DIRECTORS GENERAL OF CIVIL AVIATION-MIDDLE EAST REGION

Third Meeting (DGCA-MID/3)
(Doha, Qatar, 27-29 April 2015)

Agenda Item 6: Aviation Security and Facilitation

AIR CARGO SECURITY

(Presented by the United States)

SUMMARY

Recognizing that there is no "one-size-fits-all" approach, this paper discusses ongoing developments in air cargo security, including data- and intelligence-based risk approaches, International Civil Aviation Organization Standards and Recommend Practices, advanced cargo information, and mutual recognition of cargo security regimes. We emphasize that States may consider employing these strategies to develop efficient, effective risk mitigation in the growing international air cargo environment.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The global trends in air cargo supply chain security will involve the development and implementation of risk-based frameworks that include:

- Mitigation of risk through comprehensive targeting;
- Mutual recognition of common national standards; and
- Further development of initiatives that minimize operational disruptions within the supply chain.

1.2 While all these initiatives are generally distinct in their purpose, they all share a common foundation – each requiring a significant degree of partnership and commitment between Host Governments and industry and information sharing to the extent possible. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) remains committed to this ideal and looks forward to establishing new partnerships while emphasizing existing ones.

2. DISCUSSION

2.1 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standard 4.6.4 and 4.6.10 (Annex 17 Amendment 14):

> **4.6.4** *Each Contracting State shall ensure that enhanced security measures apply to high-risk cargo and mail to appropriately mitigate the threats associated with it.*

2.2 The issuance of Amendment 14, 4.6.4 resulted in an increase of air cargo security controls globally. TSA incorporated a risk-based approach by conducting the following:

- Implemented enhanced screening methods for all cargo designated as high risk, while lower-risk shipments would be required to undergo other types of screening.
- Established a risk-based analysis of shipments and shippers to determine tiered screening protocols.

2.3 Many national authorities are reviewing the feasibility of implementing security controls earlier in the supply chain. Through a supply chain security approach, national authorities may mitigate the potential for bottlenecks at air carrier cargo facilities.

2.4 ***TSA encourages sharing best practices ***

> **4.6.10** *Each Contracting State shall ensure that, where screening of cargo and mail is conducted, screening is carried out using an appropriate method or methods, taking into account the nature of the consignment.*

2.5 The Contracting State should determine the appropriate security controls to be applied to any given consignment. The appropriate screening of cargo should be conducted in consideration of the commodity in order to effectively detect the existence of prohibited items that could endanger the aircraft. These measures should be designed to deliver effective security while facilitating the movement of cargo through the entire secure supply chain.

2.6 TSA has developed performance specifications for screening equipment in consideration of cargo commodity in accordance with internal TSA processes. The specifications are considered Sensitive Security Information (SSI) and, as such, are protected under strict rules for sharing. Regulated parties who choose to use technology-based screening devices as their preferred method of inspection for cargo bound for the United States must obtain their screening devices from the TSA Air Cargo Screening Technology List. A list of approved equipment includes: Non-Computed Tomography Transmission X-ray devices, Explosives Trace Detection devices, Electronic Metal Detection devices, and Explosives Detection Systems. In addition, carbon dioxide detectors for the detection of stowaways on all-cargo aircraft are also included. This list is distributed to the regulated entities as the list is updated.

2.7 **Advance cargo shipment information**: The United States has instituted Advance Cargo Information efforts via the Air Cargo Advance Screening (ACAS) system. Still in the pilot phase, ACAS is a joint effort between TSA and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). It is implemented at the National Targeting Center – Cargo (NTC-C) in Herndon, Virginia. TSA involvement with ACAS expanded in the aftermath of the October 2010 Yemeni incident in which terrorists introduced improvised explosive devices into printers being transported on all-cargo aircraft. Immediately following the Yemeni incident, TSA expanded its presence at the NTC-C. Initially all ACAS efforts were executed by the TSA Office of Security Operations (OSO). In 2013, the ACAS mission transitioned to the TSA Office of Global Strategies (OGS). Both OSO and OGS maintain a presence at the NTC-C, with OSO concentrating on domestic targeting efforts and OGS focusing on international inbound targeting efforts. As of September 2014, there are 11 OGS Transportation

Security Specialists and 11 OSO Transportation Security Inspectors. The ACAS pilot currently includes voluntary participants from multiple nodes in the supply chain to include the express integrated carriers, passenger air carriers, freight forwarders, and all-cargo aircraft operators. TSA and CBP are receiving advance cargo security filing data from pilot participants in over 230 countries. Industry participants are voluntarily providing a subset of data elements through the current CBP Trade Act of 2002 requirements. Over 200 million shipments have been processed from pilot participants.

2.8 **Formal Mutual Recognition of Existing Air Cargo Security Programs**: The NCSP recognition process has been a key initiative for TSA and industry to meet the Congressional mandate to ensure 100 percent screening of all cargo inbound to the United States on board passenger aircraft. Although originally developed for passenger operations, TSA has expanded its recognition process to include all-cargo operations.

2.9 The TSA NCSP recognition process involves a comprehensive review of a country's entire supply chain from shipper to air carrier. The comprehensive review specifically covers six key pillars of the supply chain, which are identical to the supply chain security concepts within the ICAO Aviation Security Manual (Doc 8973). These six pillars are:

1) **Facility Security** requires that cargo handling and storage facilities have physical barriers and deterrents that guard against unauthorized access.

2) **Personnel Security** requires cargo entities to have processes in place to vet prospective employees and contractors and to periodically check current employees with unescorted access to passenger air cargo during and after screening.

3) **Screening** requires regulated entities screen cargo through the application of technical or other means, which are intended to identify and/or detect weapons, explosives, or other dangerous devices, along with articles or substances that may be used to commit an act of unlawful interference. Air carriers follow requirements regarding acceptance and screening of cargo transferring or transiting to the United States.

4) **Training** requires that cargo entities appropriately train all personnel who screen, handle screened cargo, or perform other duties related to air cargo screening/preparation/storage.

5) **Chain of Custody/Transit Procedures** require methods/procedures that prevent and deter unauthorized access to cargo while stored or in transit between facilities prior to loading aboard aircraft.

6) **Quality Control/Compliance and Oversight Activities** require that authorized entities involved in air cargo security meet certain requirements to participate in the security program and are routinely audited by appropriate authorities identified by the Host Government to ensure the ongoing fulfillment of those requirements.

2.10 **Risk-Based Approaches to Security:** With an understanding that risk mitigation is achievable in an efficient manner in the global supply chain (where risk elimination may not be), States and industry partners have consistently recognized that the vast majority of air cargo poses a low (or no) risk to the security of the air cargo system. Developing methods to identify low-risk cargo can ensure a quicker, more efficient, hassle-free process while focusing scarce resources on those elements that may pose an elevated risk. Recent efforts and initiatives in this area include:

- Establishing parameters and definitions for high-risk cargo;
- Piloting the use of advance air cargo shipment information

- The use of explosives detection canines in the air cargo environment; and
- Mutual recognition of State's air cargo security regimes.

2.11 Effective December 3, 2012, TSA and industry met the requirements of the Implementing Recommendations of 9/11 Act, requiring 100% screening of cargo uplifted on passenger aircraft inbound to the United States. TSA does so through a risk-based approach. The NCSP recognition process will continue to encompass risk-based methodologies to address supply chain security vulnerabilities.

2.12 **Way ahead**: The global trends in air cargo supply chain security will involve the development and implementation of risk-based frameworks that include:

- Mitigation of risk through comprehensive targeting;
- Mutual recognition of common national standards; and
- Further development of initiatives that minimize operational disruptions within the supply chain.

2.13 While all these initiatives are generally distinct in their purpose, they all share a common foundation – each requiring a significant degree of partnership and commitment between governments and industry and information sharing to the extent possible. TSA remains committed to this ideal and looks forward to establishing new partnerships while emphasizing existing ones

3. ACTION BY THE MEETING

3.1 The meeting is invited to encourage States to partner within the Middle East Region to strengthen the overall cargo network given the volume of cargo both originating and transiting the Region and the overarching threat to cargo.

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