



ICAO MID

ASPIG/3

Third Meeting of the Aerodromes Safety,
Planning and Implementation Group



SAFETY

CAPACITY & EFFICIENCY



Final Report

25 - 27 October 2021



INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

**REPORT OF THE AERODROME SAFETY &
PLANNING IMPLEMENTATION GROUP (ASPIG/3)**

(Virtual, 25-27 October 2021)

The views expressed in this Report should be taken as those of the Regional Aviation Safety Group and not of the Organization. This Report will, however, be submitted to the ICAO Council and any formal action taken will be published in due course as a Supplement to the Report.

Approved by the Meeting
and published by authority of the Secretary General

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PART I – HISTORY OF THE MEETING

1. PLACE AND DURATION

1.1 The Third meeting of the Aerodrome Safety & Planning Implementation Group (ASPIG/3) was held virtually, 25-27 October 2021, using MS Teams.

2. OPENING

1.2 The meeting was opened by Mr. Mohamed Smaoui, Acting Regional Director, ICAO Middle East Office, who welcomed the participants to the ASPIG/3 meeting.

1.3 Mr. Smaoui highlighted the most important agenda items which will be addressed by the meeting and thanked all participants for their attendance wishing them successful and productive meeting.

3. ATTENDANCE

1.4 The meeting was attended by a total of Sixty (60) participants from thirteen (13) States (Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, UAE and Yemen) and five (5) Organizations (ACI and IATA, IFATCA, IFALPA and WBA). The list of participants is at **Attachment A**.

4. OFFICERS AND SECRETARIAT

1.5 The meeting was chaired by Mr. Mohammed Yousif Mohamed, Acting Manager Aerodromes Section, General Civil Aviation Authority (GCAA), UAE.

1.6 Mr. Mohamed Iheb Hamdi, the Regional Officer for Aerodromes and Ground Aids (RO/AGA) was the Secretary of the meeting.

5. LANGUAGE

5.1 Discussions were conducted in English and documentation was issued in English.

6. AGENDA

6.1 The following Agenda was adopted:

Agenda Item 1: Adoption of the Provisional Agenda

Agenda Item 2: Regional Performance Framework for Aerodrome Safety

Agenda Item 3: Regional Performance Framework for Aerodrome Capacity and Efficiency

Agenda Item 4: Future Work Programme

Agenda Item 5: Any other Business

7. CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIONS – DEFINITION

7.1 The RASG-MID records its actions in the form of Conclusions and Decisions with the following significance:

- a) **Conclusions** deal with matters that, according to the Group's terms of reference, merit directly the attention of States and its stakeholders/partners, or on which further action will be initiated by the Secretary in accordance with established procedures; and
- b) **Decisions** relate solely to matters dealing with the internal working arrangements of the Group and its subsidiary bodies.

8. LIST OF CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIONS

*DRAFT CONCLUSION 3/1: MID AIR NAVIGATION DEFICIENCIES MANAGEMENT
PROCESS (MID AND-MP)*

*DRAFT DECISION 3/1: ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MID REGION ACDM TASK
FORCE (MID ACDM-TF)*

PART II: REPORT ON AGENDA ITEMS**REPORT ON AGENDA ITEM 1: ADOPTION OF THE PROVISIONAL AGENDA**

1.1 The subject was addressed in WP/1 presented by the Secretariat. The meeting reviewed and adopted the Agenda as at paragraph 6 of the History of the Meeting

REPORT ON AGENDA ITEM 2: REGIONAL PERFORMANCE FRAMEWORK FOR AERODROME SAFETY

Follow-Up on Endorsed Conclusions Related to Aerodrome Safety

2.1 The subject was addressed in WP/2 presented by the Secretariat. The meeting reviewed the progress made for the implementation of the RSC/7, MIDANPIRG/18 & RASG-MID/8 Conclusions, as at **Appendix 2A**.

Aerodromes Safety Dashboard

2.2 The subject was addressed in WP/3 presented by the Secretariat. The meeting noted with appreciation the new methodology used by the MID Office to Manage Aerodromes & Ground Aids and Aerodromes Operations (AGA-AOP) matters, as well as, the new workflow established address of the ASPIG activities essentially based on collected and analysed data. The secretariat emphasised on the importance of the Data-driven decision making process to effectively implement the ICAO requirements in line with the Regional and Global Aviation Safety Plans.

2.3 The meeting reviewed and updated the progress made at the Regional Level on Aerodromes Safety Management, as at **Appendix 2B**, in terms of :

- Aerodrome Certification Implementation,
- Runways Safety Teams Establishment, and
- Global Reporting Format Implementation/Deployment.

2.4 The meeting noted with appreciation the decision made by IRAQ CAA the suspend all international Aerodromes Certificates considering the establishment of a national project in order to recertify those Aerodromes based on new applicable regulatory framework and the use of qualified inspectors, supported by necessary tools, to implement the Aerodromes certification process.

2.5 The meeting noted that the ICAO MID Office received a request from Iran in order to update Iran's International Aerodromes list/data respectively included in the MID eANP Tables AOP I-1 and AOP II-1. Accordingly, ICAO MID Office will issue a Proposal for Amendment (PFA) to amend the MID eANP in accordance with the PFA approval process.

Follow-up of the Aerodromes SEIs included in the MID Regional Aviation Safety Plan (MID RASP) 2020-2022 Edition.

2.6 The subject was addressed in WP/4 presented by the Secretariat. The meeting was apprised on the implementation progress of the referenced SEIs related to AGA-AOP and their associated Actions as follows:

- G2-SEI-01: Strengthening of States' Safety Oversight Capabilities
- G3-SEI-01: Certification of International Aerodromes
- G3-SEI-02: Establish Runway Safety Team (RST) at International Aerodromes
- G4-SEI-01: Promote the Use of industry Programmes
- G1-SEI-01: Aircraft upset in flight (LOC-I)
- G1-SEI-02: Runway Safety- Runway Excursion
- G1-SEI-03: Runway Safety- Runway Incursion
- G1-SEI-05B: Ensure the Safe Operations of UAS (drones)

2.7 The meeting reviewed and updated the SEIs related to AGA-AOP and their associated safety actions, as well as the status of implementation of the SEIs as at **Appendix 2C**.

2.8 With regard to G3-SEI-01, the meeting noted with appreciation the effort made by the ICAO MID Office in terms of planning and conduct of capacity building activities notably the Implementing Annex 14 and Aerodrome Certification virtual training classrooms. In addition the meeting noted with appreciation the effort made by UAE and Egypt, with the support of Secretariat, in developing a Regional Safety Advisory (RSA) on Apron Management, as at **Appendix 2D**. The meeting agreed to present the final draft of the RSA to the RASG-MID/9 for its endorsement and publication.

2.9 In connection with the above SEI, the meeting was apprised of the deployment of the ICAO implementation Package (iPack) on Aerodrome Restart. The meeting noted that Syria was selected for the deployment of the aforementioned iPack. The meeting highlighted that the goal of this iPack is to facilitate and guide Civil Aviation Authorities and/or aerodrome operators in applying Annex 14, Volume I and other relevant ICAO provisions, to ensure safety, regularity and efficiency of aerodrome operations after a partial or full aerodrome closure due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In this regard, the meeting encouraged States which are willing to get the iPack on Aerodrome Restart to express their interest to the ICAO MID Office in order to facilitate the deployment of the iPack.

2.10 With reference to G1-SEI-02, the meeting was apprised of the 4 ACI-ICAO Global Reporting Format (GRF) customized Virtual Training Classrooms been conducted for the benefit of MID States CAAs and Airport Operators. The meeting noted with appreciation the active involvement of the MID States which participated to the 4 GRF Virtual Classrooms. In this regard, the meeting encouraged States, which are willing to get the ACI-ICAO GRF Training, to express their interest to the ICAO MID Office in order to facilitate the deployment of the course.

SOP on Runway Surface Condition Reporting

2.11 The subject was addressed in WP/5 presented by the UAE. The meeting was apprised of the Standard Operations Procedure on Runway Surface Condition Reporting, as at **Appendix 2E**. The meeting noted with appreciation the effort made by UAE and agreed to use the aforementioned SOP as a baseline to develop a Regional Safety Advisory (RSA) on Runway Surface Condition Assessment. The meeting agreed that an action group, championed by UAE and supported by Iran, Oman and Saudi Arabia, be assigned for the development of the RSA in order to its final draft to the ASPIG/4 meeting for its validation.

SMS Toolkit designed for GHSP

2.12 The subject was addressed in WP/6 presented by the UAE. The meeting was apprised of the Safety Management System (SMS) Toolkit designed for Ground Handling Service Provider (GHSP) as at **Appendix 2F**. The meeting noted with appreciation the effort made by UAE and encouraged States to use the Toolkit guidance as best practices and adjust it to develop local technical guidelines as deemed necessary.

2.13 In this regard, the meeting recalled that an action group, championed by Saudi Arabia and supported by IATA, is assigned to develop a Regional Safety Advisory (RSA) on Ground Handling Service Provider Certification and present its final draft to the ASPIG/4 meeting for its validation.

APPENDIX 2A

Conclusion ID #	conclusions and decisions	Why: concerns/challenges/rationale	deliverables		When: Deadline	Last Revised Deadline	Drafted by	Endorsed by	status	Date of completion	Actions required by the State	States that didn't reply/take action yet	Remarks
			What: item(s)	Who: responsible									
SAFETY													
RSC C 7/5	Survey on Basic Regulatory Framework FOR Aerodrome Certification								Ongoing				
	That, by May 2020, a Survey on Basic Regulatory Framework for Aerodrome Certification in the MID Region be carried out using the Template at Appendix 3E.	Assurance of the establishment of the necessary Regulatory Framework for Aerodromes Certification by States.	Survey on Basic Regulatory Framework for Aerodrome Certification	States	May-20	15-Aug-21	ASPIG/1	RSC/7			Provide State's Regulatory Framework for Aerodrome Certification	Libya, Yemen	(Revised Date due to the Pandemic Crisis the deadline has been extended to 2021)
RSC C 7/6	Aerodrome Certification Implementation Progress								Ongoing				
	That, States provide the ICAO MID Office, by May 2020 with: a) the status of implementation of the Basic Regulatory Framework for aerodrome certification using the Table 1 of Appendix 3E; and b) their progress/plan for Aerodrome Certification Implementation using the Template at Appendix 3F.	Development of a detailed Aerodrome Certification Implementation Progress/Plan	Progress/Plans on the Aerodrome Certification Implementation	States	May-20	15-Aug-21	ASPIG/1	RSC/7			Provide State's Implementation Plans for Aerodromes certification	Libya, Yemen	(Due to the Pandemic Crisis the deadline has been extended to 2021)
RSC C 7/7	Regional Seminar on Global Reporting Format (GRF)								Completed				
	That, a) a Regional Seminar on Global Reporting Format (GRF) be organized by the ICAO MID Office during the first quarter of 2020; and b) States (CAAs, Airports Operators, ANSPs, Airlines, etc.) and International Organizations are invited to actively participate in this Seminar.	Foster the implementation of the runway condition assessment new methodology in the MID Region: The Global Reporting Format (GRF)	GRF Regional Seminar	ICAO	Q1 of 2020	27-Oct-20	ASPIG/1	RSC/7		27-Oct-20	Participation to the event		(Revised Date. Due to the Pandemic) Replaced by a Regional Webinar conducted on 27 Oct 20
RSC C 7/8	Global Reporting Format (GRF) Implementation and Deployment at Aerodromes								Been replaced and superceded				
	That, States: a) be requested to report on the implementation of the GRF to the ICAO MID Regional Office by July 2020; b) be encouraged to organize at National Level Seminars, Workshops, trainings, etc. related to GRF; and c) ensure full deployment of GRF at their airports.	Effective implementation of the GRF methodology and its deployment at the MID Region Airports	Status report of the GRF implementation and deployment at Airports	States	Jul-20	30-Jul-20	ASPIG/1	RSC/7			Provide Status Report for GRF Implementation	All States	Replaced and superceded by PIRG-RASG C 1/2
PIRG-RASG C 1/2	MID REGION GRF IMPLEMENTATION ACTION PLAN								Ongoing				
	That, States be urged to: a) nominate a National GRF implementation Focal Point to coordinate the implementation activities at the National level; b) provide the ICAO MID Office with the contact details of their nominated GRF Focal Points by end of February 2021; and c) provide regular progress reports/updates on the subject to the ICAO MID Office using the MID Region GRF Implementation Plan Template/Milestones at Appendix 3.2C.	Effective implementation of the GRF methodology and its deployment at the MID Region Airports	States' GRF Implementation Plans	States	May-20	29-Jul-21	ASPIG/2	MIDANPIG/18 RASG/8			Provide State's GRF Implementation Plans	Libya	
RSC C 7/9	Runway Safety Team Implementation Plan								Ongoing				
	That, States be urged to provide the ICAO MID Office by May 2020 with a Runway Safety Team Implementation Progress/Plan, using the Template at Appendix 3G.	Development of a detailed RSTs Implementation Progress/Plan including the GRF Deployment at Airports	Progress/Plans on RSTs Implementation including the GRF Deployment at Airports	States	May-20	15-Aug-21	ASPIG/2	RSC/7			Provide State's RST Implementation Plans	Libya, Yemen	(Due to the Pandemic Crisis the deadline has been extended to 2021)

APPENDIX 2B





MID Region
Aerodromes Safety Dashboard

State	Country Code	Total # of AD (AOP Table I-I)	City	Aerodrome Name (AOP Table I-I)	Location Indicator (AOP Table I-I)	Designation (AOP Table I-I)	AD Certification Implementation		AD Local RST Establishment		AD Readiness for GRF Deployment		National GRF Implementation Plan Progress	Aerodrome Traffic Density		
							Certified	Level of Implementation	Established	Level of Implementation	Ready	Level of Deployment		Light	Medium	Heavy
Bahrain	BHR	1	Manama	Bahrain International Airport	OBBI	RS										
Egypt	EGY	7	Borg ElArab	BORG ELARAB INT AIRPORT	HEBA	RS										
			Aswan	ASWAN INT AIRPORT	HESN	RS										
			Cairo	CAIRO INT AIRPORT	HECA	RS										
			Hurghada	HURGHADA INT AIRPORT	HEGN	RS										
			Luxor	LUXOR INT AIRPORT	HELX	RS										
			Marsa Alam	MARSA ALAM INT AIRPORT	HEMA	RNS										
			Sharm El Sheikh	SHARM EL SHEIKH INT AIRPORT	HESH	RS										
Iran	IRN	9	Bander Abbas	Bandar Abbas International Airport	OIKB	RS										
			Esfahan	Shahid Beheshti International Airport	OIFM	RS										
			Mashhad	Shahid Hashemi Nejad International Airport	OIMM	RS										
			Shiraz	Shahid Dastghaib International Airport	OISS	RS										
			Tabriz	Tabriz International Airport	OITT	RNS										
			Tehran	Imam Khomeini International Airport	OIE	RS										
			Tehran	Mehrabad Int/ OIII	OIII	RS										
			Yazd	Shahid Sadooghi International Airport	OIYY	RS										
			Zahedan	Zahedan International Airport	OIZH	RS										
Iraq	IRQ	6	Al-Najaf	Al-Najaf Al-Ashraf International Airport	ORNI	RNS										
			Baghdad	Baghdad International Airport	ORBI	RS										
			Basrah	Basrah International Airport	ORMM	RS										
			Erbil	Erbil International Airport	ORER	RS										
			Mosul	Mosul International Airport	ORBM	RS										
			Sulaymaniyah	Sulaymaniyah International Airport	ORSU	RS										
Jordan	JKU	2	AMMAN	Queen Alia International Airport	OJAI	RS										
			AQABA	King Hussein International Airport	OJAQ	RS										

As of 27 October 2021

MID Region Aerodromes Safety Dashboard																
State	Country Code	Total # of AD (AOP Table I-I)	City	Aerodrome Name (AOP Table I-I)	Location Indicator (AOP Table I-I)	Designation (AOP Table I-I)	AD Certification Implementation		AD Local RST Establishment		AD Readiness for GRF Deployment		National GRF Implementation Plan Progress	Aerodrome Traffic Density		
							Certified	Level of Implementation	Established	Level of Implementation	Ready	Level of Deployment		Light	Medium	Heavy
Kuwait	KWT	1	KUWAIT	Kuwait International Airport	OKBK	RS										
Lebanon	LBN	1	BEIRUT	Rafic Hariri International Airport	OLBA	RS										
Libya	LBY	3	BENGHAZI	Benina International Airport	HLLB	RS										
			SEBHA	Sebha International Airport	HLLS	RS										
			TRIPOLI	Tripoli International Airport	HLLT	RS										
Oman	OMN	2	Muscat	Muscat International Airport	OOMS	RS										
			Salalah	Salalah International Airport	OOSA	AS										
Qatar	QAT	2	Doha	Doha International Airport	OTBD	RS										
			Doha	Hamad International Airport	OTHH	RS										

MID Region Aerodromes Safety Dashboard																	
State	Country Code	Total # of AD (AOP Table I-I)	City	Aerodrome Name (AOP Table I-I)	Location Indicator (AOP Table I-I)	Designation (AOP Table I-I)	AD Certification Implementation		AD Local RST Establishment		AD Readiness for GRF Deployment		National GRF Implementation Plan Progress	Aerodrome Traffic Density			
							Certified	Level of Implementation	Established	Level of Implementation	Ready	Level of Deployment		Light	Medium	Heavy	
Saudi Arabia	SAU	4	DAMMAM	King Fahd International Airport	OEDF	RS	✓		✓		✗						
			JEDDAH	King Abdulaziz International Airport	OEIN	RS	✓		✓		✓						
			MADINAH	Prince Mohammad Bin Abdulaziz International Airport	OEMA	RS	✓		✓		✗						
			RIYADH	King Khalid International Airport	OERK	RS	✓		✓		✗						
Sudan	SDN	4	EL OBEID	El Obeid International Airport	HSOB	AS	✓		✓		✓						
			KHARTOUM	Khartoum International Airport	HSSS	RS	✓		✓		✓						
			NYALA	Nyala International Airport	HSNN	AS	✗		✓		✓						
			PORT SUDAN	Port Sudan International Airport	HSPN	RS	✓		✓		✓						
Syria	SYR	3	ALEPPO	Aleppo International Airport	OSAP	RS	✗		✗		✗						
			DAMASCUS	Damascus International Airport	OSDI	RS	✗		✗		✗						
			LATTAKIA	Lattakia International Airport	OSLK	RS	✗		✗		✗						
UAE	ARE	8	ABU DHABI	Abu Dhabi International Airport	OMAA	RS	✓		✓		✓						
			ABU DHABI	Al Bateen International Airport	OMAD	RNS	✓		✓		✓						
			AL AIN	Al Ain International Airport	OMAL	RS	✓		✓		✓						
			DUBAI	Al Maktoum International Airport	OMDOW	RS	✓		✓		✓						
			DUBAI	Dubai International Airport	OMBD	RS	✓		✓		✓						
			FUJAIRAH	Fujairah International Airport	OMFJ	RS	✓		✓		✓						
			RAS AL KHAIMAH	Ras Al Khaimah International Airport	OMRK	RS	✓		✓		✓						
SHARJAH	Sharjah International Airport	OMSJ	RS	✓		✓		✓									
Yemen	YEM	5	ADEN	Aden International Airport	OYAA	RS	✗		✗		✗						
			HODEIDAH	Hodeidah International Airport	OYHD	RS	✗		✗		✗						
			MUKALLA	Riyan International Airport	OYRN	RS	✗		✗		✗						
			SANA'A	Sana'a International Airport	OYSN	RS	✗		✗		✗						
			TAIZ	Taiz International Airport	OYTZ	RS	✗		✗		✗						

MID Region Aerodromes Safety Dashboard												
State	Region Code	Total # of AD (AOP Table I-1)	AD Certification Implementation		AD Local RST Establishment		AD Readiness for GRF Deployment		National GRF Implementation Plan Progress	Aerodrome Traffic Density		
			Certified	Level of Implementation	Established	Level of Implementation	Ready	Level of Deployment		Light	Medium	Heavy
MID REGION AERODROMES SAFETY DASHBOARD	MID	58	34		40		33			38	17	3

General Guidance:

- **Country Code** : ISO 3-Letter Code of the Country
- **City/Aerodrome**: Name of the city and aerodrome, preceded by the location indicator.
- **Designation**: Operability of the aerodrome as indicated on the MID eANP Vol I (AOP Table I-1):

RS : international scheduled air transport, regular use;
RNS : international non-scheduled air transport, regular use;
AS : international scheduled air transport, alternate use;
ANS : international non-scheduled air transport, alternate use.

Note 1 : when an aerodrome is needed for more than one type of use, normally only the use highest on the above list is shown.
[Example : an aerodrome required for both RS and AS use would only be shown as RS in the list.]

Note 2 : when the aerodrome is located on an island and no particular city or town is served by the aerodrome, the name of the island is included instead of the name of a city.

- **Aerodrome certification process:**

Phase 1: Dealing with the expression of interest by an intending applicant for the aerodrome certificate;
Phase 2: Assessing the formal application, including evaluation of the aerodrome manual;
Phase 3: Assessing the aerodrome facilities and equipment;
Phase 4: Issuing or refusing an aerodrome certificate; and
Phase 5: Promulgating the certified status of an aerodrome and the required details in the AIP.

- **Aerodrome Traffic Density**

a) **Light.** The number of movements in the mean busy hour is not greater than 15 per runway or typically less than 20 total aerodrome movements.
b) **Medium.** The number of movements in the mean busy hour is of the order of 16 to 25 per runway or typically between 20 to 35 total aerodrome movements.
c) **Heavy.** The number of movements in the mean busy hour is of the order of 26 or more per runway or typically more than 35 total aerodrome movements.

Note 1. The number of movements in the mean busy hour is the arithmetic mean over the year of the number of movements in the daily busiest hour.

Note 2. Either a take-off or a landing constitutes a movement.

AERODROME SAFETY MANAGEMENT RELATED PART

Safety Actions- Consolidated List of SEIs with their respective Actions

SEI Code	SEI name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion date
Organizational Challenges and Emerging Risks					
Goal 2: Strengthen States' Safety Oversight Capabilities					
G2-SEI-01:	Strengthening of States' Safety Oversight Capabilities	A1- Conduct Capacity Building Activities (Workshops, Training, Webinars, GSI Courses) to promote effective implementation of SARPs, with a focus on the following technical areas: ANS, AGA, and OPS	ICAO	USOAP-CMA webinar conducted on 11 Feb 2021	2022
		A2- Conduct technical assistance and NCLB missions to States	ICAO		2022
		A3- Develop and implement a specific NCLB plan of actions	ICAO and concerned States		2022
Goal 3: Ensure the Appropriate Infrastructure is available to Support Safe Operations					
G3-SEI-01:	Certification of International Aerodromes	A1- Support States on the implementation of the ICAO Annex 14 requirements to achieve compliance with regards to Aerodrome Design and Operations, through Workshops/Training	ICAO and ACI. Supported by ACAO	Training course conducted on implementing Annex 14, during period of 8-12 Nov2020	2022
		A2- Enhance capacity building for States CAAs and Airport operators related to aerodromes certification through Workshops/Training	ICAO and ACI		2022
		A3- Develop guidance material/ share best practices on Apron Management (Attachment A)	States (UAE and Egypt)	Completed and ready for endorsement by the RASG-MID	2021

2C-2

		A4 – Deployment of iPack on Aerodrome Re-Start	ICAO	- iPack deployment started with Syria.	2021
G3-SEI-02:	Establish Runway Safety Team (RST) at International Aerodromes	A1- Conduct of assistance missions by the Runway Safety Go-Team (RST)	ICAO. Supported RSP (Runway Safety Programme Partners)		2022
		A2: Support States to implement the Global Reporting Format Methodology through workshops/trainings: (Action addressed under G1-SEI-02: Runway Excursion)	ICAO and ACI. Supported by CANSO, IATA, FAA and Aircraft Manufactures	Webinar has been conducted on 27 Oct 2020	2022
Goal 4: Expand the Use of Industry Programmes					
G4-SEI-01:	Promote the Use of industry Programmes	A1- Encourage IATA’s IOSA and ISAGO registrations through safety promotion	IATA		2022
		A2- Encourage the implementation of ACI Airport Excellence (APEX) in Safety Programme	ICAO and ACI		2022
Goal 5: Implementation of Effective SSPs and SMSs					
G5-SEI-01:	Implement an effective Safety Management	A1- Conduct SSP training course in Cairo	ICAO	SSP course planned for 26 Oct- 1 Sep 2021	2021
		A2- Conduct SSP Workshop in coordination with ACAO in Casablanca, Morocco	ICAO and ACAO	-Postponed due to COVID-19 -An Event Risk Assessment webinar to be delivered on 7 June 2021organised by ICAO MID Office	2021
		A3- Provide SSP/SMS workshops for MID States personnel	ICAO. Supported by IATA, CANSO, ACI, and States (UAE)	SSP workshop conducted in Kuwait in March 20	2022
		A4- Develop guidance material/share best practices on occurrence reporting for the CAA personnel on establishing an	States (UAE)		2022

	effective operation of the mandatory and voluntary reporting systems			
	A5- Support and guide States in the development of NASPs through workshops and sharing of best practices	ICAO and States (UAE)	<p>1. ICAO organizing series of RASP webinars.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MID-RASP Webinar to be conducted by ICAO on 25 May 2021 <p>2. ICAO organized series of Webinars related to GASP/NASP:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 16 March 2021: ICAO's Global Safety Strategy: the Global Aviation Safety Plan. - 30 March 2021: Introduction to the National Aviation Safety Plan - 13 April 2021: Using the Roadmap to Develop a National Aviation Safety Plan 	2022
	A6- Development of guidance/share best practices for the processes and procedures for oversight of SMS	States (UAE)		2022
	A7- Deployment of the Aviation Safety Risk Management iPack	ICAO	Completion of ASRM iPACK related to COVID-19 project with PACA Oman and conducted the closing meeting on 4 May 2021. Planned to be delivered during the year 2021	2020
	A-8- Conduct assistance missions by SMIT to support States with SSP implementation	SMIT. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE. Supported by CANSO and IATA	SMIT Handbook is being drafted and be shared with SEIG/3 for review.	2022

Goal 6: Increase Collaboration at the Regional Level to Enhance Safety

	To be developed in the future				
Regional Operational Safety Risks					
Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction in Operational Risks					
G1-SEI-01:	Aircraft upset in flight (LOC-I)	A1- Guidance material on flight crew proficiency	IATA and Aircraft manufacturers		2022
		A2- Advisory Circular: Mode Awareness and Energy State Management Aspects of Flight Deck Automation	IATA and Aircraft manufacturers. Supported by KSA		2022
		A3- Conduct Upset Recovery Workshop	ACAO, IATA, and ICAO. Supported by FAA to be co-firmed. Host State to be confirmed	ICAO, KSA, and FAA UPRT Feb 20	2022
		A4- Develop guidance material/share best practices on Ground Handling Service Provider Certification Process	IATA and KSA	On going	2022
		A5- Conduct a Ground Handling workshop	ACAO and ICAO. Supported by IATA	On going	2022
G1-SEI-02:	Runway Safety- Runway Excursion	A1- Support States to implement the Global Reporting Format (GRF) Methodology through Webinar/ Workshops/Training	ICAO and ACI. Supported by CANSO, IATA, FAA and Aircraft Manufactures	Maintained as planned (Q4 2021)	2021
		A2- Guidance material on un-Stabilized Approach	IATA. Supported by CANSO and IFALPA		2022
		A3- MID Region Action Plan/Milestones on the Global Reporting Format (GRF) Implementation	ICAO	Completed and submitted for the States	2021
		A4: MID Region customized ACI-ICAO Global Reporting Format (GRF) for Runway Surface Conditions for Airport Operators	ACI, ICAO	(04 virtual GRF Training classrooms conducted for the MID Region States/Airport Operators)	2021

G1-SEI-03:	Runway Safety- Runway Incursion	A1- Support States to implement aerodrome inspection through workshops/trainings/Webinars	ICAO. Supported by FAA and UAE	Regional Webinar planned to be conducted on Aerodrome Safety	2022
G1-SEI-05B:	Ensure the Safe Operations of UAS (drones)	A1- Circulate ICAO developed guidance and advisory circulars: Regulatory framework for the operation of drones to support states' CAA personnel in the implementation and oversight of UAS operations	ICAO	To be circulated on May 2021	2021
		A2- Organize symposium on Drones related subjects	ICAO, ACAO. Supported FAA	Planned to be held in Casa Blanca during 15-17 Dec 2021	2021
		A3- States and regional organizations to share occurrences and/or safety analysis/information involving drones to ASRG to perform a technical analysis of the reported occurrences and come out with recommendations.	ICAO, IATA, ACI, CANSO, and States (TBD)		2022

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(RSA-15)



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MID-Region

Apron Management

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These guidelines are developed by the Aerodromes Safety, Planning and Implementation Group ASPIG, as part of MID Region Aviation Safety Plan (MID-RASP) Safety Enhancement Initiatives (Ref: G3-SEI-01/ Goal 3: Ensure the Appropriate Infrastructure is available to Support Safe Operations) based on the work of the UAE General Civil Aviation Authority in collaboration with the Egyptian Civil Aviation Authority, ICAO MID Regional Office and the Regional Aviation Safety Group - Middle East (RASG-MID).

The guidance materials have been adapted, based on regional input, from UK CAP 642 publication as of January 2014.

Disclaimer

This document is intended to provide guidance for civil aviation regulators, aerodrome operators and other stakeholders involved in the safety oversight of Certified Aerodromes.

This document has been compiled by members of the aviation industry to enhance aviation safety. It is not intended to supersede or replace existing materials produced by the State or in ICAO SARPs. The distribution or publication of this document does not prejudice the State's ability to enforce existing National regulations. To the extent of any inconsistency between this document and the National/International regulations, standards, recommendations or advisory publications, the content of the National/International regulations, standards, recommendations and advisory publications should prevail.

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INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

This advisory publication was developed further to the expertise and experience of the General Civil Aviation Authority of the United Arab Emirates and Egyptian Civil Aviation Authority to support the work of the Aerodromes Safety, Planning and Implementation Group ASPIG under the MID Region Aviation Safety Plan (MID-RASP) framework/Safety Enhancement Initiatives (Ref: G3-SEI-01/ Goal 3: Ensure the Appropriate Infrastructure is available to Support Safe Operations).

This publication provides guidance material to promote safe and efficient apron management. This publication provides a regulatory framework supported by detailed guidance material. Note that apron pavement maintenance and physical characteristics are not included within the scope of this advisory.

The Detailed Implementation Plan for the Safety Enhancement Initiative delivered by this publication is as follows:

Without an effective safety oversight regime, States' efforts to assess and improve aerodrome runway and ground safety may be thwarted or addressed in an inconsistent manner.

Whilst this Safety Advisory provides a readily adoptable materials for regulation and guidance material related to apron safety, it is essential for all States to ensure adequate legal and regulatory frameworks.

PURPOSE

The purpose of this Safety Advisory is to provide model elements for regulation and guidance material in support of apron safety. The guidance consists of the following elements:

Model Regulation as it pertains Apron Management

(Chapter 1)

Model Guidance Material to be considered...

(Chapter 2)

Model Safety Committee guidance...

(Appendix A)

These guidelines are based on the work carried out by the General Civil Aviation Authority of the United Arab Emirates and Egyptian Civil Aviation Authority as an integral part of their commitment to enhance aerodrome ground safety through the creation of materials to support apron management.

In doing so, there is one single concern: **safety**.

This Safety Advisory serves to further empower States in their efforts to improve apron safety through provision of model regulation and processes.

USING THIS SAFETY ADVISORY

The Table of Contents provides an overview of the materials which may be used by States as part of their safety oversight of Certified Aerodromes through proactive oversight of Aerodrome Infrastructure Projects. Each chapter of this Safety Advisory includes proposed application of the model elements for the consideration, adaptation and adoption of States. The Safety Advisory does not have to be read in order from beginning to end; particular paragraphs may be consulted as required.

The reader will choose the depth at which the Safety Advisory will be used at any given time. Reading may range from using the Table of Contents or elements of the model materials as a benchmark for gap analysis – to adopting and/or adapting the content of the model elements.

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CHAPTER 1
REGULATION IN SUPPORT OF
APRON MANAGEMENT

1.1 Application

National Civil Aviation Regulations should support safe management of aprons. Below are sample clauses and definitions which should be considered by each State.

1.2 Model Regulation: Definitions

1.2.1 Aerodrome Traffic Density.

- a) **Light.** Where the number of movements in the mean busy hour is not greater than 15 per runway or typically less than 20 total aerodrome movements.
- b) **Medium.** Where the number of movements in the mean busy hour is of the order of 16 to 25 per runway or typically between 20 to 35 total aerodrome movements.
- c) **Heavy.** Where the number of movements in the mean busy hour is 26 or more per runway or typically more than 35 total aerodrome movements.

Note 1: The number of movements in the mean busy hour is the arithmetic mean over the year of the number of movements in the daily busiest hour.

Note 2: Either a take-off or a landing constitutes a movement.

1.2.2 Air Traffic Services Unit - A generic term meaning variously, air traffic control unit, aerodrome flight information services unit, flight information centre or air traffic services reporting office.

1.2.3 Apron. A defined area, on a land aerodrome, intended to accommodate aircraft for purposes of loading or unloading passengers, mail or cargo, fuelling, parking or maintenance.

1.2.4 Apron Management Service. A service provided to regulate the activities and the movement of aircraft and vehicles on an apron.

1.2.5 Manoeuvring Area. That part of an aerodrome to be used for the take-off, landing and taxiing of aircraft, excluding aprons.

1.2.6 Movement Area. That part of an aerodrome to be used for the take-off, landing and taxiing of aircraft, consisting of the Manoeuvring Area and the apron(s).

Note: Manoeuvring Area and Movement Area are generic terms intended to describe the 'airside' part of an aerodrome, rather than just those pavements or surfaces on which aircraft movements take place.

1.2.7 Runway. A defined rectangular area on a land aerodrome, prepared for the landing and take-off run of aircraft along its length.

1.2.8 Taxiway. A defined path on a land aerodrome established for the taxiing of aircraft and intended to provide a link between one part of the aerodrome and another, including:

- a) **Aircraft Stand Taxilane.** A portion of an apron designated as a taxiway and intended to provide access to aircraft stands only.

- b) **Apron Taxiway.** A portion of a taxiway system located on an apron and intended to provide a through taxi route across the apron.
- c) **Rapid Exit Taxiway.** A taxiway connected to a runway at an acute angle and designed to allow landing aeroplanes to turn off at higher speeds than are achieved on other exit taxiways thereby minimizing runway occupancy times.

1.3 Model Regulation: Applicability of Regulation

1.3.1 Rule

The condition of the Movement Area and the operational status of related facilities should be monitored on a regular basis and reports on matters of operational significance affecting aircraft and aerodrome operations should be provided in order to take appropriate action, particularly in respect of the following:

- a) Construction or maintenance work;
- b) Rough or broken surfaces on a runway, a taxiway or an apron;
- c) Water on a runway, a taxiway or an apron; and
- d) Other contaminants on a runway, taxiway or apron.

1.3.2 Rule

Movement Area Inspections

- 1.3.2.1 Inspections of the Movement Area to assess its operational status should be carried out each day at least twice at a Certified Aerodrome.

Guidance Material: *Where there is a potential for an increase in FOD, the inspection rate should be increased.*

Guidance Material: *The Aerodrome Operator should ensure all personnel assessing and reporting runway surface conditions are trained and competent in the assessment of runway surface friction characteristics.*

- 1.3.2.2 The minimum number of inspections should be increased by one where Aerodrome Traffic Density is considered to be Medium or Heavy.

- 1.3.2.3 An Aerodrome Operator should inspect an aerodrome, as the circumstances require, to ensure aviation safety:

- a) as soon as practicable, after any Aircraft Accident or Incident;
- b) during any period of construction or repair of the aerodrome facilities or equipment that is critical to the safety of aircraft operation;
- c) after any period of adverse weather; or
- d) at any other time when there are conditions at the aerodrome that could affect aviation safety.

1.3.3 Rule

Aprons should be kept clear of contaminants to the extent necessary to enable aircraft to manoeuvre safely or, where appropriate, to be towed or pushed.

1.3.4 Rule

The following aerodrome facilities should be provided with a secondary power supply capable of supplying power when there is a failure of the primary power supply:

- a) Illumination of apron areas over which passenger aircraft are being handled.
- b) Floodlighting on a designated isolated aircraft parking positions if provided.

1.3.5 Rule

Unserviceability markers should be displayed wherever any portion of a taxiway, apron or holding bay is unfit for the movement of aircraft but it is still possible for aircraft to bypass the area safely. On a Movement Area used at night, unserviceability lights should be used.

Note: Unserviceability markers and lights are used for such purposes as warning pilots of a hole in a taxiway or apron pavement or outlining a portion of pavement, such as on an apron, that is under repair. They are not suitable for use when a portion of a runway becomes unserviceable, nor on a taxiway when a major portion of the width becomes unserviceable. In such instances, the runway or taxiway is normally closed.

1.3.6 Rule

Low Visibility Taxi Routes

- a) Low visibility taxi routes should be established and enforced in LVC to facilitate navigation, reduce traffic complexity and minimise risk of runway incursions;
- b) LVP taxi routes should minimise manoeuvring between runway and apron;
- c) SMGCS and signs should support standard LVP taxi routes; and
- d) LVP taxi routes should be indicated on charts.

1.3.7 Rule

Direct speech circuits should be provided between the Air Traffic Services Unit and:

- a) the unit providing approach control services;
- b) apron Control;
- c) the Meteorological Office; and
- d) maintenance personnel responsible.

1.3.8 Rule

Apron Management Service

An appropriate Apron Management Service should be provided on an apron by the Aerodrome Operator, in order to:

- a) regulate movement with the objective of preventing collisions between aircraft, and between aircraft and obstacles;
- b) regulate entry of aircraft into, and coordinate exit of aircraft from, the apron with the Air Traffic Services Unit; and
- c) ensure safe and expeditious movement of vehicles and appropriate regulation of other activities.

1.3.9 Rule

When the Air Traffic Services Unit does not participate in the Apron Management Service, procedures should be established to facilitate the orderly transition of aircraft between the apron management unit and the Air Traffic Services Unit.

Note: Guidance on an apron management service is given in the ICAO Airport Services Manual (Doc 9137), Part 8, and in the ICAO Manual of Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems (SMGCS) (Doc 9476).

1.3.10 Rule

An Apron Management Service should be provided with radiotelephony communications facilities. All vehicles/personnel involved with the facilitating the movement of aircraft should be equipped with a serviceable receive/transmit airband radio.

1.3.11 Rule

Where low visibility procedures are in effect, persons and vehicles operating on an apron should be restricted to the essential minimum.

Note: Guidance on related special procedures is given in the ICAO Manual of Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems (SMGCS) (Doc 9476).

1.3.12 Rule

An emergency vehicle responding to an emergency should be given priority over all other surface movement traffic.

1.3.13 Rule

A vehicle operating on an apron should give way to:

- a) an aircraft taxiing, about to taxi, or being pushed or towed;
- b) an emergency vehicle; or
- c) to other vehicles in accordance with local airport regulations.

1.3.14 Rule

An aircraft stand should be visually monitored to ensure that the recommended clearance distances are provided to an aircraft using the stand and to ensure the stand is clear of FOD.

1.3.15 Rule

A vehicle should be operated:

- a) on a Manoeuvring Area only as authorised by Air Traffic Services Unit or an authority as defined by the Aerodrome Operator; and
- b) on an apron only as authorised by the appropriate Aerodrome Operator.

1.3.16 Rule

The driver of a vehicle on the Movement Area should comply with all mandatory instructions conveyed by aerodrome markings and signs unless otherwise authorised by:

- a) the Air Traffic Services Unit when on the manoeuvring area; or
- b) the appropriate designated authority when on the apron.

1.3.17 Rule

The driver of a vehicle on the Movement Area should be appropriately qualified and competent for the tasks to be performed and unless unsafe to do so should comply with the instructions issued by:

- a) the Air Traffic Services, when on the Manoeuvring Area; and
- b) the appropriate designated service provider, when on the apron.

1.3.18 Rule

The driver of a radio-equipped vehicle should establish satisfactory two-way radio communication with the aerodrome Air Traffic Services Unit before entering the Manoeuvring Area and with the appropriate authorisation before entering the apron. The driver should maintain a continuous listening watch on the assigned frequency when on the Movement Area.

1.3.19 Rule

The driver of a vehicle on the Manoeuvring Area should hold a valid national driving licence, be appropriately trained for the tasks to be performed and should hold an appropriate Airport Driving Permit. The driver of a vehicle on the apron area should be appropriately trained for the tasks to be performed and should hold an appropriate Airport Driving Permit.

1.4 Model Regulation: Operator Obligations in relation to Aerodrome Infrastructure

1.4.1 Rule

Compliance with Standards and Practices: The aerodrome operator should comply with the standards and practices specified in this part and with any conditions endorsed in the certificate pursuant to regulations.

1.4.2 Rule

Competence of Operational and Maintenance Personnel: The aerodrome operator should employ an adequate number of qualified and skilled personnel to perform all critical activities for aerodrome operation and maintenance.

1.4.3 Rule

Aerodrome Operation and Maintenance

- 1) The aerodrome operator should operate and maintain the aerodrome in accordance with the procedures set out in the aerodrome manual.
- 2) The aerodrome operator should ensure proper and efficient maintenance of the aerodrome facilities.

- 3) The aerodrome operator should coordinate with the CAA, ATS provider in order to be satisfied that appropriate air traffic services are available to ensure the safety of aircraft in the airspace associated with the aerodrome. The coordination should cover other areas related to safety such as aeronautical information service, air traffic services, designated meteorological authorities, and security.
- 4) The aerodrome operator should maintain the aerodrome manual as a living document subject to amendment in order to ensure that it provides current and accurate information. and establish a mechanism for reviewing the manual periodically as minimum quarter annually.

1.4.4 Rule

Aerodrome Operator's Internal Safety Audits and Safety Reporting

- 1) The aerodrome operator should arrange for an audit of the safety management system, including an inspection of the aerodrome facilities and equipment. The audit should cover the aerodrome operator's own functions. The aerodrome operator should also arrange for an external audit and inspection programme for evaluating other users, including fixed-base operators, ground handling agencies and other organizations working at the aerodrome.
- 2) The audits should be carried out every 3 months, or less, and submit report to CAA.
- 3) The aerodrome operator should ensure that the audit reports, including the report on the aerodrome facilities, services and equipment, are prepared by suitably qualified safety experts.
- 4) The aerodrome operator should retain a copy of the report(s).
- 5) The report(s) referred item (d) must be prepared and signed by the persons/committee who /whom carried out the audits and inspections.

1.4.5 Rule

Notifying and Reporting

- 1) The aerodrome operator should comply with the requirement to notify and report to the CAA, air traffic control and pilots within the specified time limits required by these regulations.
- 2) Notification of inaccuracies in aeronautical information service (AIS) publications: the aerodrome operator should review all Aeronautical Information Publications (AIPs), AIP Supplements, AIP Amendments, Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs), Pre-flight Information Bulletins and Aeronautical Information Circulars issued by AIS and immediately after such reviews should notify CAA of any inaccurate information contained therein that pertains to the aerodrome.
- 3) Notification of changes to the aerodrome facilities, equipment and level of service planned in advance: the aerodrome operator should notify AIS and the CAA, in writing, at least 42days before effecting any change to the aerodrome facility or equipment or the level of service at the aerodrome that has been planned in advance and which is likely to affect the accuracy of the information contained in any AIS publication.
- 4) Issues requiring immediate notification: the aerodrome operator should notify CAA and should arrange with air traffic control service and the flight operations unit to receive immediate notice detailing any of the following circumstances of which the operator has knowledge.

1.4.6 Rule

Warning notices: When low flying aircraft, at or near an aerodrome, or taxiing aircraft are likely to be hazardous to people or vehicular traffic, the aerodrome operator should:

- 1) post hazard warning notices on any public way that is adjacent to the manoeuvring area; or
- 2) if such a public way is not controlled by the aerodrome operator, inform the authority responsible for posting the notices on the public way that there is a hazard.

1.5 Model regularity Process for CAA evaluation of apron Management

1.5.1 Purpose

To provide guidance to state to evaluate of apron management established by Aerodrome Operators. These process may be include in caa policy and procedure manual as part of Aerodrome Certification mechanism and during periodic surveillance audits or during the change management process.

1.5.2 Applicability

This model Procedure is applicable to evaluate of requirement of apron management

1.5.3 Regulatory System

- a) Civil Aviation Law [.....]
- b) [Caa Regulation]
- c) [Advisory Circular]
- d) [Inspector Handbook/ ...]
- e) [...]

1.5.4 Responsibilities

- a) The Head of Aerodrome Safety & Standards department or (equivalent dep.) which is responsible for aerodrome certification and surveillance, Assigns team leader and team members for aerodrome certification or during aerodrome surveillance mission.
- b) The Team Leader (Lead Aerodrome Certification and Surveillance Inspectors, (LACSI) prepares and initiates the inspection program, Team members (Aerodrome Certification and Surveillance Inspectors, (ACSI) conduct the inspection purpose (certification / surveillance) according to templates ref. to 1.5.5.4.

1.5.5 Procedure

1.5.5.1 Introduction

Apron management service is a service provided to regulate the activities and the movement of aircraft and vehicles on an apron. Depending upon volume of traffic and operating conditions, an appropriate apron management service is provided by an ATS unit, aerodrome operating authority or by a cooperative combination of these. When the aerodrome control tower partially participate in the apron management service, inspector is obligated to see that procedures are established and followed to facilitate the orderly transition of functions between the apron management unit and the aerodrome control tower.

1.5.5.2 Process

- 1) The inspector needs to have planned the inspection of this area with attention to all the elements of the system including:
 - responsibilities,
 - operating procedures,
 - reporting and communication and training as well as seeking assurances about system compliance.
- 2) The inspector will be keen to see evidence of coordinated and disciplined activity on the maneuvering area during normal and low visibility operations.
- 3) Salient points issues/areas to inspect and for audit questions:
 - a) Arrangements between air traffic control and the apron management unit;
 - b) Clear bifurcation of scope of work for the ATC and Apron management;
 - c) Arrangements for allocating aircraft parking positions;
 - d) Arrangements for initiating engine start and ensuring clearance of aircraft push-back;
 - e) Marshalling service;
 - f) Arrangement for Follow me services;
 - g) Arrangement expeditious movement of vehicles;
 - h) Arrangement for the highly coordinated two way communications between the aircraft, vehicle, apron control unit and the ATC;
 - i) Where conditions warrant, provision of separate communication channels including procedures for use of visual signals;
 - j) System and procedure for aircraft and vehicle control in low-visibility operating conditions;
 - k) Arrangement for integrated system of surveillance, control and guidance, and communication with the use of technology applications. (ASMGCS) in these areas; and
 - l) Procedure for reporting of incidents/ accidents.

1.5.5.3 Records

Evaluation Forms and Correspondences are maintained in Aerodrome file no.[.....].

1.5.5.4 Forms

- Appendix B: CAA certification checklist (apron management assessment)
Appendix C: CAA surveillance checklist (apron management assessment)

CHAPTER 2 GUIDANCE IN SUPPORT OF APRON MANAGEMENT

2.1 Application

The model guidance provides a benchmark for States in their efforts to support safety apron management.

Wherever the word “organisation(s)” is used, it should mean operator(s)/organisation(s)....

This GM may be applicable to all MID States based organisations required to comply with National Civil Aviation Regulations.

2.2 Model Guidance: Introduction

2.2.1 Purpose

The advice and guidance in this document is best described as ‘accepted or best practice’ and represents an acceptable way of doing things. It illustrates how risks might be identified and provides advice about how airside safety can be managed within the context of a systematic and structured management approach - a Safety Management System (SMS). Service providers and their contracted organisations (at every level) are ultimately responsible for deciding on the appropriateness and applicability of any particular safety arrangements with respect to their own specific circumstances and for monitoring the suitability and success of the arrangements collaboratively.

This GM sets out the hazards and risks that respective organisations operating in the airside environment are expected to consider but it should be noted that this guidance is not intended to be totally comprehensive in the detail provided; nor does adherence to its content absolve those responsible for securing a safe operating and working environment from considering hazards and assessing risks for themselves. It indicates the safety organisational elements which, if provided, may help demonstrate to aerodromes, airlines and other organisations operating at aerodromes, as well as regulatory bodies, that the effort to discharge safety accountabilities under the law is effective, well directed and responsible.

This document also seeks to address those operational situations which contain elements of risk and which might be considered commonplace. It is important to note that the examples reflect the management organisation that might exist at a typical regional airport and that job titles and responsibilities described therein will not necessarily be the same at individual airports.

In many cases the responsibility for performing a particular function is delegated to a particular individual or third party organisation or service provider. In such circumstances the delegation or division of responsibility should be clearly documented and accepted by all parties involved. It should be noted that delegation of a task does not absolve the organisation of the accountability of ensuring the task is carried out correctly and to the required standards.

Where information has not been provided to cover a particular situation it is expected that users will be guided by the general safety management principles set out to identify and create a safe working and operating environment.

Ensuring the safety of individuals and aircraft in airside areas is a complex undertaking and the content of this document cannot be taken in isolation. There are many associated systems and procedure documents that will affect the various organisations that operate in airside areas at an aerodrome. It is important to recognise that not only will each organisation need to develop its own systems to complement those it interfaces with but that no two aerodromes are alike and that no assumptions can be made based on the solutions used at another location.

2.2.2 Applicability

This document is intended as a guide to accepted good practice for those persons and organisations engaged in working on and around the operational areas of airports, aerodromes or heliports, or anywhere where aircraft are attended and handled; in other words it may apply to everybody working airside. Whilst the document is primarily aimed at aerodrome operators, airlines and ground handling service providers, it is equally applicable in most cases to activities at uncertified aerodromes. In these cases the term ‘Aerodrome Operator’ should be considered as the ‘person in charge of safety at the aerodrome’, or for example, the ‘Accountable Manager’. Any organisation, regardless of size or complexity of operation, or whether subject to direct oversight by National Authority, should establish a Safety Management System through the application of the general principles outlined in this document and from further more comprehensive guidance issued by the National Authority or other resources such as the Eurocontrol Skybrary website.

2.2.3 The Status of this document - Airside Safety Management

This document represents an accepted way of organising and operating safe working practices which is largely endorsed by industry. The National Authority, as part of the on-going aerodrome certification process, in conducting its routine inspections and audits of the airside safety environment, should consider these guidelines as best practice. The National Authority makes it clear that the general principles, processes and procedures set out within this document form the basis of acceptable safety arrangements airside. It is however accepted that there can be other methods to achieve an acceptable level of safety.

2.2.4 Compliance with Statutory Requirements

The requirements for the safe operation of aerodromes, with respect to aircraft safety and for the safety of individuals at their places of work, are contained within formal legislative requirements which may form part of National Civil Aviation Law. It is therefore legally incumbent on those who provide the workplace, all employers and all employees, to comply with the safety requirements that are set out in the relevant Statutory Instructions. Nothing in this GM substitutes the requirements of the law.

Users of this document should be aware of other statutory provisions that may apply to their activities, for example, the duty to report aircraft accidents and certain occurrences. It is the responsibility of all those involved with the operation of aerodromes, aircraft and the provision of services to be familiar with their legal obligations.

2.2.5 Amendment

This document is subject to continuous review and amendment if so required. Questions, suggestions for improvement or new material should be sent to the National Authority.

2.3 Model Guidance: References

[National Authority to insert references to relevant ICAO, National Civil Aviation Regulation, guidance materials, health and safety, etc.]

2.3.1 Useful References and Further Reading

The following documents contain regulations, guidance or information concerned with airside safety. Many of the documents listed below describe in detail the responsibilities of those involved in ensuring the safety of personnel and aircraft in airside areas of airports and are key reference documents. It should be noted that the list is by no means exhaustive but is intended as an initial reference for further reading.

2.3.2 Legislation

[National Authority to insert references to relevant legislation]

2.3.3 Reference Documents

[National Authority to insert references to relevant references including AIP, advisory publications, etc.]

Airport Council International (ACI) - Visual Aids Handbook
International Air Transport Association (IATA) Airport Handling Manual (AHM) IATA Ground Operations Manual (IGOM)
Airport Council International (ACI) - Apron Signs and Markings Handbook
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) Annex 13 - Aircraft Accident Investigation ICAO Annex 14 - Aerodrome Design and Operations (Volumes I and II)
ICAO Annex 18 - The Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air ICAO Annex 2 Rules of the Air
ICAO Annex 6 - Operation of Aircraft
ICAO Document 9137 Airport Services Manual ICAO Document 9157 Aerodrome Design Manual ICAO Document 9184 Airport Planning Manual ICAO Document 9859 Safety Management Manual
UK Health & Safety Executive (HSE) publication Aircraft Turnround
Department of Transport (DOT), Abu Dhabi, Environment Health Safety Management System (EHSMS) Decree 42, 2009

2.3.4 Health and Safety

[National Authority to insert references to relevant references for Local Health or Safety Authorities.]

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2.4 Model Guidance: Glossary

[National Authority to update against relevant abbreviations.]

ACOP	<i>Approved Code of Practice</i>
ACI	<i>Airport Council International</i>
AGL	<i>Aeronautical Ground Lighting</i>
ANO (DG)	<i>Air Navigation (Dangerous Goods) Regulations</i>
APU	<i>Auxiliary Power Unit</i>
ATC	<i>Air Traffic Control</i>
CAAP	<i>Civil Aviation Advisory Publication</i>
CAR	<i>Civil Aviation Regulation</i>
CCTV	<i>Closed Circuit Television</i>
FEGP	<i>Fixed Electrical Ground Power</i>
FOD	<i>Foreign Object Debris</i>
GPU	<i>Ground Power Unit</i>
HS	<i>Health and Safety</i>
IATA	<i>International Air Transport Association ICAO</i>
JAR-OPS	<i>Joint Aviation Requirements - Operations</i>
LVP	<i>Low Visibility Procedures</i>
ROSI	<i>Reporting of Safety Incidents</i>
NOTAC	<i>Notice to Aerodrome Certificate Holders</i>
POB	<i>Persons on board</i>
PPE	<i>Personal Protective Equipment</i>
RT	<i>Radiotelephone/Radiotelephony</i>
SMS	<i>Safety Management System</i>
SOP	<i>Standard Operating Procedure</i>
VDGS	<i>Visual Docking Guidance System</i>
VORSY	<i>Voluntary Occurrence Reporting System</i>

2.5 Model Guidance: Chapter 1 - General Principles for Airside Management of Health and Safety

2.5.1 Introduction

- 2.5.1.1 Organisations operating on aerodromes need to manage aircraft safety and are required to have a duty of care towards occupational health and safety, in order to reduce aircraft damage and personal injuries on the ramp. However, without adequate safety **management**, legal and moral obligations cannot be met, and business and reputational losses may be incurred. Examples of such losses may include:
- Compromised aircraft safety and the potential for a catastrophic aircraft accident;
 - Costs of replacing and compensating injured employees or others;
 - Contractual penalties or loss of revenue if flights are delayed or cancelled;
 - Damaged assets (including aircraft and equipment);
 - Loss of reputation;
 - Loss of existing and future contracts.
- 2.5.1.2 Global leading authority studies have shown that the uninsured costs of accidents can be up to 36 times greater than the costs of insurance premiums. Furthermore, directors, managers and nominated post holders may be held accountable for failures to control aircraft safety and/or occupational health and safety
- 2.5.1.3 The lessons learned from accidents to aircraft and people show that, in many cases, failures in safety management were a key causal factor. Chapters 1 and 2 of this document seek to summarise the processes by which aircraft safety and occupational health and safety can be managed, by identifying the hazards and managing the risks.
- 2.5.1.4 The key elements in an SMS acceptable to the National Authority are:
- Safety policy and objectives;
 - Safety risk management;
 - Safety assurance; and
 - Safety promotion.
- 2.5.1.5 Annex 19 describes five key elements to safety management. All five steps are fundamental.
- Policy;
 - Organising;
 - Planning and implementing;
 - Measuring performance; and
 - Auditing and reviewing performance.
- 2.5.1.6 The precautions which protect aircraft from damage on the ramp often also protect people working on the ramp from harm and vice versa. Consequently, the management of the health and safety of people (occupational health and safety) and the management of safety of aircraft share common themes. There are key elements which should form part of any system for managing safety:
- a system that sets the targets and standards to be achieved, and makes clear to people what their responsibilities and accountabilities are;
 - a way of identifying hazards, assessing risks and introducing control measures;
 - a method of monitoring that controls are in place and are effective. This should include proactive monitoring, such as inspection; reactive monitoring, such as accident investigation and data trend analysis; and audit and review of standards; and
 - documenting the procedures outlined above and relevant key information, including policies, risk assessments and reports from monitoring activities.

- 2.5.1.7 These basic principles underpin the SMS. However, there are some notable differences in the terminology used when discussing safety management, as well as differences in the benchmarks which are applied and relative importance of some of the key elements involved. When developing an integrated airside SMS that deals with both the risks to aircraft and people, it is necessary to recognise these differences. It does not follow that organisations require separate systems to manage the safety of aircraft and occupational health and safety.
- 2.5.1.8 Furthermore, all the organisations and individuals involved should always be clear whether they are considering issues pertaining to aircraft safety, or occupational health and safety, or both, in order to prevent confusion arising.

Key Concepts

2.5.2 ‘So far as is reasonably practicable’

- 2.5.2.1 Duties under the health and safety law are often qualified by the term ‘so far as is reasonably practicable’ or ‘as low as reasonably practicable’ (ALARP). These terms are also sometimes used in relation to aircraft safety.
- 2.5.2.2 The term ‘so far as is reasonably practicable’ has been defined by the European courts. To carry out a duty, ‘so far as is reasonably practicable’ means that the degree of risk in a particular activity or environment can be balanced against the time, trouble, cost and physical difficulty of taking measures to avoid or reduce the risk. If these are so disproportionate to the risk that it would be unreasonable for the people concerned to have to incur them to prevent it, they are not obliged to do so.
- 2.5.2.3 Therefore, the greater the risk, the more reasonable it is to go to greater expense, trouble and invention to reduce it. If the consequences and the extent of a risk are small, insistence on great expense would not be considered reasonable. It is important to remember that the judgment is an objective one and the size or financial position of the employer is immaterial.

2.5.3 Risk Assessment – as part of a Safety Case

- 2.5.3.1 It is implicit when considering what is reasonably practicable, that hazards have to be identified and risks assessed.
- 2.5.3.2 The primary function of identifying the hazards and assessing the risks on the airside is to determine whether enough has been done to prevent an incident or accident that may lead to fatalities, injuries and ill health and/or damage to aircraft. Risk assessments assist in determining whether enough has been done to meet the requirements of aviation law and health and safety legislation and to mitigate the risk to an acceptable level, and are a key component in any system for managing aircraft safety and occupational health and safety. Given the complexities associated with aircraft ramp operations, people and ground service equipment, it is often the case that hazards may not always be directly associated with aircraft movements.
- 2.5.3.3 Risk assessment can also indicate what improvements need to take priority, and thereby assist in developing action plans, budgets and business cases. Risk assessments should be undertaken on a regular basis as circumstances change, with appropriate and suitable mitigation measures implemented as necessary.
- 2.5.3.4 In brief, when undertaking an assessment the following key items should be considered:
- a) identify the hazards;
 - b) decide who/what might be harmed/damaged and how;
 - c) evaluate the risks, list any current mitigations and decide on additional precautions; and
 - d) record findings, allocate actions and implement them.

Note: ICAO Doc. 9859 contains a suggested Risk Assessment Process

- 2.5.3.5 A hazard is anything with the potential to cause harm; a hazard is any condition, potential condition, event, or circumstance which could induce an accident, lead to injury, illness, or death to people; damage to or loss of a system, equipment, or property; or damage to the environment. A hazard is a condition that is a prerequisite to an accident or incident. Risk analysis is a function of the likelihood (probability) that harm will occur and the severity of that harm.
- 2.5.3.6 Consideration must be given to the risks to the health and safety of employees from other organisations, visitors, members of the public and anyone else who may be affected by the activity or task.
- 2.5.3.7 The general principles for prevention consist of a broad hierarchy of measures:
- a) avoiding the risk;
 - b) evaluating those risks which cannot be avoided;
 - c) combating risks at source;
 - d) adapting the work to the individual;
 - e) adapting to technical progress;
 - f) replacing the dangerous by the non-dangerous or the less dangerous;
 - g) developing a coherent overall prevention policy which covers technology, organisation of work, working conditions, social relationships and the influence of factors relating to the working environment;
 - h) giving collective protective measures priority over individual protective measures; and
 - i) giving appropriate instructions to staff.
- 2.5.3.8 In reality, a combination of such measures is likely to be required or be in place. Furthermore, precautions lower in the hierarchy (such as wheelchairs for disabled passengers with reduced mobility that are specifically designed to be moved up stairs) may be used as a temporary control measure until other measures, higher in the list, can be implemented (such as the purchase and use of an ‘ambulift’).
- 2.5.3.9 However, in certain circumstances, the risk will not be acceptable until permanent control measures are in place. For example, it would not be acceptable to use only a system of work as a temporary measure to protect staff using a catering vehicle without means to prevent falls from the platform, as the likelihood and consequences of a fall remain far too high.
- 2.5.3.10 Notwithstanding an aerodrome’s SMS, safety case and risk management processes, aerodrome operators should engage in dialogue with the National Authority prior to introduction of significant new measures which might affect aircraft safety in order to ensure that aerodrome certification conditions should continue to be met.
- 2.5.3.11 A constituent part of any safety case should be the oversight and interfaces with third party organisations. A risk assessment for activities that affect people or tasks carried out by another organisation should consider the impact on the third party. Any mitigation expected to be delivered or followed by another party should be agreed mutually. For example, during the aircraft turnround phase, many activities involve interaction with a number of different organisations. These risks should be assessed collaboratively to ensure ‘buy-in’ of all parties involved.

2.5.4 Health and Safety

- 2.5.4.1 The duty of employers and the self-employed is to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the health and safety of any individual who might be affected by any work activity within their control. The individuals who may be affected include employees, members of the public, contractors, visitors and other aerodrome users. Good health and safety management is key to ensuring that these duties are met.

- 2.5.4.2 Amongst other things, employers and the self-employed need to provide places of work which are safe, provide and maintain work equipment and systems of work which will not cause injury, protect their employees and others from hazards to health and provide welfare facilities for their employees.
- 2.5.4.3 Employers who share a workplace, whether temporarily (such as an aircraft stand) or permanently, must co-operate and co-ordinate their efforts to ensure a safe workplace.
- 2.5.4.4 Employers are also required to consult their employees on matters connected with their health and safety at work.
- 2.5.4.5 Organisations, such as landlords, that have some degree of control over workplaces which are made available to other employers as a place of work, need to ensure that any premises, plant and equipment or substances that they provide for others to use are safe and without risks to health. This duty is qualified by the degree of control they have over the premises, plant, equipment or substances. As the extent of control increases, so does the degree of responsibility for the management of risks.
- 2.5.4.6 Every worker at an aerodrome has a duty to take reasonable care for their own health and safety and that of other persons who might be affected by what they do.

2.5.5 Aircraft Safety

- 2.5.5.1 Organisations may also have specific responsibilities to ensure aircraft safety. Good management of aircraft safety is vital if these responsibilities are to be discharged satisfactorily.
- 2.5.5.2 Key amongst these are:
- a) the responsibility of the aerodrome certificate holder (who may also be the aerodrome operator) to provide and maintain an aerodrome which is safe for aircraft to use;
 - b) the responsibility of the aircraft operator (airline) to operate aircraft in a safe manner; and
 - c) the responsibility of aircraft ground handling organisations and ground service providers to operate safely during all ramp operations.
- 2.5.5.3 Every individual at an aerodrome has a duty of care to do what they can to ensure that aircraft are not damaged, and, where this is discovered, that the occurrence is immediately reported through the appropriate channels, ideally within the organisation's internal 'just culture' or open non-punitive reporting system.
- 2.5.5.4 The responsibilities for aircraft safety on the ground at aerodromes are essentially placed on the airline operator and aerodrome operator. However, all aerodrome users, including aircraft operators, approved maintenance organisations and ground handlers have a part to play in ensuring the safety of aircraft.
- 2.5.5.5 Control of Contractors/Third Party Service Providers**
- 2.5.5.6 Organisations retain some responsibility for health and safety during activities carried out by their contractors. These legal responsibilities cannot be delegated.
- 2.5.5.7 There may also be benefits which accrue to those who develop partnerships with their contractors. Reliance simply on standard contract clauses requiring contractors to comply with relevant legislation, standards or guidance is unlikely to be enough to secure such benefits or comply with legal requirements. Therefore all reasonable and practicable steps should be taken to:
- a) ensure existing and prospective contractors' arrangements and organisation are adequate so as to ensure that they can carry out their tasks safely and without damaging aircraft or equipment, or risks to personnel;
 - b) co-ordinate and control the work they carry out; and
 - c) monitor their performance.

2.5.6 Assessing Contractors

2.5.6.1 It is recommended that any assessment of contractors should use a number of criteria, including:

- a) at the pre-tender stage, obtaining details of relevant documents, for example the accountabilities and safety policy and copies of risk assessments for the work included in the contract;
- b) interviewing short-listed contractors and/or visiting current work to assess standards, for example, driver training schemes and vehicle maintenance;
- c) investigating past performance, as useful information can include references from current and former clients, internal audits and inspections against the aerodrome operator's safety management system, and/or the results of any audits undertaken by the aerodrome operator or another third party; and
- d) monitoring performance throughout the term of the contract.

2.5.7 Co-ordinating and Controlling Performance

2.5.7.1 This can be achieved through a combination of:

- a) appointing a supervisor to oversee the activity, especially in relation to aircraft turnround (described further in Chapter 4). This could be a member of staff, or a nominated agent. They should have sufficient authority to control the activities involved. For most construction work it is advisable to appoint a principal contractor, one of whose functions is to oversee the conduct of the work;
- b) agreeing and writing down a plan for the activity. For construction work, a health and safety plan may be required by health and safety law. For aircraft turnround, it is best practice for a plan for the turnround to be developed and agreed between those parties involved;
- c) where practicable, the undertaking of joint risk assessments for relevant processes. These assessments could inform the performance standards and the plan. Joint risk assessments will need to take account of differences between companies' management, supervision, equipment and training; and
- d) agreeing performance standards, for example, frequency of vehicle maintenance and standards for training and refresher training. These may be set through reference to standards imposed on the client and contractor organisations by the aerodrome operator or AOC holder.

2.5.8 Performance Monitoring

2.5.8.1 To be effective, performance monitoring should consider several factors, such as:

- a) methods of work: standing instructions or method statements for the contractors' staff should be clear how confirmation that the plan for the activity is being followed and what procedures are in place to monitor compliance;
- b) the foreseeable risks of the activity should be identified and managed. For example, measures in place to prevent falls from heights or vehicles striking aircraft and how these risks are identified and how mitigation measures are determined and implemented;
- c) aerodrome rules, as well as procedures, should be in place to ensure that these rules are complied with, should be clear to all working on the aerodrome. For example, the policies in place to ensure that contractor employees are wearing hi-visibility (hi-vis) clothing and have the appropriate Personal Protective Equipment (PPE); and
- d) methods of identifying, reporting and recording deviations from instructions and rules should be clear, as should those methods that are in place to identify and monitor trends in these deviations.

2.5.8.2 Individuals monitoring performance should be trained to identify unsafe practices and should have enough resources to carry out the work.

2.5.9 Control of Contractors during Turnround

- 2.5.9.1 The use of contractors at aerodromes to provide services for aircraft is increasing. At many aerodromes, airline, aircraft operators and/or Ground Handling Agencies (GHA) are the clients for these services. The contracted staff are usually employed directly by the party who then contracts the provision of individual services. It is conceivable that there may be a mix of service providers; some contracted locally, others on the basis of international contracts.
- 2.5.9.2 Whatever the arrangements, the airline/aircraft operator/service provider should consider the elements discussed in the relevant paragraphs on apron/stand management and turnround. Further details concerning aircraft turnround can be found in Chapter 4 of this document.

2.5.10 Aerodrome Operator

- 2.5.10.1 The duty of the aerodrome operator (who is usually the aerodrome certificate holder) is to provide and maintain an aerodrome which is safe for aircraft and people to use.
- 2.5.10.2 Every Aerodrome Certificate Holder is required to maintain an Aerodrome Manual, an integral part of the aerodrome operator's system, to manage the safety of aircraft and people on the ground. The Aerodrome Manual complements the aerodrome operator's approach to quality management, including the management of the business, customer-critical processes and health and safety. The Aerodrome Manual contains all necessary information and instructions to enable the aerodrome operating staff to perform their duties and sets out information and instructions that are to be included in the Aerodrome Manual. The Aerodrome Manual should be disseminated widely so that everyone who undertakes tasks that can affect aircraft safety is familiar with the relevant parts of the document.
- 2.5.10.3 The standard of occupational health and safety is not considered as part of the Aerodrome Certificate, and the Health and Safety Authority's (or equivalent authority) do not licence aerodrome operators. Nevertheless, the aerodrome operator should provide an aerodrome which is safe for aircraft and people to use, as far as reasonably practicable.
- 2.5.10.4 This includes:
- a) an aerodrome layout which is safe, for example such that pedestrians and vehicles can move about safely;
 - b) equipment provided by the aerodrome operator which is safe, for example aerobridges and fixed electrical ground power for aircraft use; and
 - c) systems of work which ensure safety, such as an aircraft turnround plan or 'hot work' permits for contractors.
- 2.5.10.5 The people who need to be protected include the aerodrome operator's own employees, the staff of contractors and tenants, visitors, members of the travelling public and their friends and relatives, and other members of the public, such as spectators.
- 2.5.10.6 Many precautions will protect both aircraft and people, which include:
- a) properly planned and adequately maintained infrastructure;
 - b) adequate standards of specification and maintenance of equipment which interfaces with the aircraft;
 - c) adequate standards of specification and maintenance for vehicles, whether directly serving aircraft or not;
 - d) adequate driver and operator training;
 - e) properly planned and executed aircraft turnrounds; and
 - f) good co-operation and co-ordination between all aerodrome users.

- 2.5.10.7 As the central organisation at the aerodrome, the aerodrome operator has a key role in developing co-operation and co-ordination between all the users of the aerodrome. It may consider establishing committees or other discussion groups for ensuring aircraft safety, setting aerodrome-wide health and safety standards or agreements.
- 2.5.10.8 The operators of aerodromes should also take a proactive role in monitoring standards, for example by introducing aerodrome-wide safety assurance systems or audits of companies working at their aerodrome. The implementation of a ground operator licensing system may be a suitable solution at some aerodromes. Those aerodromes which have the power to make byelaws should consider taking positive action against organisations or persons that consistently breach their requirements.

2.5.11 Aircraft Operators (Airlines)

- 2.5.11.1 In addition to the risks to the safety of aircraft, the operator of the aircraft (usually the airline) will need to consider the health and safety of persons not in its employ who are affected by its activities or the activities of its contractors, as well as that of its employees.
- 2.5.11.2 Airlines may decide to co-operate with each other, the aerodrome operator and service providers to agree uniform standards for performance and monitoring. This may reduce the time and effort required for individual airlines to develop such standards and reduce the probability of human error resulting from a wide variety of standards.

2.5.12 Service Providers

- 2.5.12.1 Contractors on the apron are often required to work to tight timescales to complete their respective tasks in the time allowed for aircraft turnround. However, all those involved should take adequate account of each other's safety needs, for example ensuring that their vehicles or parked equipment is not blocking escape routes of a refuelling vehicle, and that vehicles are not parked in such a way as to hinder or prevent other vehicles having safe ingress/egress access to aircraft.
- 2.5.12.2 Where a handling agent has been appointed, service providers should co-ordinate with them to ensure that safety procedures are understood and implemented by the handling agent. They should be working to an agreed plan for the turnround and each service provider should ensure that they have a copy of this plan. In addition, each service provider should have a supervisor or leading hand who can control the various stages of its contribution to the turnround. In all instances plans should also be shared with the airport operator.
- 2.5.12.3 Service providers should ensure that any subcontractors they engage undergo an assessment, control and monitoring processes as appropriate and as may be outlined and in accordance with company procedures.

2.6 Model Guidance: Chapter 2 - Identifying the Hazards and Managing the Risks

2.6.1 Introduction

- 2.6.1.1 At large and complex aerodromes, as well as at small general aviation locations, the aerodrome apron is a busy and often congested place of work, particularly during peak periods of air traffic movements. Aircraft and people face many potential hazards, particularly from the movement and operation of aircraft and ground vehicles. Failure to eliminate or control such hazards may lead to accidents to aircraft and/or people or cases of ill health injury or death.

2.6.1.2 It is recognised that much of the guidance below may appear to be geared towards large aerodromes. However, safety management of the apron will apply to any aerodrome, regardless of size; only the range and magnitude of operations will vary. Managers will need to consider the degree of applicability of the detailed material presented in this Chapter and, indeed, the use of any suitable control measures additional to those described. The hierarchy of controls outlined in Chapter 1 should be referenced when considering the most appropriate combination of control measures.

2.6.2 Potential Hazards on the Apron

2.6.2.1 This section discusses some of the potential hazards commonly encountered on the apron. It is important that all aircraft operations, including turnrounds, should take full account of the need for safe working practices. Failure to do this may result in shortcuts and bad practice which can lead to accidents, ill health and damage to assets.

2.6.2.2 Common hazards/risks at aerodromes (some of which are discussed in the following paragraphs) may include:

- a) Vehicles striking aircraft, other vehicle or equipment/object and/or people;
- b) Foreign Object Debris (FOD);
- c) Erratic and poor apron driving discipline, monitoring and oversight;
- d) Inconsistent working practices and standard operating practices/procedures;
- e) Poor general aerodrome awareness (apron and aircraft stand layout);
- f) Hazards to passengers and staff on the apron;
- g) Moving aircraft (including aircraft on pushback or being towed);
- h) Live aircraft engines (including prop and rotary);
- i) Falls from height and falling objects;
- j) Operation and movement of aerobridges;
- k) Manual handling; (Lifting, pulling, pushing etc.);
- l) Noise; (Aircraft engines and machinery);
- m) Work equipment (including machinery);
- n) Hazardous substances and Dangerous Goods (including radioactive substances);
- o) Inadequate, imperfect or incorrect lighting, glare or confusing lights;
- p) Adverse weather conditions (Sandstorms, Low Visibility, Thunderstorms etc);
- q) Slips and trips; (Oil/fuel spillages, defective pavements);
- r) Electrical hazards; (Fixed Electrical Power FEP and also Static Electricity)
- s) Faults and defects; and
- t) Refuelling.

2.6.2.3 Dealing effectively with these hazards will require good management of aircraft safety and occupational health and safety, as well as co-operation and co-ordination between the aerodrome operator, ground handlers, airlines and other aerodrome users, such as maintenance contractors. Initiatives for reducing the risk to aircraft and health and safety from these hazards should be an integral part of the planning of individual projects.

2.6.3 Vehicles Striking Aircraft, other Vehicle or Equipment and/or People

2.6.3.1 Airside vehicles constitute an ever present hazard to both aircraft and people so extreme vigilance is necessary for all those working airside. It may be possible to eliminate the risks to people in certain areas of the aerodrome by keeping aircraft, vehicles and pedestrians apart where possible, for example by the use of passenger boarding bridges (aerobridges), or, when this is not reasonably practicable, by the provision of separate designated routes, such as pavements or clearly defined pedestrian routes (green walkways painted on the ground). Well organised traffic routes, including one-way systems, adequate lighting to roads and unambiguous road markings can also assist.

- 2.6.3.2 It may not be possible to ensure complete segregation of aircraft, pedestrians and vehicles in all areas of the aerodrome. However, this does not mean that the whole idea of segregation can be abandoned. Wherever practicable, procedures to ensure the segregation of aircraft, people and vehicles should be put in place.
- 2.6.3.3 Where segregation is not reasonably practicable, there are other measures which can be employed to control the risk. For example, it may be possible to reorganise the layout of an area, so that the interaction of pedestrians, aircraft and vehicles is minimised, or the frequency of high risk activities such as reversing are reduced. Any changes to the layout of an aerodrome which affect aircraft safety should be discussed with the National Authority at an early stage, as the aerodrome certificate conditions may be affected.
- 2.6.3.4 Paragraphs 2.6.6.1 to 2.6.6.4 provide further advice on protecting passengers on the apron.
- 2.6.3.5 Some aerodromes may consider service delivery systems built into the stands, thus reducing the number of vehicles that have to attend an aircraft. Even if such systems are installed it is important that safe contingency procedures are available to cater for equipment failure.
- 2.6.3.6 In all circumstances, a safe system of work should be developed. This provides an opportunity for partnership in planning involving all those with a direct interest in aircraft safety and occupational health and safety on the apron. Such a system should include:
- a) traffic rules governing such issues as speed limits, especially on approach to aircraft and in the vicinity of people;
 - b) correct vehicle maintenance, especially of safety critical components such as brakes and steering;
 - c) driver training, airside driving permits, competency checks and refresher training;
 - d) driving standards;
 - e) competence/attitude of airside workers;
 - f) Apron management;
 - g) provision of assistance and/or audible warning devices for reversing vehicles (although such audible warning devices might not be fully effective in the vicinity of high ambient noises, or if people are wearing hearing protection, and so may need to be supplemented by visual systems);
 - h) procurement of suitable vehicles, e.g. vehicles offering good driver vision;
 - i) regular monitoring of standards;
 - j) safe parking of vehicles in such a way as to prevent interference with aircraft manoeuvring or other aerodrome users;
 - k) encouragement of good practice;
 - l) the provision and wearing of high visibility clothing;
 - m) special procedures for operating vehicles during periods of inclement weather (e.g. low visibility, thunderstorms); and
 - n) adequate supervision of passengers on the ramp.
- 2.6.3.7 Where more than one company or department attends an aircraft, effective co-ordination and co-operation is essential to prevent vehicles striking aircraft, equipment, vehicles or people. Airlines, handling agents and third party operators and aerodrome operators all have important roles in this as part of their systems for assessing, controlling and monitoring their staff or contractors. The turnaround plan is likely to be a key document in ensuring that vehicle movements are controlled around aircraft. Chapter 4 gives further advice and guidance on the turnaround plan.
- 2.6.3.8 It is likely that a combination of measures will be required to control the risks. The exact combination may vary with location, activities and perhaps even the time of day. The effects of changes to the aerodrome, for example due to temporary works or the effect of new buildings, will need to be considered, preferably at an early stage. It is important that the risks from vehicles are assessed, as part of an overall system for managing aircraft safety and occupational health and safety.

- 2.6.3.9 FOD is an ever present hazard at aerodromes and must be constantly managed and procedures implemented to prevent ingestion into engines and other aircraft components. FOD (prevention and removal) is the responsibility of all apron personnel and provisions should be in place by the aerodrome operator to ensure each head of stand has a FOD disposal bin allocated.
- 2.6.3.10 Erratic and poor apron driving discipline, monitoring and oversight with varying degrees of driving experience across the apron, this naturally causes a potential hazard to apron safety. The aerodrome operator should have an Airfield Driving Permit (ADP) program that is robust and is continually controlled and monitored.

2.6.4 Inconsistent working practices and standard operating practices/procedures

- 2.6.4.1 Standard operating procedures on the apron (e.g. aircraft pushback procedures) should be as consistent as possible. Multiple pushback procedures introduce additional elements of risk which should be avoided. A risk assessment by the aerodrome operator in conjunction with the airlines and service providers should be conducted prior to any change in pushback procedure.

2.6.5 General aerodrome awareness (apron layout)

- 2.6.5.1 Lack of aerodrome familiarity, particularly for personnel involved with aircraft headset operations and push backs is a significant hazard. Headset operator should be familiar with pushback instructions provided by ATC to ensure a safe push back manoeuvre at all times.
- 2.6.5.2 The aerodrome operator should at the very least have a process in place to ensure that any personnel performing head set functions have completed an induction course specific to apron geography.
- 2.6.5.3 The airline operator should ensure that their employees performing the head set operation have been inducted by the aerodrome operator.

2.6.6 Hazards to Passengers on the Apron

- 2.6.6.1 At many aerodromes, passengers have to walk across the apron and sometimes roadways, between the terminal building and the aircraft. This may expose passengers to hazards such as vehicles moving across the apron. The risks of injury are increased as passengers are vulnerable and generally unaware of the dangers around them. Additionally, they will not be subject to the same PPE requirements (e.g. hi-viz clothing and suitable footwear) as those who work on the apron. Furthermore, passengers may inadvertently (or even deliberately) damage aircraft. The aerodrome operator, the airline operator and ground handlers all have responsibility for ensuring that the movement of passengers is strictly supervised and controlled.
- 2.6.6.2 Under National Civil Aviation Law the aerodrome operator may have a responsibility to provide an aerodrome that is safe for its users. The aerodrome operator, co-ordinating with organisations operating at the aerodrome, should conduct a risk assessment. This should identify the risks to passengers on the apron, and take into account stand layout, equipment required for the turnaround of the aircraft, and other user provision for passenger and ground services requirements, and airline requirements. Additionally, risk assessments may need to be conducted for specific stands or pedestrian areas and it may be further necessary for the company responsible for the movement of passengers to and from aircraft to complete their own risk assessment prior to implementation.
- 2.6.6.3 In designing the aerodrome layout and facilities, the aerodrome operator can make a significant contribution to the safety of passengers. For example, when the aerodrome operator provides aerobridges, passengers are not exposed to any of the hazards on the apron. Where the provision of aerobridges is not reasonably practicable, the aerodrome operator should ensure that the layout and marking of airside areas enables the safe movement of passengers to and from the terminal areas. The guidance in the preceding section is particularly relevant in this regard.

2.6.6.4 The steps that can be taken to ensure passenger health and safety on the apron will vary from aerodrome to aerodrome and from stand to stand, but will include the following measures:

- a) passengers should not be permitted to roam free. Staff should be positioned on the apron to ensure that passengers follow a safe path to the terminal/aircraft. If necessary, passengers should be led from the aircraft or terminal;
- b) where possible, the aerodrome operator should ensure that permanent traffic routes, e.g. aerodrome roads or taxiways, do not dissect the pedestrian/passenger routes between the terminal and the aircraft;
- c) where this is not possible, the aerodrome operator should provide safe routes marked on the apron surface (including safe crossing points for the apron roads) and clear, unambiguous signs to indicate the route to be followed. Positive control of vehicular traffic may be required from the airline or handling agent; co-ordination and co-operation with the aerodrome operator may be necessary to achieve this;
- d) safe routes can also be indicated by the use of moveable barriers and chains (Passenger Guidance Systems) to create a temporary safe route across the apron for passengers to follow. When not in use, it is important that such equipment is properly stowed to ensure that it does not become a source of FOD;
- e) routes to the aircraft should not pass below aircraft wings or beneath fuel vents, or close to propellers or rotors of aircraft on adjacent stands. Routes should also be clear of vehicular traffic around the aircraft, electrical cables, fuel hoses and other ramp equipment; this may require the use of temporary mobile passenger guidance barriers, also known as 'Passenger Inward Guidance Systems' (PIGS) or other suitable airport passenger guidance system or equipment;
- f) restrictions should be placed on the running of aircraft engines in the vicinity of passengers and positive measures should be taken to protect them from excessive engine noise and jet blast;
- g) passengers should be informed of the safe route they should follow into the terminal/aircraft, in accordance with instructions given by either the handling agents or cabin crew; this may also include information provided by public announcement before passengers leave the aircraft/terminal;
- h) for remote stands or stands in a different location to the terminal lounge, passengers should be transported to the aircraft by bus; and
- i) information on embarking and disembarking passengers could form part of the turnaround plan, as per Chapter 4.

2.6.6.5 Relying solely on informing passengers of safe routes and marking them out is unlikely to be adequate for commercial passenger operations. Whenever passengers have to walk across the apron there should be sufficient ground staff to ensure that passengers do not wander away from safe routes. If there is insufficient staff, then passengers may need to be disembarked or boarded in small groups which can be adequately controlled by the available staff.

2.6.6.6 Responsibility for ensuring that passengers are safeguarded between the aircraft and the terminal building is shared between the airline, aerodrome operator and any ground handlers involved. It is vital that it is clear who is responsible for providing staff to supervise and/or escort passengers across the apron, and that sufficient numbers of staff are provided. Clearly, any contracts will need to take this into account. Failure to supervise passengers properly may lead to accidents with serious consequences for all involved. Consideration should be given to unusual circumstances, such as evacuation of terminal buildings or aircraft, in which passengers and other members of the public may be required to enter airside areas. Procedures should ensure that responsible persons who are familiar with the hazards that exist in airside areas are present to supervise passengers and members of the public as soon as practicable wherever there is emergency egress. Consideration should also be given to methods by which aircraft movement and other sources of hazard may be stopped in areas in which passengers and members of the public may congregate with limited supervision. Furthermore, when passengers have checked in and are proceeding to the aircraft, it is the responsibility of the airline or handling agent to escort them safely there.

2.6.7 Moving Aircraft

- 2.6.7.1 The movement of aircraft on the ground, either under their own power or towed, creates a number of hazards that are unique to the aviation industry. In particular operating jet or propeller engines can cause fatal or serious injuries and extensive damage to equipment or other aircraft, as detailed further in paragraph 2.6.29.

2.6.8 Aircraft Parking Safety Practices - General Considerations - Operation of the Stand

- 2.6.8.1 The following paragraphs describe typical responsibilities and accountabilities for the operation of aircraft on and off stand. Relationships might vary from aerodrome to aerodrome due to differing contractual arrangements with stakeholders, or other owner/operator agreements. Therefore, it is good practice for aerodromes and other stakeholders to develop and establish the hierarchy of responsibilities and, where practicable, conduct joint risk assessments with the aerodrome users, then seek to establish agreed safe working practices within that hierarchy.
- 2.6.8.2 The aerodrome operator is responsible for the rules and procedures that safeguard the arrival and departure movements of aircraft on stands and for the dissemination of information to airline/company operators. Information documents/instructions and requirements should be based upon the subjects described in the following paragraphs.

2.6.9 'Ownership' of Stand/Parking Bay

- 2.6.9.1 In general the aerodrome operator has the responsibility to ensure that aircraft stands remain serviceable, clean and free from obstruction. However, in the busy operation of the apron, with minute to minute changes of status and vehicle/equipment movements, ground handling staff also have specific responsibilities (see Chapter 4 Aircraft Turnround).
- 2.6.9.2 Whether an aircraft stand is equipped with a visual docking guidance system (VDGS) or requires the aircraft to be marshalled, when a stand is allocated for use to an aircraft operator and the arrival of their aircraft on stand is imminent, it is usually the responsibility of the handling staff to ensure that the stand and clearways are free from obstructions, FOD, and vehicles or equipment. These staff should also ensure that, where provided, the aerobridge is fully retracted and correctly parked with the drive wheels in the parking box/circle provided before the arrival of the aircraft. These actions must be completed by the handler before the VDGS is switched on. Switching on the VDGS will normally signify to the aircraft commander that the stand is clear and is safe to enter. Once the VDGS is switched on, the stand must remain under supervision until the aircraft arrives on stand in order to ensure that it remains safe for use by the aircraft. If for any reason the stand becomes 'unsafe' or unattended before the aircraft has arrived on stand the VDGS should be switched off or 'STOP' indicated, using the Emergency Stop System if necessary.
- 2.6.9.3 Ideally, a Stand Supervisor or Turnround Co-ordinator (or equivalent) should be nominated to control and manage the turnround process and should be clearly identified to all staff working on the stand. As described in Chapter 4, the supervisor (or Turnround Co-ordinator) should be working to an agreed plan for the turnround and should have sufficient authority to control the activities around the aircraft. The supervisor should be present throughout the arrival, handling and departure procedures.

2.6.10 Vehicle and Equipment Operations

- 2.6.10.1 Further guidance for vehicle operations is contained in Chapter 5 of this document. Prior to aircraft arrival ground equipment should be/remain parked in the equipment areas provided. Service vehicles and baggage trolleys should stay clear of the stand and equipment, such as ground power units or any other equipment with trailing cables or hoses should be fully retracted and stowed. The stand must be clear of all obstructions and equipment prior to the arrival of the aircraft allocated to the stand. Other considerations for the safe docking and parking of an aircraft are described in the following paragraphs.

2.6.11 Stand Markings

2.6.11.1 In areas or stands that can accommodate a number of variations of aircraft parking arrangements, there are often complex signs or markings, only some of which are appropriate for specific aircraft. It is important to ensure that all staff who may be involved in activities in the area are fully trained in the appropriate configuration for all aircraft types that may use the stand and the appropriate marking and signage. Further guidance and details on markings, signs and stand design considerations are contained in Chapter 3 of this document.

2.6.12 Self-manoevring: Stand Configurations and Safety Considerations

2.6.12.1 Self-manoevring is a procedure whereby an aircraft enters an apron, parks and subsequently departs under its own power. The principal methods of stand configuration are angled nose-in, angled nose-out and parallel-parking; each method involves the adjacent apron area in being subjected to high levels of engine blast, noise and fumes at some stage of an aircraft movement. Taxi-through stands can also be used for self- manoeuvring and the blast effects are smaller. Some of the busier airports also employ what is known as 'remote holding', which is where loaded aircraft might be towed from its pier stand to a remote area in order to wait for an ATC delayed slot time, therefore vacating the pier stand for another aircraft. This might often involve small/medium sized aircraft being positioned nose-out on a remote stand where self-manoevring off the remote stand is not considered a blast problem.

2.6.12.2 Self-manoevring operations do not require aircraft tugs and ground crews but the layout of stands requires approximately double the apron area of conventional nose-in pushback operations. Due to the relatively high levels of engine power likely to be used for self- manoeuvring, and dependent upon location, there is an increased potential safety threat to buildings, installations, vehicles, equipment and personnel and passengers which must be controlled and managed.

2.6.12.3 Before deciding to adopt self-manoevring operations aerodromes should conduct a joint risk assessment with the aerodrome users. This should include consideration of other methods of aircraft handling. Self-manoevring on open, unmarked aprons should be subject to special procedures and a marshalling service should be available for all aircraft arrivals. The aerodrome operator should determine which combination of aircraft stands and conditions require a marshalling service on departure.

2.6.12.4 A risk assessment should ensure that the following arrangements and requirements are met:

- a) stand entry routes, parking positions and departure routes should be marked with standard paint markings, in accordance with the requirements of National Civil Aviation Regulation or, in the event of non-mandatory markings, the ACI Apron Markings and Signs Handbook;
- b) buildings and installations adjacent to self-manoevring stands should be constructed to withstand the engine blast or be protected by blast screening;
- c) Vehicles and equipment should not be placed in a position where they can be affected by blast, and where appropriate, equipment parking areas should be protected by blast screens or located remote from the stands;
- d) where appropriate, and as deemed necessary due to health and safety considerations, passenger areas and apron staff working areas should be protected by blast screens. Passengers should not be subjected to blast, excessive noise or fumes; and
- e) safety instructions should be issued, specifying the maximum aircraft sizes to be permitted on individual stands so as to ensure that any prescribed safe clearances (such as aircraft to stand) are maintained. Pilots should also be required to exercise caution and use the minimum engine power settings needed to complete a satisfactory manoeuvre.

2.6.13 Out of Service or 'Dead' Aircraft Handling

2.6.13.1 In addition to the above considerations, the handling staff pushing back a 'dead' aircraft for towing will need to consider the following, accepting that local procedures apply depending on local circumstances, for example when using 'tow bar less' tugs may require specific less general procedure than stated here:

- a) a trained staff member will normally be required to occupy the flight deck to control the brakes, monitor radio contact between tug/aircraft and ATC and control the aircraft's anti-collision and, if appropriate, navigation lights;
- b) as soon as a tug crew is assigned a task associated with the movement of an aircraft on any part of the manoeuvring area it should liaise with ATC for the necessary approvals and obtain a specific clearance before entering the manoeuvring area. The tug driver is normally required to advise ATC when the manoeuvre is complete;
- c) whilst an aircraft is under tow, the tug driver is responsible for the safety of the aircraft, just as the aircraft commander is when it is taxiing. It should be remembered that, irrespective of any instructions issued by ATC, in accordance with Rules of the Air regulations it is the tug driver who is responsible at all times for ensuring that the aircraft does not collide with vehicles, aircraft, buildings or other obstructions;
- d) when towing an aircraft, it is particularly important to be aware of the extent of the extremities, such as wingtips, of the aircraft and their proximity to obstructions. In the event that a tug driver is unsure whether there is sufficient clearance for an aircraft under tow to be moved safely, he or she should safely bring the aircraft to a stop and request assistance. If the aircraft stops on the manoeuvring area for this reason, the driver should advise ATC;
- e) for safety reasons it is important that the number of persons on board (POB) the aircraft is known for local ground movements. Companies involved with ground movements should ensure that tug drivers ascertain the POB. In the event of an incident or other unusual circumstances involving the towed aircraft, the tug driver should be able to advise Airfield Operations or the Rescue and Fire Fighting Service (RFFS) of the POB; and
- f) when an aircraft is being towed during the hours of darkness or low visibility, it must display those lights which would be required when flying, i.e. navigation lights. Logo lights will usually be of assistance to ATC; however, towbar-less tugs may require specific procedures regarding the display of navigation lights that must be agreed with both the aerodrome and Air Traffic Control.

2.6.14 Preparation of Stand - Visual Docking Guidance System (VDGS)

2.6.14.1 The compliance requirements for VDGS are described in National Civil Aviation Regulation.

2.6.14.1 Where a VDGS is provided the aerodrome operator should arrange for the stopping guidance to be calibrated and indicated for all selected user aircraft, in a clear and unambiguous manner. Azimuth guidance indication should also be regularly checked for accuracy. **It is generally accepted as International Best Practice that the VDGS should only be activated when the appropriate visual stand checks have been conducted which should include a walking FOD Inspection.** It is often the case with modern or advanced VDGS that the system self-checks prior to arming, however all systems should be subject to regular serviceability checks as deemed appropriate, the results of which should be recorded in line with local maintenance and serviceability procedures. Details of VDGS available at the aerodrome should be promulgated in the Aeronautical Information Publication with serviceabilities promulgated via NOTAM.

2.6.15 Aircraft Arrival on Stand and Parking Safety Considerations

2.6.15.1 In general, some of the hazards generated during the arrival of an aircraft on stand are, jet blast, carelessly driven vehicles, indiscriminately parked or stowed ground equipment and misleading markings or signals.

2.6.16 Control of the Parking/Docking Operation

- 2.6.16.1 Ground handling staff are responsible for certain aspects of the control of the parking/docking operation and should only allow the aircraft on stand once all the necessary stand checks have been completed, which includes a walking FOD Inspection. Once the aircraft has entered the stand, and where a marshaller is responsible for guiding the aircraft on to the stand, local instructions should clearly indicate the point at which responsibility is transferred from the marshaller to the handling staff. The nominated supervisor should control the progress of the operation and the actions of the handling team and should include the consideration with regard to the protection of the marshaller whilst carrying out the task, particularly where they are required to be positioned on an airside road. However, under all circumstances, it is the Commander of the aircraft who retains ultimate control and responsibility of taxiing the aircraft onto stand and bringing the aircraft to a halt. The aircraft remains under the responsibility of the aircraft commander until the appropriate indication is given to ground personnel that the aircraft has stopped and the aircraft engines have spooled down.
- 2.6.16.2 Wing-walkers - On some particularly compact stands, a wing walker/wingman may be required to ensure safety oversight of wing tip clearances; particularly on wide bodied aircraft.

2.6.17 Brakes/Chocks

- 2.6.17.1 On arrival, when the aircraft is positioned to the pilot's satisfaction and finally stopped, the appropriate aircraft wheel brakes should be engaged by the pilot until the aircraft has been safely and properly chocked (emergency situations such as dangerously hot or failed brakes should be addressed under operator company procedures). Wheel chocks should not be inserted until the pilot has indicated/signalled that the aircraft has finally stopped, engines are off and spooled down and any propellers have stopped turning. In addition to aircraft marshalling hand signals, it is standard practice for the pilot of a jet-engine aircraft to indicate to ground crews that it is safe to insert chocks by turning off the anti-collision beacons and shutting down the engines. However, as aircraft engines and the anti-collision beacons are not coupled for all aircraft types, they should not be considered as the only indication for ground crews to assume it is safe to approach the aircraft. Personnel should not be permitted to approach an aircraft unless it has been secured as described above. However, under certain operational circumstances and/or for emergency (aircraft) operational reasons, the approaching of aircraft for the purpose of connecting Fixed Electrical Ground Power (FEGP)/Ground Power Units (GPU) whilst anti-collision lights remain illuminated and when aircraft engines are running may be acceptable. Under any other circumstances the airline must produce a safety case that includes a risk assessment that is acceptable to the aerodrome operator.
- 2.6.17.2 To avoid the possibility of the aircraft climbing or ejecting its chocks, ground markings showing aircraft stop positions should not be used as a positive indication to insert chocks or that the aircraft has reached its final position. When not in use chocks should be safely stowed and not left on the apron surface or the Fixed Electrical Ground Power (FEGP) 'bucket' or any on any other type of equipment, for example, a baggage belt unless appropriate cradles are fitted and the chocks cannot fall off and become a safety hazard to other aircraft and vehicles. A chock and cone 'combo' storage trolley could be provided at the appropriate head of stand areas.

2.6.18 Flap and Control Surface Movement

- 2.6.18.1 Staff should be aware of the dangers of the movement of aircraft flaps and other under wing devices when an aircraft is on stand. These areas should be avoided by staff, and vehicles and equipment should not be driven or parked in such a way that damage would be caused by flap and other control surface movements.

2.6.19 Wheels

- 2.6.19.1 When an aircraft is in motion staff should keep well clear of all wheels to avoid becoming trapped. When an aircraft arrives on stand, tyres and particularly brake assemblies can remain very hot for some time. Ramp staff should exercise care when required to work in the vicinity of aircraft wheels. Where there is some free movement of aircraft wheels, care must be exercised to ensure that clothing and hands or feet do not become trapped.
- 2.6.19.2 Following the placement of chocks, a visual arrival inspection of the aircraft fuselage should be conducted. The appointed ground handler personnel should conduct an inspection of their 'work area' (i.e. cargo door frames, toilet and water service panels) prior to opening.
- 2.6.19.3 The engineer should conduct a full fuselage damage inspection. Any damage noted must be communicated to the engineer and airline representatives.

2.6.20 Marshalling of Aircraft

- 2.6.20.1 The marshalling service is normally, but not necessarily exclusively, provided by the aerodrome operator. The principal considerations are as follows:
- a) the aerodrome operator, as part of its SMS, should provide for the training, testing and authorisation of aircraft marshallers. This provision may be also met by the approval of trainers from handling agents, or third party organisations providing the training. To ensure compliance with regulation and standards, it is recommended that this is audited by the aerodrome operator and findings communicated and followed up as required in any corrective action plans. Only the standard (ICAO) marshalling signals, as laid down in the 'Rules of the Air Regulations 2009' should be employed. Only trained, experienced marshallers in regular practice should be permitted to marshal aircraft unsupervised;
 - b) except where full self-manoeuvring is permitted, a marshalling service should be provided automatically on stands not equipped with VDGS or where the VDGS or other stand facilities have known unserviceabilities. A marshalling service should also be available on request; and
 - c) in certain circumstances, such as a non-standard taxiway routing or on request from a visiting pilot, unfamiliar with the aerodrome, and/or in poor visibility, a 'Follow me' vehicle should lead the pilot to a marshaller or the designated parking place directly.

2.6.21 Fixed Electrical Ground Power (FEGP)/Auxiliary Power Units (APU)/Ground Power Units (GPU)

- 2.6.21.1 In accordance with local airport environmental policies and rules, concerning noise and emissions predominately, the running of all types of engines on the apron should be kept to the minimum necessary to maintain operational needs. Where FEGP units are provided on stands they should be used in preference to other forms of auxiliary power. The running of aircraft Auxiliary Power Units (APUs) and engine driven Ground Power Units (GPUs) should be strictly controlled to the minimum operational requirement. Airlines should be encouraged to use GPUs with the quietest engines available. At large aerodromes consideration can be given to the provision, on stand, of pre-conditioned air units to reduce the running of APUs for cabin conditioning.
- 2.6.21.2 When entering a stand, it is desirable that flight crews use the minimum power needed to carry out a normal arrival manoeuvre. Where possible the aircraft should be kept moving to avoid the need to apply 'break away' power to continue the approach to the stand. This may be particularly important in locations where there are stands on the opposite side of the taxiway or taxilane.
- 2.6.21.3 Thrust levers should not be exercised for any purposes when the arriving aircraft is on stand, unless specifically approved by the aerodrome operator.

2.6.21.4 Fundamental to the safe management of an aircraft movement is the timely attendance of the dispatcher/aerobridge operator to initiate those actions necessary to promote a safe arrival sequence. A full functional check of the aerobridge should be completed in good time before the aircraft arrives. To maintain aircraft and personnel safety and to ensure that the prescribed safe clearances between aircraft and bridge are maintained, the following precautions should be taken into consideration by the team leader:

- a) before the aircraft enters the stand, ensure by personal visual inspection that there are no potential hazards (such as FOD or vehicles illegally parked or equipment poorly positioned) to a safe parking operation;
- b) a visual inspection of the serviceability of the aerobridge tyres should also take place to verify that there is sufficient pressure in the tyres (where applicable, some are fitted with solid rubber tyres) before manoeuvring of the bridge can take place.
- c) before the aircraft enters the stand, the drive wheels of an apron-drive aerobridge must be positioned in the marked parking box/circle provided or, in the case of a rail-drive aerobridge, must be fully retracted;
- d) before the aircraft enters the stand, confirm that the stand is set up for the approaching aircraft type;
- e) a careful check should be made to ensure that no vehicles or equipment are obstructing the horizontal or vertical movement of the bridge while ensuring that the aerobridge remains in the appropriate position;
- f) the aerobridge cab should be adjusted vertically and in azimuth to suit the incoming aircraft type;
- g) only when the aircraft has stopped, the wheel chocks are in place, the engines have run down and the aircraft anti-collision beacon has been extinguished, can the aerobridge be driven from its parking position and docked to the aircraft, or steps be positioned beside the aircraft; and
- h) the aircraft passenger door should remain closed until the aerobridge has been docked, the canopy has been lowered on to the fuselage and the autoleveller device has been set;

2.6.22 Stop Short System

2.6.22.1 On stands equipped with VDGS, an indicator system should be provided to advise the pilot to Stop Short; this may be because the aerobridge is unserviceable and passenger steps must be used, or due an obstruction or due to works at the head-of-stand for example. The Stop Short indication may be an electronic sign associated with the VDGS display, or conspicuous painted signs may be used, normally fixed to the aerobridge. In Stop Short conditions a marshalling service should be provided.

2.6.23 Location of Controls

2.6.23.1 The determination of the best positions for VDGS, Stop Short and Emergency Stop switches may vary from aerodrome to aerodrome, or even from stand to stand. However, it should be an objective of the safety system to standardise the location of switches on all stands at a particular aerodrome. The following locations offer the best control positions:

- a) Emergency Stop switches: One gated switch located in the aerobridge cab and clearly marked. A second gated switch, working in parallel with the first, located in a prominent and easily reached position at the head-of-stand and conspicuously marked. A person should be positioned adjacent to each switch until the aircraft has successfully parked.
- b) Stop Short and VDGS Switches: These switches should ideally be grouped together with the emergency stop buttons, fuel cut-off switches and emergency telephones. One set of VDGS switches should be located in the aerobridge cab and clearly marked. A second set of VDGS switches working in parallel with the first should be located at a prominent easily reached position at stand level and conspicuously marked. Which of these positions is the primary VDGS switching position will depend on which position gives the operator the best view of the stand area.

Note: It is important the VDGS controls are located in a position such that the operator has an unimpeded view of the specific apron parking position whilst the controls are being used.

2.6.24 Departure and Post Turnround Responsibilities - Aircraft Departure

- 2.6.24.1 Aircraft departure is a critical phase of flight. Notwithstanding the pressures that often call for expeditious movement to meet schedules, clearances and 'slot' allocations, the safe management of departure procedures is paramount. For the purposes of this section the departure phase is considered to be from the time the aircraft starts an engine, or pushback movement starts (if earlier), to the point where taxi clearance is issued by ATC. Guidance covering the various methods of aircraft departure is given in the following paragraphs.
- 2.6.24.2 To avoid damage and to maintain a safe clearance from the aerobridge the following precautions should be observed before aircraft pushback is initiated:
- a) the aircraft passenger doors must be closed;
 - b) the aerobridge canopy and autoleveller must be retracted;
 - c) the aerobridge safety barrier should be erected or the doors should be closed;
 - d) an apron drive bridge or steps should be withdrawn and the drive wheels placed in the parking position provided;
 - e) a rail drive bridge should be fully retracted; and
 - f) a check should be made that there are no vehicles, FOD, equipment or personnel obstructing the movement of the aerobridge before it is moved. A check should also be made to confirm that the ground equipment is configured to meet any specific settings for the aircraft type.

2.6.25 Pushback Procedures

- 2.6.25.1 Aircraft pushback operations have the potential for accidents involving personal injury/fatalities for ground crews and damage to aircraft, vehicles and equipment. During the pushback sequence the stand centreline should be followed by the pushback driver until the main landing gear has reached the back of stand safety line and should also be monitored by the head set operator. Any deviations from the centreline prior to the safety line then the push should be stopped.
- 2.6.25.2 As part of an SMS, it is recommended that all stakeholders (aerodrome operators, airlines and ground handlers) conduct and coordinate risk assessments to establish and promulgate general rules and requirements for the safe conduct of pushback operations. The development of detailed procedures, within the guidelines issued, may remain the responsibility of airline operators/handling agents. Aerodrome operators should maintain safety management arrangements to audit compliance with pushback requirements including the use of Tug Release Points (TRP) where required. When considering rules for pushbacks the following should be taken into account:
- a) detailed written operating procedures should be produced by airline operators/ handling agents for use by their staff. These procedures should ensure the safety of the aircraft and the personnel involved; ideally this information should be contained within the aircraft turnround plan or similar associated documentation which should include instruction in regard to simultaneous pushbacks on adjacent stands;
 - b) a visual fuselage external check of the aircraft to ensure that there are no missing panels or damage has occurred and all doors/holds are closed;

- c) unless required to ensure the safety of the aircraft, personnel involved in the pushback should stay within the aircraft tug. Personnel working outside the aircraft tug, such as the headset operator, are particularly vulnerable to injury and employers must have risk assessments and safe working practices in place to address the hazards. Where risk assessment has shown it to be advisable, 'tail look-out' and/or 'wing-walkers' should be used to safeguard the rearward movement of the aircraft and prevent collisions with other aircraft, vehicles or personnel. Procedures for these personnel should be written down and should ensure the safety of the aircraft and the people involved. Personnel should be trained to ensure they are familiar with the procedures;
- d) during the pushback process, headset operators should not 'ride' the pushback tug and should walk alongside the aircraft. The side at which they walk (port or starboard) should be dictated by the most prominent hazard at either side of the aircraft;
- e) tug drivers should not commence the push if the headset operator is riding the tug;
- f) all tug drivers should be trained and competent to drive aircraft tugs in all weather conditions;
- g) pushback supervisors should be nominated, trained and certificated as competent, as in c) above; and
- h) the supervisor should, ideally, be in verbal contact with the flight deck crew throughout the pushback. Where there is a possibility that verbal communication will not be available for any reason, the supervisor and other members of the ground crew should be trained to use internationally agreed hand signals.

2.6.25.3 In the case of a departing aircraft being pushed back from its stand, the pilot of the aircraft will usually obtain approval to push back from ATC and pass this information to the headset operator who will then communicate this to the tug driver. It is imperative that the Tug Driver is provided with all the ATC clearance information in regard to 'standard' or 'non-standard' pushbacks.

2.6.26 Power-back procedures (Reversing under Power)

2.6.26.1 Powering back an aircraft is inherently less directionally accurate than pushback or powering forward; there may also be an increase in noise and blast effect. Accordingly, the use of this technique should be limited to those aircraft types authorised in the aircraft's flight manual to reverse under power and for which procedures can be agreed which do not adversely affect apron safety in respect of engine noise, vibration and blast effects.

2.6.26.2 Before approving power-backs the aerodrome operator should conduct a risk assessment taking into consideration aircraft characteristics, apron layout/stand density, the stand clearances available and any gradients involved on stands or taxiways.

2.6.26.3 The following items should also be considered:

- a) the procedures are authorised in the aircraft manufacturer's manual;
- b) the procedures to be used are incorporated in the airline's operations manual;
- c) pilots are trained and experienced in power-back operations;
- d) the aircraft is directed by a trained handling agent/marshaller using standard power-back marshalling signals;
- e) wing walkers are employed to safeguard the rearward movement of the aircraft, particularly wing tip clearances, to prevent collisions with other aircraft or vehicles or personnel. Procedures, training and personal protective equipment should be employed which ensure the safety of these personnel during power-back operations; and
- f) a trial of a live power-back is carried out using the engine settings, aircraft weight and procedure intended for operational use in which the safety of the operation is demonstrated.

- 2.6.26.4 The aerodrome operator should assess the effects of noise, vibration, blast and fumes, observed during the trial, in order to decide the suitability of the procedure demonstrated. It is not possible to state the finite limits of noise, blast and fumes to suit all locations and all aircraft types; aerodrome operators should decide the local limitations to be met.
- 2.6.26.5 Power-back operations should not be permitted when passengers are being boarded or disembarked on adjacent stands unless it is necessary for operational reasons. In such circumstances, the aerodrome operator should specifically risk assess the associated hazards and put in place control measures to reduce the risks to as low a level as reasonably practicable.

2.6.27 Engine Management on Aircraft Arrival/Departure

- 2.6.27.1 When entering a stand, it is desirable that flight crews use the minimum power needed to carry out a normal arrival manoeuvre. Where possible the aircraft should be kept moving to avoid the need to apply 'break away' power to continue the approach to the stand. This may be particularly important in locations where there are stands on the opposite side of the taxiway or taxilane. A trained member of airline or handling staff should ensure that the area behind the aircraft and the zone immediately in front of the engine intakes are clear of personnel, vehicles FOD and equipment before engine start.
- 2.6.27.2 The aircraft anti-collision beacon(s) must be switched on before an engine is started.
- 2.6.27.3 The number of engines started before pushback commences should be the minimum to meet technical and passenger service needs.
- 2.6.27.4 During start up and pushback, engine power settings should not normally exceed ground idle.
- 2.6.27.5 Aircraft leaving the inner stands of a cul-de-sac should be towed forward to a safe distance from the blast screen (noting that not all airports provide blast screens at the end of a cul- de-sac where a rear-of-stand road is provided for example) before the tug and towbar are disconnected. This position may be marked on the taxiway centreline for additional guidance to the tug-crew.

2.6.28 Multiple Pushback Procedures

- 2.6.28.1 Multiple aircraft pushbacks from a run of stands, or in a cul-de-sac, are an accepted method of achieving a faster pushback and departure rate, but they must be conducted with due regard to the additional health and safety requirements that arise for ground crews and for overall aircraft safety.
- 2.6.28.2 Approval for start of 'pushback' normally rests with ATC and if there are apron areas of an aerodrome where the ground movement controller does not have a full view of the aircraft, then any procedures must take this into account.
- 2.6.28.3 The principal safety threats in multiple pushback operations where aircraft end up positioned nose to tail are:
- a) aircraft positioned too close to each other when the pushback phase is completed; and
 - b) excessive levels of engine blast and fumes for pushback crews positioned behind aircraft with engines running.
- 2.6.28.4 In order to avoid excessive blast and fumes, the safe separation distance behind an aircraft must be determined by conducting collaborative a risk assessment involving all interested parties, including the air navigation service provider, which should make reference to aircraft engine manufacturer's specific guidance. The distance may vary according to aircraft type and engine fit. Experience gained from other aerodromes may be useful in deciding what practical separation distances can safely be used. It is impractical for pushback crews or operational staff to measure exact distance each time, so a practical rule of thumb should be established to permit multiple pushback operations to be managed and sequenced safely. Aircraft maintenance manuals will also include guidance on this topic.

2.6.28.5 The acceptance of a clearance from ATC to push back into an area in which other aircraft are being manoeuvred will normally assume that the prescribed safety distance criteria will be achieved. The decision to accept a clearance for a 'multiple pushback' remains with an aircraft commander as does the responsibility to ensure that the pushback crew are fully aware of any limitation or conditions to be adhered to. Clearly there is a need for prior planning, co-ordination and information exchange between the aerodrome operator, the aircraft operators and ATC before such manoeuvres are adopted as standard practice at any aerodrome.

2.6.29 Engine Hazards

The associated safety hazards caused by exhaust blast, vibration, fumes, turning propellers and rotors and the intake suction of jet engines are well recognised. As part of the safety management system, aerodrome operators should ensure that rules and procedures for safe engine running on the aerodrome are promulgated and understood by flight crews and handling staff. All personnel (including contracted employees) should have successfully completed an apron safety awareness course (Induction) prior to release to working airside, acceptable to the aerodrome operator.

2.6.30 Blast, Vibration, Noise and Fumes

Even at idle power the blast effects, ingestion, vibration and fumes from all sizes of aircraft engines can be significant. As engine size and power settings are increased, the potential for personal injury and damage increases. The amount of fumes produced is directly related to the engine running time and the power settings used. Engine running on the apron and adjacent taxiway areas should be limited to the minimum necessary to meet aircraft operating needs. In formulating safety rules the issues detailed in the following paragraphs should be considered.

2.6.31 General

- 2.6.31.1 Vehicles and personnel should not pass behind running engines. Staff should not approach aircraft whilst engines are running and/or whilst anti-collision beacons are illuminated unless it is part of their job function and is necessary for the task at hand, in which case a risk assessment of the procedure, leading to control measures and mitigations which protects aircraft safety and health and safety of ground personnel have been jointly agreed with all relevant stakeholders.
- 2.6.31.2 Drivers and pedestrians should be vigilant at all times on the apron. A common indication to ground staff that aircraft engines are running, or are about to be started, is the illumination of the aircraft's anti-collision beacon(s).
- 2.6.31.3 Where possible, blast screens should be provided to protect buildings, installations and vehicle and staff areas that are vulnerable to blast. These screens should be designed to withstand blast from the aircraft types expect to use those stand areas.
- 2.6.31.4 An assessment and consideration should be given to the location and building design (including protection to minimise the effects of blast, vibration, noise and fumes for the occupants) where contractors are required to use temporary buildings (i.e. portacabins etc) on the apron or other airside locations,

2.6.32 Engine Test Running

- 2.6.32.1 Engine ground runs and check starts should be controlled and only carried out with prior approval from air traffic control and the aerodrome operator who should specify the conditions to be applied, for example:
 - a) where possible, engine ground runs should be carried out on agreed, selected and prepared remote areas, preferably equipped with engine baffles/detuners;

- b) engine ground runs at above idle power should not be permitted in cul-de-sacs or, for example, in areas where the jet efflux would impinge on stands, equipment areas or works areas;
- c) engine ground runs on stands in regular use in apron areas should be limited to check starts and idle power only;
- d) where engine running is permitted on the apron, a remote area should be chosen where the jet-blast will not affect other apron areas and busy taxiways;
- e) where necessary, engine ground runs should be safeguarded by Airfield Operations staff who should arrange for any rear-of-stand roads and, if needed, sections of taxiway to be closed;
- f) the area behind and adjacent to the cone of the blast should be clear of equipment and aerodrome signage and the ground must be firm and without loose tarmac, stones or other material;
- g) the engineer in charge of the ground run must ensure that the aircraft wheels are safely chocked and that the aircraft cannot move forward under any circumstances;
- h) ground running must not take place when passengers are being embarked/ disembarked on any adjacent or opposite stands, except when such passengers are using an aerobridge; and
- i) a trained member of airline or handling staff is to be positioned on the stand and should be in verbal contact with the flight deck and ATC. He/she will communicate by R/T or interphone with the flight deck to ensure that the engine(s) are shut down if persons or vehicles move into the danger area in front of, behind or in the vicinity of a live engine. For this purpose and if the R/T or interphone link is unserviceable, hand signals by day and light signals by night may be used.

2.6.33 Propellers

- 2.6.33.1 Aerodrome operators should issue instructions to safeguard apron operations around propeller driven aircraft. Apron staff must be alert to the dangers of running propellers and should be educated by suitable awareness campaigns. At some aerodromes there are relatively few propeller driven aircraft and ramp staff are likely to be less familiar with precautions that need to be observed, particularly for staff of airlines which themselves offer no propeller driven services. In these circumstances it is the airlines responsibility to communicate such risks to the relevant handling organisation and other stakeholders to ensure that the safeguarding of 'propeller areas' is included in operating safety procedures.
- 2.6.33.2 Aerodrome operators should provide suitable apron layouts and facilities that provide compliant clearances for the operation of propeller aircraft types, with particular emphasis on ground clearance for propeller tips and the proximity of ramp equipment when the aircraft is at, or approaching, its parking position. Stands at which this cannot be achieved should not be used for propeller aircraft.
- 2.6.33.3 Passengers must not be permitted to walk on aircraft parking stands when propellers of an aircraft on that stand are turning. Where it is operationally essential to have the propellers turning, passengers must be effectively controlled by the relevant handling company's safety procedures.

2.6.34 Rotors

- 2.6.34.1 Helicopter operations, particularly those of large helicopters, should be segregated from fixed-wing apron operations where possible. In addition to the provision of standard clearances for rotors in the apron layout, due regard should be given to the other characteristics of rotary operations, including:
 - a) the heavy down draught produced by helicopter movements;
 - b) the vulnerability of helicopters and aircraft to jet blast, strong winds and rotor downwash from other helicopters;
 - c) the risk of reduced ground clearance caused by the drooping of the rotor (blade sailing) as it runs down following engine shut down or drive disconnection;
 - d) the ease of approach to the chosen helicopter stands in hover and hover-taxi mode and the least interference from/for taxiing fixed wing aircraft; and
 - e) the risks associated with tail rotors.

2.6.34.2 Dependent on aircraft type characteristics, procedures should include arrangements whereby:

- a) helicopter arrivals are marshalled, unless the helicopter apron is remote and configured for self-manoeuvring. Marshalling assistance/safeguarding may also be required for departure;
- b) ideally passengers should not be allowed to walk on the apron when rotors are turning. Where it is operationally essential to keep rotors running passengers must be effectively controlled;
- c) staff, vehicles and ground equipment should remain well clear of the rotor disk until it has come to rest. If as above, running the rotors is essential, handling staff must be trained accordingly; and
- d) suitable signs should be provided to warn drivers and apron staff that they are approaching an area where helicopter operations are handled. All airside drivers and handling staff should be briefed to maintain a good look-out and also should be trained to look upwards as well as horizontally to detect and give way to helicopter movements.

2.6.35 Fumes and Noise

2.6.35.1 In approving engine running or self-manoeuvring on the apron, the following should be taken into account:

- a) the concentration of fumes present in an aerodrome area is in direct relation to the length of time engines are run, the type of engine and power settings used and the strength and direction of the surface wind; and
- b) where workplaces, such as cargo-sheds and engineering facilities, have to open directly on to stand areas, a specific risk assessment is required to determine how best to operate all facilities safely and without risks to health, in respect of noise and fumes.

2.6.36 Suction - Ingestion

2.6.36.1 Personnel entering the danger zones in front of a running jet engine expose themselves to the risk of being sucked in, almost invariably resulting in serious or fatal injury. The intake suction of jet engines is a hazard, even at idle power, and the flow characteristics of air into an engine are such that items can be picked up from in front of, from below, and from the sides of the intake. Even small items ingested can damage the engine, but the larger engines are quite capable of ingesting large objects from several metres away with catastrophic effect.

2.6.36.2 The extent of the danger zone depends on the size of the engine, the mounting height and the power setting. Managers of aircraft handling staff should calculate and promulgate to their staff the safe distances for operating around the types of aircraft they operate.

2.6.37 Foreign Object Damage

2.6.37.1 Foreign object damage' or 'foreign object debris', both abbreviated to FOD, are a potential source of catastrophic damage to aircraft, particularly engines. FOD can also be a tripping or slipping hazard resulting in injury to personnel and passengers. Foreign objects may be ingested into aircraft engines causing damage leading to engine failure, which is critical if it occurs during the take-off phase of flight. At best, such damage leads directly to premature engine removal and replacement. In addition, damage caused by foreign objects can occur to tyres and undercarriages, control systems and other parts of the airframe. All such damage could lead to in-flight failures and inevitably requires expensive repairs to be made. All foreign objects are a threat to aircraft safety.

- 2.6.37.2 Dealing with the temporary sources of risk, such as FOD, requires the whole aerodrome community to play a part. Loose items should be removed by whoever notices them; some of them will only be suitable for the FOD bin. Larger items, such as cables, should be reported to the owner of the piece of equipment concerned, who should in turn have the items removed or tidied away promptly. If the owner of a larger piece of equipment cannot be established, the FOD should be reported to the aerodrome operator.
- 2.6.37.3 FOD is a general term which applies to all loose objects which are a danger to the safety and integrity of an aircraft and which, therefore, must not be left in any area so as to constitute a hazard. The list of FOD items most frequently found on the apron is long and principally includes:
- a) plastic and paper bags/sheets;
 - b) rags;
 - c) empty oil and hydraulic fluid cans;
 - d) empty soft drink cans;
 - e) nuts and bolts, tools and equipment;
 - f) luggage wheels and baggage tags;
 - g) metal cutlery;
 - h) burst ballast bags; and
 - i) broken wooden items and miscellaneous rubbish.
- 2.6.37.4 The presence of FOD is due mainly to the carelessness of staff and their lack of understanding of the consequences. Every individual has a responsibility to ensure that the risk of damage to aircraft from FOD is minimised. Any item of FOD found by any staff member in the course of their work should be removed and placed in the bin provided. An item of FOD seen in an area that a staff member is not authorised to enter or which they are unable to remove for any reason should be brought to the attention of their supervisor and the duty manager airside operations. All operators should introduce staff procedures that reflect these responsibilities.
- 2.6.37.5 Aerodrome operators should include instructions, services, facilities and initiatives to combat the risks arising from FOD, establish a programme to educate all apron users on the hazards and requirements associated with FOD, and stress the responsibilities of all personnel employed on the apron to minimise risks from FOD.
- 2.6.37.6 Aerodrome operators should ensure that there are programmes of regular apron sweeping, cleaning and inspection, including appropriate and timely response to fuel and other liquid and chemical spillages in accordance with agreed procedures. They should also provide facilities for the disposal of solid and liquid aircraft waste and FOD protection, with particular attention to such prime FOD generators as contractors' areas, bin, compactors and baggage facilities all of which should be regularly checked. FOD bins should be located in the vicinity of the head of each stand.
- 2.6.37.7 All vehicles and equipment used on the aprons should be maintained in a clean and serviceable condition, not only for reasons of safe vehicle operation but also to minimise the leakage of fluids and depositing of FOD from these vehicles (See Chapter 5 for additional guidance on the management of airside vehicles.).
- 2.6.37.8 Generally, airport operators should have in place agreed policies and arrangements for the removal of hazards from the apron such as abandoned vehicles and equipment.

2.6.38 Falls and Falling Objects - General

- 2.6.38.1 Access to external elevated levels on and around aircraft will be required when aircraft are on the stand. Such work includes catering, cargo and baggage handling at the aircraft holds, some cleaning activities and maintenance.

- 2.6.38.2 It is not sufficient merely to indicate the presence of an edge from which a person may fall. There must be suitable and effective measures to prevent any person falling a distance likely to cause personal injury. Measures must also be taken to prevent aircraft or people being struck by falling objects. Preference should be given to providing a safe place of work (e.g. elevated platforms with edge guards) rather than relying on personal protective equipment, information, instruction, training or supervision to prevent these events. Nevertheless, even where all other reasonably practicable measures have been taken to prevent falls, personal protective equipment (PPE), for example a safety harness and lanyard, may still be necessary if a significant risk of falls remains.
- 2.6.38.3 The necessity and provision of head protection should be determined by the employer's risk assessment of staff carrying out tasks on the ramp. Head protection may be necessary for other activities on the apron, such as construction work or maintenance of plant.
- 2.6.38.4 By its very nature all access equipment has to be used in close proximity to the aircraft. Drivers may need to seek assistance, especially from a person appointed to guide the vehicle, to ensure the correct positioning of the access equipment so that there are no gaps large enough for a person to fall through, as well as preventing the access platform or its chassis striking the aircraft. Drivers should also make allowance for the change in height of an aircraft during loading/unloading as this might cause the aircraft to touch the access equipment resulting in damage to the aircraft.
- 2.6.38.5 Suitable access equipment should always be used to gain access to heights. Work from surfaces such as vehicle cabs, roofs of buildings and equipment is not acceptable unless these places have been designed or adapted to make them safe for such work. Mobile elevating work platforms (MEWPs) provide flexible and safe means of access to heights. They should be used in accordance with a safe system of work and procedures which minimise the risk of injury and damage to the aircraft. Passenger steps should be equipped with non-slip devices to mitigate the potential for falls, particularly in humid conditions.
- 2.6.38.6 Some places may be temporarily adapted to make work at heights safe. For example, some aircraft have attachment points on their wings for running lines and harnesses. The health and safety of the engineers preparing such places of work for use should be considered, as well as the prevention of damage to the aircraft.
- 2.6.38.7 Work at heights above should only be undertaken from equipment fitted with guardrails to all sides in order to meet best practise guidance or requirements.
- 2.6.38.8 Where guardrails or barriers cannot be fitted, other means, such as the use of PPE, should be considered. It should be noted that where the potential height of a fall is less than four metres, the use of lanyard and harness systems as fall arrest devices may not prevent injury as the worker may hit the ground before the device becomes effective. Advice should be obtained from the equipment supplier.
- 2.6.38.9 Where the potential height of a fall is less than two metres, each situation should be assessed for the likelihood of injury and aircraft damage, and appropriate preventive measures taken. For example, the likelihood of injury is increased if there are obstructions, such as low profile equipment with sharp edges, onto which people may fall, or the work is taking place alongside a traffic route. The availability of safety guard rails on Main and Lower Deck Loading equipment and passenger steps should be mandatory. Conveyor belts should be equipped with safety guard rails and should be utilised, especially when used on wide body aircraft.

2.6.38.10 As with all equipment, means of access and means for preventing falls (including those integral to the aircraft) should be maintained in efficient working order and in good repair if continued protection against injury and aircraft damage is to be ensured. A regime of inspection may also be required to ensure that any deterioration in the equipment which may affect health and safety or aircraft safety is detected and rectified in good time. This inspection should be carried out by people with sufficient knowledge, experience and training to identify and prioritise defects. The results of inspections should be recorded and kept until at least the next inspection and longer if the inspection results are used for monitoring serviceability trends.

2.6.39 Access to Aircraft Doorways

2.6.39.1 Safe access to aircraft entry/service doorways is particularly important as the height of fall from the doorway of an aircraft may result in a fatal injury. Aircraft doors and doorways are also particularly vulnerable to damage. Such damage may go undetected for some time. For example, damage to escape slides may not be immediately apparent and may not be discovered until the next periodic inspection of the slide assembly or until it is used in an emergency. Equally, for example, damage to door sills can cause aircraft depressurisation; therefore all damage, even seemingly insignificant, should be reported via the local incident/accident reporting procedures (See Chapter 7 Safety Performance Management and Measurement for more details about reporting).

2.6.39.2 Airline operators should ensure that doors are not to be opened unless ground equipment is in place. This must be communicated to ground handlers and other service providers. A door safety lanyard is not sufficient mitigation as it does not act as a weight bearing safety device. During maintenance/hangar input the use of a door safety net should be considered.

2.6.39.3 Proper planning, safe systems of work and instruction and training are required to ensure that aircraft doors are opened in such a way that no one is exposed to the risk of a fall, and the risk of damage to the aircraft is minimised.

2.6.39.4 Airlines should ensure that they do not require aircraft doors to be opened in a manner which exposes people to unnecessary risk. The types of vehicles commonly used to service aircraft rarely have means to prevent falls from the edge that is adjacent to the aircraft when in use. In some circumstances the access equipment can be brought close to the aircraft before a person has to approach the leading edge. Examples are when the aircraft doors open inwards upwards, are powered open and closed, or otherwise avoid the need for people to approach the edge of the access equipment or the aircraft doorway.

2.6.39.5 Where the aircraft has outwards opening doors, which may foul the access equipment during opening and closing, employers should establish whether the safest option, for both the worker and the aircraft, is to open the door from inside. This may require co-operation and co-ordination with the airline operating the aircraft.

2.6.39.6 If opening the door from the inside is not the safest option, employers should ensure that people work at the unprotected edge of the access equipment for the shortest time that is practicable. The floor on which the employee is standing should not have any defects that are likely to cause them to slip, trip or fall. Secure handholds should also be provided.

2.6.39.7 Where an extra wide platform can be positioned against the aircraft, the increased width can provide additional protection against falling and reduce the risk of damage to the aircraft door. There should be a safe system of work in place for opening the door, and employees should be given information, instruction and training on the task.

- 2.6.39.8 Whatever platform is used, the moveable side guardrails should be adjusted to be close enough to the aircraft to protect the workers without causing damage to the aircraft; it must be kept in mind that a gap of more than 300 mm will not ensure the safety of the workers and that the aircraft may move during loading and unloading. Guardrails should be moved into position as soon as is practicable and certainly before the doorway is used. The last task before the access equipment is withdrawn from the aircraft should be to retract the guardrails. It is equally important that any controls that move the platform should be located so that the operator has a clear view of the platform in order to prevent the platform striking the aircraft. For vertical height fluctuations, particularly as an aircraft is being loaded/unloaded and refuelled during a turn around, it is recommended that some guidance is given to ground handlers as to the maximum safe height clearance. A useful guide is 29mm. A clearly defined horizontal guidance marker line is also recommended (dependant on the ground movement characteristics of the aircraft type).
- 2.6.39.9 Sometimes aircraft doors are left open for reasons other than access, for example to keep the aircraft cooler in hot weather whilst cleaners etc. work inside. When doors are left open, suitable means to prevent a fall should be in place. These include placing aircraft steps at the doorway; although particular aircraft operator's or aerodrome operator's security requirements need to be kept in mind.
- 2.6.39.10 The straps and their attachments which are often fitted to aircraft doorways are not sufficient as a means to prevent a fall, as they are not designed to withstand the forces generated by a person falling or leaning against them.
- 2.6.39.11 If other means of preventing a fall cannot be provided, then the aircraft doors should be kept shut. If necessary, the aircraft's air conditioning should be used to keep working temperatures comfortable. Where possible, this should be provided by a safely positioned mobile air conditioning unit, rather than the aircraft's auxiliary power unit (APU), as the APU generates considerable noise for those working outside the aircraft. Any aerodrome policies on the use of GPU/APUs should be followed.
- 2.6.39.12 Access to parts of the aircraft other than the doorway may be gained by a suitable MEWP, although other measures may be used if they are suitable and effective. The edge protection around the working platforms should be maintained so as to prevent persons falling.
- 2.6.39.13 Lightweight fall restraint devices incorporating a lanyard and harness have been found to be effective for over-wing access. Any equipment which interfaces with the aircraft surfaces should be approved by the aircraft manufacturer. Some aircraft manufacturers provide attachment points for harnesses on wings of their aircraft and, in such cases, the manufacturer's guidance on their use must be followed.
- 2.6.39.14 A significant number of accidents occur as the result of falls through uncovered access points in the internal floors of aircraft when covers have been temporarily lifted. Accordingly, covers should be replaced when the access way is not in use and uncovered access points should be provided with a temporary barrier.

2.6.40 Aerobridge Operations

- 2.6.40.1 There have been several incidents involving aerobridges which have occurred globally which had potential for major aircraft damage and/or serious injury to personnel. These have included:
- a) collapse and other extensive structural failure, in particular the service steps which are often overloaded with cleaning staff waiting to access the aircraft;
 - b) un-commanded or unexpected movements;
 - c) obstructions, such as vehicles and equipment, being struck by the aerobridge, due in part to the failure of detection devices; and
 - d) rotten floors and leaking roofs creating slip and trip hazards.
- 2.6.40.2 These incidents have commonly been caused either by incorrect installation or inadequate maintenance of the equipment, or poor procedures leading to operator error.

- 2.6.40.3 The efficient and safe in-service operation of these walkways depends on their correct installation. Therefore, they should be inspected after installation and before being put into service for the first time.
- 2.6.40.4 Detailed advice cannot be given on the content of such an inspection, but it is unlikely to be adequate unless it is based on the findings of a risk assessment. Such an assessment will need to cover the appropriate issues outlined in paragraph 2.5.3
- 2.6.40.5 The process of installation may be subject to any requirements of the Construction (Design and Management) Regulations.
- 2.6.40.6 The following auxiliary equipment should be fitted to apron drive aerobridges:
- a) audible and visual warnings that operate automatically when the bridge is in motion;
 - b) in order to overcome downward and rearward blind spots for the operator, CCTV or sight mirrors should be fitted to cover blind areas in which the aerobridge is able to manoeuvre;
 - c) pressure sensitive safety hoops which, when they touch an object, cut out the motive force thus stopping movement of the bridge;
 - d) means to prevent falls from the leading edge of the aerobridge, such as doors or guardrails, for use when the aerobridge is not in place against an aircraft.
- 2.6.40.7 Apron-drive aerobridges are vulnerable to obstructions. Significant damage has occurred when items of equipment have been parked in the operating area of aerobridges. For stands equipped with an apron-drive aerobridge, ground marking in the form of a hatched area should be provided to delineate the area within which the parking of vehicles and equipment must be prohibited. The aerodrome operator should enforce this parking restriction and aerobridge operators should bring improperly parked vehicles to the aerodrome operator's attention.
- 2.6.40.8 For stands equipped with an apron-drive aerobridge, a ground marking in the form of a parking box should be provided to show the position of the aerobridge wheels when it is fully retracted so that the prescribed safe clearance can be maintained between any aircraft and the bridge structure. The parking box should be clearly defined at all times, particularly during night operations. Any unserviceable markings should be reported to the airport operator immediately.
- 2.6.40.9 To assist marshallers and tow-on crews, painted stop marks should be provided across the stand centreline and designed for each aircraft type permitted to use the stand. These stop marks should be harmonised with the VDGS stopping positions for the particular aircraft.
- 2.6.40.10 The extendable portion of rail-drive aerobridges should be highlighted by conspicuous marking (such as retroreflective chevrons) to indicate to pilots, drivers and apron staff that the bridge is extended.
- 2.6.40.11 Aerodrome operators should establish a schedule of preventative maintenance and cleaning, including inspection by competent people.
- 2.6.40.12 Such inspection and maintenance regimes are unlikely to be adequate unless they consider the following points:
- a) the structural integrity of the aerobridge, including components vulnerable to catastrophic failure and the potential for water ingress to cause corrosion to the walkway or its control and drive systems;
 - b) the electrical safety of the aerobridge and the potential for electrical failure to cause un-commanded or unexpected movement;
 - c) the mechanical integrity of the drive and control systems of the aerobridge, including the condition of the hydraulic fluid and the components on which it impinges;
 - d) the conditions of wheels and tyres;

- e) the devices for detecting obstructions (if any), such as closed circuit television (CCTV) or sensor rings; and
- f) the cleanliness of aerobridge cab windows to provide unobstructed vision to the ramp and a FOD-free cab.

- 2.6.40.13 Aerodrome operators should establish and promulgate a formal reporting system for aerobridge faults. The procedure should include immediate response activities by engineering and airfield operations staff, where necessary withdrawing the aerobridge from service until remedial action is taken, to maintain safe aircraft and passenger handling.
- 2.6.40.14 Aerodrome operators should ensure that they develop and promulgate Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for aerobridges. These should include emergency back-off and wind-off procedures. Instructions for emergency back-off action should be displayed in the aerobridge cab and in the case of manual wind-off, at the point of operation.
- 2.6.40.15 Procedures that are specific to the stand or aerobridge should normally be displayed at the aerobridge control position. This is particularly important if the procedures relate to different configurations for particular aircraft types.
- 2.6.40.16 In the event of an emergency whilst the aircraft is on stand, the aerobridge should remain attached or be re-attached to the aircraft until all passengers and crew have evacuated the aircraft.
- 2.6.40.17 A system should be established for the training, testing and licensing of aerobridge operators. An Aerobridge Operator's Licence (or permit), endorsed for the appropriate type of aerobridge, should be issued by the aerodrome operator or delegated trainer provider when a satisfactory level of competence has been demonstrated. The demonstration of competence should include a practical test. Procedures should be established to ensure that aerobridge operators attempt to operate only those types of aerobridge on which they have been assessed as being competent. Aerobridges with different operating characteristics or control/warning systems are to be considered to be different types of aerobridge.
- 2.6.40.18 Licences should only be issued to those staff who regularly operate aerobridges as part of their job function, as it is these staff who remain fully familiar, in good operational practice and up to date with operational changes and aerobridge modification states. Licence holders should be subject to regular revalidation to confirm that they remain competent to operate the equipment. The aerodrome operator should also establish an audit system to ensure aerobridge operator competency and adherence to standards. Records of aerobridge incidents and major faults should also be examined. If responsibility for training and/or testing of aerobridge operators has been delegated to a handling agent or a third party, the airport operator should conduct regular audits of the performance and actions of these organisations in order to ensure that adequate levels of safety are achieved. Following an accident or incident, aerobridge operators should be subject to revalidation on request of the aerodrome operator and it should be possible to suspend an operator's licence pending re-training.
- 2.6.40.19 If a new type of aerobridge is introduced, all aerobridge licence holders who will be required to operate (or trainers who will be required to give instruction on) the equipment, should undertake training and testing to demonstrate their competency and familiarity with the new equipment before being permitted to use it operationally.
- 2.6.40.20 Aerobridges should not be left unattended when passengers are being embarked or disembarked. Should the bridge go out of limits while loading or unloading is taking place, the bridge is to be removed and repositioned.
- 2.6.40.21 When bridges are not being used for passenger loading or unloading they should be retracted into their parking box and closed down. Airlines and handlers are advised that whenever a bridge is docked to an aircraft a qualified aerobridge operator should be in attendance, unless an approved and serviceable safety shoe device is employed.

2.6.40.22 Aircraft operators are reminded that they are responsible for the security of their aircraft and docked aerobridges make aircraft vulnerable. To prevent unauthorised access via aerobridges, airlines should either deploy personnel to control access to their aircraft or remove the aerobridge from it.

2.6.40.23 The aircraft passenger door is to remain closed until the aerobridge has been correctly docked and must be closed before the bridges is retracted. Additionally, aerobridges must not be moved when passengers are on the aerobridge.

2.6.41 Manual Handling

2.6.41.1 Manual handling is the term that applies to activities such as lifting, lowering, pushing, pulling or supporting a load by hand or bodily force. Commonplace manual handling activities in the industry include, for example, ground crew operations such as the loading or unloading of an aircraft and lifting tow bars onto and from aircraft or towing vehicles. The provision of assistance for incapacitated or disabled passengers will require particular thought.

2.6.41.2 Some Handling Agents have developed Handling Operations Manuals which set out the requirements.

2.6.41.3 The best means of avoiding risk is to eliminate the hazard altogether, for example, by mechanised handling techniques. These include the use of ambulifts to assist the movement of incapacitated or disabled passengers onto the aircraft and handling aids for baggage. Where it is not reasonably practicable to eliminate the hazard, and ground staff are required to undertake manual handling, best practice requires that:

- a) a suitable and sufficient risk assessment is made of each task which is considered to present a risk of injury. This should address the task, the load, the working environment and the capabilities of the individuals concerned;
- b) action is taken on the results of the assessment, appropriate steps are taken to reduce the risk of injuries from manual handling
- a) information is provided on the weight and centre of gravity of the loads that are to be lifted where it is reasonably practicable to do so. Baggage handling potentially, gives rise to more manual handling problems than any other activity at aerodromes. The following may help reduce injury from baggage handling. All these suggestions will require co-operation and co-ordination between the aerodrome operator, airlines and ground handling companies: Proper planning of new and refurbished facilities can provide significant reductions in the risk of injury, as well as increasing efficiency;
- b) examine the entire handling operation (where possible, from the first moment a bag is handled by a worker to the last) and consider whether a change of process or equipment could eliminate any stages of manual handling;
- c) handling systems should be integrated with each other where possible. Different pieces of equipment should be compatible with each other and positioned to prevent unnecessary handling between, for example, security scanners, conveyors, dollies and aircraft loading equipment;
- d) use conveyors (or similar) that are of a suitable height to minimise the risk of injury from lifting or lowering items to or from such equipment. 650 mm above the floor is commonly found to be an acceptable height, but this might vary depending on local circumstances and should not be applied rigidly;
- e) consider the environment in which manual handling is undertaken. Floors should be dry and adequately maintained. There should be sufficient space to allow people to turn whilst handling, if such turning is unavoidable. There should be no gaps between equipment that result in people having to throw baggage. Lighting should be sufficient to allow tasks to be carried out safely. Ambient temperature should be kept at a reasonable level (e.g. in baggage halls), or warm/cool clothing provided where this is not possible (e.g. on the apron);
- f) ensure that automated systems are properly maintained to minimise consequential poor manual handling techniques;

- g) ensure that training is relevant to the tasks that people are undertaking. It may be necessary to target training to specific activities such as moving bags in the confines of the aircraft baggage hold; and
- h) provide general indication of the weight of each bag. This could be achieved by the attachment of a 'heavy bag' label at check in with instruction and training given to employees on how to deal with such baggage.

2.6.41.4 The primary objective must be to reduce the requirements for manual handling. It is good practice to review each stage of the baggage handling process with the aim of eliminating any unnecessary stages. For example, it might be possible to eliminate some stages by using a baggage transfer vehicle that can adjust to the correct height of the aircraft hold door. This eliminates manual handling from the transfer vehicle to a belt loader.

2.6.42 Noise

2.6.42.1 There are many sources of noise on an aerodrome. Excessive noise exposure can result in both short-term and permanent hearing loss. It can also compromise effective communication during safety-critical tasks.

2.6.42.2 The primary source of noise on aerodrome aprons are aircraft engines, APUs and support equipment such as mobile ground power units. Many of these sources are highly mobile and exhibit variability in their noise emissions. Therefore, the level of ambient/background noise and, potentially, levels of personal noise exposure, can fluctuate very significantly and can greatly exceed the action levels.

2.6.42.3 Employers should try to reduce the noise exposure of both their employees, and others at work on the apron exposed to the noise created by their activities, without relying on hearing protection. Some suggestions are:

- a) where fixed electrical ground power units (with power generation sited away from employees on the apron) and fixed air conditioning units are provided on the stands, aircraft operators should make full use of these facilities to minimise the need for APUs or mobile units which generate high levels of noise;
- b) where existing noisy ground support plant is used it should be engineered to minimise noise output. In some instances this may require retrospective remedial action, e.g. partial enclosure, to reduce noise emission;
- c) before the procurement of new plant, noise emission data provided by the supplier, should be taken into account in deciding whether to purchase, and whether further protective measures may be needed. The aerodrome operator may set minimum standards for new equipment;
- d) the amount of time that workers spend in the vicinity of noisy plant and equipment should, if possible, be minimised by planning and organising work accordingly;
- e) work associated with cargo holds or other service points near the APU could be undertaken when it is not running; and
- f) for vehicle operators an acoustic cab could be fitted, provided that the vehicle can be operated with the doors and windows kept closed. If this is not reasonably practicable, it may be feasible for drivers to use hearing protection.

2.6.42.4 The areas in which hearing protection is required should be marked and warning notices displayed, so far as is reasonably practicable. This may be difficult on the apron itself, but relatively easy within or on equipment, e.g. in cabs of vehicles where the second action level may be exceeded for part or all of the time. Signs should also be placed at all apron access points.

- 2.6.42.5 On the apron one employer's activities may cause the employees of other employers to be exposed to noise. For example, high levels of noise from an APU will affect baggage handlers and others working in the vicinity of the aircraft. The various employers involved will usually need to agree who is to coordinate their action on noise. Normally, this will be the employer in overall control of the work. This employer should make sure that the noise exposure that his work activity generates is assessed and reduced, and that the information on noise is made available to all affected employees; the actual employer of each worker provides any training and personal protective equipment needed. In most cases exchange of information and collaboration between employers will be needed to ensure that duties are fulfilled without unnecessary duplication.
- 2.6.42.6 Where communication between personnel is essential or audible alarms are used to assure safety, a thorough risk, health and safety assessment of the environment must be carried out to ensure that any risks that result from the use of hearing protection are properly managed.

2.6.43 Work Equipment (including machinery) - General

- 2.6.43.1 Work equipment includes every item on the apron, including vehicles, specialist equipment such as cargo loaders, fixed equipment such as aerobridges and FEGP Units and hand tools.
- 2.6.43.2 The hazards to health and safety and aircraft safety from work equipment can arise when it is moved, installed, used, maintained or dismantled. They include hazards from:
- a) Machinery;
 - b) Hot or cold surfaces;
 - c) Instability (collapsing or overturning);
 - d) Objects or people falling or being ejected from the equipment;
 - e) Disintegration, deterioration or malfunctions in the equipment or its controls;
 - f) Improper use of the equipment (for example using it for a purpose for which it is not suitable); and
 - g) Fire or overheating.
- 2.6.43.3 Dependent on the process involved, the hazards may always be present with the equipment, (such as its weight which may affect how easily it can be moved or lifted), or transitory (such as the risk of striking the aircraft when equipment is raised or lowered).
- 2.6.43.4 In order to protect aircraft and people, all companies at aerodromes should ensure that:
- a) equipment is suitable (i.e. with regard to its initial integrity, the place where it will be used and the purpose for which it will be used);
 - b) equipment is maintained in a safe condition;
 - c) equipment is inspected in certain circumstances to ensure that it is, and continues to be, safe for use. Any inspection should be carried out by a competent person and a record kept until the next inspection and longer if the inspection results are used for monitoring serviceability trends.
- 2.6.43.5 Companies should also ensure that the risks created by the use of the equipment are: Eliminated, where possible or controlled by:
- a) taking appropriate 'hardware' measures, e.g. providing suitable guards, protection devices (such as buffers to surfaces which interface with the aircraft), markings and warning devices (such as Emergency Stop buttons); and
 - b) taking appropriate 'software' measures, such as following safe systems of work (e.g. ensuring maintenance is only performed when equipment is shut down) and providing adequate information, instruction and training.

- 2.6.43.6 The measures should be selected on the basis of an assessment of the risks. As part of this assessment, the hierarchy of controls outlined in Chapter 1 should be considered. In many cases, a combination of measures may be necessary.
- 2.6.43.7 Whatever the combination of measures, stakeholders need to ensure that people using work equipment have received adequate training, instruction and information for the particular equipment.
- 2.6.43.8 Mobile work equipment poses additional hazards to aircraft and people. Such equipment or vehicles may strike aircraft, people, or other work equipment. Furthermore, unless it is operated correctly and loose articles are suitably secured, objects may fall and strike aircraft or people nearby and may also create a FOD hazard.
- 2.6.43.9 Consequently, stakeholders and their staff should ensure that where mobile work equipment is used for carrying people or objects, it is suitable for this purpose (i.e. there is proper seating and stowage areas). In some cases, measures may need to be taken to reduce the risks to the operator, any other people being carried, anyone else who might be affected (such as passers-by) and aircraft. This may include measures to prevent the work equipment rolling over, or people or objects being thrown from the equipment (i.e. seatbelts or other restraints). The measures should be based on the findings of a risk assessment. In all cases it is important that loads carried in vehicles are appropriately secured, with vehicle side and rear flaps fastened. An equipment 'health check' should be carried out by the operator prior to use.
- 2.6.43.10 Aircraft may be struck and damaged by lifting equipment as it moves up or down. Lifting equipment also poses risks to people. People may fall from elevated working positions, or may be struck by loads falling or released from the equipment. Lifting equipment may overturn or collapse, resulting in injury and damage.
- 2.6.43.11 All lifting equipment and lifting operations (except those done solely by manual effort without assistance from equipment) are subject to a 'Lifting Operations and Lifting Equipment' serviceability check and issued with an appropriate certificate from the manufacturer.
- 2.6.43.12 In order to ensure that the risks to aircraft, people and are controlled, lifting equipment should be:
- a) strong and stable enough for the particular use and marked to indicate safe working loads;
 - b) positioned and installed to minimise any risks;
 - c) used safely, i.e. the work is planned and organised, and is performed by competent people; and
 - d) subject to on-going thorough examination and, where appropriate, inspection by competent people. The aerodrome operator should lay down maximum periods between examinations, depending on the nature and use of the equipment.
- 2.6.43.13 It may sometimes be difficult to determine what is, and what is not, lifting equipment. At aerodromes, the following should always be considered to be lifting equipment:
- a) Catering vehicles, ambulifts and other hi-loaders;
 - b) De-icers with a boom assembly;
 - c) Cargo loaders;
 - d) Mobile elevating work platforms (MEWPs, 'cherry pickers');
 - e) Lifting platforms on toilet and potable water servicing vehicles and refuelling vehicles including Forklift trucks.
- 2.6.43.14 The following are not regarded as lifting equipment or lifting operations:
- a) Aerobridges (any lifting which occurs during manoeuvring is entirely incidental to their main function); and
 - b) Escalators.

2.6.43.15 Before purchasing a machine, users need to consider:

- a) Where and how it will be used;
- b) What it will be used for (is it fit for purpose);
- c) Who will use it (skilled employees, trainees);
- d) What risks to aircraft safety and staff health and safety may result;
- e) Comparison of how well these risks are controlled by different manufacturers' equipment; and
- f) Human factors – does the equipment determine the process or working practice, or vice versa.

2.6.44 Hazardous Substances and Transport of Dangerous Goods Substances Hazardous to Health

2.6.44.1 Some substances are defined as hazardous to health. Some of these substances may also damage aircraft, for example, by corroding control surfaces and fuselage. These substances can be toxic, corrosive, irritant or otherwise harmful to health (e.g. biological agents).

2.6.44.2 Substances can be:

- a) used in a work activity (such as hydraulic oil or cleaning products); or
- b) those that arise or are encountered during a work activity (such as engine exhaust fumes, microbes in aircraft toilet waste, leaks from damaged packages of dangerous goods).

2.6.44.3 Cargo that is hazardous to health may also be subject to the requirements for the carriage of dangerous goods.

2.6.44.4 Companies should assess the risks arising from the work with hazardous substances. This assessment should consider the risk created by the use, handling, or release of the substance. First and foremost, the assessment should show whether exposure to the hazardous substance can be eliminated - for example, could a less hazardous substance be used instead?

2.6.44.5 If exposure cannot be prevented then it should be adequately controlled. This could be achieved, for example, by ensuring chemicals cannot splash onto aircraft or people, or that fumes cannot accumulate near to aircraft or people. Personal protective equipment (PPE) should not be relied upon alone to protect people from harmful substances. However, personal protective equipment may be a useful back-up for employees undertaking such tasks as emptying and cleaning toilets, who might use protective gloves, and overalls. Eye/face protection might also be useful in some circumstances.

2.6.44.6 Certain substances used on aircraft, where appropriate, should be approved by the aircraft manufacturer. Any control measures selected must be effective and in some instances it may be necessary to monitor the exposure of people to hazardous substances to ensure that they are not exposed to harmful levels.

2.6.44.7 Exposure to substances which emit radiation can cause damage to health. Radiation may cause immediate harm, e.g. radiation burns, or may cause changes in cell DNA, which can eventually lead to cancers.

2.6.44.8 Companies need to assess the risks from exposure to radiation and to ensure that exposure is restricted. They should also have in place contingency plans. Staff working with radioactive substances, including those handling radioactive cargo should be competent in order to ensure their safety, the safety of those working with them and the safety of the aircraft.

- 2.6.44.9 Companies may have to appoint Radiation Protection Advisors to give competent advice on the measures needed to protect staff health and safety. Some radioactive substances may also be toxic or corrosive etc. Radioactive substances which form part of a cargo consignment may also be subject to the requirements relating to the transport of dangerous goods.
- 2.6.44.10 As with substances hazardous to health, flammable substances may be used as part of a process (such as aircraft repairs), handled as cargo, or encountered accidentally, for example as the result of a fuel spillage. They may be solid, liquid or gaseous. Fire and explosion are the main hazards associated with these substances. Such events may cause considerable damage to aircraft and injury to people. However, these substances may also be hazardous to health or may damage aircraft in other ways, for example because they are corrosive.
- 2.6.44.11 The risks from work involving flammable substances, including storage and transport, should be assessed. Where possible, the flammable substance should be eliminated, or substituted for a substance which is non-flammable. There may be a balance to be struck between the risks involved, for example, if the proposed substitute carries a greater hazard to health than the flammable substance. Where the substance cannot be eliminated, or substituted, then appropriate precautions need to be in place. Control of the risks of flammable substances can be considered in terms of removing at least one side of the 'Fire Triangle'.
- 2.6.44.12 This may include a combination of:
- a) safe storage, away from sources of ignition, incompatible substances (such as oxidisers) and mechanical damage;
 - b) adequate ventilation to remove flammable vapours or gases;
 - c) dispensing and decanting in a way which reduces spills and releases;
 - d) use of equipment specifically designed for use with flammable substances;
 - e) good housekeeping to remove flammable residues; and
 - f) adequate procedures and equipment for dealing with emergencies and spillages, including training, information and instruction for staff.
- 2.6.44.13 The flammable substance which is likely to be found in the greatest quantity at aerodromes is aircraft fuel. Guidance on working with fuel safely is not reproduced in this publication. Please refer to the Code of Safe Practice in the Petroleum Industry Part 7. Most aerodromes will also operate 'Hot work permits' intended to reduce the risk of fire, including fuel fires.
- 2.6.44.14 Currently, there is no specific legislation on the use of flammable substances on the apron.
- 2.6.44.15 Flammable cargo is also subject to the requirements relating to the transport of dangerous goods.
- 2.6.44.16 Transport of dangerous goods by air is also subject to the requirements of the ICAO Technical Instructions, which are reflected in the IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations.

Note: Compliance with these standards does not necessarily mean that the requirements of the National Civil Aviation Law covering transport of Dangerous Goods by other modes of transport have been met. However, requirements for the carriage of dangerous goods by road include an exemption permitting the carriage of dangerous goods that are intended for air transport, to or from an aerodrome when not fully meeting the road requirements, providing that the ICAO Technical Instructions have been complied with.

2.6.45 Task Lighting, Glare and Confusing Lights

- 2.6.45.1 During darkness and periods of low visibility, apron areas must be provided with lighting of sufficient coverage and level of luminance to enable pilots and ramp staff to operate safely and effectively.

2.6.45.2 The levels of luminance on aircraft stands should comply with the standards described in **National Civil Aviation Regulation**.

2.6.45.3 It is equally important that every workplace has suitable and sufficient lighting to ensure people can work safely. In general, lighting should achieve a reasonably uniform luminance on all relevant work areas and should avoid sudden changes in luminance (for example, where apron roads run underneath buildings). There may be a need for local lighting (for example, task or vehicle) at specific areas where people are at work).

2.6.45.4 Aerodrome operators should introduce arrangements to control and co-ordinate the provision and installation of any general airside (apron) and aeronautical lighting systems.

2.6.45.5 Area lighting is normally mounted on pylons or gantries and should be subject to the following:

- a) the intensity, beamspread, setting angles and mounting height of the luminaires should achieve the specified apron luminance without causing dazzle to pilots and other persons;
- b) the layout of lighting pylons should be such that overlapping cover is provided which does not give rise to areas of deep shadow; and
- c) floodlighting, including mobile equipment, in contractors' work areas should be strictly controlled and subject to regular checks to ensure that glare/dazzle are eliminated.

2.6.46 Adverse Weather Conditions (including Winter Operations)

2.6.46.1 Adverse weather conditions affect the safety of aircraft operations on aprons, principally strong surface winds and low visibility conditions. As part of the safety management system, aerodrome operators should issue instructions about the precautions to be taken in anticipation of these conditions and with emphasis on the safety requirements for apron operations.

2.6.46.2 Strong wind conditions can give rise to hazards from wind-blown items and in very strong winds there is a possibility of structural damage to aircraft. The principal threats are of engine ingestion or airframe damage to aircraft on stands, taxiways and runways; the severity of the threat of obstruction of a runway to an aircraft taking off or landing cannot be stated too strongly. There is also a danger of personal injury for apron staff and damage to vehicles and equipment. Some aerobridges also have operating design limits during periods of strong winds which should be understood and adhered to.

2.6.46.3 When meteorological warnings of strong winds are received, they should be promptly relayed to all relevant organisations including airlines, ground handling organisations and operators.

2.6.46.4 When strong wind conditions are experienced, one of the first problems encountered is FOD being carried across the airfield, causing engine ingestion threats to aircraft on stands, taxiways and runways. Plastic bags and sheeting are particular problems.

2.6.46.5 As wind speeds increase, baggage containers, unsecured equipment, and large debris (mostly from the aprons), can be blown across the movement area causing a damage hazard to aircraft in all areas. There is also a risk of personal injury and damage to vehicles and equipment by 'flying' debris. Action must be taken to ensure that covers are securely fastened on all waste containers and to ensure that parking brakes are applied to all vehicles and equipment. All non-essential equipment should be removed to a protected area or stillage, secured to a fixed object or removed from the ramp area. Additionally, aircraft may require enhanced chocking in line with airline requirements.

- 2.6.46.6 It is not always feasible or necessary to position a large aircraft into wind at aerodromes. Where there is a requirement for aircraft to be positioned into wind and/ or picketed, this should be the responsibility of the airline manager, agent or owner concerned. Aerodrome operators may assist by the allocation of suitable stands and other airfield areas for this purpose. As wind speeds rise, there is a requirement for airline managers, agents or owners concerned to ensure that wind milling propellers and rotors are tethered and/or secured.
- 2.6.46.7 Aerodrome operators will have in place comprehensive arrangements and rules to safeguard low visibility operations on the manoeuvring area and these issues are not discussed in detail here.
- 2.6.46.8 In most airfield layouts, aprons border directly on to the taxiway system. Therefore, when LVPs are in force, there is an impact upon apron operations and there is a requirement for ramp staff to be aware of the implications for taxiway operations and to comply with any requirements and limitations that are notified.
- 2.6.46.9 When visibility is reduced, it must be ensured that staff are aware of the additional safety requirements to maintain safe operations. All users should make themselves aware of the additional restrictions that are required in low visibilities. These may include escorts for vehicles normally allowed to operate on the manoeuvring area, warning signs should be placed at airside access points and safeguarding barriers on airside roads as required.
- 2.6.46.10 During periods of low visibility, vehicles should be operated with dipped headlights, and where fitted, fog lights should be illuminated. Drivers should proceed with extreme caution, and vehicle obstruction lights should be switched on. Staff should be alert to the sudden appearance of an aircraft entering a stand and be prepared to give way accordingly.
- 2.6.46.11 Managers of aerodromes that continue to operate during severe winter conditions are recommended to issue an 'Adverse Weather Warning' to all airside users and to agree and publish an Adverse Weather Plan to include operations during thunderstorms and sandstorms.
- 2.6.46.12 During adverse weather conditions additional precautions and arrangements are required, by all those involved with airside operations. Safety instructions should be issued to highlight the hazards of adverse weather operations and detail the measures to be taken to mitigate the effects on the apron. The aerodrome plan should involve all relevant business partners where required, and it is good practice to arrange briefings for the managers and staff of user airlines/companies on working and operating in adverse weather conditions.
- 2.6.46.13 The aerodrome operator should establish that they, airlines and handling agents have arrangements in place for the following:
- a) The clearance of sand in critical areas peripheral to stands such as loading bridge movement areas, bridge steps and drive wheels, passenger routes (including external steps and ramps), FEGP units and other fixed service equipment;
 - b) When meteorological warnings are received and when thunderstorm conditions are expected or observed, warnings should be transmitted to all apron operators and staff by the best local means;
 - c) Additional apron inspections to detect sand build up on perimeter roads and around aerodrome signage etc.
- 2.6.46.14 Simple precautions that can reduce risks should be taken as follows:
- a) allow additional time for all ramp activities;
 - b) take extra care when driving, especially when approaching an aircraft, or on the approaches to a road junction. When driving, bear in mind that vehicles require a greater distance in which to stop safely;

- c) do not leave a vehicle unattended with the engine running simply to keep the cab cool/warm or to charge the battery;
- d) ensure attention is given to vehicle inspection prior to use. Check the operation of lights, battery condition, brakes and tyres;
- e) surfaces, particularly painted areas, initially become more slippery during very wet conditions. Staff and passers should be warned to exercise extra care in these circumstances;
- f) high visibility clothing should be worn in accordance with current instructions;
- g) make allowance for other staff whose movements may be restricted by difficult working conditions; and
- h) avoid the unnecessary formation of sand on apron and road surfaces.

2.6.47 Slips and Trips

- 2.6.47.1 Slips and trips account for almost a quarter of accidents to people at aerodromes. Whilst some of these accidents are difficult to prevent, many could be avoided by simple measures which can and should be taken.
- 2.6.47.2 Slips and trips may be caused by a variety of obstructions, loose items and defects in walkways, stairs and other areas. Loose items include FOD, which is of course a source of risk to aircraft as well. Improperly stowed cables (for example, from fixed or mobile electrical ground power units) can also cause people to trip over. Slips can be caused by spillages, for example from hydraulic leaks. Marshalls are specifically at risk of trips and falls due to the focus being concentrated on the aircraft so procedures should not encourage them to walk backwards during the docking of aircraft.
- 2.6.47.3 The initial design and construction of work areas can contribute as much to the risk of slips and trips as to its reduction. Sudden changes in level, poor drainage, and insufficient surface roughness of the floor can all increase the risk of slips or trips. The aerodrome operator should ensure that the risks from slips and trips are considered at the design of new or refurbished facilities, and are eliminated or controlled by good design, as much as possible.
- 2.6.47.4 Poor maintenance of surfaces can also contribute to the risk of slips and trips. Damage such as potholes and excessive wear increase the risk that slips will occur, as well as also being a potential source of FOD. Aerodrome maintenance programmes should be developed by the aerodrome operator to discover areas in need of attention before they become a source of danger. Airlines and ground handlers should assist, for example by reporting parts of the apron which have been damaged, or are becoming excessively worn.

2.6.48 Electrical Hazards

- 2.6.48.1 There are a variety of sources of electrical hazards on the apron, including lighting, fixed or mobile electrical ground powers units, power supplies to other apron equipment (such as aerobridges) and the aircraft itself.
- 2.6.48.2 Again, design and installation can significantly reduce risk. Proper means of isolation should always be provided to electrical systems. These should be lockable. Where possible, isolators should be designed so that people cannot gain access to parts which carry dangerous electrical currents unless the power is switched off. The aerodrome operator should ensure that redundancy is designed into systems where isolation would cause severe inconvenience (for example, as with the AGL system), so that one circuit can be isolated and worked on safely, whilst the second circuit keeps vital services operating.
- 2.6.48.3 Electrical equipment should always be used safely. Plugs should be used with the sockets for which they were designed. Circuits should not be overloaded, and should be suitable for the environment in which they are used. Cables should not be left in positions where they could be damaged.

- 2.6.48.4 Of particular note is the use of ground power units (GPUs). Many GPUs have an electrical interlock which detects when the aircraft is connected. This interlock can be bypassed. However, this facility is intended for maintenance purposes only. Interlocks should not be bypassed, even temporarily, whilst the GPU is in normal use. If the GPU will not operate unless the interlock is bypassed, then the GPU is faulty, and it should be withdrawn from service for repair.
- 2.6.48.5 All electrical systems should be properly maintained. This will require a programme of inspection and test to identify defects before they become a source of danger. It also requires everyone to report promptly to their employer, and/or the operator or owner of the equipment, any defects they discover during the course of their work. All maintenance of electrical systems should be carried out by competent people to an adequate standard.
- 2.6.48.6 Where contractors are to be used to undertake electrical work, they should be subject to the assessment, control and monitoring arrangements outlined in Chapter 1.

2.6.49 Faults and Defects

- 2.6.49.1 Aerodrome operators should promulgate and maintain comprehensive fault reporting procedures for all apron equipment and installations provided by the aerodrome. Clear instructions should be issued and repeated by notice at main installation sites.
- 2.6.49.2 For staff of airlines or operators, simple 'one shot' fault reporting is best. Faults on vital operational equipment, or facilities, that could affect aircraft safety, such as aerobridges and VDGS, should be reported to a single agency. By this means the appropriate and immediate safety decisions can be taken and at the same time a prompt engineering response can be initiated.
- 2.6.49.3 Details of all reported faults and their rectification should be recorded for management audit purposes.
- 2.6.49.4 Some faults may also be serious enough to require reporting to the Safety Department, even if they also qualify as a ROSI. These include the collapse or overturning of any lifting equipment, certain electrical short circuits or fires, and collapse of certain scaffolding.
- 2.6.49.5 Reports submitted under company reporting procedures should be made via the aerodrome operators SMS.
- 2.6.49.6 All employers should ensure that there are systems in place to enable staff to report defects and faults in company equipment. Action should be taken on these reports, within in a timescale which reflects the seriousness of the defect or fault and the risk to aircraft and/or people.

2.6.50 Movement Area Inspections

- 2.6.50.1 The requirement for inspections and maintenance of airfield facilities is implicit in the aerodrome certification process and the associated legislation. The Aerodrome Manual must contain the requirements and accountabilities for the inspection and auditing of all the safety systems airside on a systematic basis. The results should be recorded/ reported and fed back into the safety management system.
- 2.6.50.2 Aerodrome operators should maintain inspection schedules for all apron equipment and facilities it provides. The results of these inspections should be recorded. Serviceability/availability records should be maintained on the principal systems for audit and management purposes.

2.7 Model Guidance: Chapter 3 - Aprons and Stands

2.7.1 Introduction

- 2.7.1.1 The guidance in this Chapter takes account of good practice at major International airports, and applies equally to terminal-contact and remote stands. Stand and aerodrome design needs to be dynamic to allow for changes to aircraft type, dimensions, aircraft mix and other operating characteristics.
- 2.7.1.2 Aprons are provided to accommodate aircraft for the purpose of loading or unloading passengers, mail or cargo, fuelling, parking or maintenance. They usually comprise individual stands, apron areas divided into separate stands, Multi-Aircraft Ramp Systems (MARS) or a Multi-Choice Apron (MCA). The location and purpose of the stand may impact on its design; whether the stand is being used for passenger traffic, freight or remote parking or whether the stand is used in a 'taxi or nose-in, push back', 'self-maneuvring' or 'drive-through' configuration.
- 2.7.1.3 'Best Practice' has highlighted some of the hazards that may occur on apron areas, and therefore it is important to provide stands and aprons that are designed to reduce the hazards where possible and to facilitate aircraft turnrounds and other activities as safely as possible.
- 2.7.1.4 Congested operating conditions may impact on a safe apron environment and the degree of ramp congestion is often, though not exclusively, related to the total numbers of vehicles and equipment permitted/required to park and operate on the apron. Operators should take into account the delivery targets and service/safety level agreements between airlines and ground handling organisations. The business models of many airlines rely on short aircraft turnround times; on some occasions without using the aerobridges that are provided. This, together with the general increase in the volume of baggage/cargo and servicing products, may put pressure on the aircraft stand area available to support increased activity. The aerodrome operator can contribute to the safety and efficiency of aircraft turnrounds by providing aprons and stands which take into account the actual practices at the airport and by enforcing agreed operating principles.
- 2.7.1.5 The introduction of future and next generation aircraft design features, such as winglets or blended wings on aircraft, may result in aerodromes having to modify some stands to accommodate increased wingspan generated by the new wing designs. This may lead to reduced clearances between stands, which results in a more demanding environment for the ground handlers to complete the safe turnround of the aircraft. To address these challenges, and to allow for future increases in aircraft size, aerodromes may wish to consider, as appropriate, generic stands, linked to aircraft code rather than specific aircraft type, in the development of future aprons.
- 2.7.1.6 Consideration may also be given to addressing the shift towards containerisation of the smaller aircraft (e.g. A320 type) and the effect this operation places on the available space within the stand area. One solution may be the employment of offset centrelines, which provide an increased area on the starboard side of the aircraft. This allows for a greater manoeuvring area for the increased amount of large equipment employed during an aircraft turnround. The location of other services such as fuel hydrant pits, FEGP, aerobridge, PCA etc, will need to be considered.

2.7.2 Physical Characteristics

- 2.7.2.1 A stand is a 'box' of designated apron space intended to be used for the parking and turnround servicing of an aircraft, and individual or groups of stands should have a design maximum size of aircraft to be served. The boundaries of a stand are:
- Front: boundary with the head-of-stand road, equipment area or building line;
 - Rear: boundary with the rear-of-stand road or taxilane /taxiway strip; and
 - Sides: measured laterally from the wingtip of the largest span aircraft.

2.7.2.2 Stand design should provide minimum clearances around the extremities of the largest aircraft type expected to use the stand, as set out in National Regulation.

2.7.3 Multi-Aircraft Aprons

2.7.3.1 Flexibility for changing aircraft size can be accommodated by adopting Multi-Aircraft Ramp System (MARS) stands or a Multi-Choice Apron (MCA) concept.

2.7.3.2 Multi-Aircraft Ramp System (MARS) stands allow either two smaller aircraft or one larger aircraft to be parked on the same stand, for example, two B737-400s or one B747-400. Clearances will be as described above, except that it is recommended that the clearance between the wingtips of the two smaller aircraft as one passes the other be as required in National Civil Aviation Regulation. Guidance for vehicles to pass safely between the wingtips of the two smaller aircraft on MARS stands may be indicated by ground paint markings known as wingtip guidance lines or 'MARS Bars'.

2.7.3.3 A Multi-Choice Apron (MCA) is a defined area of pavement accepting more complex combinations of aircraft than MARS (for example: three smaller aircraft or two larger ones). Clearances around the edges of the MCA will be as described above. Good practices for MCA design are as follows:

- a) a set of adjacency rules will be required for stand allocation;
- b) no two centrelines should be closer than 10 m;
- c) a distinct sequence will be required for stand numbering (i.e. no L, C and R suffixes);
- d) stand numbers will be marked beside the lead in arrows at the taxiway centreline and repeated at the double white line marking the tail of stand;
- e) both elements of VDGS (azimuth and stopping) should be provided and co-located directly ahead of the cockpit; and
- f) inter-stand clearways or airside roads will be provided, as required, at the extremities of the area defined as MCA.

2.7.3.4 Normally wingtip guidance lines (MARS Bars) are not provided within the MCA as these have proven difficult to provide in an unambiguous way. The major advantage of aprons using MCA layouts is the flexibility provided to meet different aircraft mix requirements at different times. However, there are also a number of possible disadvantages, as follows:

- a) lack of markings other than centrelines requiring additional operating procedures, such as the use of cones around wingtips, affecting airline and handling agents training and costs;
- b) problems in providing service connections to serve all parking combinations, particularly aerobridges and FEGP. Underground service pits may have to be considered;
- c) multiplicity of the humps associated with fuel hydrants which cause problems for positioning of equipment when serving the aircraft;
- d) reduction in area available for head-of-stand equipment parking due to the increased number of tug lanes and other factors, leading to increased requirements elsewhere; and
- e) the human factors element: MCA layouts provide potential for both ground staff and pilots to become confused about the correct positioning of aircraft and equipment due to multiple ground markings.

2.7.4 Self-manoeuvring Stands

Safety clearances around self-manoeuvring stands will need to be increased from those used for nose-in/pushback stands to take account of jet blast/prop wash. There may also be requirements for jet blast protection, which may include blast diffuser screens and/or an area clear of equipment, roadways, buildings and activity.

2.7.5 Access Roads

- 2.7.5.1 Stands should, wherever possible, have a head-of-stand road, used not only to access the stand but also to provide a route for traffic to move around the terminal area. Where this is not possible, a rear-of-stand road may be provided but this should lie entirely outside both the taxiway strip and beyond the rear-of-stand.
- 2.7.5.2 Normally, a head-of-stand road is preferable to a rear-of-stand road because, on the latter, traffic would be held up as an aircraft enters or is pushed back from the stand, and at least one additional member of staff is normally required in the pushback ground handling team to check that traffic has stopped. The main exception may be at smaller airports where the passenger handling is carried out without aerobridges, at ground level resulting in a tail of stand road being preferred, as this reduces the risks associated with vehicles and pedestrians.
- 2.7.5.3 A reserved area should be located at the head of each stand for the pushback tug. Width should be a minimum of 6 m for small and medium stands and minimum of 7.5 m for large stands and above, equally disposed about the stand centreline. Access from the head-of-stand airside road should not be restricted by building columns, particularly where the head-of-stand road is one way providing less space to make the turn into the reserved tug area. On stands without a head-of-stand road, a greater length will normally be required.

2.7.6 Equipment Parking/Storage

- 2.7.6.1 Aerodrome operators should take a proactive approach in ensuring this is included in development plans for future projects.
- 2.7.6.2 It is generally accepted that equipment areas are divided into a number of locations, those on the stand/apron, support areas and dedicated areas for specific operations (e.g. ULD storage, and large vehicle operations). However, growing pressures to achieve shorter turnaround times have forced ground handling companies and aerodrome operators to develop initiatives which support the objectives of the airlines, but at the same time, using the opportunity to increase the safety aspects of the turnaround operation. Enhanced methods of managing the 'on stand' equipment areas may be suitable, for example the establishment of dedicated areas on the stand for the storage and parking of equipment, seen as essential to the efficient turnaround of aircraft provided clearances are maintained.
- 2.7.6.3 The aerodrome operator, in co-operation with the ground handling companies, should identify the equipment that is required close to the apron to support the shorter turnaround times. It is important that the design of the stand is fine-tuned to identify the greatest possible area that could be allocated to equipment storage, taking into account the capacity of the stand and its layout (e.g. MARS, MCA). Allocation of the equipment area to specific equipment types should be jointly agreed and supported by the marking of the area to ensure it is effectively managed.
- 2.7.6.4 Demands on space caused by aerodrome development may cause pressure to reduce the levels of equipment areas. Aerodrome operators should be aware of their responsibility to ensure parking/storage space is allocated for aircraft and the equipment required to service it.
- 2.7.6.5 At some airports it may be the responsibility of the Turnaround Coordinator, or other such person with responsibility for the aircraft turnaround, to ensure all equipment used in the turnaround process is returned to its allocated space when the process is completed.
- 2.7.6.6 Aerodrome operators, airlines and ground handlers may wish to consider the use of equipment pre-positioning areas. Temporary waiting areas are identified and marked on the stand, which allow vehicles and equipment, intended to be utilised in the turnaround, to await the arrival of the aircraft. To ensure the areas are not used as permanent parking areas, it is advised that the areas are identified in a different colour to that used for the existing equipment parking areas.

- 2.7.6.7 Allowance should be made for parking areas for ground service equipment and vehicles, for areas on and close to stands for vehicle positioning prior to an aircraft's arrival, and for longer term fleet parking areas, preferably close to crew room accommodation. Where crew rooms are close to stands, it may be necessary to split the nearby equipment areas between the two requirements. The factors affecting the area required include routes served (i.e. long-haul or short-haul), aircraft type (i.e. narrow-body or wide-body), whether it is a local based airline, and the number of handling agents.
- 2.7.6.8 Ideally as a suggestion, an area equivalent to a figure between 12.5% of the stand area for short-haul, narrow-body aircraft, and 22.5% of the stand area for long-haul, wide-body aircraft has been assessed as necessary for equipment parking. The higher figure is because long-haul passengers have greater baggage allowance and wide-body aircraft use baggage containers whose storage is space consuming. However, where a higher proportion of aircraft use containerised baggage, additional parking and Unit Load Device (ULD) container storage facilities may be required. Only part of this requirement (no more than 7.5%, often less) is met by the head-of-stand areas either side of the pushback tug reserved area. These figures are strictly net and will, for purposes of calculation, exclude all fixed installations, items not relevant to the operation of the individual stand and those portions of the area available which are not considered to be accessible or of reasonable size or shape. Stand area is the length multiplied by the width. Special considerations apply on aprons used by cargo aircraft.
- 2.7.6.9 The parking areas needed for longer term parking are additional to the above, as are any areas required for cargo consolidation, Unit Load Device (ULD) container storage facilities, and areas required for the repair and maintenance of ground service vehicles and equipment and where practicable located off or away from the ramp. In general, parking areas should be sized to meet the needs of all the stands in a particular apron area. They should be sited so that they are accessible from both stands and crew accommodation whilst ensuring that travelling distances are minimised.
- 2.7.6.10 Where apron space is short, consideration should be given to the provision of multideck 'stillage' for the storage of baggage containers.
- 2.7.6.11 Provision may also be required in parking areas for the recharging of electrical vehicles and equipment.

2.7.7 Passenger/Staff access

- 2.7.7.1 Safety principles places importance on the segregation of pedestrians, whether staff or passengers, and vehicles. Therefore pedestrian routes on aprons and associated with airside roads are required to be clearly marked. A clear unobstructed walkway of at least 1m width should be provided, between the point(s) where pedestrians leave the terminal building to the side of the aircraft nose on the aircraft commander's side. This should be painted green with a non-slip surface and showing a white 'pedestrian' figure motif every 20m, or as necessary. Where these cross a roadway, a 'zebra' crossing should be painted and traffic control lights or other control measures should be considered.

2.7.8 Surface Markings

- 2.7.8.1 Guidance on ground markings is provided in the 'ACI Apron Markings and Signs handbook':
- a) a lead-in arrow, aligned with the stand centreline, should be painted on the taxiway surface to delineate the stand centreline intersection with the access taxiway or taxilane-lane. The stand number should be painted alongside this arrow;
 - b) Aircraft nosewheel stop marks, painted perpendicular to and across the stand centreline, should be provided towards the head of the line such that the aircraft parking position provides sufficient access for any aerobridge and such that all service vehicles can access the appropriate part of the aircraft. Aircraft types are to be stencilled alongside the relevant stop bar, abbreviated i.e. 'A332'/'B744';

- c) aerobridge manoeuvring areas should be cross-hatched or ‘starburst’ in white, with a white circle or rectangle denoting the normal retracted position;
- d) active and redundant fuel hydrant positions should be outlined and differentiated colour wise;
- e) inter-stand clearways should be outlined in white zig-zags;
- f) fire hydrants should be cross-hatched in red; and
- g) should a stand have undergone a reconfiguration process over time, the previous markings should not be visible with the naked eye. This has the potential to confuse pushback and flight crews, especially during night or adverse weather operations whereby a clearly defined centreline and associated markings are crucial.

2.7.9 Services and Equipment

- 2.7.9.1 The safety aspects of stand operation are of paramount importance and should not be compromised. Of particular concern is the large number of vehicle movements on the stand which presents a safety hazard to aircraft and people (airport personnel and passengers). Collisions between vehicles and aircraft can cause considerable expense and disruption due to delays to passengers as well as the cost of repairs, and, with the presence of aviation fuel, are potentially very dangerous. The overall design objective therefore, must be to reduce the number of vehicle movements, particularly the large and less manoeuvrable vehicles such as aviation fuel tankers and apron passenger vehicles, by the use of fixed services wherever practical.
- 2.7.9.2 In addition to providing space for vehicles to service an aircraft and for equipment parking, stand and apron design must allow for the range of other facilities that may be required:
- 2.7.9.3 **Aircraft Cleaning and Disposal of Aircraft Refuse** - Airline ground handling staff or their agents will clean the interior of the aircraft during the turnround and remove the waste generated, together with the waste generated from in-flight catering, etc. Additionally, some airports may allow aircraft to be washed on stand. Where this is allowed, the design of the pavement drainage system will need to accommodate this.
- 2.7.9.4 When the weather conditions, particularly thunderstorms, reach certain limits, the airlines or their handling agents should have specific procedures in place to reduce the risk of a lightning strike to staff working on the aircraft particularly the headset man.
- 2.7.9.5 **Aircraft Electrical Supplies** - Most aircraft types are equipped with an Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) which provides power to run the aircraft systems when the aircraft’s engines are shut down and to start those engines. However, they can be noisy, polluting and not particularly economical to run for long periods. Therefore, the provision of ground power is normally required. This can take the form of a mobile Ground Power Unit (GPU), or a Fixed Electrical Ground Power (FEGP) system with an outlet associated with each stand centreline. GPUs suffer from the same problems as the APU, as they can also be noisy, polluting and not particularly economical to run. In addition, local planning constraints or airport procedures may limit or ban the running of APUs and GPUs at certain times because of their noise and emissions. Therefore, the provision of FEGP should be considered in the design of all stands. FEGP may be supplied from a cubicle located in the head-of-stand equipment area via a cable mounted on a pantograph (or ‘crocodile’), from below an aerobridge or from a pit in the stand. The addition of an AC/DC converter may be required on stands used by the smaller turbo-prop aircraft. Experiments in the past to route FEGP along the aerobridge have not been entirely successful, with problems created when the aerobridge is unserviceable, and aircraft damaged when the aerobridge has been backed off before the power cable was disconnected. Typical power requirements are:
- a) Code A-C stands: 115v 400Hz 90kVA; and
 - b) Code D-F stands: 115v 400Hz 180kVA (double-unit).

- 2.7.9.6 **Aircraft Maintenance** - Routine minor maintenance is carried out during the aircraft turnround on stands. However, on occasion, minor repair work may be carried out involving the use of engineering platforms, etc. For major repair work, the aircraft would normally be towed to the maintenance area or a remote stand.
- 2.7.9.7 **Aircraft Refuelling** - Aircraft may be refuelled from large fuel tankers or from an underground pipeline via a hydrant service vehicle which regulates the flow rate, filters the fuel and records the amount delivered. At airports without hydrant fuelling facilities, long- range wide-bodied aircraft may need several of the largest tankers to refuel, and as the elimination of large vehicles is encouraged, the provision of fuel hydrants should be considered in the design of all stands at airports with the necessary infrastructure. Each stand with fuel hydrants should have an emergency fuel cut-off button provided at the head-of-stand in an easily accessible position, prominently signed and close to the telecommunications link and apron-level emergency aircraft stop facility.

Example diagram:

- 2.7.9.8 **Aircrew Handling** - At some airports aircrew are taken to and from the aircraft by coach; sometimes separate coaches for flight deck crew and cabin crew.
- 2.7.9.9 **Apron Floodlighting** - Stands used at night should be lit so that the turnround activities can take place safely.
- 2.7.9.10 **Assembly Points** - To cater for evacuation from the passenger terminal and/or pier, assembly points need to be provided in accordance with the H & S requirements.
- 2.7.9.11 **Baggage Handling** - Passenger baggage is normally conveyed between the aircraft and the terminal building in containers on dollies or loose on small trailers, a string of which will be towed by a small tug. Except for the smallest aircraft, the baggage will be loaded/unloaded using specialist mobile equipment. Some late baggage may be checked in at the gate and descend to the apron level by lift or chute.
- 2.7.9.12 **Cargo Handling** - Much cargo now travels in the under floor holds of passenger aircraft and on the main deck of combi-aircraft (i.e. where the main deck has separate sections for passengers and freight), as well as on dedicated cargo aircraft. This will be conveyed between aircraft and the cargo terminal by vehicle, while loading into the under floor holds will use the same equipment as for passenger baggage (see above). Main deck loaders are large/wide vehicles and clearances must allow for their safe passage.
- 2.7.9.13 **Catering Supplies** - Prepared meals are delivered to the aircraft and empty containers removed during the turnround by specialist vehicles which can be raised to the upper and main deck levels.
- 2.7.9.14 **Disposal of Aircraft Sewage** - This is normally emptied from the aircraft into a specialist vehicle and taken to the sanitation building.



- 2.7.9.15 **Disposal of Refuse Generated during Aircraft Turnround Activities** - Aircraft maintenance and other turnround activities generate waste, particularly hydraulic fluid cans and the boxes they come in. Some airports do not provide refuse bins on stands as they expect waste to be removed, but this requires a high level of apron discipline and monitoring. Other airports provide refuse and FOD (Foreign Object Debris) bins sometimes in pairs for 'dry' and 'wet' (i.e. any liquid, including oil) waste. In the latter case the bins may be labelled POL (Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants). Some airports provide large compactors every few stands which take both aircraft and stand waste. Provision on new stands should take local practice into account.
- 2.7.9.16 **Emergency Facilities (particularly at larger aerodromes)** - In addition to the VDGS Emergency Aircraft Stop button the following provisions should be considered:
- a) a fuel hydrant Emergency Shut-Off switch. This should be situated alongside the emergency telephone at the head-of-stand, and clearly signed;
 - b) portable fire extinguishers should be readily available at the head of stands in conjunction with procedures agreed between them and the airport's rescue and fire fighting service;
 - c) the provision of fire hydrant equipment on the apron is explained further in National Civil Aviation Regulation; and
 - d) spillage response kits should be provided.
- 2.7.9.17 **Engine Starting** – Normally, engine starting uses internal (APU) or external (FEGP or GPU) power. However, a back-up system requires the use of mobile air-start units providing high- pressure air.
- 2.7.9.18 **Fuel Hydrants** – Should be provided for each underwing position required by the aircraft types intended to use the stand. Hydrants should be located no more than 10 metres from the fuelling points of the aircraft types intended to use the stand. This may require the installation of more than one hydrant head per stand, as determined by the airport operator and the airlines utilising the stand.
- 2.7.9.19 **Passenger Handling** – Passengers arrive and depart from an aircraft in one of three ways; directly between a pier and an aircraft via an aerobridge, by walking across the pavement to/from a nearby building or via an Apron Passenger Vehicle (APV). In the latter two cases one or more sets of aircraft steps will be required to enable them to reach or leave the aircraft cabin, unless the APV is of the type that can be raised to cabin level, or the aircraft is equipped with airstairs. Where an aerobridge is not available, or is unserviceable, disabled passengers will be conveyed to/from the aircraft by specialist vehicles (ambulift) which can be raised to cabin level. Areas reserved for aerobridge manoeuvring, passenger walkways and/or APV manoeuvring will be required.
- 2.7.9.20 **Pre-Conditioned Air** - Low-pressure pre-conditioned air may be required when an aircraft has been standing for some time in very high or very low temperatures. This can be supplied by a specialist vehicle or generated locally at each stand.
- 2.7.9.21 **Pushback Tractor** - Most aircraft types require their own towbar, leading to a requirement for sections of equipment parking areas to be allocated for their storage. The introduction of towbarless tractors may reduce this particular need in the future. However, towbarless tractors tend to be wider than the conventional type leading to a possible need for wider reserved tug areas.
- 2.7.9.22 **Replenishment of Potable (Drinking) Water** - Potable water is normally delivered to the aircraft by a specialist vehicle. Providing potable water as a fixed service directly to stands is not recommended as water hygiene standards cannot be ensured where water is required to be put through pipe work and branches to individual aircraft stands.

2.7.9.23 **Telecommunications** - The Stand (Emergency) Telephone is a weatherproof unit, which is usually restricted to calling airport-only extensions, and is normally provided at apron level at, or readily accessible from, the head of each stand. The facility should be conspicuously signed with the emergency numbers and its location prominently marked. Where two remote stands are located head to head, they could share the telephone, the emergency aircraft stop button and emergency fuel cut-off button. Consideration should also be given to providing an intercom system between gate room level and apron level on pier-served stands.

2.7.10 Visual Docking Guidance System (VDGS)

2.7.10.1 Visual Docking Guidance Systems (VDGS) provide alignment and stopping guidance to an aircraft entering the stand (also known as Stand Entry Guidance (SEG)). As required by ICAO Annex 14, VDGS providing both azimuth and stopping guidance should be installed where it is necessary to indicate, by a visual aid, the precise positioning of an aircraft on a stand. All VDGS must meet the requirements specified in ICAO Annex 14, where aircraft intended to use that stand require precise stop positions, due to aerobridge, fuel hydrant or stand infrastructure or furniture. On stands where VDGS is not provided, or where systems are unserviceable or incorrectly calibrated for the type of aircraft assigned to the stand, an aircraft marshaller or alternative method may be used as appropriate.

2.7.10.2 Visual docking of an aircraft involves three elements, aircraft type identification, alignment (azimuth) guidance and stopping guidance. The type of stopping guidance to be provided depends on the number of stopping positions required and their location, which in turn depends on the fixed services to be provided, particularly aerobridge and fuel hydrants and is achieved by automation with modern and advanced VDGS.

2.7.10.3 The accuracy required from VDGS is a maximum aircraft mis-park of 0.6 m to the left, right, forward or aft. Where a rail-drive aerobridge ('noseloader') is involved, the forward and aft mis-park maximum may need to be reduced to 0.3 m.

2.7.10.4 MARS stands should be equipped with a VDGS on all lead in lines, unless aircraft are marshalled, and there should be an interlock in the switching arrangement such that when VDGS for the left, right or centreline is selected, VDGS for the main centreline cannot be switched on, and vice versa. Similarly, Emergency Aircraft Stop signs and buttons will be provided in association with each centreline. The Aircraft Emergency Stop sign should be activated by any button on the stand which will cause the STOP signs on all centrelines to be illuminated and all SEG to be switched off. Similar arrangements will be required on Multi- Choice Apron (MCA) stands.

2.7.10.5 To minimise the loss of already scarce equipment parking areas, VDGS should be mounted on the terminal building or pier structure, wherever practical. Where columns are required, their number should be kept to the minimum necessary. On stands designed for nose loading cargo aircraft, special consideration may need to be given to mounting of SEG such that it does not hinder the loading and unloading of the aircraft.

2.7.11 Alignment Guidance

2.7.11.1 Alignment guidance is primarily provided by the painted stand centreline. However, to comply with National Civil Aviation Regulation requirements, where precise positioning of the aircraft is required on nose-in/pushback stands, alignment and stopping guidance should be provided in a single unit mounted directly in front of the cockpit and usable by either pilot. If there is a building located at the head-of-stand, then the VDGS should be mounted on it, wherever practical. If no suitable building is available, it should be placed on a column or gantry. However, where constrained by local conditions and infrastructure, an operational risk assessment may be utilised in order to determine the optimum position of stand entry guidance, in order to meet the requirements. It is recommended this assessment be carried out in co-ordination with the airline(s) and ground handling organisation operating on that stand.

2.7.11.2 For other stands, where a combined unit is not provided, alignment guidance, in addition to a painted stand centreline, should be provided on nose-in/pushback stands. An example of this is an AGNIS (Azimuth Guidance for Nose-In Stands) unit. If there is a building located at the head-of-stand, then the AGNIS should be mounted on it, wherever practical. If no suitable building is available, it should be placed on a column or gantry, together with any other VDGS elements provided. Where provided, it should be aligned with the left-hand pilot who requires an offset from the centreline of, normally, 0.53 m, and mounted at a height within the angle of view from the cockpits of the types of aircraft for which the stand is intended.

2.7.12 Stopping Guidance

2.7.12.1 Precise stopping guidance is required on nose-in/pushback stands equipped with aerobridges and/or hydrant refuelling, due to the variety of positions and accuracy required in the stopping of aircraft. On these stands, ICAO Annex 14 compliant systems are necessary and such devices must provide guidance to both pilot positions without turning his/her head.

2.7.12.2 On self-manoeuvring stands and on nose-in/pushback stands without aerobridges or hydrant refuelling, stopping guidance may be provided by units offset from the stand centreline, a mirror, a paint marking in the form of one or, occasionally, two stop lines, which usually takes the form of a Stop Arrow (also known as Stop Line). These are aligned with the pilot's eye position when parked and are normally located to the left of the stand centreline, but may be provided on the right or both sides as circumstances dictate. The mirror is normally used on stands with a rail-drive aerobridge ('noseloader') where there would be a small number of stopping positions close together. A Parallax Aircraft Parking Aid (PAPA) unit is normally required where there are a number of widely spaced stopping positions due to the slope requirements in an apron drive aerobridge and/or fuel hydrant requirements. A Stop Arrow (stop line) is appropriate where there are few such limitations or where a small group of similarly sized aircraft are served by an apron-drive aerobridge, such as on the left-hand centreline of a MARS stand.

2.7.13 Stand Identification

2.7.13.1 Stand identification is provided by a Stand Number Indicator Board (SNIB) displaying the stand designation which should be located close to the stand centreline where it can be seen both by the pilots of an aircraft approaching along the taxiway and, on nose-in/pushback stands, from the cockpit of a parked aircraft prior to pushback. In exceptional circumstances it may be necessary to provide two SNIBs. The SNIB will need to be illuminated (normally internally) if the stand is to be used at night, with lighting control usually by a photo-electric cell.

2.7.13.2 European aerodrome certification specifications allow other conspicuous combinations to be used, except for combinations including red'.

2.7.13.3 Additionally, the stand designation should be painted beside the taxiway centreline directly opposite the stand together with a lead-in arrow aligned with the stand centreline. On MARS and MCA stands, the designation for each stand centreline should be repeated beside the stand centreline at the double white lines marking the tail of stand.

2.7.14 Pushback Allowance

2.7.14.1 The normal pushback manoeuvre requires the aircraft to be turned through 90° and aligned with the taxiway centreline. When pushing-back from the last stand in a cul-de-sac to a blast screen, the space required to carry out this manoeuvre is ideally about one and a half times the length of the aircraft, measured from the stand centreline. However, this can be reduced if the airlines and handling agents are prepared to adopt the 'snaked' or 'swan-neck' method, particularly if it involves a small aircraft being pushed back into a taxiway wide enough for a much larger aircraft.

2.8 Model Guidance: Chapter 4 - Aircraft Turnround

2.8.1 Introduction

- 2.8.1.1 The aircraft turnround is a complex, busy and a potentially hazardous activity involving people from various companies working together in close proximity to aircraft, vehicles and equipment. The hazard associated with the aircraft turnround may be affected by time constraints, environmental factors such as noise and weather and the adequacy of lighting. This chapter addresses the turnround of aircraft for the purpose of providing generic information to assist airport and aircraft operators and ground handling organisations when developing their own plans. It focuses on the activities undertaken on the ramp so that risks are properly identified and appropriate measures taken, with the aim of reducing aircraft damage and the number of personal injuries and other incidents connected with the aircraft turnround, which, apart from the pain and suffering caused to individuals and their families, may also cause significant disruption and financial loss to various stakeholders. The provision of this guidance does not infer a requirement; it is recognised that there are complexities and sensitivities in both the provision of plans and the accountabilities of turnround coordination; nevertheless, this guidance seeks to reflect what may be considered good practice, where such plans exist. Further guidance on aircraft turnround may be obtained from the IATA Airport Handling Manual (AHM) and IATA Ground Operations Manual (IGOM).
- 2.8.1.2 The guidance in this chapter is intended to provide a common framework for those organisations involved with the turnround of aircraft.
- 2.8.1.3 The responsibility upon all parties to conduct the turnround procedure safely is enshrined in the Safety Management System (SMS). Effective safety management within the turnround procedure will not only reduce the number of accidents and incidents but also improve efficiency and on time performance.

2.8.2 Turnround Plan

- 2.8.2.1 Where more than one company or organisation is attending an aircraft, effective co-ordination and cooperation between all parties is essential in order to prevent vehicles, equipment or people striking aircraft. Airlines and airport operators have a key role in this as part of their safety management systems for assessing, controlling and monitoring third party contractors operating in the airside environment. The aircraft turnround plan is therefore a key document in describing how an aircraft turnround should be carried out safely, in describing the roles and responsibilities of each contractor. All contractors involved in aircraft turnround should have a copy of the plan, or have developed their own company procedures in accordance with a higher level turnround plan produced by either the airport operator, or their customer airline.
- 2.8.2.2 An aircraft turnround plan should describe the activities involved in the generic aircraft turnround process and what should be considered at each stage. Individual airlines, ground handling organisations and ramp service providers should produce their own detailed turnround plans. The plan for the turnround should describe how the turnround will be carried out, and should enable every contractor to carry out their work safely and without endangering others. All the contractors involved should either have a copy of the plan, or have ready access to it.
- 2.8.2.3 The turnround plan should cover the processes involved in an aircraft turnround, for which each company and/or operator will have their own procedures for carrying out the activities below:
- a) Pre-flight planning;
 - b) Pre-aircraft arrival;
 - c) Aircraft arrival;
 - d) Aircraft on stand;
 - e) Passenger disembarkation;
 - f) Catering;
 - g) Baggage offload/onload;

- h) Refuelling;
- i) Cleaning;
- j) Toilet and potable water servicing;
- k) Engineering maintenance;
- l) Passenger embarkation;
- m) Aircraft stand departure;
- n) Post-aircraft departure; and
- o) Emergency procedures.

2.8.2.4 Additionally, airlines and/or ramp service providers should be responsible for the following on each turnround operation:

- a) Ensuring that risk assessments for all activities are in place;
- b) Identifying and appointing a competent Turnround Co-ordinator;
- c) Ensuring that staff roles, responsibilities and risks are defined;
- d) Ensuring that all staff are correctly trained and are doing the right job in the safest way;
- e) Ensuring that the plan is confirmed by the Turnround Co-ordinator and any deviations communicated to the relevant parties;
- f) Ensuring that the appropriate correct and sufficient Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) is provided for all staff;
- g) Ensuring sufficient human and equipment resources and contingency plans for any shortfalls; and
- h) Ensuring all incidents are reported,

2.8.3 Co-ordination of the Turnround

2.8.3.1 The airport industry is continually being challenged to improve its safety performance, so effective safety can only be provided through co-operation and co-ordination between all organisations and companies involved during the turnround process, i.e. a 'total system' approach. Therefore, the provision of a 'Turnround Co-ordinator' appointed to be in control of the activity should be considered as best-practice. The Turnround Co-ordinator's role is to ensure that safe practices of work (as detailed in the plan) are adhered to and that the turnround plan is as efficient as possible. The co-ordinator is deemed to be in control of all co-ordination aspects of such turnround.

2.8.3.2 The airline or ground handler in charge of the turnround should nominate an individual to be the turnround Co-ordinator who will be in overall control of the ground handling activity of the aircraft turnround. The co-ordinator should have sufficient knowledge and authority to control the activities around the aircraft. The requirements and nature of the aircraft operation and, on occasion, the operating procedures of the airline operator, may result in the Turnround Co-ordinator responsibilities being transferred from one member of staff to another. On such occasions transfer of the role must be clearly understood and acknowledged by both parties. The Turnround Co-ordinator should be clearly identifiable to all other companies involved in the turnround and they should ensure that work proceeds in accordance with any agreed turnround plan.

2.8.3.3 The Turnround Co-ordinator is also responsible for ensuring that all required resources are in place and that individuals are aware of their tasks and responsibilities. The Turnround Co-ordinator should be clearly identifiable to all other companies involved in the turnround and they should ensure that work proceeds in accordance with the appropriate policies.

2.8.3.4 As the role is important to ensure safety and that the turnround plan is as safe and efficient as possible, the co-ordinator role should fulfil the following requirements:

- a) **Competence:** It is important that the role profile/job description and person appointed to undertake the role has the necessary competencies to understand and manage the safety and operational aspects of the turnround process. This includes an understanding of risk assessments and the mitigations built into the turnround plan.
- b) **Authority:** It is essential that the co-ordinator has the authority to manage and direct the wide range of contractors and sub-contractors that may be involved in the turnround process. This authority should be formalised and, in the event of an airline delegating this task to one of its service suppliers, the delegation of authority to manage the turnround process should be covered within any contractual arrangements.
- c) **Workload:** The co-ordinator should have sufficient available capacity to fulfil the obligations of this role as priority. A risk assessment of the complexity and timescales of the turnround to be managed will be able to inform the ability of the co-ordinator to undertake additional duties.

2.8.3.5 It is recognised that the turnround plan will address a typical aircraft turnround and other associated activities that may be involved. In these circumstances, together with the ramp service providers, it is the airline's responsibility to produce a plan that ensures that all activities are properly controlled and co-ordinated accordingly. A key element to ensure both aircraft and personal safety will be to identify who is responsible at each stage of the turnround.

2.8.3.6 Similarly, for operators of non-commercial aircraft it is the airline or ramp service provider's responsibility to have a turnround plan that complies as much as possible with the guidance contained in this document.

2.8.4 General Turnround Planning

2.8.4.1 Airlines and/or ramp service providers should be responsible for the following on each turnround operation and should have plans that include the following:

- a) identification of and confirmation that the Turnround Co-ordinator function is discharged. Where provided, the co-ordinator should be clearly visually identifiable, for example: different coloured vest with title or specific recognised headwear;
- b) ensuring that the appropriate authorities are informed of company flight schedules in advance, to allow for any special arrangements;
- c) ensuring that both the load plan and the turnround plan are confirmed by the Turnround Co-ordinator and any deviations communicated to relevant parties;
- d) ensuring that the appropriate Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) is provided for all staff and is being utilised effectively;
- e) ensuring that sufficient resources (staff and equipment) are in place, along with contingency plans for any shortfalls;
- f) ensuring that all staff and contractors are familiar with the aerodrome rules and emergency procedures;
- g) ensuring that risk assessments are in place;
- h) agreed parking arrangements where possible, giving as much prior notice as possible;
- i) ensuring that the necessary security arrangements are in place;
- j) ensuring that all staff are competent and tasked to do the job.
- k) ensuring that any safety related hazards or incidents during the turnround are duly reported through the company's corporate safety reporting system.

2.8.5 Turnround Process

- 2.8.5.1 Additional to generic planning for the operation the turnround may be divided into separate phases, as shown below:
- a) Pre-stand arrival;
 - b) Aircraft arrival on stand;
 - c) Aircraft on stand;
 - d) Aircraft stand departure; and
 - e) Post-aircraft stand departure.
- 2.8.5.2 Shown below is a generic list of turnround activities (not exhaustive). It is recognised however, that the various third parties operating on the ramp may have their own set of standard operating procedures and checklist for aircraft pre-arrival. The turnround process depends upon the allocation of all necessary roles and suitable co-operation to ensure a workable contractor/client relationship.
- 2.8.5.3 It should be the Turnround Co-ordinator's responsibility to monitor the turnround process and report back failures of contractors so that non-compliance or safety issues can be resolved.
- 2.8.5.4 Typically, the aerodrome operator's main considerations, which may impact upon the turnround process, are the timely allocation of stands and effective communication and co-ordination of any changes.

2.8.6 Pre-Stand Arrival

- 2.8.6.1 Immediately prior to aircraft arrival on stand, a turnround coordinator/procedure should be in place to ensure the following:
- a) turnround plan confirmed by Turnround Co-ordinator and any deviations communicated;
 - b) all safety and security procedures are in place;
 - c) communication of any special loads, dangerous goods, and any procedures which must be followed in relation to these;
 - d) during periods of low visibility and/or the hours of darkness, check that the parking stand is sufficiently well lit and (where applicable) the aircraft Stand Number Indicator Board (SNIB), if available, is illuminated;
 - e) the Turnround Co-ordinator must consider adverse weather conditions when planning the turnround, ensuring the safety of the passengers, staff and the aircraft. This may include thunderstorms, strong winds, heavy rain, excessive heat etc. Weather must also be considered with regard to unloading of items such as animals and dangerous goods;
 - f) the Turnround Co-ordinator must ensure that all resources are in place and individuals are aware of their roles;
 - g) ensure correct use of PPE and the safety of all staff, contractors and equipment providers undertaking the aircraft turnround, high visibility vest should be fastened to ensure conspicuity;
 - h) walking inspection of the stand to remove FOD and report spillages or obstructions;
 - i) confirm stand equipment availability (e.g. chocks, cones, Passenger Inbound Guidance (PIGs) etc);
 - j) check that there is sufficient access; no trip, slip or fall hazards;
 - k) ensuring all equipment is parked within vehicle parking bays;
 - l) ensure correct position and serviceability of aerobridge or other passenger embarkation/disembarkation equipment.
 - m) person near emergency stop button to manage aircraft arrival; and
 - n) when the stand is clear, give instruction to, or activate the VDGS, if available. Where a VDGS is unserviceable or is not available marshalling assistance should be sought.

2.8.7 Aircraft Arrival on Stand

- 2.8.7.1 Once indication has been provided by the aircraft commander that engines are off and anti-collision beacons extinguished:
- a) monitor the safe arrival of aircraft ensuring all staff and equipment remain clear;
 - b) where VDGS is available, a nominated person should be in position to activate the VDGS emergency stop. (Where a VDGS is unserviceable or is not available then Airfield Operations should be contacted);
 - c) the emergency stop button must not be used to stop aircraft on the nose wheel mark;
 - d) use of aircraft marshalling hand signals where appropriate for initial communication with pilot;
 - e) nominated person to chock aircraft;
 - f) nominated person to connect Ground Power Unit (GPU or FEGP) if available, or requested;
 - g) authorised person to communicate with flight deck crew, either through hand-signals, or on a headset (if available);
 - h) when the aircraft engines have shut down and reached a safe condition to approach, the anti-collision lights are off and chocks are in place, the aircraft can be approached and coned as required. Some airlines may require permission to be given by engineers or ground staff to confirm it is safe to approach, particularly in the case of propeller aircraft or helicopters; and
 - i) switch off VDGS.

2.8.8 Aircraft on Stand

- 2.8.8.1 Once the aircraft is parked on the stand, with its engines and anti-collision lights off and chocks in place, unloading and servicing can proceed as is highlighted below. Not all events will occur in the same sequence and some will occur concurrently. There will also be some variations dependent on type of aircraft and the length of the turnaround period. This stage is often carried out over a very short time scale and this coupled with increased vehicle activity around the aircraft and passenger movement leads to an inherently hazardous environment. Procedures should be developed to ensure that a thorough damage inspection of the 'work areas' such as cargo doors and servicing panels are conducted by the ground handling personnel. The ground engineer should also conduct a thorough inspection of the aircraft fuselage.
- 2.8.8.2 Any damage must be reported immediately to the engineer and airline representatives and a safety occurrence report filed through the airport/company safety reporting system.
- 2.8.8.3 There are three elements listed here:
- a) Offload
 - b) Servicing
 - c) On load

2.8.9 Offload Process

- a) ensure equipment is in position; serviceability of brakes checked on equipment prior to positioning on the aircraft;
- b) check that the offload and emergency routes are available for passengers, and that all safety measures are in place including Passenger Inward Guidance Systems (PIGS)
- c) position rear and front steps where applicable;
- d) communicate ready to proceed;
- e) aircraft doors opened;
- f) information passed to airline representative regarding disembarkation;
- g) appropriate control measures utilised when manoeuvring vehicles (e.g. the use of banksman);
- h) re-assess plan in respect to any unplanned changes; and
- i) co-ordinate offloading needs:

- 1 People**
 - i. special needs wheelchairs, hi-lifts, ambulance dispatched first;
 - ii. very Important Persons (VIPs), Unaccompanied Minors (UMNRS) etc;
 - iii. monitored safe exit of passengers to bus or terminal, marshalling passengers to ensure they remain within the designated safe areas; and
 - iv. crew issued with local instructions.
- 2 Animals**
 - i. quarantine procedures in force;
 - ii. appropriate unloading, cages/containers; and
 - iii. hazardous material awareness.
- 3 Cargo Load**
 - i. positioning of equipment correctly;
 - ii. order of work scheduling followed, taking sequential unloading into consideration to avoid the risk of tipping;
 - iii. offload of any dangerous goods following procedures laid out in the IATA Dangerous Goods Manual;
 - iv. offloading bags/freight/cargo/mail/value goods complete; and
 - v. check aircraft hold(s) are empty (where applicable).

2.8.10 On Load Process

- a) reposition equipment if required;
- b) loading Instruction Report Form completed and passed to relevant people;
- c) re-check aircraft hold(s) are empty (where applicable);
- d) co-ordinate onloading:
 - 1) People**
 - i. special needs loading;
 - ii. monitor safe arrival of passengers for boarding.
 - iii. ensure the passengers have not been able to deviate from the departure route.
 - 2) Animals**
 - i. quarantine procedures followed;
 - ii. appropriate loading, safe cages, animal welfare (water food).
 - 3) Cargo Load**
 - i. awareness of dangerous goods and special loads and any relevant procedures which need to be followed;
 - ii. check order of work scheduling, taking into consideration sequential loading to avoid the risk of tipping;
 - iii. positioning of equipment correct;
 - iv. load bags/freight/cargo/mail/value goods complete and correctly secured.
- e) All documentation checked and details to aircraft Commander:
 - 1) loading instruction report form must be signed to show it has been loaded in accordance with the instructions shown, and any deviations reflected and communicated to load controller;
 - 2) weight and Balance document completed, including any Last Minute Changes (LMCs);
 - 3) maintenance sheet signed off;
 - 4) fuel report sheet;
 - 5) other, i.e. firearms (where located);
 - 6) cargo manifest;
 - 7) passenger manifest (if required by the airline); and
 - 8) information provided to the pilot-in-command concerning dangerous goods and any special loads.

2.8.11 Aircraft Departure

2.8.11.1 Once loading is complete, the aircraft is ready to depart and the final checks below should be completed.

2.8.11.2 Aircraft departure is a critical phase of any flight. The pressures for quick turnrounds to meet schedules, clearances and slot allocations highlight the need for safe management of the departure procedure. For the purposes of this guidance the departure starts from checks of security of dead loads and nets (if applicable) or doors closing.

- a) check dead loads secure and net sections are in place;
- b) clear signal to close doors, close aircraft doors;
- c) check hatches and latches are all secure and any damage reported immediately to the engineer and airline representative;
- d) check the stand is clear of FOD and obstructions;
- e) steps removed and equipment (including cones and chocks) parked or positioned safely (banksman used if required);
- f) monitor to ensure correct pushback procedures are followed; and
- g) pushback must not start until:
 - 1) communication has been established between ground crew and the flight deck;
 - 2) ground crew have completed an inspection of the aircraft, checking all doors and latches are secure, there are no leaks, loose wires etc and any damage reported immediately to the engineer and airline representative;
 - 3) the head set operator is on the ramp and ready to walk alongside the aircraft;
 - 4) wing walkers, if required, are in place;
 - 5) aircraft anti-collision lights are on;
 - 6) the aircraft commander has indicated that clearance to pushback has been received from ATC;
 - 7) any aircraft approaching the stand along the taxiway/apron taxiway has passed well clear of the vicinity of the planned pushback, unless ATC instructions to each applicable aircraft indicate otherwise.
 - 8) all vehicles and equipment have been withdrawn to the equipment areas;
 - 9) pushback clearance and any special instruction therefore must be heard and/or confirmed by the tug driver and head-set operator;
 - 10) carry out pushback/self-manoeuvring procedures; and
 - 11) signal pilot all equipment clear, headset un-plugged and by-pass pin removed.

2.8.12 Post-Aircraft Stand Departure

2.8.12.1 Shown below is what the Co-ordinator should check at this stage:

- a) that a walking inspection is undertaken to check that the stand is clear of obstruction and FOD;
- b) that all equipment has been shut down and correctly parked or stored and the equipment areas are free of FOD; and
- c) that any safety management shortfalls or near misses (e.g. fuel spills, trips, and slips) are reported through applicable reporting systems to the aerodrome operator or appropriate control authorities.

2.9 Model Guidance: Chapter 5 – Airside Vehicle Operations

2.9.1 Introduction

- 2.9.1.1 Every vehicle operating in airside areas should have an individual Airside Vehicle Permit (AVP) to meet the National Authority's security requirements. These should be conspicuously displayed in the vehicle and be visible to a person standing on the ground at all times when the vehicle is operating airside. The requirement for an aerodrome to have an Airside Driving Permit (ADP) scheme is contained in National Civil Aviation Regulation.
- 2.9.1.2 The aerodrome operator should establish and promulgate local minimum standards for vehicles operating in airside areas. These standards should ensure that each vehicle is fit for its intended purpose and that its condition is such that it will not endanger vehicle users, other vehicles, pedestrians, aircraft or property. Airside vehicle permits should not be issued to any vehicle which cannot meet the specified standards.
- 2.9.1.3 Before a permit is issued a vehicle should be inspected by a competent person appointed by the applicant. Periodic inspections should be conducted thereafter to ensure that it continues to meet the minimum standards. An inspection should also be conducted if information or reports indicate that a particular vehicle may not be meeting the specified standards.
- 2.9.1.4 All vehicles should normally be required to meet the requirements appropriate for the grant of a vehicle licences by the Local Authority.
- 2.9.1.5 The AVP displayed on a vehicle must include a clear identification and details of any limitations imposed. Additionally, vehicles should be readily identifiable by their specific equipment number, livery or by the prominent display of the vehicle operator's name.
- 2.9.1.6 The aerodrome operator must ensure operators are aware of requirements for the maximum height, width and length of vehicles for airside operations or for operation within specific areas. Height is particularly significant where airside bridges exist, and should be displayed in the driver's cab. It may be necessary for the aerodrome operator to specify minimum manoeuvrability standards. It is important that companies' operating vehicles airside ensure that their drivers are fully aware of any limitations imposed by the manoeuvrability or size of particular vehicles.
- 2.9.1.7 Because of the potential for serious damage to aircraft and their engine caused by foreign objects it is essential that all practical steps are taken to minimise the risk of such damage from vehicle operations. The aerodrome operator must ensure that all vehicle operators are aware of the need for strict control of the security of loads, as well as vehicle equipment and FOD on and in the vehicle. This is particularly important in respect of items such as chocks, fuel tank caps and hub caps, the loss of which is not particularly significant during normal road operations; the standards set by the aerodrome operator may include a requirement that such items are secured in such a way as to ensure that they cannot become unintentionally detached from the vehicle.
- 2.9.1.8 Vehicles holding AVPs should normally be equipped with flashing yellow obstruction lights which meet the specification published in National Civil Aviation Regulation.
Note: Additional lighting requirements apply to vehicle trailers.

2.9.2 Vehicle Operating Rules

- 2.9.2.1 The following paragraphs set out definitions and operating rules, which have proved to be satisfactory over many years of operation at aerodromes in Europe. Whilst local operating conditions determine the exact procedures at individual aerodromes, it is recommended that the basis of this guidance material be considered for incorporating into an airport local instruction for airside rules at all aerodromes.

2.9.2.2 The following colours should be used to distinguish between ground surface markings used by aircraft and those applicable to the movement and control of vehicles and equipment:

YELLOW: Markings for the guidance of aircraft;

WHITE: Markings for the guidance of vehicles and equipment, and where applicable, pedestrians (for pedestrian crossings for example).

2.9.2.3 The boundary between the apron and the manoeuvring area (vehicle limit line) should be indicated by a continuous double white line, to indicate DO NOT CROSS. Entry into and movement between these areas should be strictly controlled. Apart from pushback vehicles and crews, no vehicle (other than RFFS, other allocated vehicles and with free-ranging privileges) should normally enter the manoeuvring area other than at designated vehicle crossing points unless the vehicle driver is in radio contact with air traffic control and has been cleared to enter the manoeuvring area.

2.9.2.4 No markings or signage of any sort should be permitted in the airside area without the express permission and approval of the aerodrome operator.

2.9.3 Traffic Rules

General

- a) the aerodrome operator should determine speed limits applicable to the airside area. Different limits may be applied to sections of roadway subject to local conditions. This information should be published and signs displayed as appropriate;
- b) on the airside road system vehicles should always keep to the right when passing an approaching vehicle, particularly to avoid confusion where there are no road markings. On apron areas different rules may be promulgated;
- c) no vehicle should be left unattended anywhere on the airside area with its engine running. This is to prevent risks such as overheating and consequent fire in the vicinity of aircraft, and uncontrolled or unauthorised vehicle movement;
- d) vehicles should remain in the airside area only long enough to conduct their legitimate business;
- e) to ensure that no object is dropped on the apron or manoeuvring area, all doors and shutters on vehicles must be closed while the vehicle is moving. All loads and equipment, and all parts of the vehicle must be properly secured and checked for potential FOD Hazards before a vehicle enters the apron or manoeuvring area. Objects dropped can cause serious hazards to aircraft and personnel;
- f) obstruction lights meeting the National Authority's requirements must be displayed at all times by vehicles operating on the manoeuvring area. Unless there are specific instructions to the contrary, dipped headlights should always be used in conditions of darkness and reduced visibility;
- g) all parking restrictions must be strictly observed;
- h) vehicle drivers should follow designated routes, giving way, where appropriate, to routes provided for pedestrians and aircraft;
- i) vehicles must not be driven across aircraft stands, unless they are directly involved in the operation of the aircraft using or about to use the stand;
- j) vehicles must give way to aircraft at all times;
- k) when aircraft engines are running, vehicle drivers must ensure that they stay well clear of areas behind the aircraft where slipstream and jet efflux may cause damage or danger to the vehicle or its occupants. The minimum safe distance should be determined (usually by the aerodrome operator) and promulgated to all vehicle drivers;

- l) vehicles should not be driven in reverse on the manoeuvring area or apron unless directly engaged in aircraft manoeuvring or servicing, or during parking positioning. When reverse movement is essential, guidance should be provided to the driver by a person outside the vehicle (banksman) or other means. The fitting of reversing alarms and CCTV cameras should be considered as part of risk management of reversing operations; and
- m) vehicles must remain at least one metre away from any part of an aircraft unless they are engaged in a task that specifically requires them to operate closer to the aircraft.

2.9.4 Control of Vehicles

- 2.9.4.1 Control of vehicles on the manoeuvring area is normally the responsibility of Air Traffic Control. On apron areas, control of taxiing aircraft and aircraft under tow is the responsibility of Air Traffic Control but the control of vehicles is subject to rules and instructions issued by the aerodrome operator.
- 2.9.4.2 Irrespective of any clearance or instruction issued by Air Traffic Control, drivers of vehicles and of vehicles towing aircraft are responsible for ensuring that their vehicle (and any part under tow) does not collide with any other vehicle, aircraft, people, building or obstruction.
- 2.9.4.3 In all cases, signs displayed at airside area entry points, and at crossing points within the area, must give adequate information to drivers about the procedure to be followed for movement into and within the airside area. Signs should describe any relevant control methods, such as traffic lights or signal lamps. Uncontrolled crossings should be clearly marked as such, and the conditions of use displayed. Particular attention should be given to the need for the clear statement of prohibition of entry to airside areas by unauthorised pedestrians.
- 2.9.4.4 Aerodrome operators may wish to issue specific instructions about the classes of vehicle permitted to access the movement area (including active runways), subject to the issue of a clearance by Air Traffic Control. The conditions for entering or crossing active runways should be clearly set out in a document published by the aerodrome operator and signed by the relevant vehicle operators and drivers.

2.9.5 Operations at Night and in Poor Visibility

- 2.9.5.1 The aerodrome operator should promulgate instructions dealing with vehicle operation at night and in conditions of poor visibility.
- 2.9.5.2 Instructions for operations at night should include descriptions of the airport lighting, including that which is displayed in areas that are not normally used by vehicles, and the lighting required on vehicles.
- 2.9.5.3 Where practicable trailers operating at night should display red rear lights, or be fitted with conspicuous retro-reflective markings.
- 2.9.5.4 Certain navigational aids for the operation of aircraft in conditions of reduced visibility are provided in accordance with the requirements of the National Civil Aviation Regulation. Airport operators must ensure that all drivers are aware of the meaning of aids such as runway guard lights where these are provided, and of the significance of ILS protection areas. Access to the manoeuvring area in conditions of reduced visibility should be limited to experienced and suitably trained drivers, and permitted only in exceptional circumstances.
- 2.9.5.5 Low Visibility Procedures implemented by the Air Traffic Control and the aerodrome operator should include the following procedures for vehicle control:
 - a) confirmation that all entry points into the movement area are either brought under positive control or closed off;
 - b) confirmation that all runway guard lights or holding point board lights, that are required under operational procedures, are fully operational;

- c) warnings given and confirmations are received to ensure that all parties operating vehicles have been removed from the movement areas, with the exception of safety critical operational vehicles; and
- d) assure that all apron and taxiway crossings are under positive control by ATC.

2.9.5.6 It is important that communication of the introduction and cancellation of Low Visibility Procedures is fast and effective, but must include procedures to ensure that physical barriers have been placed and/or removed and that this has been communicated to ATC and airside operations prior to releasing those areas back for aircraft or vehicular traffic use.

Note: Site-specific Low Visibility Procedures should be included in the relevant aerodrome manual and should be reflected in the procedures of all companies that are permitted to operate vehicles in airside areas.

2.9.6 Radio-Telephony (R/T) Equipment and Mobile Telephones

- 2.9.6.1 When operating on certain parts of the airport it will be necessary to use radiotelephony or mobile telephone communications equipment. This may introduce additional risks whilst driving and vehicle operators must ensure that the use of such equipment does not distract the driver from the primary task of driving the vehicle.
- 2.9.6.2 Drivers of vehicles requiring to cross or enter active runways and taxiways (except at designated uncontrolled taxiway crossing points) must normally be in two-way communication with Air Traffic Control and must comply with any clearance issued to them.
- 2.9.6.3 With regard to other vehicles, the aerodrome operator should decide the basis on which R/T equipment is provided and used. In some cases a listening watch may be required of vehicles on certain parts of the movement area. In other cases vehicles may be required only to carry R/T equipment to satisfy the need of the company operator. The procedures for use of R/T equipment must be clearly promulgated by the aerodrome operator.
- 2.9.6.4 It is recommended that users of R/T equipment who communicate with Air Traffic Control or transmit on any frequency used by aircraft must comply with the requirements of the National Authority.
- 2.9.6.5 The aerodrome operator should establish a system of allocating R/T call signs to be used by vehicles so that the potential for confusion between vehicles and, where relevant, between vehicles and aircraft, is minimised. This is particularly important at aerodromes where the R/T frequency used by vehicles is the same as that used by aircraft or where the R/T frequency used by vehicles is re-broadcast on the R/T frequency used by aircraft.
- 2.9.6.6 In the interests of safety it is essential that Air Traffic Control is made aware of all radio facilities being used at the airport, whether or not these facilities are used for communication with Air Traffic Control.
- 2.9.6.7 Vehicle driver should be trained on emergency communication lighting signals in case of losing communication with ATC.

2.9.7 Vehicle Accident Reporting Procedures

- 2.9.7.1 Every aerodrome operator should publish rules for the reporting of accidents involving vehicles operating on the airside.
- 2.9.7.2 Under the provisions of the National Civil Aviation Regulations, aircraft operators may have responsibilities for the reporting of certain accidents involving damage to aircraft.

- 2.9.7.3 Under the provisions of the National Civil Aviation Regulations, aerodrome operators and managers, and certain other classes of persons including ground handlers, may be required to report occurrences and defects which could endanger aircraft or their occupants.
- 2.9.7.4 There is, therefore, a requirement under legislation for the reporting of accidents and incidents where vehicles damage or otherwise cause danger to aircraft, but as legal requirements do not cover all vehicle events it is essential that aerodrome operators provide their own scheme for the reporting of airside vehicle accidents not included in the scope of AAI or ROSI accidents/incidents (typically this process may be established as part of an aerodromes safety management system) The scheme should cover the reporting of accidents between vehicles, vehicles and aircraft, vehicles and equipment or buildings, and vehicles and pedestrians. Records of occurrences should be kept for at least three years. They should be reviewed regularly to establish whether any steps could be taken to eliminate the causes of accidents in the airside area. Chapter 7 of this document discusses reporting in further detail).
- 2.9.7.5 If a person has been injured, there may be legislative requirements for the injury to be reported to the relevant health and safety enforcing operator. At most airports this could be the local police or the office of the Health and Safety department, although at some airports, it may be the Environmental Health Office of the local Operator or Municipality.

2.9.8 Monitoring of Standards

- 2.9.8.1 The aerodrome operator should establish procedures for the monitoring and assessment of airside vehicle operating standards.
- 2.9.8.2 All vehicle/equipment operators and their maintenance providers should have facilities commensurate with the type and size of vehicle and equipment it operates and maintains and should be able to demonstrate compliance with the appropriate airport operator and Department of Transport (DOT) standards, where applicable.
- 2.9.8.3 **Inspections** - Vehicle operators should ensure that persons carrying out safety inspections are appropriately trained and technically competent on the complexity and type of vehicle being inspected. Therefore evidence of individual competencies should be made available, if requested by the airport operator or other agency during audit.
- 2.9.8.4 **Records** - Individual vehicles and equipment should have their own records containing all maintenance records where relevant.
- 2.9.8.5 **Daily Inspections** - It is important that all vehicle owners and operators ensure their drivers and other personnel are aware of the airport operator's requirements for vehicle maintenance and standards.
- 2.9.8.6 Routine daily inspections of vehicles and equipment should be the responsibility of vehicle owners and operators. It is therefore the responsibility of vehicle operators to ensure checks are carried out and any defects recorded and corrected. Walk round checks should include the whole vehicle including any combination of trailers or dollies. It is also important that a 'nil', or 'no faults/defects found' entry is included in the recording system.
- 2.9.8.7 Vehicle defects should be recorded and reported to a competent person who has the authority to ensure that appropriate action is taken to rectify any defects found. As determined by local policies, vehicles or equipment found to be unserviceable may be required to be removed from the airside environment by the operator until maintenance work has been completed to the required vehicle and equipment standards for operating airside.
- 2.9.8.8 Vehicles and equipment deemed to be in a dangerous condition by having a safety defect may be issued with a 'Prohibition Notice' and the local airside vehicle permit withdrawn, in accordance with local airport operator instructions and policies.

2.9.8.9 Conventional road vehicles that have been modified for airport use should still comply with the standards contained in the Local Authority Regulations, irrespective of whether the vehicle is being used on public roads or not. Operators of non-conventional vehicles should ensure that the appropriate and relevant paperwork is held, covering change of use notifications and the relevant insurance and modification certification.

2.9.8.10 The aerodrome operator should establish procedures for the monitoring and assessment of airside vehicle operating standards. These procedures should include a review of the increase/decrease in the number of valid ADPs and the reasons for the change. An assessment of the impact on overall airside safety should be conducted if the number of vehicles operating in airside areas changes significantly.

2.9.9 Performance Management

2.9.9.1 The aerodrome operator should publish any penalties it has established for non-compliance with the rules and instructions for the use of vehicles on the airside. These may include temporary or permanent exclusion from the airside area of individuals, particular vehicles, or group of vehicle controlled by a specified vehicle operator.

2.10 Model Guidance: Chapter 6 - Training for Safety

2.10.1 Objective

2.10.1.1 Working in the airside environment is inherently hazardous therefore all organisations have a duty to ensure that their employees are competent to work safely within their operating environment and all undertake a safety induction to raise the awareness of the hazards associated with working airside. To ensure this competence each organisation will be required to provide adequate training to each employee that is proportionate and commensurate with their role and responsibilities and to ensure they understand that Safety is all airside users' responsibility.

2.10.1.2 This means:

- a) identifying safety skills and training required for each role (typically identified by way of a task and role analysis);
- b) developing and co-ordinating training programmes in co-operation with employees, airport certificate holders and business partners;
- c) delivering appropriate training in a timely fashion;
- d) regularly reviewing the effectiveness of the programme and providing adequate reinforcement training as necessary;
- e) ensuring the training takes account of the capabilities of the individuals being trained;
- f) maintaining adequate records of the training undertaken;
- g) making all apron users aware of the non-punitive safety culture; and
- h) ensuring all staff understand the reporting safety related hazard and incidents (overview of the corporate safety reporting system)

2.10.2 Introduction Objective

2.10.2.1 All employers have a responsibility to provide information, instruction training and supervision to their employees. Having a competent and safe workforce makes good business sense as incidents and injuries damage lives and are a needless expense for an organisation.

2.10.2.2 Organisations need to set clear training policies and objectives that are supported and driven at Board level and by senior management. It is critical that these policies include the monitoring of the effectiveness of any training.

2.10.2.3 In developing training for working in the airside environment organisations should consider:

- a) whether staff undertaking different roles airside require different training, and whether it is adequately provided;
- b) what specialist training is required and by whom;
- c) whether there are sufficient resources (financial, human and equipment) available to provide training;
- d) whether there is a structure in place to deliver the relevant safety training;
- e) whether the organisation has the knowledge, competence and skills to design and deliver the training;
- f) assess whether the balance of theoretical and practical training is adequate;
- g) determine what level of supervision is required and who will provide it;
- h) determine what oversight monitoring is in place that will ensure that key airside safety and performance objectives continue to be met and to ensure that there is good co-operation and co-ordination to meet the objectives.

2.10.2.4 The aerodrome operator should lead in determining the compatibility of airside training between all airside service providers in order to foster standardisation and to ensure safety training delivers a safe working environment.

2.10.3 Evaluate/Measure Effectiveness

2.10.3.1 Safety training should be reviewed at least annually to ensure that training needs are being met and that the training is effective in bringing about desired changes in behaviour and safety awareness. Systems to measure these changes should be in place and methods of measuring achievement need to have been set at the training objectives stage within this module. A system of feedback from employees will enable employers to assess whether the courses are meeting their objectives and changes identified by training evaluation or audit should be fed back into the course design administration.

2.10.4 Categories and Timing of Training

2.10.4.1 Health and safety training needs to be tailored to the individual and the role, and needs to take account of the whole term of employment:

- a) induction Training - On employment with the organisation, as part of the induction process;
- b) specialist Training - When there are specialist requirements, new systems or tasks are introduced to the person's role;
- c) Refresher Training - At periods throughout employment to reinforce the health and safety message;
- d) As required to maintain competence; and
- e) When a person changes job.

2.10.5 Induction Training

2.10.5.1 Safety induction training should be carried out for every person who is new to an organisation or department (this includes contractors). The induction training should be carried out by a suitably qualified and competent 'trainer'. It should not be assumed that because an individual has worked in airside areas in the past that they will already be familiar with these topics. The following list of training areas should be considered (this list is not exhaustive):

- a) the company health and safety policy;
- b) safety responsibilities;
- c) local emergency procedures;
- d) incident reporting;
- e) main hazards and risks of the job;

- f) welfare arrangements;
- g) key safety procedures;
- h) rules and the names of key safety personnel and safety representatives within the organisation;
- i) airside safety and familiarisation training;
- j) provision and use of personal protective equipment;
- k) emergency procedures (low visibility/inclement weather);
- l) flight safety/ Occurrence Reporting procedures; and
- m) environmental related considerations.

2.10.6 Specialist Training

2.10.6.1 Specific training should be provided where specialist skills are required to work safely, with requirements identified as part of a task-focused training needs analysis, for example: pushback and headset operations.

2.10.7 Refresher Training

2.10.7.1 Refresher training should be provided where necessary to ensure safety competencies are maintained. The frequency will vary according but not to exceed 24 months to the degree of risk, the use of the skills and the rate at which skills can be forgotten and when any significant changes to procedures are made. Refresher training should be programmed and recorded when completed.

2.10.8 Conclusion

2.10.8.1 By following the general guidance and advice contained within this chapter, airside operators at all size and complexity of aerodromes should be able to develop a systematic approach to assessing training, delivering training needs and evaluating its effectiveness.

2.11 Model Guidance: Chapter 7 - Safety Performance Management and Measurement

2.11.1 Introduction

2.11.1.1 The term 'Safety Performance Management' is used here to reflect a structured process of management and involves policy and target setting, activity monitoring, measuring and reviewing performance against targets, supervising, rewarding and disciplining.

2.11.1.2 This Chapter provides guidance on safety performance management, within the aerodrome safety management system. It includes the following topics:

- a) the fostering and maintenance of safety discipline;
- b) just Culture;
- c) active performance monitoring and management;
- d) investigation of accidents and incidents;
- e) enforcement of regulations; and
- f) implementation of remedial action.

2.11.1.3 Any system to manage safety and to measure and monitor safety performance will have a number of common elements. There are many texts which describe both theoretical aspects and practical application of safety performance management and this document seeks to illustrate some of these principles. It must be remembered, however, that only the aerodrome operator and managers of airside operators can determine the most appropriate systems for their organisations and environment.

2.11.2 The Fostering and Maintenance of Safety Discipline

- 2.11.2.1 One of the prime contributory factors in the establishment and maintenance of effective safety discipline is an open and honest occurrence reporting system. Such a system creates an environment of trust at all levels and facilitates learning from common experiences and contributes to the prevention of accidents. A sound reporting system should make due allowance for the honest genuine mistakes. However, there is no place in the air transport industry for ill-discipline or lack of professionalism.
- 2.11.2.2 Industry sources considered that one of the major issues on the ramp is the threat to safety posed by aircraft damage that is not reported, but is subsequently 'found'. It is therefore important that stakeholders provide education and awareness training so that all personnel understand the safety significance of reporting all incidents. It follows that the most important task is to establish a non-threatening or a 'just' culture for the genuine mistake which is honestly reported. It is in the general interests of the industry to reduce damage (and thus costs) to aircraft and equipment and it is everyone's duty of care and responsibility to do their utmost to prevent injury to personnel. However, of paramount importance is the need to avoid aircraft departing with unreported and unknown damage. Such incidents can potentially lead to catastrophic accidents. Experience has shown that the major disincentive to reporting accidental ground damage is the fear of dismissal or other punishment.
- 2.11.2.3 Not only is unreported damage potentially lethal but it also precludes timely investigation and subsequent remedial action aimed at preventing a recurrence; a significant disadvantage when statistics show that accidents have often been presaged by earlier similar incidents. Everyone must be made aware that in any incident in which an aircraft is damaged, the most serious offence is failure to report. It follows that keeping quiet about an accident or incident would be considered as a 'wilful violation' under a Just Culture policy and any subsequent disciplinary action would reflect the seriousness of the failure to report.
- 2.11.2.4 To foster the comprehensive reporting of accidents and incidents, aerodrome operators should encourage the adoption of effective safety reporting systems. These systems should be brought to the attention of every employee and adopted by all the other organisations that have an airside role. The safety reporting system should be headed by a formal statement, and signed by the company Accountable Manager. What should flow from this policy statement is an instruction to all staff on the subject of the reporting of aircraft ground damage.
- 2.11.2.5 Safety awareness and an understanding of reporting procedures should be fostered by all staff as part of normal working activity. Both are a function of line management and should not be regarded by either management or employees as separate issues that are the sole responsibility of specialist safety staff. The aerodrome operator should take particular care to see that its own safety management arrangements and staff attitudes are exemplary and that they are seen to be so by other organisations and persons working airside.
- 2.11.2.6 Although this Chapter sets out a number of recommended practices on enforcement of regulations, fostering and maintenance of safety discipline should also operate on the reward principle. Good standards and operating practices should be recognised when observed and promoted to others. Safety management should not be confined to seeking out low standards, bad operating practices and breaches of regulations, but the overall safety performance system should include procedures for recognising, highlighting and possibly rewarding good performance.
- 2.11.2.7 One cause of airside accidents is where personnel trained for low skill tasks are required to carry out these tasks in a 'high-tech' environment. Managers and supervisors must ensure that selection and training recognise the full operational safety requirement: that is, selection and training satisfy the needs of the task and the environment within which the task is to be undertaken.

2.11.3 Just Culture

2.11.3.1 The National Authority encourages a 'Just Culture' in the interests of the on-going development of flight safety. This means the National Authority supports the development, within all areas of the aviation community, of a culture in which:

- a) Individuals are not punished for actions, omissions or decisions taken by them that are commensurate with their experience and training but which result in a reportable event; but
- b) Where gross negligence, wilful violations and destructive acts are not tolerated.

2.11.3.2 Just Culture has evolved from a 'No-Blame' approach and recognizes that there are instances, such as gross negligence, where even though an incident has been reported the circumstances are such that the responsible individual should face disciplinary or punitive action. Such action should, however, be the exception rather than the norm and a transparent process to make such determinations is necessary. The point is that staff are encouraged to report incidents without fear of unfair punitive action.

2.11.4 Active Performance Monitoring and Management

2.11.4.1 Airside safety performance and management should be pro-active, rather than reactive, at all levels of the management structure. Monitoring should be part of the daily routine, not a set piece procedure for use only following an incident or accident. Performance monitoring and management should be an accepted part of the overall responsibilities of all management and supervisory personnel. Although large organisations might have staff dedicated to full-time safety performance monitoring, safety performance monitoring and management is a line management responsibility - it should not be delegated.

2.11.4.2 Very few, if any, airside operations procedures or working practices occur in total isolation. Many airside operations involve co-operation, both formal and informal between two or more departments of an organisation and often between two or more separate organisations. This is a complex matrix that requires cooperation, co-ordination and good understanding and agreement. It is clearly advantageous, and in many cases necessary, for line managers to work closely with their counterparts from other departments and third party organisations. The benefits of co-ordination are obvious: increased rapport, a mutual exchange of safety-related information and the same standards of safety discipline applied across the whole aerodrome operation. The aerodrome operator should act as the focal point in coordinating best practice for all organisations on the aerodrome; for example, by acting as the Chairman of the Airside Safety Committee (see Chapter 2, Appendix 2A). Where appropriate and practicable, managers and supervisors of airside operators should ensure that they maintain a suitable level of visibility on airside working areas. Their role should include observation of, and participation in, all aspects of airside work carried out by their staff and indeed the staff of other organisations where it can be seen that airside safety could be improved.

2.11.4.3 Wherever practical, aerodrome operators should collate safety performance data from all airside operators and co-ordinate an overall safety performance programme. Such a system will identify those organisations that operate best practice and will enable lessons from incidents to be shared by all airside operators. In order to do this it is essential that all operators collect comparable data and the aerodrome operator should define the data to be collected as part of a total system approach.

2.11.4.4 Accident investigation looking into causal factors suggest that as much as 50% of all serious aircraft accidents have resulted from non-compliance with procedures at some point. Clearly it is important that all safety-related activities are described by documented procedures. Such procedures should include defined performance measures and monitoring systems where appropriate.

- 2.11.4.5 Companies operating on the apron should establish measures to ensure and monitor that safety performance procedures are implemented correctly and are achieving their intended objective. The aerodrome operator should conduct a similar programme of audits to assess the effectiveness of aerodrome-wide procedures. Any deficiencies that are identified in an audit should be considered and appropriate remedial action or measures taken. The audit should be followed up to ensure that these remedial actions and measures are effective. In this way deficiencies in procedures that could lead to an unsafe situation should be remedied before an incident or accident occurs.
- 2.11.4.6 A Local Proficiency Check (LPC) is a useful self-audit mechanism which also identifies noncompliance of ground handlers and airport operators.
- 2.11.4.7 A set of local level safety KPI's can provide greater insight into safety and risk management at a local airport level and implement areas and measures for improvement.

2.11.5 Investigation of Accidents and Incidents

- 2.11.5.1 It should be the primary aim of any investigation following an accident or incident to establish the facts of the matter in order to prevent a recurrence. Managers are reminded that beyond the requirement for internal procedures, some occurrences and accidents fall within statutory reporting requirements. This includes occurrences that take place on the apron. Accident or incident investigation will usually be best conducted by a line manager or supervisor. Such persons will almost certainly be most familiar with the type of operation or working practice during which the accident or incident occurred. In some cases, it may be preferable for the investigation to be carried out by a manager from a different department from that involved in the accident or incident. It is important that managers do not assume that investigations into accidents and incidents conducted under statutory provisions will necessarily meet the requirements of their own internal investigation procedures.
- 2.11.5.2 'Accidents' and 'Incidents' in the context of this Chapter should not be limited solely to occurrences where physical damage or injury is sustained to equipment, structures or persons. Occurrences exhibiting a possible risk of damage or injury will also merit formal investigation, where managers consider there has been exposure to unacceptable but avoidable risk. Managers should also be aware that where an accident occurs airside it might be necessary to co-ordinate the airside safety investigation with parallel investigations by others.

2.11.6 Enforcement of Regulations

- 2.11.6.1 It is essential that a 'just-culture' accident and incident reporting policy is not confused with the necessity for sanctions that preserve airside safety against indiscipline. Establishing a 'Just Culture' needs to have formal disciplinary procedures that, at their extreme, might have the force of criminal law under airport bye-laws or legislative provisions. It is this area of safety performance management that requires the greatest management expertise, clear thinking and well-documented procedures. It is imperative that all staff are aware of the Just Culture principles to give them the confidence to report incidents without fear of punitive action, while acknowledging that there is no place for gross negligence, wilful violations or destructive acts. Fundamentally, Just Culture should be understood as being fair.
- 2.11.6.2 Accidents and incidents will come under the jurisdiction of the National Authority, the Accident Investigation Authority or Local Law Enforcement Authorities and these organisations should be involved during the course of any investigation as required.
- 2.11.6.3 Each organisation needs to establish processes to support their Just Culture, including what is considered as gross negligence, wilful violation or a destructive act. Examples of situations where punitive or disciplinary action may be appropriate are:

- a) failure to report damage to an aircraft;
- b) smoking airside;
- c) driving on the manoeuvring area without permission;
- d) failure to report a potentially hazardous incident;
- e) driving in front of, or behind, an aircraft with aircraft engines still running and/or
- f) anti-collision warning lights on;
- g) parking in areas marked as 'parking unsafe' or 'prohibited'; and
- h) leaving vehicle unattended with engine running on movement area.

2.11.6.4 All employers at each aerodrome will need to consider their disciplinary structure in order to ensure that it is appropriate and fair. Procedures should provide proper opportunities for individuals to put their side of the case.

2.11.6.5 The aerodrome operator should publish details of any penalties it has established for non-compliance with the rules and instructions whilst working airside including the use of vehicles. These may include temporary or permanent exclusion from the airside area of individuals, particular vehicles, or group of vehicles controlled by a specified vehicle operator.

2.11.6.6 In the interests of natural justice it will be important for any penalty system to include an appeal procedure. However, this should not prejudice the immediate exclusion of a particular individual or vehicle where, in the opinion of the aerodrome operator, this is necessary in the interests of safety.

2.11.6.7 The aerodrome operator is responsible to the National Authority for ensuring that the aerodrome is safe for use by aircraft. The continuance of the aerodrome operating certificate depends on the aerodrome operators (or certificate holder's) ability to secure the continued maintenance of safety for aircraft. The aerodrome operator should make this responsibility for safe operation quite clear to all third parties and seek compliance with appropriate safety management and safety performance standards.

2.11.6.8 Whilst the aerodrome operator is responsible to the National Authority for the safe operation of the aerodrome with respect to aircraft, all organisations and operators at an aerodrome are collectively and individually responsible for safety in its widest sense. It should be noted that nothing said here or within this document as a whole can absolve any person from his responsibility and accountability under the law.

2.11.6.9 Clearly, disciplinary offences against safety regulations may be reported by anyone, but should be directed in the first instance via the alleged offender's supervisor or manager. Subsequent action will depend on what arrangements are in force for disciplinary offences at each particular aerodrome. However, it is the aerodrome operator who carries the responsibility and he may require to know how disciplinary offences against aerodrome safety regulations have been dealt with, in pursuit of his responsibilities. It is a matter for service providers and aerodrome operators to reach agreement about how accidents and incidents are to be reported, recorded and investigated. Participation in the Airside Safety Committee (as described further in **Appendix A**) is a good vehicle for this action.

2.11.6.10 In some circumstances the aerodrome operator may take action against a company or organisation, as opposed to an individual.

2.11.7 Implementation of Remedial Action

2.11.7.1 The objective of any accident or incident investigation should be to identify the root causes and produce findings which facilitate further action aimed at prevention of recurrences. Such findings should focus on how procedures, practices, or regulations failed to prevent the accident or incident. The report should list recommendations and nominate those responsible for taking corrective action. The whole proceedings should be reviewed at senior management level with the intention of establishing what subsequent actions are required. The loop should then be closed by ensuring that all line managers and safety specialists are aware of the changes so that they can monitor their effectiveness.

It is equally important to determine whether the changes identified require any changes to training syllabuses and to action accordingly.

2.11.8 Conclusion

2.11.8.1 Whatever systems are implemented, airside safety performance management essentially consists of two fundamental and key elements:

- a) A 'just' culture, based on company policy to ensure that accidents affecting aircraft and airside safety are reported, in order to protect the public and the workforce from preventable injury.
- b) A code of discipline to secure a safe airside working environment for everyone.

2.11.8.2 The outcome of effective safety performance management should be seen by everyone to be:

- a) educational and developmental;
- b) encouraging and rewarding;
- c) active rather than reactive;
- d) constant rather than intermittent;
- e) continuing rather than currently fashionable;
- f) part of normal work rather than an isolated activity;
- g) a means of reducing or containing costs rather than costing money itself;
- h) everybody's concern rather than that of specialists, or worse, nobody's concern; and
- i) punitive only as a last resort.

APPENDIX A

AIRSIDE/APRON SAFETY COMMITTEE

A.1 General

1. Airports and aerodromes need effective forums in order to communicate with all airside operators; the aim of the Airside/Apron Safety Committee (ASC) is to promote and maintain airside safety standards and it is the foremost forum for the discussion and resolution of apron and ramp safety issues. The ASC provides the partnership between the airport operator's safety managers and other airside users to communicate and resolve matters concerning airside safety and operations.
2. It is recommended that aerodrome certificate holders or airport operators establish an ASC or an equivalent. The committee should be headed by the aerodrome manager, or senior airport operations manager, safety manager, or equivalent. At large airports, membership should consist of many different organisations including flight operators, ground services companies, and aircraft handling organisations, ATC and representatives from the emergency services. In order to maintain membership at a manageable level, joint operator groups, such as a ramp, baggage, or aircraft fuelling, may consider nominating selected members to represent group interests.
3. At smaller airports or aerodromes, the ASC may be less complex and comprise membership from multi-disciplined stakeholders, commensurate with the particular type of hazard presented in the airside environment and the safety issues represented.
4. Meetings should be scheduled on a regular basis, with notes and actions from meetings communicated and promulgated to the wider airside community in a timely manner following meetings, with agreed actions recorded and tracked for closure.
5. The Airside/Apron Safety Committee should:

- a) ensure that all airside personnel are aware of the potential safety hazards connected with their duties (safety awareness);
- b) ensure that lessons arising from safety occurrence investigations and other safety activities are disseminated to accountable safety managers within all organisations operating airside; and
- c) ensure that all stakeholders are actively encouraged to engage and propose solutions to identified hazards and changes in order to improve safety where they appear needed, or in response to safety incidents.

A.2 Terms of Reference

6 The Committee's Terms of Reference should include:

- a) acting as the focus for shared ownership of and responsibilities for airside safety issues;
- b) developing policies for safe airside operations;
- c) considering actions to resolve airside safety problems;
- d) promoting airside safety discipline;
- e) reviewing apron and Health and Safety incidents, in order to share analysis and lessons learned. The committee may consider other aspects of operational safety such as the following list (not exhaustive or prioritised):
- f) apron congestion issues and advise on best solutions;
 - i. airside cleanliness issues;
 - ii. review reports and statistics on accidents, incidents and emergencies, airside discipline issues and discuss trends and solutions;
 - iii. identification and reduction of shared risks;
 - iv. apron equipment issues;
 - v. airside traffic issues;
 - vi. standard operating procedures for airside activities;
 - vii. new and updated airside safety instructions;
 - viii. personal protective clothing/equipment issues;
 - ix. environmental safety matters such as noise, blast and fumes;
 - x. methods to develop and promote apron safety awareness initiatives, such as poster campaigns and safety presentations/exhibitions;
 - xi. sand clearance issues;
 - xii. receive reports on significant outages and breakdowns concerning airside fixed facilities;
 - xiii. receive engineers' briefings and reports on ongoing or imminent airside works and projects and provide safety advice;
 - xiv. proposed changes/developments to the airside environment, aircraft ground handling operations and/or standard operating procedures; and
 - xv. results of aircraft turnround audits.

Note: The existence of an Airside Safety Committee must not substitute for safety management arrangements made by individual organisations represented on the flight safety, ground safety or local runway safety committees.

APPENDIX B

CAA CERTIFICATION CHECKLIST APRON MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT

Name of Aerodrome/Aerodrome:		Inspection date:		Name of Operator:		
Managing Agency of Facilities:		Inspector(s) name (s)		Reference: Regulation		
Activity and objective				Reg. ref.	Status S/US/O/N/A	Comments
1.	Aerodrome Manual					
2.	Does the manual contain particulars of the procedures for aircraft parking control, if established?					
3.	Does it include the arrangements between air traffic control and apron management?					
4.	And the arrangements for allocating aircraft parking positions?					
5.	And the arrangements for initiating engine start and ensuring clearances for aircraft bushback?					
6.	And an inventory and description of the activation and deactivation of any visual docking guidance system used at the aerodrome?					
7.	And details of the marshalling service?					
8.	And the leader van service or follow-me service?					
9.	And the names, telephone numbers and roles of the persons responsible for planning and implementing aircraft parking control?					
10.	Record Keeping					
11.	List of documents checked.					
12.	Is the operator maintaining records in accordance with the aerodrome manual?					
13.	Facilities					
14.	Are suitable staff available to control aircraft parking?					
15.	Are suitable staff and facilities available to design parking layouts and marking?					
16.	Are staff available to provide follow me vehicle service if required?					
17.	Procedures					
18.	Is the staff aware of safety requirements relating to clearances and blast?					
19.	Are the organisational responsibilities and control arrangements in accordance with the manual?					
20.	Are parking positions allocated in accordance with the manual?					
21.	Are engine starts and push backs initiated in accordance with the manual?					
22.	Are any conditions or exemptions complied with?					
23.	Product Check					
24.	Are the visual docking systems in accordance with the manual?					
25.	Are the aircraft parking markers and markings in accordance with the manual?					
26.	Feedback					
27.	Are aircraft parking related incidents noted, reported and followed up?					

APPENDIX C
CAA SURVEILLANCE CHECKLIST APRON MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT

Name of Aerodrome/Aerodrome:		Inspection date:		
Name of Operator:		Managing Agency of Facilities:		
Inspector(s) name (s)				
Reference: Regulation				
S/N	ITEM	Reg. ref.	Status S/US/O N/A	Comments
AERODROME OPERATIONS MANUAL				
1.	Has the aerodrome operator identified individual/s who are responsible for apron management and apron safety?			
2.	Has the aerodrome operator distributed parts of the Aerodrome Operations Manual to those who require it to conduct their duties/ operate on airside?			
3.	If Yes, is the aerodrome operations manual distribution list available for review?			
APRON SAFETY MANAGEMENT				
4.	Are risk assessment and safety audits conducted on the apron?			
5.	If Yes, who is the person/s responsible for ensuring that risk assessment s and safety audits are conducted?			
6.	Are the risk assessments/ analysis and internal audits conducted by competent individuals?			
7.	Has the Aerodrome Operator developed criterion to identify and assess risks identified on apron areas? (Risk Matrix)			
8.	Are risk assessments and safety audits conducted on apron operations?			
9.	Has the Aerodrome Operator developed a procedure to ensure the consistent application of risk assessments on aerodrome apron operations?			
10.	Is the frequency of risk assessments and preceding management review detailed?			
11.	Are there risk assessments and hazard identification reports available for inspection?			
12.	Has the Aerodrome Operator developed a safety occurrence and investigation procedure for events?			
13.	Are there accident and incident investigation reports available for inspection			
14.	Has the Aerodrome Operator established a Committee/Forum where Apron Safety issues are discussed?			
15.	Are the minutes available for review?			
AIRCRAFT SAFETY				
16.	Are all aprons clean and clear of foreign object debris (FOD)?			
17.	Are there any FOD bins available on the parking bays and other strategic positions?			
18.	Are FOD bins emptied regularly?			
19.	Is all apron equipment parked in designated staging areas?			
20.	Is the marshaller on the aircraft stand prior to the arrival of the aircraft? (One sample per apron)			
21.	Do all marshallsers comply with all standard operating procedures prescribed by the aerodrome operator?			
22.	Are the marshalling signals used compliant with CAA Requirements?			
23.	Is all marshalling staff adequately trained? (Sample: Verify marshaller details with marshalling training records)			
24.	Interview: Is the marshaller familiar with the aircraft marshalling standard operating procedures?			

25.	Do apron staff approach the aircraft prior to been given the go-ahead from the aircraft engineer?			
26.	Are there any unsafe acts/ conditions during the loading and unloading of the aircraft?			
27.	Do all apron equipment and vehicles adhere to the speed limit permitted when on the ramp?			
28.	Are all standard operating procedures adhered to during the servicing of the aircraft?			
29.	PARKING OF, SECURING AIRCRAFT ON THE APRON			
30.	Are there safety lines painted to define the areas intended for use by ground vehicles and other servicing equipment, to provide safe separation from aircraft?			
31.	Does the aircraft stand provide the minimum clearance requirements as prescribed in ECAR 139?			
32.	Does the aerodrome have an apron management service at the aerodrome?			
33.	Is the movement of aircraft on apron areas conducted in a safe manner?			
34.	Do all pilots adhere to all parking and departing instructions issued by the Apron Management Service/ATC?			
35.	Is the aircraft properly chocked once stationary?			
36.	Are the chocks used, suitable for the size of aircraft?			
37.	Is provision made for smaller aircraft to be properly moored?			
38.	Does the aerodrome make use of air-bridges?			
39.	If yes, are the air-bridge operators suitably trained?			
40.	Do the airbridge operators comply with the aerodrome operators' standard operating procedures when using the airbridges?			
41.	Does the aerodrome make use of motorized apron equipment?			
42.	Are the apron equipment in a serviceable and roadworthy condition?			
43.	Are the steps used suitable for the type of aircraft?			
44.	Interview: An apron equipment operator on the content of the standard operating procedures governing the use of such equipment.			
45.	Record the following information (1 Sample to be taken from each apron): Aircraft registration; ETA of aircraft Ground handling company; Unsafe acts or conditions noted during the handling of the aircraft.			
MOVEMENT OF VEHICLES				
46.	Is vehicular movement regulated			
47.	Has the aerodrome operator developed rules and procedures to regulate the movement of vehicles and equipment on the movement area?			
48.	Has the aerodrome operator implemented measures to ensure that all drivers are familiar with and complies with, the rules and procedures for the operation of ground vehicles on service roads and aerodrome stands?			
49.	Do all drivers adhere to the minimum speed and standard operating procedures when on the apron/s and service roads?			
50.	Interview: (One Sample per apron) Verify if the driver has all necessary authorisation to operate a vehicle on airside and if he/she is knowledgeable on the standard operating procedures governing vehicular movement on the aerodrome?			
51.	With reference to 5: Has these drivers been trained to operate vehicles on the movement area ?			
APRON INSPECTIONS				
52.	Has the aerodrome operator developed an aerodrome inspection programme, incorporating information and procedures for apron inspections?			

53.	Are all apron areas inspected at least once daily and are the findings recorded on a daily basis?			
54.	Do competent aerodrome personnel conduct these inspections?			
55.	Does the apron inspection checklist used, Inspection date the specific operational safety needs of the aerodrome?			
56.	Do all employees complete the apron inspection checklist in accordance with the apron inspection procedures?			
57.	Are these reports available for inspection?			
58.	Are these inspection reports verified by aerodrome anagement?			
59.	Is the apron sufficiently illuminated when dark?			
60.	Are airside staff allowed to smoke on airside?			
REFUELLING OF AIRCRAFT				
61.	Has the aerodrome prescribed standard operating procedures with regard to aircraft refuelling?			
62.	Is refuelling of aircraft done in accordance with the prescribed standard operating procedures?			
63.	Does the aerodrome operator ensure that refuelling is conducted within the prescribed safety parameters?			
64.	Does the Aerodrome Operator ensure that all refuelling vehicles are roadworthy and that the refuelling equipment is compliant with the safety specifications?			
65.	Does aircraft refuelling take place whilst passengers are boarding or disembarking from the aircraft			
66.	If Yes, has the Aerodrome Operator prescribed procedures to mitigate the risks associated with this practice?			
67.	Are these procedures complied with at all times?			
68.	Are fuel/ oil spillages reported, appropriately treated and cleaned immediately?			
69.	Are fuel spillages recorded?			
70.	To prevent staff and drivers going under aircraft wings, are safety cones placed around wingtips, vent areas and engines?			
71.	Are these areas kept clear whilst refuelling is taking place?			
72.	Interview: Are the staff charged with ensuring airside safety aware and knowledgeable about the prescribed refuelling procedure?			
73.	Interview: Are the refuelling staff aware and knowledgeable about the prescribed refuelling procedure?			
SAFETY TRAINING				
74.	Is appropriate training being given to personnel who are charged with the responsibilities of ensuring safety on the apron?			
75.	Is such training being presented by competent personnel			
76.	Is the training presented at an accredited training establishment?			
77.	Are all persons working on the apron inducted in terms of the aerodrome standard operating procedures?			
78.	Are training records being kept indicating the individuals who attended the training, the type of training, when the training was attended and if the training was successfully completed?			
INSPECTOR REMARK: RECOMMENDATION:				
NAME OF INSPECTOR: _____ SIGN: _____ DATE: _____				

-END-

APPENDIX 2E

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE

SOP Title:	Runway and Movement Area Surface Condition Assessment and Reporting						
SOP Ref. No.:	ADA/Airport/Division /Dept/Section/SOP/ 187-V1.0/20062021	Version No.:	V1.0	Version Date:	20/06/2021	Page:	1/21



STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE

Runway and Movement Area Surface Condition Assessment and Reporting

Airside Operations

Business Process Area / Functional Area:	Business Process Area / Functional Area		
SOP Owner:	Name/Title/Department		
SOP Ref. No:	ADA/Airport/Division/Dept/Section/SOP/187-V1.0/20062021		
Implementation Date:	04/11/2021		
Approved By:	VP Airside Operations and Standards		
Approval Date:	TBA		
Version No.:	V1.0		
Version Date:	20/06/2021		
Approver's Signature: (for non-electronic copies)			
Information Classification	OFFICIAL USE	2	This classification refers to information that is to be used internally by Abu Dhabi Airports personnel only.

<i>A Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) consists of a set of statements describing instructions in an orderly manner for the purpose of achieving a result. SOPs are developed to maximize the efficiency and accuracy of implementation of a policy or operational process.</i>							
Template Title:	SOP Template	Template Ref. No.:	TEM/03/SOP/V4.0/ 01072019	Version No.:	V4.0	Version Date:	01/07/2019

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1. TITLE

Runway and Movement Area Surface Condition Assessment and Reporting

2. PURPOSE

The purpose of this SOP is to standardize the runway surface condition reporting whenever water is present on the runway. Assessing and reporting the condition of the movement area is necessary in order to provide the flight crew with the information needed for safe operation of aircraft. This SOP will outline the new regulations in line with the Global Reporting Format (GRF) with the objective of reducing runway excursions.

3. SCOPE

The scope of this is SOP when applicable applies to the runway and movement area of Abu Dhabi International Airport only.

4. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Definitions	Description
AERODROME	A defined area on land or water (including any buildings, installations and equipment) intended to be used either wholly or in part.
APRON	A defined area on a land and aerodrome, intended to accommodate aircraft for purpose of loading or unloading passengers, mail or cargo, fuelling, parking or maintenance.
MANOEUVRING AREA	That part of an aerodrome to be used for the take-off, landing and taxiing of aircraft, excluding apron.
MOVEMENT AREA	That part of an aerodrome to be used for the take-off, landing and taxiing of aircraft, consisting of the manoeuvring area and the apron(s).
RUNWAY	A defined rectangular area on a land aerodrome prepared for the landing and take-off of aircraft.
SNOWTAM	Special series NOTAM notifying the presence, or removal, of hazardous conditions due to snow, ice, slush or standing water on the movement are by means of a specific format


Abbreviations	Description
ADIA	Abu Dhabi International Airport
AIS	Aeronautical Information Services
AOCC	Airport Operation Control Centre
AOO	Airside Operations Officer
APNSC	Apron Surface Condition
ATC	Air Traffic Controller
BCP	Business Continuity Plan
DMA	Duty Manager Airside
GRF	Global Reporting Format
HOD	Head of Department
NOTAM	Notice to Airmen
NR	No information is to be reported
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
RCAC	Runway Condition Assessment Checklist
RCAM	Runway Condition Assessment Matrix
RCR	Runway Condition Report
RT	Radiotelephony
RWYCC	Runway Condition Code
SOAO	Senior Officer Airside Operations
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
TWYSC	Taxiway Surface Condition
UTC	Coordinated Universal Time

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5. PROCEDURE STEPS	Responsible Party
---------------------------	--------------------------



The DMA will be supervising the entire process and ensure the Runway Condition Report (RCR) in the RCAC is issued in a timely manner as per this SOP.

The DMA will also initiate this process when a significant change in runway surface condition occurs due to water. Weather forecast from the MET Office must be actively checked for probability of rain or any adverse weather.

If a slippery wet runway NOTAM is present, the DMA must brief the SOAOs and AOOs conducting this additional inspection. The portion where the friction level is below MFL must be made known to the runway inspector in order for the inspector to report the appropriate RWYCC (RWYCC 3 – Slippery Wet) in the respective runway third.

DMA

General Guidelines:


- a. It is essential that the runway surface conditions are reported accurately as per this SOP and current regulations. The RWYCC reflects the braking capability as a function of the surface conditions. With this information, the flight crew can derive the necessary stopping distance of an aircraft on the approach under the prevailing conditions.

REMEMBER: Monitoring and accurately reporting prevailing runway surface condition reduces the risk of runway excursion of an aircraft. Visibility could also greatly reduce in the event of adverse weather which increases the risk of runway

SOAO/AOO

<p>incursion by the inspection vehicle. Heightened attention by the driver is necessary to increase situational awareness.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> b. Ensure the vehicle used for inspection is in good working order. c. Ensure all necessary equipment, tools (water depth measuring tool – ruler) and PPE’s are on-board the vehicle and fit for use. d. Before commencing any runway surface inspection, permission must be obtained from ATC. e. On entering the runway, a positive entry call must be made. f. On leaving the runway, ATC must be advised when the inspection vehicle is clear of the runway. 	
<p>1. SIGNIFICANT CHANGE ON THE SURFACE OF THE RUNWAY OR MOVEMENT AREA.</p> <p>Whenever water is present on the RUNWAY and movement areas due to precipitation (drizzle, rain, hail, etc.), the DMA shall give instructions to the SOAO or AOO on duty to assess the runway surface condition, taxiway surface condition and apron surface condition.</p> <p>The assessment will determine if significant changes on the surface of the runway and movement areas are reportable to interested parties.</p> <p>NOTE 1: Reporting of the runway surface condition shall continue to reflect significant changes until the runway is no longer contaminated. When this occurs, Airside Operations shall issue a runway condition report that states the runway is wet or dry as appropriate.</p> <p>NOTE 2: The runway in use will be inspected first prior to inspecting the subsidiary runway. Both inspections will generate their own individual RCRs.</p>	DMA
<p>2. RWY / TWY OR APRON SURFACE CONDITION ASSESSMENT.</p> <p><u>Runway Surface Condition Assessment:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. The lower runway designation number will be the reference of the RCR therefore the entry point during a runway surface condition assessment must be either on TWY A2 for Runway 13L (North runway) and TWY E2 for Runway 13R (South runway). If the entry taxiway is occupied or unserviceable, the nearest taxiway entrance may be used and inspection should start from the threshold area. <p><i>See Figure 1 and 2 below.</i></p>	SOAO/AOO

Figure 1: North Runway 13L




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Figure 2: South Runway 13R




- b. Vehicle must be driven at the centerline of the runway at **45km/h** or slower (if required) for a more detailed inspection.
- c. Each runway third shall be assessed and a RWYCC generated and reported to ATC upon completion of the inspection.
- d. If a runway third is assessed with a RWYCC of "2" or "3", request to issue a SNOWTAM must be included in the RT to ATC.

APPLYING COVERAGE CRITERIA:

- Assess per cent coverage of runway contamination for each runway third. See Table 1 and Figure 3 below.

Table 1	
ASSESSED PER CENT	REPORTED PER CENT
10 – 25 %	25 %
26 – 50 %	50 %
51 – 75 %	75 %
76 – 100 %	100 %

Figure 3: Coverage Criteria



SOAO/AOO

ASSIGNMENT OF RUNWAY CONDITION CODE (RWYCC):

- Assess and determine the type and depth of contaminants present for each runway third and assign respective RWYCC.
- If the contaminant coverage for that third is less than 10% a RWYCC 6 is to be generated for that third, and no contaminant is to be reported (NR).
- If all thirds have less than 10% contaminant coverage, no report is generated.
- If the contaminant coverage for that third is greater than or equal to 10% and less than or equal to 25%, a RWYCC 6 is to be generated for that third and the contaminant reported at 25% coverage.
- If the contaminant coverage for that third is greater than 25%, the RWYCC for that third is based on the contaminant.
- Identify RWYCC by reviewing all runway surface description categories in below table (Table 2):

Table 2

RUNWAY CONDITION CODE	
RWYCC	Runway Surface Description
6	DRY
5	WET – the runway surface is covered by any visible dampness or water up to and including 3 mm depth.
3	SLIPPERY WET – Only to be used when the runway is already NOTAMed may be slippery when wet.
2	STANDING WATER – More than 3mm depth of water.

- e. Scan the surface of the runway, from edge to edge and pay particular attention on the following:
- Depth of the water at the touch down zone areas where aircraft wheels will contact the runway;
 - Areas where water is accumulating (scattered or in isolation) – measure and take note of the depth of the water;
 - Areas with flowing water to one side or across the runway, flowing water is standing water – measure and take note of the depth of the water;
 - Accumulated water at the runway edge which effectively reduces the cleared runway width – measure and take note of the width and length of the accumulated water on every runway third.
 - Any significant observation that is likely to affect aircraft safety must be reported to ATC in plain language when reporting the RCR.

Taxiway Condition Assessment:

- Upon receipt of instruction from the DMA, SOAOs or AOOs assigned on respective taxiways shall perform a taxiway condition assessment.
- All taxiways in use must be inspected for any contamination.
- Refer to **Table 1** regarding the terms to be used in describing the taxiway surface condition.

NOTE: A taxiway should be kept clear of contaminants to the extent necessary to enable aircraft to be taxied to and from an operational runway.

Apron Condition Assessment:

- Upon receipt of instruction from the DMA, SOAOs or AOOs assigned on respective aprons shall perform an apron condition assessment.
- All Apron stands must be inspected for any contamination.
- Refer to **Table 1** regarding terms to be used in describing the apron surface condition.

NOTE: Aprons should be kept clear of contaminants to enable aircraft taxiing in, allow aircraft ground handling and push back for departure.

SOAO/AOO

Table 3	
TAXIWAY and APRON SURFACE CONDITION DESCRIPTION	
DRY	Taxiway or apron surface is dry.

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WET	The taxiway or apron surface is covered by any visible dampness or water.
POOR	The taxiway or apron surface is covered by water or any contaminant that obstruct significant ground markings, AGLs and advertently affect surface movement of aircraft.


3. REPORT RCR / TWYSC to ATC // REPORT APNSC to AOCC

Runway Condition Report (RCR):

SOAO/AOO


Upon completion of the inspection, pass the RCR to the ATC Tower frequency in the following format:

Example 1:



RT: "Abu Dhabi Tower North, Leader 5, runway vacated via A17, inspection completed, runway condition report for RWY 13L, runway condition code 5, 5, 5. Per cent coverage, 100%, 100%, 100%. Water depth, NR, NR, NR. Contaminant type, WET, WET, WET.

Example 2:



RT: "Abu Dhabi Tower North, Leader 5, runway vacated via E15, inspection completed, runway condition report for RWY 13R, runway condition code 5, 2, 2. Per cent coverage, 75, 100, 100. Water depth, NR, 04mm, 04mm. Contaminant type, WET, STANDING WATER, STANDING WATER. **Please advise AIS to issue a SNOWTAM.**

Taxiway Surface Condition (TWYSC):

- a. If a portion of a taxiway is unsafe for aircraft to taxi due to present contaminants, immediately notify ATC Tower via the RT.

SOAO/AOO

Apron Surface Condition (APNSC):

- a. If a parking stand/bay is unsafe for aircraft use due to present contaminants, immediately notify AOCC by using your mobile phone.

4. REPORT RCR, TWYSC and APNSC to DMA

RCR, Taxiway Surface Condition and Apron Surface Condition:

SOAO/AOO

<p>Report the same information to the DMA via the RT or mobile phone:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Runway Condition Report – RWYCC, % coverage, water depth, contaminant type and any other significant observation. • TWYSC – report present condition of the inspected taxiways using the terms in Table 3 and other plain language remarks. • APNSC - report present condition of the inspected taxiways using the terminologies in Table 3 and other plain language remarks. 	
<p>5. UPDATE RECORDS</p> <p>a. Record necessary information on the appropriate inspection checklist (i.e., RCAC, Runway Inspection Checklist, Taxiway Inspection Checklist and Zone Inspection Checklist).</p>	<p>SOAO/AOO</p>
<p>6. UPDATE RCAC</p> <p>Upon receipt of all pertinent information from the inspectors, the ADIA RCA Checklist must be updated by the SOAO and reviewed by the DMA for accuracy.</p> <p><i>See Appendix 1 of this SOP on how to fill-up the RCAC.</i></p> <p><u>Upgrading or Downgrading the RWYCC</u></p> <p>After the first assessment of runway surface condition, a first RCR is generated.</p> <p>A re-assessment of the runway condition surface that could upgrade or downgrade the RWYCC should be considered in the event of the following but not limited to:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. When weather conditions are changing that may change the previous runway surface condition report; b. Increase in depth of the water by 3mm from previous reported depth of any runway third; <ul style="list-style-type: none"> NOTE: For STANDING WATER (RWYCC 2) 4mm depth have to be reported as a minimum. c. From RWYCC 2 (more than 4mm depth of water) the depth of the water in subsequent assessment reveals that the depth of the water is below 3mm. d. Two consecutive SPECIAL AIR-REPORTS of POOR runway braking action is received from ATC; <p>NOTE 1: If contamination exceeds 10% of the assessed runway thirds which is standing water exceeding 15mm in depth, the DMA should consider continued operation of the runway. In this situation the DMA must escalate to the Airport Duty Manager (ADM) and Head of the Department (HOD) for Business Continuity Plan (BCP).</p> <p>NOTE 2: Consider the suspension of operations on respective runway when one pilot reported a LESS THAN POOR runway braking action. Refer to RCAM table below.</p>	<p>DMA/SOAO</p>

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RUNWAY CONDITION ASSESSMENT MATRIX (RCAM)			
Assessment criteria		Downgrade assessment criteria	
Runway condition code	Runway surface description	Aeroplane deceleration or directional control observation	Pilot report of runway braking action
6	• DRY	---	---
5	• WET (the runway surface is covered by any visible dampness or water up to and including 3 mm depth)	Braking deceleration is normal for the wheel braking effort applied AND directional control is normal.	GOOD
4		Braking deceleration OR directional control is between Good and Medium.	GOOD TO MEDIUM
3	• WET ("slippery wet" runway)	Braking deceleration is noticeably reduced for the wheel braking effort applied OR directional control is noticeably reduced.	MEDIUM
2	More than 3 mm depth of water: • STANDING WATER	Braking deceleration OR directional control is between Medium and Poor.	MEDIUM TO POOR
1		Braking deceleration is significantly reduced for the wheel braking effort applied OR directional control is significantly reduced.	POOR
0		Braking deceleration is minimal to non-existent for the wheel braking effort applied OR directional control is uncertain.	LESS THAN POOR

7. SCAN AND SEND TO GROUP E-MAIL

Once the ADIA Runway Condition Assessment Checklist is correctly filled-up, it must be signed by the SOAO and handed to the DMA. The DMA must review and sign the official report for quality assurance purposes.

The report will be scanned by the SOAO and send to the group e-mail: grf@adac.ae.

SNOWTAM REQUEST

- In the event of a reported RWYCC 3 (slippery wet runway) or RWYCC 2 (water depth more than 3mm) in any runway thirds of the assessed runway, the DMA will follow-up with the ATC Supervisor (02 599 8735) and confirm if the SNOWTAM request was passed on to AIS as per the RT and official RCR (in the e-mailed RCAC).
- The DMA must verify the issued SNOWTAM for correctness of information in the e-mail updates sent by AIS.
- If a SNOWTAM is issued, the 8 hour window must be observed by the DMA for currency of information. A new RCR must be generated to reflect current conditions prior to the expiration of the SNOWTAM.
- An issued SNOWTAM must be cancelled if all runway thirds appears to fall into RWYCC 5 or 6. SOAO/AOO upon completion of the re-assessment must verbally request ATC over the RT to cancel the SNOWTAM. DMA/SOA to follow-up accordingly (See letter "b" above).

DMA/SOAO

NOTE: The initial request for SNOWTAM would be via the RT after completion of the runway inspection by the SOAO/AOO.

6. MONITORING, EVALUATION AND REVIEW

Compliance with the SOP is monitored by the ADAC internal audit program. This SOP will be reviewed on an annual basis or whenever required.

7. POTENTIAL RISKS

Risk	Control Measure
Runway excursion due to inconsistencies with reported runway surface condition assessment to ATC.	Application of the Global Reporting Format (GRF) - Standard Runway Condition Assessment Matrix (RCAM) for reporting runway surface condition. Annual re-training and competency check of Airside Operations personnel.
Runway incursion by inspection vehicle.	Only trained and authorized personnel from Airside Operations conduct runway surface inspections. ATC clearance obtained prior to runway entry. Fully equipped inspection vehicles are used for runway surface inspections.

8. EXCEPTIONS

This SOP applies to ADIA only.

9. LEGAL REQUIREMENTS

- CAR Part IX Aerodromes, Chapter 4, 4.11.4

10. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION AND TOOLS

- ICAO Doc 9981 PANS Aerodromes
- ICAO Circular 355 Assessment, Measurement and Reporting of Runway Surface Conditions

11. FILING AND DISTRIBUTION

The master soft or hard copy of this SOP will be filed in the Integrated Management System IMS under the SOP file in the Airside Safety and Standards section of the ADIA Operations department. This SOP document is available on ADAC Matari IMS site. The online version of this procedure is official, therefore all printed versions are unofficial uncontrolled copies.

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12. CHANGE LOG

Version No.	Document Creation, Review, Approval and Change Tracking	Actioned by (Name, Title, Department)	Action Date	Change Effective Date
V1.0	Document creation	Saeed Al Hameli	20/06/2021	04/11/2021

N.B. This document is UNCONTROLLED unless signed by an authorized person in the appropriate section of this document or viewed in Workflow! on Abu Dhabi Airports Matari-Sharepoint.

APPENDIX A. How to fill-up the Runway Condition Assessment Checklist.

Aeroplane Performance Calculation Section

- Fill-up the necessary fields (e.g., aerodrome, date, etc.) and check the boxes in the RCAC.
- In the runway illustration, write "L" or "R" the runway designation. Also mark the drawing with any water formations observed by the inspector.
- On the runway thirds boxes, the runway condition code and per cent coverage must be checked accordingly.
- The numeric code of the RWYCC must reflect on the upper right **red box** of each runway thirds based on the observation.

Situational Awareness Section

All individual messages in the situational awareness section end with a full-stop sign, in order to distinguish the message from subsequent message(s).

The information to be included in this section consists of the following:

- Reduced runway length
This information is conditional when a NOTAM has been published with new declared distances affecting the landing distance available (LDA). Check the box when applicable.
Example: NOTAM issued reducing runway length?
- Taxiway
This information is optional.
Format: TWY [nn]n POOR
Example: TWY E14 POOR
- Apron
This information is optional.
Format: APRON [nnnn] POOR
Example: APRON Stand 221 & 222 – POOR
- Plain language remarks using only allowable characters in capital letters.

Where possible, standardized text is used. 'UPGRADED or DOWNGRADED' is used whenever assessed RWYCC differs from what follows directly from RCAM.

RUNWAY CONDITION REPORT (RCR)

- a. Aerodrome location: four letter ICAO location indicator.

Format: nnnn

Example: OMAA (*already printed in checklist*)

- b. Date and Time of assessment: date and time (UTC) when the assessment was performed.

Format: MMDDhhmm

Example: 03150630

- c. Runway: runway designation for which the assessment is carried out and reported.

Format: nn[L] or nn[R]

Example: 31R

- d. Runway Condition Code for each runway third: a one-digit number identifying the RWYCC assessed for each runway third.

The codes are reported in a three-character group separated by a '/' for each third. The direction for listing the runway thirds is the direction as seen from the lower runway designation number.

NOTE: When transmitting information on the runway surface condition by air traffic services to flight crews, the sections are, however, referred to as the first, second or third part of the runway. The first part always means the first third of the runway as seen in the direction of landing or take-off.

Format: n/n/n

Example: 5/5/5

- e. Per cent coverage contaminant for each runway third: a number identifying the percentage coverage. The percentages are to be reported in an up-to nine-character group separated by a '/' for each runway third.

The assessment is based upon an even distribution within the runway thirds.

NOTE: This information is conditional. It is not reported for any runway third that is dry or covered with less than 10 per cent. The position of this type of information in the information string is then identified by /NR/.

Format: [n]nn/[n]nn/[n]nn

Example: 75/100/100

- f. Depth of loose contaminant: standing water for each runway third: a two- or three-digit number representing the assessed depth (mm) of the contaminant for each runway third.

The depth is reported in a six- to nine-character group separated by a '/' for each runway third.

The assessment is based upon an even distribution within the runway thirds following an assessment.

If measurements are included as part of the assessment process, the reported values are still reported as assessed depths.

Format: [n]nn/[n]nn/[n]nn

Example: 05/05/05

NOTE 1: This information is conditional. It is reported only for STANDING WATER.

NOTE 2: For runway conditions other than STANDING WATER, the depth is not reported. The position of this type of information in the information string is then identified by /NR/.

Example: 5/5/5 100/100/100 **NR/NR/NR** WET/WET/WET

NOTE 3: When the depth of the contaminants varies significantly within a runway third, additional information is to be given in the language remark part of the situational awareness section of the RCR.

- g. Condition description for each runway third: to be reported in capital letters using the terms specified in Table 2. The condition types are separated by an oblique stroke '/'.

Format: nnnn/nnnn/nnnn

Example: WET/WET/WET

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- h. Width of runway to which the RWYCCs apply if less than the published width: two digit number representing the width of cleared runway in meters.

Format: nn (write in the box provided)

Example: 40m

NOTE: If the cleared runway width is not symmetrical along the center line, additional information is given in the plain language remark part of the situational awareness section of the RCR.


- i. RCR Serial Number (SN). To distinguish between issued RCACs, a serial number must be manually written on every RCAC. The first official RCAC will be labeled "1-L" or "1-R" and the next official RCAC will be "2-L" or "2-R" and so on.

NOTE: "L" and "R" corresponds to the runway designation. The number value corresponds to the sequence of the RCAC as it was officially issued when there is a significant change with the previous reported RCAC.

RUNWAY CONDITION ASSESSMENT CHECKLIST

Aerodrome:		AEROPLANE PERFORMANCE CALCULATION SECTION
Date:		Is more than 10% of any runway third surface, wet or contaminated?
Time (UTC):		<input type="checkbox"/> YES – assign runway condition codes for each third and complete Runway Condition Report (blue box below).
Runway:		<input type="checkbox"/> NO – no report created.
RWY Inspector:		NOTE: RWYCC 6/6/6 for all runway thirds may be used to indicate that the runway is no longer wet.

NOTE: Mark the illustration below of significant water formation (ponding, flooding, flowing, etc.) that could be detrimental to aircraft safety (arrival and departure).



- ✓ Identify % coverage if more than 10% (assessed %) of the runway third.
- ✓ Identify Runway Condition Code (RCC).
- ✓ Identify depth (if applicable).
- ✓ Record the most restrictive code in the red box to the right.

1st RUNWAY THIRD			2nd RUNWAY THIRD			3rd RUNWAY THIRD		
NOTE: For coverage 25% or LESS, enter Code 6.			NOTE: For coverage 25% or LESS, enter Code 6.			NOTE: For coverage 25% or LESS, enter Code 6.		
RUNWAY CONDITION CODE	ASSESSED PER CENT	REPORTED PER CENT	RUNWAY CONDITION CODE	ASSESSED PER CENT	REPORTED PER CENT	RUNWAY CONDITION CODE	ASSESSED PER CENT	REPORTED PER CENT
6 = Dry <input type="checkbox"/>	10 – 25%	25 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 = Dry <input type="checkbox"/>	10 – 25%	25 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 = Dry <input type="checkbox"/>	10 – 25%	25 <input type="checkbox"/>
5 = Wet (damp, <=3mm) <input type="checkbox"/>	26 – 50%	50 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 = Wet (damp, <=3mm) <input type="checkbox"/>	26 – 50%	50 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 = Wet (damp, <=3mm) <input type="checkbox"/>	26 – 50%	50 <input type="checkbox"/>
3 = Slippery Wet ** <input type="checkbox"/>	51 – 75%	75 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 = Slippery Wet ** <input type="checkbox"/>	51 – 75%	75 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 = Slippery Wet ** <input type="checkbox"/>	51 – 75%	75 <input type="checkbox"/>
2 = Standing Water <input type="checkbox"/>	76 – 100%	100 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 = Standing Water <input type="checkbox"/>	76 – 100%	100 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 = Standing Water <input type="checkbox"/>	76 – 100%	100 <input type="checkbox"/>
FOR STANDING WATER, 4mm DEPTH HAVE TO BE REPORTED AS MINIMUM.	** SLIPPERY WET (Only to be used when the RWY is already NOTAMed may be slippery when wet)		FOR STANDING WATER, 4mm DEPTH HAVE TO BE REPORTED AS MINIMUM.	** SLIPPERY WET (Only to be used when the RWY is already NOTAMed may be slippery when wet)		FOR STANDING WATER, 4mm DEPTH HAVE TO BE REPORTED AS MINIMUM.	** SLIPPERY WET (Only to be used when the RWY is already NOTAMed may be slippery when wet)	
ASSESSED DEPTH: <input style="width: 50px;" type="text"/>			ASSESSED DEPTH: <input style="width: 50px;" type="text"/>			ASSESSED DEPTH: <input style="width: 50px;" type="text"/>		

SITUATIONAL AWARENESS SECTION

NOTAM issued reducing runway length?

Notes: _____

TWY _____ Apron _____ Others _____

NOTE: If contamination exceeds 10% of the assessed runway thirds which is standing water exceeding 15mm in depth, the DMA should consider continued operation of the runway. In this situation the DMA must escalate to the Airport Duty Manager (ADM) and Head of the Department (HOD) for Business Continuity Plan (BCP).

OMAA

RCR

SN


Aerodrome Type 3rd Third Date and Time (MMDDhhmm) RWY RWYCC % Coverage Depth in mm Contaminant Type 1st Third Contaminant Type 2nd Third Contaminant

Plain language remarks: _____


Request for SNOWTAM? YES NO

Reduced RWY Width in meters (if applicable): _____

NORTH RUNWAY 13L



SOUTH RUNWAY 13R



-END-

SECTION:	AIR NAVIGATION AND AERODROMES FORMS	ANF-ADR-002b ANF-149
TITLE:	CHECKLST - SMS ASSESSMENT TOOL – GROUND HANDLING SERVICE PROVIDERS	

AUDIT INFORMATION					
Audit Title :				Date :	
Organisation :					
Nominated Personnel Name : assigned to the Audit		Title:		Present <input type="checkbox"/>	Absent <input type="checkbox"/>
Delegated / Representative:		Title:			
Lead Auditor – Name:					
Other Auditors – Name:					

Introduction

GCAA CAR ADR and ICAO Annex 19, promotes a common approach to safety management and safety oversight across aviation domains. This document provides a common assessment methodology focusing both on assessment and continual improvement of the Safety Management System (SMS).

On the 13th of March 2018, the GCAA through the National Airport Operations Technical Committee, communicated the requirement for the Aerodrome Operators to monitor and audit the SMS of the Ground Handling Service Providers (GHSP) to ensure the continued safe operation of the GHSP.

This assessment tool is designed based on Chapter 4 of ICAO DOC 10121 Manual on Ground Handling, and to be used by the Aerodrome Operator, to assess the effectiveness of the GHSP Safety Management System, for the purpose of continuous improvement.

The intent of ICAO DOC 10121 Manual on Ground Handling is to address the ground handling services that form an integrated part of the aviation system and contribute directly to flight and aerodrome safety. The manual brings together the ground handling operation and the principles of SMS to highlight safety improvements in the overall system for GHSP as well as air and aerodrome operators.

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TOOL GUIDANCE

The tool assesses the effectiveness of the SMS through a series of features based on ICAO Annex 19 Second Edition, CAR Part X - Safety Management System requirements, and ICAO DOC 10121 Chapter 4. It is set out using the 12 elements of the ICAO SMS Framework. Each feature should be reviewed to determine whether the feature is present, suitable, operating and effective, using the definitions and guidance set out below.

The SMS Assessment Tool should be sent to the GHSP minimum 2 months' prior the SMS Assessment. The Aerodrome Operator should request the GHSP to complete and return the SMS Assessment Tool not less than 10 working days prior to the start of the SMS Assessment.

The GHSP should be requested to complete the self-assessment, in relation to:

- Present markers
- Suitable markers
- Operating markers

The effective marker must be filled by the Aerodrome Operator only. The Aerodrome Operator will verify and validate the GHSP self-assessment prior to or during the SMS Assessment.

DEFINITIONS

Present: There is evidence that the feature is documented within the organisation's Safety Management system/SMS Documentation.

Suitable: The feature is suitable based on the size, nature, complexity of the organisation and the inherent risk in the activity.

Operating: There is evidence that the feature is in use and an output is being produced.

Effective: There is evidence that the feature is achieving the desired outcome and has a positive safety impact.

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SECTION:	AIR NAVIGATION AND AERODROMES FORMS	<p style="text-align: center;">ANF-ADR-002b ANF-149</p>
TITLE:	CHECKLST - SMS ASSESSMENT TOOL – GROUND HANDLING SERVICE PROVIDERS	

The Present, Suitable, Operating, Effective (PSOE) level should be considered as progressive; it must first be present, then confirmed as suitable, then it becomes operating, and may then be Effective. During ongoing assessments, the suitability should be reassessed taking into account changes to the GHSP and its activities. An item cannot be considered Effective if it is not present because if it is not documented it cannot be carried out consistently and systematically.

SECTION:	AIR NAVIGATION AND AERODROMES FORMS	ANF-ADR-002b ANF-149
TITLE:	CHECKLIST - SMS ASSESSMENT TOOL – GROUND HANDLING SERVICE PROVIDERS	

CAR PART X Ref	2.1 SAFETY POLICY AND OBJECTIVES		
	1.1	2.1.1	MANAGEMENT COMMITMENT

SMS Checklist Ref	1.1	ICAO Doc 10121 Ref	4.2.4.2
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Evaluation Criteria:

- GHSPs should define their safety policy in accordance with international and national requirements and be signed and dated by the Accountable Manager of the organization.
- The safety policies should reflect the positive organizational commitments regarding safety, including a clear statement about the provision of necessary human and financial resources for its implementation.
- The policy should be communicated with visible senior management endorsement throughout the organization.
- The safety policy should encourage safety reporting and clearly show which types of behaviours are unacceptable and include the conditions under which disciplinary action would not apply.

PRESENT		SUITABILITY CONSIDERATIONS		OPERATIONAL		EFFECTIVE	
There is evidence that the marker is documented within the organization's SMS Documentation.		The marker is suitable based on the size, nature, complexity of the organization and the inherent risk in the activity.		There is evidence that the marker is in use and an output is being produced.		There is evidence that the marker is achieving the desired outcome and has a positive safety impact.	

Assessment results

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SECTION:	AIR NAVIGATION AND AERODROMES FORMS	ANF-ADR-002b ANF-149
TITLE:	CHECKLIST - SMS ASSESSMENT TOOL – GROUND HANDLING SERVICE PROVIDERS	

SUMMARY COMMENTS on SAFETY POLICY AND OBJECTIVES MANAGEMENT COMMITMENT

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SECTION:	AIR NAVIGATION AND AERODROMES FORMS	ANF-ADR-002b ANF-149
TITLE:	CHECKLST - SMS ASSESSMENT TOOL – GROUND HANDLING SERVICE PROVIDERS	

CAR PART X Ref	1.2	2.1.2	SAFETY ACCOUNTABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITIES			
SMS Checklist Ref	1.3 .2	1	1.4 10121 Ref	ICAO Doc	1.5	4.2.5.2, 4.2.5.3, & 4.2.5.4

Evaluation Criteria:

- The leadership of ground handling safety is the responsibility of the management who weighs risk against financial viability and is able to allocate appropriate resources.
- The drive and commitment from senior managers establishes a set of beliefs, systematic practices and integrated procedures for mitigating and monitoring safety risk. It is in management where safety culture is developed and campaigned.
- In the case of GHSPs, the Accountable Manager is accountable for the management of safety. An important concept is that responsibility for safety can be delegated but not the accountability. The safety management philosophy requires that responsibility and accountability for safety are retained within the management structure and it is here that ongoing commitment to an effective safety programme is driven.
- Identify the accountabilities of all members of management, irrespective of other functions, as well as of employees, with respect to the safety performance of the SMS;
- Document and communicate safety responsibilities, accountabilities and authorities throughout the organization; and
- Define the levels of management with authority to make decisions regarding safety risk tolerability.

PRESENT	SUITABILITY CONSIDERATIONS	OPERATIONAL	EFFECTIVE
There is evidence that the marker is documented within the organization's SMS Documentation.	The marker is suitable based on the size, nature, complexity of the organization and the inherent risk in the activity.	There is evidence that the marker is in use and an output is being produced.	There is evidence that the marker is achieving the desired outcome and has a positive safety impact.
Assessment results			

SECTION:	AIR NAVIGATION AND AERODROMES FORMS	ANF-ADR-002b ANF-149
TITLE:	CHECKLIST - SMS ASSESSMENT TOOL – GROUND HANDLING SERVICE PROVIDERS	

SUMMARY COMMENTS on SAFETY ACCOUNTABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITIES

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CAR PART X Ref	1.6	2.1.3	APPOINTMENT OF KEY SAFETY PERSONNEL	
SMS Checklist Ref	1.7	1.3	1.8 ICAO Doc 10121 Ref	1.9 4.2.6.2

Evaluation Criteria:

- The GHSP should appoint a person who fulfils the role of the Safety Manager. This individual is responsible for the implementation of the SMS and is a management official who reports to the Accountable Manager.
- The SMS responsibilities of the appointed manager are to be documented and reporting lines are to be clearly defined, especially between the Safety Manager and the Accountable Manager. The reporting lines are generally defined on an organizational chart and may be defined within the job description.

PRESENT		SUITABILITY CONSIDERATIONS		OPERATIONAL		EFFECTIVE	
There is evidence that the marker is documented within the organization's SMS Documentation.		The marker is suitable based on the size, nature, complexity of the organization and the inherent risk in the activity.		There is evidence that the marker is in use and an output is being produced.		There is evidence that the marker is achieving the desired outcome and has a positive safety impact.	

Assessment results							

SECTION:	AIR NAVIGATION AND AERODROMES FORMS	<p>ANF-ADR-002b ANF-149</p>
TITLE:	CHECKLST - SMS ASSESSMENT TOOL – GROUND HANDLING SERVICE PROVIDERS	

SUMMARY COMMENTS on APPOINTMENT OF KEY SAFETY PERSONNEL

SECTION:	AIR NAVIGATION AND AERODROMES FORMS	ANF-ADR-002b ANF-149
TITLE:	CHECKLIST - SMS ASSESSMENT TOOL – GROUND HANDLING SERVICE PROVIDERS	

CAR PART X Ref	1.10 2.1.4 CO-ORDINATION OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING
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SMS Checklist Ref	1.4	ICAO Doc 10121 Ref	4.2.7.2 & 4.2.7.3
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Evaluation Criteria:

- The Emergency Response Plan of a GHSP should allow a planned reaction to an aircraft accident or other type of adverse event that could result in fatalities, serious injuries, considerable damage and/or a significant disruption to operations. A GHSP should:
 - identify the regulations in effect at the airport, with the aerodrome operator and/or relevant authorities
 - define its role and responsibilities, in coordination with all other stakeholders;
 - establish a timeline on actions to be taken in response to events;
 - participate as required to the aerodrome operator emergency exercises; and
 - document, review and periodically test its ERP to ensure its relevance to the aerodrome ERP.
- Communication protocols should be established and shared between the GHSP, the aerodrome operator, air operators and other relevant stakeholders to facilitate the initial activation of the response to an emergency, including an up-to-date emergency contact list.

PRESENT	SUITABILITY CONSIDERATIONS	OPERATIONAL	EFFECTIVE
There is evidence that the marker is documented within the organization's SMS Documentation.	The marker is suitable based on the size, nature, complexity of the organization and the inherent risk in the activity.	There is evidence that the marker is in use and an output is being produced.	There is evidence that the marker is achieving the desired outcome and has a positive safety impact.

Assessment results

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SECTION:	AIR NAVIGATION AND AERODROMES FORMS	ANF-ADR-002b ANF-149
TITLE:	CHECKLIST - SMS ASSESSMENT TOOL – GROUND HANDLING SERVICE PROVIDERS	

SUMMARY COMMENTS on CO-ORDINATION OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING

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CAR PART X Ref	1.11	2.1.5	SMS DOCUMENTATION
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SMS Checklist Ref	1.5	ICAO Doc 10121 Ref	4.2.8.2 & 4.2.8.3
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Evaluation Criteria:

- The GHSP's SMS should be documented in a form commensurate to the size and complexity of its operations and made available to all personnel.
- Operational records of a GHSP SMS should include safety risk assessments, safety reports, Safety Performance Indicators(SPIs), safety management training records, etc.

PRESENT		SUITABILITY CONSIDERATIONS		OPERATIONAL		EFFECTIVE	
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There is evidence that the marker is documented within the organization's SMS Documentation.	The marker is suitable based on the size, nature, complexity of the organization and the inherent risk in the activity.	There is evidence that the marker is in use and an output is being produced.	There is evidence that the marker is achieving the desired outcome and has a positive safety impact.
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Assessment results

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SECTION:	AIR NAVIGATION AND AERODROMES FORMS	ANF-ADR-002b ANF-149
TITLE:	CHECKLIST - SMS ASSESSMENT TOOL – GROUND HANDLING SERVICE PROVIDERS	

SUMMARY COMMENTS on SMS DOCUMENTATION

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SAFETY POLICY AND OBJECTIVES SUMMARY		
Number of Markers assessed as being effective:	(out of 5)	
Percentage of Markers assessed as being effective:	(100/5 x number of effective markers)	
Effectiveness Achieved for Component:	(must be in excess of 75%)	YES / NO (delete as appropriate)

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TITLE:	CHECKLST - SMS ASSESSMENT TOOL – GROUND HANDLING SERVICE PROVIDERS	

CAR PART X Ref	2.2 SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT		
	1.12	2.2.1 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION	
SMS Checklist Ref	2.1	ICAO Doc 10121 Ref	4.2.9.3
<u>Evaluation Criteria:</u>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A non-punitive safety reporting system should be implemented and easily accessible to all GHSP personnel to communicate occurrences and safety issues. Safety reporting should include both mandatory and voluntary reporting systems and be compliant with GCAA/Aerodrome requirements. Examples of means to report safety relevant information are paper or electronic forms, emails or telephone hotlines. 			
PRESENT	SUITABILITY CONSIDERATIONS	OPERATIONAL	EFFECTIVE
There is evidence that the marker is documented within the organization's SMS Documentation.	The marker is suitable based on the size, nature, complexity of the organization and the inherent risk in the activity.	There is evidence that the marker is in use and an output is being produced.	There is evidence that the marker is achieving the desired outcome and has a positive safety impact.
Assessment results			

SECTION:	AIR NAVIGATION AND AERODROMES FORMS	ANF-ADR-002b ANF-149
TITLE:	CHECKLIST - SMS ASSESSMENT TOOL – GROUND HANDLING SERVICE PROVIDERS	

CAR PART X Ref	2.2 SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT		
	1.13	2.2.1	HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
SMS Checklist Ref	2.1.1	ICAO Doc 10121 Ref	4.2.9.3
<i>Evaluation Criteria:</i>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Hazard identification shall be based on a combination of reactive and proactive methods. 			
PRESENT		SUITABILITY CONSIDERATIONS	OPERATIONAL
There is evidence that the marker is documented within the organization's SMS Documentation.		The marker is suitable based on the size, nature, complexity of the organization and the inherent risk in the activity.	There is evidence that the marker is in use and an output is being produced.
			EFFECTIVE
			There is evidence that the marker is achieving the desired outcome and has a positive safety impact.
Assessment results			
SUMMARY COMMENTS on 'HAZARD IDENTIFICATION'			

SECTION:	AIR NAVIGATION AND AERODROMES FORMS	ANF-ADR-002b ANF-149
TITLE:	CHECKLST - SMS ASSESSMENT TOOL – GROUND HANDLING SERVICE PROVIDERS	

CAR PART X Ref	2.2.2	SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT AND MITIGATION	
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SMS Checklist Ref	2.2	ICAO Doc 10121 Ref	4.2.10.4, 4.2.10.5, & 4.2.10.6
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Evaluation Criteria:

- Safety risk assessments should be conducted by the appropriate manager and should include experienced personnel and third parties involved in the considered activities.
- Following a safety risk assessment, identified mitigation measures may require the development or adaption of: SOPs; modification of, or additional training; changes to equipment; etc.

PRESENT	SUITABILITY CONSIDERATIONS	OPERATIONAL	EFFECTIVE
There is evidence that the marker is documented within the organization's SMS Documentation.	The marker is suitable based on the size, nature, complexity of the organization and the inherent risk in the activity.	There is evidence that the marker is in use and an output is being produced.	There is evidence that the marker is achieving the desired outcome and has a positive safety impact.

Assessment results

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SECTION:	AIR NAVIGATION AND AERODROMES FORMS	ANF-ADR-002b ANF-149
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CAR PART X Ref	2.2.2	SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT AND MITIGATION	
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SMS Checklist Ref	2.2.1	ICAO Doc 10121 Ref	4.2.10.4, 4.2.10.5, & 4.2.10.6
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Evaluation Criteria:

- A risk register should be used for the purpose of documenting risk assessment information and monitoring risk mitigation (control) actions.
- Risk acceptability being routinely applied in decision making process.

PRESENT	SUITABILITY CONSIDERATIONS	OPERATIONAL	EFFECTIVE
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There is evidence that the marker is documented within the organization's SMS Documentation.	The marker is suitable based on the size, nature, complexity of the organization and the inherent risk in the activity.	There is evidence that the marker is in use and an output is being produced.	There is evidence that the marker is achieving the desired outcome and has a positive safety impact.
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Assessment results

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SUMMARY COMMENTS on RISK ASSESSMENT AND MITIGATION

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SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT SUMMARY		
Number of Requirements assessed as being effective:	(out of 4)	
Percentage of Requirements assessed as being effective:	(100/4 x number of effective Requirements)	
Effectiveness Achieved for Component:	(must be in excess of 75%)	YES / NO (delete as appropriate)

SECTION:	AIR NAVIGATION AND AERODROMES FORMS	ANF-ADR-002b ANF-149
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CAR PART X Ref	2.3 SAFETY ASSURANCE		
	1.14	2.3.1	SAFETY PERFORMANCE MONITORING AND MEASUREMENT

SMS Checklist Ref	3.1	ICAO Doc 10121 Ref	4.2.11.2
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Evaluation Criteria:

- GHSPs should develop procedures to verify the safety performance of the organization and to validate the effectiveness of the safety risk controls.
- SPIs, targets and alerts are means to assess the continued safety performance of the GHSP. They can be based on the results of internal or external audits, apron inspections, occurrence reporting, etc., and may be aligned with some of the SPIs of the air and aerodrome operators the GHSP interfaces with.

PRESENT	SUITABILITY CONSIDERATIONS	OPERATIONAL	EFFECTIVE
There is evidence that the marker is documented within the organization's SMS Documentation.	The marker is suitable based on the size, nature, complexity of the organization and the inherent risk in the activity.	There is evidence that the marker is in use and an output is being produced.	There is evidence that the marker is achieving the desired outcome and has a positive safety impact.

Assessment results

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SECTION:	AIR NAVIGATION AND AERODROMES FORMS	ANF-ADR-002b ANF-149
TITLE:	CHECKLIST - SMS ASSESSMENT TOOL – GROUND HANDLING SERVICE PROVIDERS	

CAR PART X Ref	1.15 2.3.1 SAFETY PERFORMANCE MONITORING AND MEASUREMENT		
SMS Checklist Ref	1.16 3.1.1	1.17 Ref ICAO Doc 10121	1.18 4.2.11.7

Evaluation Criteria:

- A GHSP should have a safety assurance programme with a detailed internal evaluation process and sufficient resources to ensure the effectiveness of the management system at all stations. The safety assurance programme should:
 - comply with applicable regulations and requirements of the aerodrome operators;
 - identify any hazards to operations;
 - monitor the effectiveness of safety risk controls; and
 - be validated using SPIs and SPTs.

PRESENT	SUITABILITY CONSIDERATIONS	OPERATIONAL	EFFECTIVE
There is evidence that the marker is documented within the organization's SMS Documentation.	The marker is suitable based on the size, nature, complexity of the organization and the inherent risk in the activity.	There is evidence that the marker is in use and an output is being produced.	There is evidence that the marker is achieving the desired outcome and has a positive safety impact.
Assessment results			

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<p>SUMMARY COMMENTS on SAFETY PERFORMANCE MONITORING AND MEASUREMENT</p>
<p> </p>

SECTION:	AIR NAVIGATION AND AERODROMES FORMS	ANF-ADR-002b ANF-149
TITLE:	CHECKLST - SMS ASSESSMENT TOOL – GROUND HANDLING SERVICE PROVIDERS	

CAR PART X Ref	1.19 2.3.2 MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE		
SMS Checklist Ref	1.20 3.2	1.21 ICAO Doc 10121 Ref	1.22 4.2.12.2

Evaluation Criteria:

- GHSPs should inform and coordinate any change in its procedures that may affect the aerodrome operator, air operators or other organizations it may interface with. Changes affecting GHSPs can be internal or involve external organizations and should be jointly assessed with them. Examples of such changes are:
 - changes of aerodrome infrastructure;
 - significant management changes (acquisitions, mergers, etc.);
 - new contracts, aircraft types or procedures;
 - changes in regulations; and
 - acquisition of new types of GSE.

PRESENT	SUITABILITY CONSIDERATIONS	OPERATIONAL	EFFECTIVE
There is evidence that the marker is documented within the organization's SMS Documentation.	The marker is suitable based on the size, nature, complexity of the organization and the inherent risk in the activity.	There is evidence that the marker is in use and an output is being produced.	There is evidence that the marker is achieving the desired outcome and has a positive safety impact.
Assessment results			

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SUMMARY COMMENTS on 'THE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE'			

CAR PART X Ref	1.23 2.3.3 CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT OF THE SMS		
SMS Checklist Ref	1.24 3.3	1.25 ICAO Doc 10121 Ref	1.26 4.2.13.2 & 4.2.13.3

Evaluation Criteria:

- As part of its SMS, a GHSP should implement a continuous improvement process. This process may include self-evaluation, follow-up actions and internal audit processes.
- When a GHSP uses an integrated management system, this continuous improvement process would be included as part of the regular quality controls and reviews.

PRESENT	SUITABILITY CONSIDERATIONS	OPERATIONAL	EFFECTIVE
There is evidence that the marker is documented within the organization's SMS Documentation.	The marker is suitable based on the size, nature, complexity of the organization and the inherent risk in the activity.	There is evidence that the marker is in use and an output is being produced.	There is evidence that the marker is achieving the desired outcome and has a positive safety impact.
Assessment results			

SECTION:	AIR NAVIGATION AND AERODROMES FORMS	ANF-ADR-002b ANF-149
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SUMMARY COMMENTS on 'CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT OF THE SMS'

SAFETY ASSURANCE SUMMARY		
Number of Markers assessed as being effective:	(out of 4)	
Percentage of Markers assessed as being effective:	(100/4 x number of effective markers)	
Effectiveness Achieved for Component:	(must be in excess of 75%)	YES / NO (delete as appropriate)

CAR PART X Ref	1.27 2.4.1 TRAINING AND EDUCATION	2.4 SAFETY PROMOTION
SMS Checklist Ref	4.1 ICAO Doc 10121 Ref	4.2.14.2 & 4.2.14.3

Evaluation Criteria:

- The GHSP shall develop and maintain a safety training programme that ensures that personnel are trained and competent to perform their duties relevant to the GHSPs SMS.

PRESENT	SUITABILITY CONSIDERATIONS	OPERATIONAL	EFFECTIVE
There is evidence that the marker is documented within the organization's SMS Documentation.	The marker is suitable based on the size, nature, complexity of the organization and the inherent risk in the activity.	There is evidence that the marker is in use and an output is being produced.	There is evidence that the marker is achieving the desired outcome and has a positive safety impact.

Assessment results			

SECTION:	AIR NAVIGATION AND AERODROMES FORMS	ANF-ADR-002b ANF-149
TITLE:	CHECKLIST - SMS ASSESSMENT TOOL – GROUND HANDLING SERVICE PROVIDERS	

CAR PART X Ref	1.28	2.4.1	TRAINING AND EDUCATION	2.4	SAFETY PROMOTION
SMS Checklist Ref	4.1.1	ICAO Doc 10121 Ref		4.2.14.2 & 4.2.14.3	
<u>Evaluation Criteria:</u>					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> SMS training for all personnel should, as a minimum, address the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) the importance of the GHSP's SMS framework, safety policy and safety culture; b) the individual involvement of the personnel in the SMS, including the use of an occurrence reporting system, application of safe working and operating practices, and response to emergency situations; and c) human factors and human error. Managers and supervisors responsible for implementing components of SMS should receive more detailed training covering all twelve elements, as relevant to their duties. 					
PRESENT		SUITABILITY CONSIDERATIONS		OPERATIONAL	EFFECTIVE
There is evidence that the marker is documented within the organization's SMS Documentation.		The marker is suitable based on the size, nature, complexity of the organization and the inherent risk in the activity.		There is evidence that the marker is in use and an output is being produced.	There is evidence that the marker is achieving the desired outcome and has a positive safety impact.
Assessment results					

SECTION:	AIR NAVIGATION AND AERODROMES FORMS	ANF-ADR-002b ANF-149
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SUMMARY COMMENTS on TRAINING AND EDUCATION

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Annex 19 SARPS Ref	1.29 2.4.2 SAFETY COMMUNICATION		
SMS Checklist Ref	1.30 4.2	1.31 Ref	1.32 4.2.15.2 & 4.2.15.3

Evaluation Criteria:

- Safety communication is two-way. Personnel should be encouraged to voluntarily report safety issues and management should then openly provide feedback on the analysis made and measures taken.

PRESENT	SUITABILITY CONSIDERATIONS	OPERATIONAL	EFFECTIVE
There is evidence that the marker is documented within the organization's SMS Documentation.	The marker is suitable based on the size, nature, complexity of the organization and the inherent risk in the activity.	There is evidence that the marker is in use and an output is being produced.	There is evidence that the marker is achieving the desired outcome and has a positive safety impact.

Assessment results

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SECTION:	AIR NAVIGATION AND AERODROMES FORMS	ANF-ADR-002b ANF-149
TITLE:	CHECKLST - SMS ASSESSMENT TOOL – GROUND HANDLING SERVICE PROVIDERS	

Annex 19 SARPS Ref	1.33 2.4.2 SAFETY COMMUNICATION		
SMS Checklist Ref	1.34 4.2.1	1.35 Ref ICAO Doc 10121	1.36 4.2.15.2 & 4.2.15.3

Evaluation Criteria:

- Safety information can be developed by the GHSP or may come from the air operators, aerodrome operator or the Authority. Some ways to convey safety information to personnel are through newsletters, posters and campaigns, safety bulletins, etc.

PRESENT		SUITABILITY CONSIDERATIONS		OPERATIONAL		EFFECTIVE	
There is evidence that the marker is documented within the organization's SMS Documentation.		The marker is suitable based on the size, nature, complexity of the organization and the inherent risk in the activity.		There is evidence that the marker is in use and an output is being produced.		There is evidence that the marker is achieving the desired outcome and has a positive safety impact.	

Assessment results

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SUMMARY COMMENTS on SAFETY COMMUNICATION

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AVIATION SAFETY FORMS MANUAL
AS/FM/01



SECTION:	AIR NAVIGATION AND AERODROMES FORMS	ANF-ADR-002b ANF-149
TITLE:	CHECKLST - SMS ASSESSMENT TOOL – GROUND HANDLING SERVICE PROVIDERS	

SAFETY PROMOTION SUMMARY		
Number of Markers assessed as being effective:	(out of 4)	
Percentage of Markers assessed as being effective:	(100/4 x number of effective markers)	
Effectiveness Achieved for Component:	(must be in excess of 75%)	YES / NO (delete as appropriate)

SMS ASSESSMENT - SUMMARY

COMPONENT	ELEMENT	Present	Suitable	Operational	Effective
SAFETY POLICY AND OBJECTIVES	1.1 - MANAGEMENT COMMITMENT				
	1.2 - SAFETY ACCOUNTABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITIES				
	1.3 - APPOINTMENT OF KEY PERSONNEL				
	1.4 - CO-ORDINATION OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING				
	1.5 - SMS DOCUMENTATION				
SAFETY MANAGEMENT RISK	2.1 - HAZARD IDENTIFICATION				
	2.2 – SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT AND MITIGATION				
SAFETY ASSURANCE	3.1 - SAFETY PERFORMANCE MONITORING AND MEASUREMENT				
	3.2 - MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE				
	3.3 - CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT OF THE SMS				
SAFETY PROMOTION	4.1 - TRAINING AND EDUCATION				
	4.2 - SAFETY COMMUNICATION				

AVIATION SAFETY FORMS MANUAL
AS/FM/01



SECTION:	AIR NAVIGATION AND AERODROMES FORMS	ANF-ADR-002b ANF-149
TITLE:	CHECKLST - SMS ASSESSMENT TOOL – GROUND HANDLING SERVICE PROVIDERS	

-END-

REPORT ON AGENDA ITEM 3: REGIONAL PERFORMANCE FRAMEWORK FOR AERODROME CAPACITY AND EFFICIENCY***Follow-up on Endorsed Decisions and Conclusions for Aerodrome Capacity & efficiency***

3.1 The subject was addressed in WP/7 presented by the Secretariat. The meeting reviewed the progress made for the implementation of the MIDANPIRG/18 Conclusions, as at **Appendix 3A**.

Aerodromes Capacity and Efficiency Dashboard

3.2 The subject was addressed in WP/8 presented by the Secretariat. The meeting noted with appreciation the new methodology used by the MID Office to Manage Aerodromes Operations (AOP) matters. The secretariat emphasised on the importance to establish a Data-driven decision making process to effectively implement the MID Air Navigation Strategy in line with the Global Aviation Navigation Plan (GANP) frameworks.

Basic Building Blocks (BBBs)

3.3 The meeting recalled that the BBB is considered an independent framework and not a block of the Aviation System Blocks Upgrade (ASBU) framework as they represent a baseline rather than an evolutionary step. This baseline is defined by essential services recognized by ICAO Member States as necessary for International Civil Aviation to develop in a safe and orderly manner. Once these essential services are provided, they constitute the baseline for any operational improvement.

3.4 The meeting reviewed and analysed the dashboard on the States Needs on Capacity Building for Effective Implementation BBBs requirements, as at **Appendix 3B**. The meeting noted that there is a need for assistance to States and their Airport Operators to implement the requirement for each AOP subarea. The meeting encouraged States which are able to provide technical assistance to coordinate with ICAO MID Office to facilitate a coordinated technical assistance as deemed necessary.

Airport Collaborative decision Making (ACDM)

3.5 The meeting may wish to review their ACDM Implementation Plans Dashboard as at **Appendix 3C**. The meeting encouraged States that didn't provide their updates on the ACDM Implementation to submit their inputs in order to amend the MID Air Navigation Strategy (Ref: MID Doc 002) and the annual MID Air Navigation Report.

3.6 The meeting noted with concern that some States are facing serious challenges to implement the ACDM. In addition, considering the benefits that accrue by the implementation of ACDM at the list of Airports concerned by the ACDM Implementation as defined on the MID Air Navigation Plan (ACDM applicability area as agreed by the MID States).

3.7 Therefore, the meeting proposed to establish an ACDM Task Force (ACDM-TF) to support and assist in the implementation of ACDM in the MID Region. The meeting agreed on the draft Terms of Reference of the ACDM Task Force as at **Appendix 3D** to be presented for the MIDANPIRG/19 meeting for its endorsement.

3.8 Accordingly, the meeting agreed on the following Draft Decision for its endorsement by the MIDANPIRG/19 Meeting:

DRAFT DECISION 3/1: ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MID REGION ACDM TASK FORCE (MID ACDM-TF)

That, the MID Region Airport Collaborative Decision Making Task Force (MID ACDM-TF) be established in accordance with the Terms of Reference at Appendix 3D.

Review the Air Navigation Deficiencies (AND) for AOP Area

3.9 The subject was addressed in WP/9 presented by the Secretariat of behalf of Sudan. The meeting recalled that the ICAO Planning and Implementation Regional Groups (PIRGs), have adopted the Council approved uniform methodology for the identification, reporting and assessment of regional Air Navigation Deficiencies against the ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) and Regional Air Navigation Plan (ANP) requirements.

3.10 In addition, the meeting noted that in order to support the implementation of the Uniform Methodology, every PIRG has developed its own unique deficiency database as a means of sharing safety information related to Air Navigation systems and viewed/used by that respective region(s) only.

MID Air Navigation Deficiency Database (MANDD)

3.11 The meeting reviewed the AND-AOP currently listed in the MID Air Navigation Deficiency Database (MANDD) as at <https://mandd.icao.int> and updated the list based on recent action taken by States. In this regard, the meeting highlighted that there is a need to include some improvement to the MANDD to enable States' Focal points to upload evidences for the closure of the identified deficiencies.

3.12 The meeting noted with concern that the majority of deficiencies, listed in the MANDD, have no specific CAP.

AOP Minimum Reporting Areas: Additional tool related to the AND

3.13 The meeting recalled that the ASPIG/2 Meeting agreed on a Template of the minimum reporting areas for Airport Operations (AOP), as available at **Attachment A of the Appendix 3E** to this paper, concerned by the fundamental infrastructure and core services to be implemented by Aerodromes in line with the Global Air Navigation Plan Frameworks.

3.14 The meeting reiterated that the ASPIG/2 meeting agreed that this tool can be used, as deemed necessary, by States as a reference to monitor the implementation of the ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) and Regional Air Navigation Plan (ANP) requirements.

3.15 The meeting noted with concern the level of efficiency related to the management and resolution of the Air Navigation Deficiencies. The meeting agreed that, in order to encourage reporting by all concerned parties and to enable efficient follow-up, particularly by the ICAO MID Office, the above-mentioned tool can be used in addition to the MANDD to report non-compliances without prejudice to the definition of 'a deficiency' as approved by the Council.

3.16 In this regard, the meeting reiterated that the intent of the list of Minimum Reporting Area, defined by the above mentioned tool, is **NOT** to replace reporting based on the Council policy, but to encourage consistent reporting, noting on one hand the current critically low level of reporting, and on the other hand the expanse of SARPs and requirements on which reporting may be effected.

3.17 Accordingly, the meeting invited States, users, and International Organizations to report on non-compliances in the subareas listed at the **Attachment A of the Appendix 3E** (in addition to reporting of any other deficiencies as defined by the Council).

3.18 The meeting recognized that the envisaged benefits of this approach include the following:

- a. Consistency in reporting across all MID States with respect to the listed AOP subareas;
- b. Ability to derive trends and propose common solutions;
- c. Facilitation of reporting by States and Organizations.
- d. Consistency in follow-up actions by ICAO MID Regional Office and other concerned parties.

3.19 The meeting highlighted that the undesirable outcomes of the proposed approach, which should be guarded against, include the reporting only on the listed subareas, instead of all deficiencies covered by the Council Uniform Methodology.

3.20 The meeting agreed to notify all MIDANPIRG Subgroups on the need to identify the Minimum Reporting Areas to cover, all domains in addition to **AOP**, notably **ATM, AIM, CNS, MET** and **SAR**.

3.21 In line with the above, the meeting noted that a Draft on Middle East Air Navigation Deficiencies Management Process (MID AND-MP) is developed aiming to coordinate the collection and management of Air Navigation Deficiencies, as per the **Appendix 3E**.

3.22 Consequently, the meeting agreed on the MID AND-MP draft to be proposed to the MIDANPIG/19 meeting for its endorsement and MIDANPIRG Handbook be updated to include a dedicated part on the ICAO Uniform Methodology for the Identification, Assessment and Reporting of Air Navigation Deficiencies as proposed at **Appendix 3F**.

3.23 Based on the above, the meeting agreed to the following Draft Conclusion be proposed to the MIDANPIRG/19 Meeting for its endorsement:

***DRAFT CONCLUSION 3/I: MID AIR NAVIGATION DEFICIENCIES
MANAGEMENT PROCESS (MID AND-MP)***


*That, in order to encourage consistent reporting of deficiencies, and efficient implementation of their resolutions, MID States and concerned Stakeholders are urged to endorse the MID Air Navigation Deficiencies Management Process (MID AND-MP), as at **Appendix 3E** including the list of Minimum Reporting Areas to be used as a guidance to minimum reporting.*

APPENDIX 3A

Conclusion ID #	conclusions and decisions	Why: concerns/challenges/rationale	deliverables		When: Deadline	Last Revised Deadline	Drafted by	Endorsed by	status	Date of completion	Actions required by the State	States that didn't reply/take action yet	Remarks
			What: item(s)	Who: responsible									
CAPACITY & EFFICIENCY													
MIDANPIRG C 18/24	STATES NEEDS FOR THE BBB-AOP IMPLEMENTATION								Ongoing				
	That, in order to support the implementation of the BBB for Airport Operations and prioritize the necessary technical assistance in line with the MID Region NCLB Strategy: a) States requiring assistance are urged to provide the ICAO MID Office, by March 2021, with their Needs for the BBB-AOP Implementation using the Table at Appendix 5.2J ; and b) States and stakeholders having the required experience and expertise are encouraged to volunteer to joint efforts with ICAO for the provision of necessary technical assistance.	Monitor the MID States BBB-AOP Implementation needs	Survey on MID States BBB-AOP Implementation needs	States	Mar-20	18-Aug-21	ASPIG/2	MIDANPIRG/18			Complete the Questionnaire on MID States BBB-AOP Implementation needs	Libya, Oman, and Yemen	(Revised Date: due to the Pandemic Crisis the deadline has been extended to 2021)
MIDANPIRG C 18/25	AIRPORT PLANNING SEMINAR								Ongoing				
	That, ICAO organize an Airport Planning Seminar in 2022 and States are encouraged to participate actively in this event.	Prepare States to the upcoming requirements on Airport Master plan	Airport Planning Seminar	ICAO	Dec-22		ASPIG/2	MIDANPIRG/18			Participation to the event		At the Draft stage: This conclusion amended the DRAFT CONCLUSION 1/8: AIRPORT PLANNING SEMINAR (ref: ASPIG/1 Meeting Report)
MIDANPIRG C 18/26	A-SMGCS IMPLEMENTATION SEMINAR								Ongoing				
	That, a) ICAO organize an A-SMGCS Implementation Seminar/Workshop in 2021- 2022; and b) States are encouraged to participate actively in this event.	Ensure proper Implementation of the A-SMGCS on Aerodromes as part of the ASBU Block 0 SURF module of the GANP 6th Edition	A-SMGCS Implementation Seminar/Webinar	ICAO	Dec-22		ASPIG/2	MIDANPIRG/18			Participation to the event		At the Draft stage: This conclusion amended the DRAFT CONCLUSION 1/7: A-SMGCS IMPLEMENTATION SEMINAR (ref: ASPIG/1 Meeting Report)
MIDANPIRG C 18/27	MID REGION ACDMIMPLEMENTATION PLAN								Ongoing				
	MID REGION ACDM IMPLEMENTATION PLAN That, by March 2021, concerned States (according to the applicability area included in the MID Region Air Navigation Strategy) be urged to: a) provide the ICAO MID Office with the contact details of their designated National ACDM Implementation Focal Points; and b) populate the Questionnaire on ACDM Implementation Plan, using the template at Appendix 5.2K .	Ensure proper implementation of the ASBU Block 0 ACDM module of the GANP 6th Edition	List of MID States ACDM focal points & Survey on ACDM Implementation Plan	States	Mar-21	18-Aug-21	ASPIG/2	MIDANPIR/18			Provide State's ACDM focal Point & complete the Questionnaire on the State's ACDM Implementation Plan	Bahrain, Kuwait and, Oman	Important Note : States concerned by this conclusion are : BAHRAIN, EGYPT, IRAN, KUWAIT, OMAN, QATAR, SAUDI ARABIA & UAE as agreed and defined on the MID eANP

APPENDIX 3B

MID States' Needs on the Capacity Building for Effective Implementation of the BBBs








APPENDIX 3C

**Aerodromes Readiness for ACDM Operations
based on the MID Region ACDM Implementation Plan**

State	Country Code	Total # of AD as defined in the Applicability Area	City	Aerodrome Name (AOP Table I-1)	Location Indicator (AOP Table I-1)	Designation (AOP Table I-1)	ICAO Reference Code		Aerodrome Traffic Density			Information Sharing	Milestones Approach	Variable Taxi Time	Collaborative Management of Flight Updates	Collaborative Pre-departure Sequence	ACDM in Adverse Conditions	Full ACDM Implementation	Integration with ATFM/ATM Solution	ACDM Elements Implementation Progress
							Number	Letter	Light	Medium	Heavy									
Bahrain	BHR	1	Manama	Bahrain International Airport	OBBI	RS	4	F												
Egypt	EGY	1	Cairo	CAIRO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT	HECA	RS	4	F												
Iran	IRN	1	Tehran	Mehrabad International Airport	OIII	RS	4	E												
Kuwait	KWT	1	Kuwait	Kuwait International Airport	OKBK	RS	4	F												
Oman	OMN	1	Muscat	Muscat International Airport	OOMS	RS	4	F												

Data collected as of 27 October 2021

Aerodromes Readiness for ACDM Operations based on the MID Region ACDM Implementation Plan																				
State	Country Code	Total # of AD as defined in the Applicability Area	City	Aerodrome Name (AOP Table I-1)	Location Indicator (AOP Table I-1)	Designation (AOP Table I-1)	ICAO Reference Code		Aerodrome Traffic Density			Information Sharing	Milestones Approach	Variable Taxi Time	Collaborative Management of Flight Updates	Collaborative Pre-departure Sequence	ACDM in Adverse Conditions	Full ACDM Implementation	Integration with ATFM/ATM Solution	ACDM Elements Implementation Progress
							Number	Letter	Light	Medium	Heavy									
Qatar	QAT	1	Doha	Hamad International Airport	OTHH	RS	4	F				✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✗	✓		
Saudi Arabia	SAU	2	Jeddah	King Abdulaziz International Airport	OEJN	RS	4	F				✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗		
			Riyadh	King Khalid International Airport	OERK	RS	4	E						✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗	
UAE	ARE	2	Abu Dhabi	ABU DHABI/Abu Dhabi int'	OMAA	RS	4	F				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		
			Dubai	Dubai International Airport	OMBD	RS	4	F						✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	

Data collected as of 27 October 2021

Aerodromes Readiness for ACDM Operations based on the MID Region ACDM Implementation Plan														
State	Region Code	Total # of AD as defined in the Applicability Area	Aerodrome Traffic Density			Information Sharing	Milestones Approach	Variable Taxi Time	Collaborative Management of Flight Updates	Collaborative Pre-departure Sequence	ACDM in Adverse Conditions	Full ACDM Implementation	Integration with ATFM/ATM Solution	ACDM Elements Implementation Progress
			Light	Medium	Heavy									
MID REGION	MID	10	0	7	3									

Useful links:

- [Global Air Navigation Plan \(GANP\)](#)
- [MID eANP](#)
- [MID Air Navigation Strategy](#)
- [MID Air Traffic Flow Management - Concept of Operations](#)
- [MID Air Navigation Report](#)

Data collected as of 27 October 2021

APPENDIX 3D

Proposed

MID Region Airports Collaborative Decision Making Task Force (MID ACDM-TF)

Terms of Reference

Scope

The scope and objective of the MID ACDM-TF is to identify, plan and assist in the implementation of A-CDM at the list of Airports concerned by the ACDM Implementation, as defined on the MID Air Navigation Plan (ACDM applicability area agreed by the MID States).

To achieve the above objective, the Task Force shall:

1. Review the Current status of ACDM Implementation Plan in MID Region;
2. Review the effectiveness of existing ACDM Programmes/Plans in the MID Region and the degree of harmonization with global guidance material;
3. Check the Readiness of the newly Implemented Elements/Enablers of any ACDM Project,
4. Provide Technical Assistance to the States to implement ACDM at their concerned Airports and monitor the progress of their Effective Implementation;
5. Support planned Workshops/Seminars/Symposiums on ACDM Implementation for the MID Region;
6. Promote the interoperability of ACDM systems with tactical ATM (AMAN and DMAN), ATM automation, ATFM and Aircraft Operator systems; and
7. Establish close working arrangements with the Air Traffic Flow Management Task Force (ATFM-TF) and report directly to the Aerodromes Safety, Planning and Implementation Group (ASPIG) which will coordinate accordingly with with other relevant ICAO Regional sub-groups such as the Air Traffic Management Sub Group (ATM SG), and other groups as deemed necessary.

Composition:


The MID ACDM-TF will be a multidisciplinary group composed by States ACDM Focal Points from both CAAs and Airports concerned by the ACDM Implementation.

The nominated focal points must be Subject Matter Experts on the ACDM Implementation, supplemented with other technical members as and when required.

Working Methods:

The Task force meeting should be held at least once a year for three-days (face-to-face meeting).

RASG-MID
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
 Including ASPIG proposed New Structure



ASRG	Annual Safety Report Group	SEIG	Safety Enhancement Implementation Group
ASPIG	Aerodromes Safety & Planning Implementation Group	AIIG	Accident & Incident Investigation Group
ACDM-TF	Airport Collaborative Decision Making Task Force		

APPENDIX 3E

**THE MIDDLE EAST AIR NAVIGATION DEFICIENCIES
MANAGEMENT PROCESS
(MIDAND-MP)**

1. Introduction

1.1 Based on the information resulting from the assessment carried out by ICAO on the input received from various regions regarding deficiencies in the air navigation field, it became evident that improvements were necessary in the following areas:

- a) collection of information;
- b) safety assessment of reported problems;
- c) identification of suitable corrective actions (technical/ operational/ financial/organizational), both short-term and long-term; and
- d) method of reporting in the reports of ICAO planning and implementation regional groups (PIRGs).

1.2 This methodology is therefore prepared with the assistance of ICAO PIRGs and is approved by the ICAO Council for the efficient identification, assessment and clear reporting of air navigation deficiencies. It may be further updated by the Air Navigation Commission in the light of the experience gained in its utilization.

1.3 For the purpose of this methodology, the definition of deficiency is as follows:

A deficiency is a situation where a facility, service or procedure does not comply with a regional air navigation plan approved by the Council, or with related ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices, and which situation has a negative impact on the safety, regularity and/or efficiency of international civil aviation.

2. Collection and inclusion of information in the Data Base

2.1 Collection of the information for all the sources (**Regional office, States, Users, Professional provider organizations' sources**): Refer to the **PART XX, Section 2 of the MIDANPIRG Procedural Handbook,**

2.2 MID Air Navigation Deficiencies Data Base (MANDD)

2.2.1 In order to support the implementation of the Uniform Methodology for the identification, assessment and reporting of deficiencies, the MID Air Navigation Deficiencies Data Base (MANDD) that is a web-based platform provides an online tool for States and relevant stakeholders to manage Air Navigation Deficiencies in the region. The application is available at <https://mandd.icao.int/>. **Reporting of information on Deficiencies actions taken by the MID Office**

3.1 In order to enable the MIDANPIRG to make consistent evaluation of deficiencies, States and concerned International organizations including IATA, IFALPA and IFATCA, are expected to provide the information they have to the ICAO MID Regional Office for action as appropriate, during MIDANPIRG meetings.

3.2 The information should at least include description of the deficiency, risk assessment, possible solution, deadlines, responsible entities, agreed new action to be taken to resolve identified Deficiencies.

3.3 Newly identified deficiencies shall be sent to MID Office by the State/Organization Focal Point through the MANDD. Evidences to support the information provided should be forwarded via email to the ICAO MID Regional Office (icaomid@icao.int) or attached in the MANDD (as potentially upgraded).

3.4 The newly added deficiency in the MANDD will always have an “N” status for New at the point of entering the details in the reporting form. Once approved by the concerned Regional Officer, the deficiency will appear in the database list highlighted in “Yellow” and will be available for MANDD users in the delete, update, search and print options.

3.5 Once received and updated in the MANDD system by the ICAO MID Office, the request is forwarded to the appropriate Regional Officer for review and analysis as per the paragraph 2.1.1 of the MIDANPIRG Procedural Handbook. The ICAO MID Office may contact the source of the information and the concerned State for more details when required. The result of the evaluation is submitted with all the evidences to a committee formed by the Regional Office subject matter Experts and the Deputy Regional Director for review.

3.6 If the deficiencies are confirmed, the State is informed by the ICAO MID Regional Office and given a time period to take appropriate actions. If actions are taken in time, the case is closed and captured in the MANDD as proposed for deletion and will appear highlighted in “Yellow” as a strike through then notified to the MIDANPIRG meeting.

3.7 Otherwise, the case is submitted to the MIDANPIRG Meeting for consideration and endorsement using the List of reported Deficiencies extracted from the MANDD system. The MIDANPIRG’ endorsed deficiencies are uploaded in the MANDD by the MID Office and the concerned State(s) are requested to submit a Corrective Action Plan within a given deadline.

3.8 The concerned State(s) shall follow-up the implementation of proposed mitigation actions, as established in the action plan and submit relevant evidences for consideration to the ICAO MID Office through the MANDD/by email.

3.9 In case of challenges with the implementation, the State Focal point should inform and coordinate with the Regional Officer managing the AND concerned Area (AOP, ATM, AIM, CNS, MET and SAR). Both, the State’s Focal Points and Regional Officer should ensure that the information provided in the MANDD is continuously updated.

3.10 The agenda of MIDANPIRG meeting should include an item on air navigation deficiencies, including information reported by States and other stakeholders in accordance with PART XX, Section 2 of the MIDANPIRG Procedural Handbook, The review of the deficiencies should be a top priority for each MIDANPIRG meeting which should make an assessment of the safety impact, of the reviewed lists of deficiencies, for subsequent review by the ICAO Air Navigation Commission.

3.11 In line with the above, and keeping in mind the need to eventually make use of this information in the planning and implementation process, it is necessary that once a deficiency has been identified and validated, defined fields of information should be provided in the reports on deficiencies in the air navigation systems. The Model reporting table for use in the MIDANPIRG report and Actions by the ICAO MID Office are stated in the Part XX, Sections 5 and 6 of the MIDANPIRG Procedural Handbook.

Additional Guidance for Minimum Reporting on non-compliances

3.12 In order to encourage reporting, the Group has adopted a list of minimum reporting areas which is reflected at **Attachment A** to this Process. The intent of the list is **NOT** to replace reporting based on ICAO Council policy, but to encourage reporting, in recognition of Assembly Resolution A37-15 Appendix L, and noting the historical critically low level of reporting, as well as the expense of SARPs and requirements on which reporting may be effected.

3.13 Without prejudice to the definition of “deficiency” as approved by the Council, States, Regulators and Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs), users, and professional organizations (IFALPA, IFATCA, IFATSEA, etc.) are encouraged to report on non-compliances in the areas listed in **Attachment A**, in addition to reporting any other deficiencies as defined by the Council.

4. Monitoring & Removal of MIDANPIRG endorsed Deficiencies from the Data base

4.1 The ICAO MID Office will monitor the implementation by the States of their corrective actions plans and report to MIDANPIRG. States shall implement their action plans and submit relevant evidences for consideration to the ICAO MID Regional Office by email to icaomid@icao.int .

4.2 The relevant Regional Officers should assess on the regular basis the implementation of the States action plans until their completion. Once the implementation completed, a documented report, comprising evidences should be submitted the ICAO MID Office for their review by the ICAO MID Regional Officers and the Deputy Regional Director. The review report is submitted to the MIDANPIRG meeting for appropriate action.

4.3 If deemed satisfactory, the deficiency is deleted from the MANDDD at which point will appear as a strike though highlighted in “Yellow” and the information is provided to the State.

4.4 Once validated and confirmed by the MIDANPIRG meeting to be an existing deficiency based on provided evidences, a command is run in the system to remove the resolved (proposed for deletion) deficiencies from the Database by the Regional Office.

5. Assessment and prioritization

5.1 A general guideline would be to have three levels of priority organized on the basis of safety, regularity and efficiency assessment as follows:

“U” priority (Red) = Urgent requirements having a direct impact on safety and requiring immediate corrective actions. Urgent requirement consisting of any physical, configuration, material, performance, personnel or procedures specification, the application of which is urgently required for air navigation safety.

“A” priority (Orange) = Top priority requirements necessary for air navigation safety. Top priority requirement consisting of any physical, configuration, material, performance, personnel or procedures specification, the application of which is considered necessary for air navigation safety.

“B” priority (Green) = Intermediate requirements necessary for air navigation regularity and efficiency. Intermediate priority requirement consisting of any physical, configuration, material, performance, personnel or procedures specification, the application of which is considered necessary for air navigation regularity and efficiency.

5.2 In addition, the MIDANPIRG’s Sub-Groups including the ASPIG (Aerodromes Safety Planning and Implementation Group) should assess, as deemed necessary, the endorsed Deficiencies based on SMS principles. As practical as it can be, the assessment and prioritization of Deficiencies is based on the safety risk matrix contained in the Safety Management Manual (SMM), Doc 9859:

DRAFT

Table 1. Safety risk probability table

Likelihood	Meaning	Value
Frequent	Likely to occur many times (has occurred frequently)	5
Occasional	Likely to occur sometimes (has occurred infrequently)	4
Remote	Unlikely to occur, but possible (has occurred rarely)	3
Improbable	Very unlikely to occur (not known to have occurred)	2
Extremely improbable	Almost inconceivable that the event will occur	1

Note.— This is an example only. The level of detail and complexity of tables and matrices should be adapted to the particular needs and complexities of each organization. It should also be noted that organizations might include both qualitative and quantitative criteria.

Table 2. Example safety risk severity table

Severity	Meaning	Value
Catastrophic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Aircraft / equipment destroyed • Multiple deaths 	A
Hazardous	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A large reduction in safety margins, physical distress or a workload such that operational personnel cannot be relied upon to perform their tasks accurately or completely • Serious injury • Major equipment damage 	B
Major	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A significant reduction in safety margins, a reduction in the ability of operational personnel to cope with adverse operating conditions as a result of an increase in workload or as a result of conditions impairing their efficiency • Serious incident • Injury to persons 	C
Minor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nuisance • Operating limitations • Use of emergency procedures • Minor incident 	D
Negligible	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Few consequences 	E

Table 3. Example safety risk matrix

Safety Risk		Severity				
Probability		Catastrophic A	Hazardous B	Major C	Minor D	Negligible E
Frequent	5	5A	5B	5C	5D	5E
Occasional	4	4A	4B	4C	4D	4E
Remote	3	3A	3B	3C	3D	3E
Improbable	2	2A	2B	2C	2D	2E
Extremely improbable	1	1A	1B	1C	1D	1E

Note.— In determining the safety risk tolerability, the quality and reliability of the data used for the hazard identification and safety risk probability should be taken into consideration.

Table 4. Example of safety risk tolerability

Safety Risk Index Range	Safety Risk Descriptio	Recommended Action
5A, 5B, 5C, 4A, 4B, 3A	INTOLERABLE	Take immediate action to mitigate the risk or stop the activity. Perform priority safety risk mitigation to ensure additional or enhanced preventative controls are in place to bring down the safety risk index to tolerable.
5D, 5E, 4C, 4D, 4E, 3B, 3C, 3D, 2A, 2B, 2C, 1A	TOLERABLE	Can be tolerated based on the safety risk mitigation. It may require management decision to accept the risk.
3E, 2D, 2E, 1B, 1C, 1D, 1E	ACCEPTABLE	Acceptable as is. No further safety risk mitigation required.

AOP MINIMUM REPORTING AREAS

AERODROMES OPERATIONS (AOP)									
	ICAO Reference Document	National Reference Document	Description	Date first reported	Remarks/ Impact of non-implementation	Action by States	Corrective Action Plan planned by the State (including timelines/target dates)	Identified implementation impediment and action thereon	Status
AERODROME DESIGN									
1.	Annex 14 - Vol 1, Chapter 1 PANS-Aerodromes, Part 1, 2		Aerodrome Master Plan		The lack of airports master plans affect their short to medium term capacity enhancement projects; restricting their ability to fulfil capacity needs.				
2.	Annex 14 - Vol 1, Chapter 2, 3 PANS-Aerodromes, Part 1, 2 MID ANP, Vol II - AOP		Runways		In view of the vital function of runways in providing for safe and efficient aircraft landings and take-offs, it is imperative that their design take into account the operational and physical characteristics of the aeroplanes expected to use the runway, as well as engineering considerations.				
3.	Annex 14 - Vol 1, Chapter 2, 3 PANS-Aerodromes, Part 1, 2		Taxiways		A properly designed taxiway system ensures a smooth, continuous flow of aircraft ground traffic, operating at the highest level of safety and efficiency and contributes to optimum aerodrome utilization				

MINIMUM REPORTING AREAS

AERODROMES OPERATIONS (AOP)									
	ICAO Reference Document	National Reference Document	Description	Date first reported	Remarks/ Impact of non-implementation	Action by States	Corrective Action Plan planned by the State (including timelines/target dates)	Identified implementation impediment and action thereon	Status
4.	Annex 14 - Vol 1, Chapter 2, 3 PANS- Aerodromes, Part 1, 2		Aprons		Apron design should take into account safety procedures for aircraft manoeuvring and contribute to a high degree of efficiency for aircraft movements and dispensing apron services.				
5.	Annex 14 - Vol 1, Chapter 2, 5, 6, 7 PANS- Aerodromes, Part 1 MID ANP, Vol II - AOP		Visual Aids		Visual aids contribute to the safety and operational efficiency of aircraft and vehicle movements. Design and Good maintenance of these aids is essential to ensure that the cues that they provide are available in all circumstances.				
6.	Annex 10 - Vol 1, Chapter 3		Radio Navigation Aids		Radio Navigation Aids contribute to the safety and operational efficiency of aircrafts. Good maintenance of these aids is essential to ensure that the cues that they provide are available in all				

MINIMUM REPORTING AREAS

AERODROMES OPERATIONS (AOP)									
	ICAO Reference Document	National Reference Document	Description	Date first reported	Remarks/ Impact of non-implementation	Action by States	Corrective Action Plan planned by the State (including timelines/target dates)	Identified implementation impediment and action thereon	Status
7.	Annex 14 - Vol 1, Chapter 8 PANS-Aerodromes, Part 1 MID ANP, Vol II - AOP		Electrical Systems		Electrical systems contribute to the safety and operational efficiency of aircraft and vehicle movements. Their design and good maintenance of these aids is essential to ensure that the cues that they provide are available in all circumstances				
8.	Annex 14 - Vol 1, Chapter 1		Terminals		Architectural and infrastructure-related requirements for the optimum implementation of international civil aviation security measures shall be integrated into the design and construction of new facilities and alterations to existing facilities at an aerodrome.				
9.	Annex 14 - Vol 1, Chapter 9 PANS-Aerodromes, Part 1		Fencing		Lack of fences on an aerodrome could lead to the entrance to the movement area of animals large enough to be a hazard to aircraft.				

MINIMUM REPORTING AREAS

AERODROMES OPERATIONS (AOP)									
	ICAO Reference Document	National Reference Document	Description	Date first reported	Remarks/ Impact of non-implementation	Action by States	Corrective Action Plan planned by the State (including timelines/target dates)	Identified impediment and action thereon	Status
AERODROME OPERATIONS									
10.	Annex 14 - Vol 1, Chapter 2 PANS-Aerodromes, Part 1, 2 MID ANP, Vol II - AOP		Aerodrome Data		Determination and reporting of aerodrome-related aeronautical data shall be in accordance with the accuracy and integrity classification required to meet the needs of the end-users of aeronautical data				
11.	Annex 14 - Vol 1, Chapter 9 PANS-Aerodromes, Part 1		Emergency planning		Lack of adequately effective emergency planning can seriously affect the effects of an emergency, particularly in respect of saving lives and maintaining aircraft operations.				
12.	Annex 14 - Vol 1, Chapter 2, 9 PANS-Aerodromes, Part 1 MID ANP, Vol II – AOP		Rescue and Firefighting		Lack of adequately effective rescue and firefighting service can affect capabilities to save lives in the event of an aircraft accident or incident occurring at, or in the immediate vicinity				

MINIMUM REPORTING AREAS

AERODROMES OPERATIONS (AOP)									
	ICAO Reference Document	National Reference Document	Description	Date first reported	Remarks/ Impact of non-implementation	Action by States	Corrective Action Plan planned by the State (including timelines/target dates)	Identified implementation impediment and action thereon	Status
13.	Annex 14 - Vol 1, Chapter 2, 9 PANS-Aerodromes, Part 1		Disable Aircraft Removal		Disabled aircraft can interfere with normal activity of an aerodrome. In addition, runway and taxiway closures can substantially reduce the number of arrivals and departures and restrict movement around the aerodrome, resulting in the reduction of the aerodrome capacity.				
14.	Annex 14 - Vol 1, Chapter 9 PANS-Aerodromes, Part 1		Wildlife Strike Hazard Reduction		Lack of measures (successful bird/wildlife control programme) on an airport and in its vicinity to minimize the likelihood of collisions between wildlife and aircraft will increase the risk to aircraft operations				
15.	Annex 14 - Vol 1, Chapter 2, 9 PANS-Aerodromes, Part 1		Operational Area Management		Lack of appropriate airport operational services will affect the safety and efficiency of aircrafts operations.				

MINIMUM REPORTING AREAS

AERODROMES OPERATIONS (AOP)									
	ICAO Reference Document	National Reference Document	Description	Date first reported	Remarks/ Impact of non-implementation	Action by States	Corrective Action Plan planned by the State (including timelines/target dates)	Identified impediment and action thereon	Status
16.	Annex 14 - Vol 1, Chapter 9		Ground Servicing of Aircraft		Lack of appropriate Ground Servicing of Aircraft will affect the safety and efficiency of aircrafts operations.				
17.	Annex 14 - Vol 1, Chapter 4, 6 PANS-Aerodromes, Part 1		Control of obstacles		The airspace around aerodromes shall be maintained free from obstacles so as to permit the intended aeroplane operations at the aerodromes to be conducted safely and to prevent the aerodromes from becoming unusable by the growth of obstacles around the aerodromes				
18.	Annex 14 - Vol 1, Chapter 10 PANS-Aerodromes, Part 1		Aerodrome Maintenance		A maintenance programme, shall be established at an aerodrome to maintain facilities in a condition which does not impair the safety, regularity or efficiency of air navigation				

MINIMUM REPORTING AREAS

AERODROMES OPERATIONS (AOP)									
	ICAO Reference Document	National Reference Document	Description	Date first reported	Remarks/ Impact of non-implementation	Action by States	Corrective Action Plan planned by the State (including timelines/target dates)	Identified impediment and action thereon	Status
19.	Annex 14 _ Vol1, Chapter 2 PANS- Aerodromes, Part 2		Global Reporting Format		Assessing and reporting the condition of the movement area and related facilities is necessary in order to provide the flight crew with the information needed for safe operation of the aeroplane. The runway condition report (RCR) is used for reporting assessed information.				
20.	Annex 14 - Vol 1, Chapter 1 PANS- Aerodromes, Part 1		Safety Management		Implementation of SMS seeks to proactively mitigate safety risks before they result in aviation accidents/ incidents and improve operational efficiencies.				
AERODROME CERTIFICATION									
21.	Annex 14 - Vol 1, Chapter 1 to 10 PANS- Aerodromes, Part 1, 2		Aerodrome Certification		Lack of certification of an aerodrome means that aerodrome does not meet the specifications regarding the facility and its operation				

MINIMUM REPORTING AREAS

AERODROMES OPERATIONS (AOP)									
	ICAO Reference Document	National Reference Document	Description	Date first reported	Remarks/ Impact of non-implementation	Action by States	Corrective Action Plan planned by the State (including timelines/target dates)	Identified implementation impediment and action thereon	Status
22.	PANS-Aerodromes, Part 1		Safety assessments and Aerodrome Compatibility		The compatibility between aeroplane operations and aerodrome infrastructure and operations when an aerodrome accommodates an aeroplane that exceeds the certificated characteristics of the aerodrome should be assessed				
AOP ASBU MODULES									
23.	MIDANPIRG CONCLUSION 18/27 MID eANP		ACDM-B0/1		To generate common situational awareness, which will foster improved decision making within aerodromes, by sharing relevant surface operations data among the local stakeholders involved in aerodrome operations.				
24.	[MIDANPIRG Conc.] MID eANP		SURF-B0/1		To improve safety and efficiency during ground operations by providing proper indications to pilots and vehicle drivers				

MINIMUM REPORTING AREAS

AERODROMES OPERATIONS (AOP)									
	ICAO Reference Document	National Reference Document	Description	Date first reported	Remarks/ Impact of non-implementation	Action by States	Corrective Action Plan planned by the State (including timelines/target dates)	Identified implementation impediment and action thereon	Status
25.	[MIDANPIRG Conc.] MID eANP		SURF-B0/1		To better maintain ATCO awareness of ground operations.				
26.	[MIDANPIRG Conc.] MID eANP		SURF-B0/1		Detection by the ATCO of potentially unsafe situations with regard to runway operations.				

Important Note:

All MIDANPIRG Subgroups should identify the Minimum Reporting Areas to cover, all domains in addition to AOP, notably ATM, AIM, CNS, MET and SAR.

APPENDIX 3F

POPOSAL FOR INCLUSION IN MIDANPIRG PROCEDURAL HANDBOOK - PART xx

PART xx - UNIFORM METHODOLOGY FOR THE IDENTIFICATION, ASSESSMENT AND REPORTING OF AIR NAVIGATION DEFICIENCIES

(Approved by the Council on 30 November 2001)

1. Introduction

1.1 Based on the information resulting from the assessment carried out by ICAO on the input received from various regions regarding deficiencies in the air navigation field, it became evident that improvements were necessary in the following areas:

- a) collection of information;
- b) safety assessment of reported problems;
- c) identification of suitable corrective actions (technical/operational/financial/organizational), both short-term and long-term; and
- d) method of reporting in the reports of ICAO planning and implementation regional groups (PIRGs).

1.2 This methodology is therefore prepared with the assistance of ICAO PIRGs and is approved by the ICAO Council for the efficient identification, assessment and clear reporting of air navigation deficiencies. It may be further updated by the Air Navigation Commission in the light of the experience gained in its utilization.

1.3 For the purpose of this methodology, the definition of deficiency is as follows:

A deficiency is a situation where a facility, service or procedure does not comply with a regional air navigation plan approved by the Council, or with related ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices, and which situation has a negative impact on the safety, regularity and/or efficiency of international civil aviation.

2. Collection of information

2.1 Regional office sources

2.1.1 As a routine function, the Regional Offices should maintain a list of specific deficiencies, if any, in their regions. To ensure that this list is as clear and as complete as possible, it is understood that the Regional Offices take the following steps:

- a) compare the status of implementation of the air navigation facilities and services with the regional air navigation plan documents and identify facilities, services and procedures not implemented;
- b) review mission reports with a view to detecting deficiencies that affect safety, regularity and efficiency of international civil aviation;
- c) make a systematic analysis of the differences with ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices filed by States to determine the reason for their existence and their impact, if any, on safety, regularity and efficiency

- d) of international civil aviation;
- d) review aircraft accident and incident reports with a view to detect possible systems or procedures deficiencies;
- e) review inputs, provided to the Regional Offices by the users of air navigation services on the basis of Assembly Resolution A37-15, Appendix L;
- f) assess and prioritize the result of a) to e) according to paragraph 4 (Assessment and Prioritization);
- g) report the outcome to the State(s) concerned for resolution; and
- h) report the result of g) above to MIDANPIRG for further examination, advice and report to the ICAO Council, as appropriate through MIDNPIRG report.

2.2 States' sources

2.2.1 To collect information from all sources, States (regulatory bodies and air navigation service providers (ANSPs)) should, in addition to complying with the Assembly Resolution A36-10, establish reporting systems in accordance with the requirements in Annex 13, Chapter 8.

2.3 Users' sources

2.3.1 Appropriate international organizations, including the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the International Federation of Air Line Pilots' Associations (IFALPA) are valuable sources of information on deficiencies, especially those that are safety related. In their capacity as users of air navigation facilities they should identify facilities, services and procedures that are not implemented or are unserviceable for prolonged periods or are not fully operational. In this context, it should be noted that Assembly Resolution A37- 15, Appendix L and several decisions of the Council obligate users of air navigation facilities and services to report any serious problems encountered due to the lack of implementation of air navigation facilities or services required by regional plans. It is emphasized that this procedure, together with the terms of reference of the PIRGs should form a solid basis for the identification, reporting and assisting in the resolution of non-implementation matters.

2.4 Professional provider organizations' sources

2.4.1 Appropriate international professional organizations, including the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers' Association (IFATCA) and the International Federation of Air Traffic Safety Electronics Associations (IFATSEA) also valuable sources of information on deficiencies. In their capacity as air navigation services professional bodies, they should identify facilities, services and procedures that are not implemented or are unserviceable for prolonged periods or are not fully operational.

Note:-

Guidance related to both mandatory and voluntary incident reporting systems is contained in the Safety Management Manual (SMM) (Doc 9859).

3. Reporting of information on deficiencies

3.1 In order to enable the ICAO PIRGs to make detailed assessments of deficiencies, States and appropriate International organizations including IATA, IFALPA and IFATCA, are expected to provide the information they have to the ICAO regional office for action as appropriate, including

action at PIRG meetings.

3.2 The information should at least include: description of the deficiency, risk assessment, possible solution, time-lines, responsible party, agreed action to be taken and action already taken.

3.3 The agenda of MIDANPIRG meeting should include an item on air navigation deficiencies, including information reported by States and other stakeholders reflected in paragraph 2.4 and 2.5 above, in addition to those identified by the Regional Office according to paragraph 2.1 above. Review of the deficiencies should be a top priority for each meeting. MIDANPIRG, in reviewing lists of deficiencies, should make an assessment of the safety impact for subsequent review by the ICAO Air Navigation Commission.

3.4 In line with the above, and keeping in mind the need to eventually make use of this information in the planning and implementation process, it is necessary that once a deficiency has been identified and validated, the following fields of information should be provided in the reports on deficiencies in the air navigation systems in line with the Model reporting table for use in the reports of the MIDANPIRG, **as at paragraph 5 (Model reporting table for use in the reports of the MIDANPIRG):**

a) Identification of the requirements

As per ICAO procedures, Regional Air Navigation Plans detail, *inter alia*, air navigation requirements including facilities, services and procedures required to support international civil aviation operations in a given region. Therefore, deficiencies would relate to a requirement identified in the regional air navigation plan documents. As a first item in the deficiency list, the requirements along with their references (name of the meeting and the related recommendation number should be included - e.g. SP AFI/08 RAN Rec. xx). In addition, the name of the State or States involved and/or the name of the facilities such as name of airport, FIR, ACC, TWR, etc. should be included.

b) Identification of the deficiency

This item identifies the deficiency and would be composed of the following elements:

- i) a brief description of the deficiency;
- ii) date deficiency was first reported;
- iii) appropriate important references (meetings, reports, missions, etc)

c) Identification of the corrective actions

In the identification of the corrective actions, this item would be composed of:

- i) a brief description of the corrective actions to be undertaken;
- ii) identification of the executing body;
- iii) expected completion date of the corrective action; and
- iv) when appropriate or available, an indication of the cost involved.

4. Assessment and prioritization

4.1 A general guideline would be to have three levels of priority organized on the basis of safety, regularity and efficiency assessment as follows:

- **“U” priority** = Urgent requirements having a direct impact on safety and requiring immediate corrective actions.

Urgent requirement consisting of any physical, configuration, material, performance, personnel or procedures specification, the application of which is urgently required for air navigation safety.

- **“A” priority** = Top priority requirements necessary for air navigation safety.

Top priority requirement consisting of any physical, configuration, material, performance, personnel or procedures specification, the application of which is considered necessary for air navigation safety.

- **“B” priority** = Intermediate requirements necessary for air navigation regularity and efficiency.

Intermediate priority requirement consisting of any physical, configuration, material, performance, personnel or procedures specification, the application of which is considered necessary for air navigation regularity and efficiency.

4.2 In addition, the MIDANPIRG’s Sub-Groups including the ASPIG (Aerodromes Safety Planning and Implementation Group) should assess, as deemed necessary, the endorsed Deficiencies based on SMS principles. As practical as it can be, the assessment and prioritization of Deficiencies is based on the safety risk matrix contained in the Safety Management Manual (SMM), Doc 9859

5. Model reporting table for use in the reports of the MIDANPIRG

MID Air Navigation Deficiencies Data Base (MANDD)

5.1 The MID Air Navigation Deficiencies Data Base (MANDD) is available at <https://mandd.icao.int/>. It provides an online tool for States and relevant stakeholders to report Air Navigation Deficiencies in the MID Region in order to be used by the MIDANPIRG for the identification, assessment, prioritization of deficiencies,

5.2 The MANDD Reporting system is based on the following model table as presented at **Appendix XX**.

Additional guidance on reporting

5.3 In order to encourage reporting, the Group has adopted a list of minimum reporting areas covering the following Air Navigation domains, **AOP, ATM, AIM, CNS, MET** and **SAR**. The intent of the list is **NOT** to replace reporting based on ICAO Council policy, but to encourage reporting, in recognition of Assembly Resolution A37-15 Appendix L, and noting the historical critically low level of reporting.

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5.4 In addition to reporting any other deficiencies as defined by the Council. And without prejudice to the definition of “deficiency” as approved by the Council, States, Regulators and Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs), users (IATA, AFRAA, etc.) and professional organizations (IFALPA, IFATCA, IFATSEA, etc.), are encouraged to report on non-compliances, referring to the minimum reporting guidance as agreed by the States and reflected on The Middle East Air Navigation Deficiencies Management Process (MIDAND-MP).

6. Action by the MID Office

6.1 Before each meeting of MIDANPIRG, the Regional Office will provide advance documentation concerning the latest status of deficiencies.

6.2 It is noted that the ICAO MID Office should document serious cases of deficiencies to the Air Navigation Commission (through ICAO Headquarters) as a matter of priority, rather than waiting to report the matter to the next MIDANPIRG meeting, and that the Air Navigation Commission will report to the Council.

Identification			Deficiencies				Action Plan			
ID	Requirements	State/ Facilities and Services	Description	Reporting Date	Remarks	Priority	Description	Executing Body	Target Date	Remarks
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
AGA XX	Annex 14, Vol I, Chap. 3	XXX Intl. Airport	Depression between threshold and threshold lights in both thresholds	DD/MM/YYYY	Identified during surveillance activity XXXX	A	<i>Include Action Plan coordinated with State</i>	XXXX	<i>Include as initial date that appearing in the Action Plan</i>	xxxx meeting recommended that Refer to details in the meeting report.

Explanation for the filling of the Form

Identification of Requirements

- Column 1: ID – Deficiency number (area-sequential numbering): Example AGA ##
- Column 2: Requirements – Element from the Air Navigation Plan/Associated SARPs
- Column 3: State/Facilities and Services such as: airport, navigation aid, FIR, ACC, TWR, etc

Identification of Deficiency

- Column 4: Clear and concise description of the deficiency
- Column 5: Reporting date of deficiency (month/year)
- Column 6: Important references, such as meetings, missions, reports, etc. *Other areas being affected by this deficiency should be indicated here.*
- Column 7: Identified Priority (U, A, B)

Action Plan

- Column 8: Clear and concise description of the Action Plan coordinated with the State. It should indicate how and when the deficiency will be resolved.
- Column 9: Identification of the body/institution responsible for Action Plan implementation.
- Column 10: Target date (month/year). The date in the Action Plan coordinated with the State will be inserted here. The Action Plan may need to be periodically updated; therefore, the corresponding target date will be amended accordingly.
- Column 11: Important references such as actions recommended by MIDANPIG to promote Action Plan implementation, progress with deficiency elimination, delays with Action Plan execution missing information, etc.

REPORT ON AGENDA ITEM 4: FUTURE WORK PROGRAMME

4.1 The meeting agreed that the ASPIG/4 meeting be tentatively scheduled to be held tentatively during the first week of March 2022. The venue would be either virtual or the ICAO MID Regional Office in Cairo, unless further coordination will be made with a State to host the meeting.

REPORT ON AGENDA ITEM 5: ANY OTHER BUSINESS***MID States Priorities/Challenges on AGA-AOP Matters***

5.1 The meeting noted with appreciation the briefings provided by the States about their Priorities/Challenges on AGA-AOP matters. The presentations provided by the States are available at: <https://www.icao.int/MID/Pages/2021/ASPIG3.aspx> .

5.2 The meeting noted that many States are facing defies on:

- Aerodromes Certification Implementation;
- Runways Safety Team Establishment;
- Global Reporting Format Deployment;
- Airport Collaborative Decision Making Implementation (as applicable); and
- Reporting and resolution of Air Navigation Deficiencies (AOP Area).

5.3 Accordingly, the meeting agreed to foster collaboration between States in coordination with ICAO MID Office to address the challenges in prioritized manner.

Third Meeting of the Aerodrome Safety, Planning and Implementation Group (ASPIG/3)
Virtual Meeting, (25-27 October 2021)
(from 08:00 to 11:00 UTC)
25 October 2021

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