



International Civil Aviation Organization

SECFAL Plan Development Group

First Meeting (SECFAL PDG/1)
(Cairo, Egypt, 31 January – 02 February 2017)

Agenda Item 3: Development of the ACAC/MID SECFAL Plan

AVIATION SECURITY INITIATIVES

(Presented by IATA)

SUMMARY

The Working Paper highlights key initiatives launched by IATA to enhance security and facilitation in the civil aviation industry. These initiatives are mainly related to the emerging and evolving threats and focused on the need for the aviation industry to adopt Security Management System (SeMS) principles supported by proper information sharing by States for more timely and efficient security risk assessment processes as an essential element.

Action by the meeting is at paragraph 3.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Over the past years, IATA is developing strategy to protect airline industry from unlawful acts of interference including new emerging and evolving threats.

1.2 The strategy is founded by the needs to collaborate with regulators and all other key value chain members, to shape the SECFAL regulatory framework, to use innovation and technology to continuously refine/improve the security processes/methods and to adopt a threat-based risk approach when it comes to security resources allocation.

2. DISCUSSION

2.1 In this regard, several initiatives and campaigns have been launched by or with engagement from IATA to address the security and facilitation challenges that the aviation industry is facing.

Security

Emerging Threats

2.2 As mentioned in the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2309 adopted on 22 September 2016, the Council of ICAO updates high priority risk areas for aviation in its Global Risk Statement¹ and all States have the responsibility to protect the security of citizens and nationals of all nations against terrorist attacks on air services operating with their territory, in a manner consistent with existing obligations under international laws, Conventions, and international standards in particular those contained in the Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention.

2.3 Tourism forecasts² for regions like Africa and the Middle East are predicting increases of more than 125% for 2030 which means that the responsibility of the States concerned is even more vital for obvious economic and reputation reasons.

2.4 Having in mind the current security challenges IATA continues to reinforce situational awareness and responses to emerging and evolving threats within the airlines community. Some of the recent events highlighted current credible airport security vulnerabilities on landside, poor performance of some ground security measures and security systems forcing airlines to deploy additional security measures in order to rectify existing deficiencies, as well as other potential insider vulnerabilities that could be exploited for terrorist and criminal activities.

2.5 The insider threat is characterized by a staff member who has the illicit intent and capability to execute or help for the execution of unlawful actions. Placing or growing an insider in the organization could be used as a modus operandi by organized crime or terrorist groups, competitors, media or even foreign intelligence.

2.6 Every organization needs to be aware of this type of threat and continuous and trusted information sharing between intelligence/law enforcement agencies and industry operators is essential for timely anticipation and implementation of effective counter-measures based on risk assessments.

Security Risk Assessment Process

2.7 IATA continues to encourage the development of the Security Management System (SeMS) which allows entities to identify, prioritize and systematically mitigate security risks in operations. Maturing risk assessment constitutes an essential element of SeMS and risk-based approach towards the aviation security.

2.8 IATA promotes awareness and development of risk assessment processes through information sessions and workshops as well as participation in capacity building initiatives (for example CASE project covering Africa and Middle East States).

2.9 IATA also continues to reinforce SeMS related standards within its auditing programs (IOSA and ISAGO) and cooperate with the appropriate authorities to promote their value.

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<http://www.icao.int/Meetings/avsecconf/Documents/Risk%20Context%20Statement/Risk%20Context%20Statement%20-%20Abridged%20Version.Published.EN.pdf>

² World Economic Forum – white paper on Digital Borders, January 2017

2.10 The success of SeMS is linked to the timely, accurate, and trusted sharing of all threat information in the possession of States agencies to the entire aviation community operating within their territories. New Annex 17 Standards on information sharing and incident reporting will be discussed during the forthcoming ICAO AVSEC Panel with the hope that all States in possession of such security information will contribute to an effective information sharing with the entire aviation community to address all potential security risks, including Cyber threats and risks, insiders, new Improvised Explosives Devices, and new landside attack modus operandi widely promoted by terrorist groups.

2.11 Finally, IATA strongly endorses the UNSCR2309 (2016) calling all States to fully implement all provisions contained in Annex 17, which only represents a worldwide baseline in Security, in a sustainable, effective and risk-based manner. The current level of compliance with Annex 17 contained in the USAP working paper³ presented during the last ICAO Assembly needs to be drastically and rapidly improved to reach 100% before the next ICAO Assembly.

Cargo and Mail Security

2.12 The ability to transport cargo and mail, cross border, over long distances in relatively short timeframes provides the industry with a clear distinctive market advantage compared with other modes. However, this advantage can only be truly realized if supply chain security and border procedures are integrated and automated.

2.13 IATA welcomes the efforts made by ICAO and ACAC to expedite the adoption of ICAO Annex 17. This reflects the efforts made across the globe to enhance global cargo and mail security measures and to adopt best practices.

2.14 IATA supports comprehensive dialogue between industry and regulators to test and solve current and emerging issues and envisages the opportunity to present – in a close future- the cargo and mail initiatives developed so far.

Cargo Security Capacity Building (formerly known as Secure Freight)

2.15 From 2008 to 2016, the IATA Secure Freight (SF) Pilot Program has established itself as an effective tool for Appropriate Authorities to develop air cargo secure supply chains while meeting Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention's provisions and other international regulatory requirements.

2.16 In its unwavering support to regulators and industry stakeholders, IATA transformed the Secure Freight pilot project program into an operational cargo security capacity building activity, which it made available to countries seeking to implement long-term security improvements.

2.17 Under the new terms of reference IATA can:

- Undertake preliminary discussions with States to assess their needs;
- Review the countries' existing air cargo security regulations against IATA Secure Supply Chain guidance materials, best practices and templates;

³ http://www.icao.int/Meetings/a39/Documents/WP/wp_020_en.pdf with a Global Average Effective Implementation of ICAO USAP Critical Elements of 71.60%

- Provide tailored cargo security solutions;
- Undertake Cargo Security Capacity Building workshops; and
- Dispatch cargo security subject matter experts.

FACILITATION

Passenger Data Exchange

2.18 The number of States that have implemented Passenger Data Exchange regimes (API or PNR) as part of their border control strategies has increased significantly between 2000 and today.

2.19 Unfortunately, in many cases, the processes being implemented have not been aligned with existing Standards or internationally agreed best practices.

2.20 To address this issue, IATA has launched a campaign to increase awareness amongst immigration and border control authorities. Several workshops have been conducted across the world and free toolkit material been made available in this regard.

2.21 In 2016 IATA cooperated with the UN Counter-Terrorism Structures (and with other stakeholders such as ICAO, WCO, IOM and INTERPOL) in development and delivery of the API workshops two of which are planned to take place in Africa.

2.22 IATA is also looking to partner with regional organizations active in the field of border security and management, in order to build up effective capacity building and technical assistance programs to meet the passenger data demands driven by UN Security Council Resolution 2178 and 2309.

3. ACTION BY THE MEETING

3.1 The meeting is invited to:

- a) take note of the information provided in this working paper;
- b) consider the inclusion of the IATA initiatives described above in the ACAC/MID SECFAL plan to enhance aviation security and facilitation;
- c) take all appropriate actions to rapidly comply with all ICAO Annex 17 and 9 provisions in a sustainable, effective and risk-based manner; and
- d) encourage effective sharing of security information with all industry stakeholders operating within their territory for better risk assessments.