic means**
- **Harvesting of new DSCs from Passports for future decisions.**



IMMIGRATION TERMINALS




NB: Immigration Terminal can invoke a Local Query to the CONSUMER Local Directory or a Global Query to the MASTER Repository


Software Modules

- Signature Verification Module


COUNTRY PKD



COUNTRY e-PASSPORT CA & RA



STAGING



Software Modules

- Country CA Cert Import Module
- Non-null CRL Import Module
- ICAO PKD Download and DSC/ CRL Import Module



Summary



- **PKD is an essential component of verification at Border**
- **PKD is a tool for ensuring compliance to Doc 9303**
- **PKD participation ensures wider acceptance of your travel documents**



Thank You

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