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WORKING PAPER

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ASSEMBLY — 37TH SESSION

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Agenda Item 13: Security Policy

TRIAL OF ADVANCED IMAGING TECHNOLOGY IN JAPAN

(Presented by Japan)

INFORMATION PAPER

SUMMARY

In an attempted terrorist attack on Northwest Airlines flight 253 which occurred on 25 December last year, the perpetrator exploited the current security system by utilising explosive chemical substances which are undetected under current metal detector technologies. Japan carried out a trial of Advanced Imaging Technology (hereinafter "AIT") at Narita Airport in order to keep safety of flight passengers and to consider countermeasures against the threat of terrorist attacks on civil aircrafts. The evaluation of the trial is currently in progress.

1. BACKGROUND

1.1 An attempted terrorist attack on the Northwest Airlines flight 253 happened on 25 December last year. In this incident, the perpetrator exploited the current security system by utilizing explosive chemical substances which are undetectable under current metal detector technologies.

1.2 In response to the incident, Ministerial Conferences on Aviation Security were held from region to region. Japan hosted the Asia-Pacific Ministerial Conference on Aviation Security in Tokyo on 13 March, 2010. At the Ministerial Conference, the Asia-Pacific Joint Declaration on Aviation Security was adopted. The following element was included in the Joint Declaration: "Utilize modern technologies to detect prohibited materials and to prevent the carriage of such materials on board aircraft while respecting the privacy and safety of individuals."

1.3 In responding to the Joint Declaration, the Japanese government decided to carry out a trial of Advanced Imaging Technology (hereinafter "AIT"). The purposes of this trial are to safeguard the safety of flight passengers and to consider countermeasures against the threat of terrorist attacks on civil aircrafts.

2. TRIAL AT NARITA AIRPORT

2.1 In order to examine the future possibility of introducing AIT into airports in Japan, we conducted trials with voluntary participation of passengers at Narita Airport from 5 July to 17 September, 2010. During that period, we tested five different millimeter/terahertz wave types of AIT. The equipments that we tested are as follows:

a) Active Automatic Detector ProVisionTM ATD by L-3 Communications Holdings, Inc. (USA), July 5-9;

b) Passive Millimeter Waves Detector MPI 2 by Tohoku University, Chuo Electronics Co., Ltd, Maspro Corp. (Japan), July 20-24;

c) Passive Millimeter Waves Detector SafeScreen by Brijot Imaging System, Inc.(USA), August 2-6;

d) Passive Terahertz Waves Detector T8000 by ThruVision Systems Limited (UK), September 6-10; and

e) Active Detector "eqo" by Smiths Heimann GmbH (Germany), September 13-17.

Prior to the trials, we compiled a guideline on privacy protection and health impact under the "Exploratory Committee on Trial of AIT" consisting of experts from relevant fields.

2.2 In its trial, we decided to focus on millimeter/terahertz wave types of AIT and examine their detection capabilities, while making allowances for privacy protection. With respect to privacy protection, the screening protocol for the millimeter wave type of AIT which displays clear full-body images of those screened is as follows (this protocol is only applied to Active Detector "eqo" by Smiths Heimann GmbH):

a) Only screeners who are in charge of monitoring images scanned under passengers' clothing can enter the monitor room. The machine displays full-body images that blur faces;

b) A screener of the same gender as the person being screened checks scanned images on monitors;

c) The screeners who are in the monitor room may never see screened passengers;

d) The machine does not store any images that it displays. The images are not allowed to be transmitted to the outside of the monitor room. The images are deleted as soon as the screening is completed; and

e) Any device for taking pictures, such as mobile phones and cameras, cannot be brought into the monitor room.

2.3 With respect to other types of AIT which do not display clear full-body images, the following screening protocol is applied:

a) The machine does not store any images which it displays. The images are deleted as soon as the screening is completed; and

b) Only screeners and the passenger himself/herself can check the scanned image.

2.4 With respect to health impact, we believe that there is no health concern on any of the tested equipment since the electric intensity generated by them is far below the standard value under the national guideline on radio wave protection.

3. FUTURE PLAN

3.1 From this point on, based on the result of questionnaires filled out by volunteer participants and our evaluation on the capabilities of AIT, we will carefully examine the relevancy and necessity of introducing AIT into airports in Japan at the Exploratory Committee.

4. ACTION BY ASSEMBLY

4.1 The Assembly is invited to note the trial of AIT in Japan.

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