



## MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE ON AVIATION SECURITY AND FACILITATION IN AFRICA

WINDHOEK, NAMIBIA, 4-8 April 2016

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### TITLE OF THE PAPER IATA initiatives towards advancement of SECFAL in Africa

*(Presented by IATA)*

#### SUMMARY

The Working Paper highlights key initiatives launched by IATA to enhance security and facilitation in the civil aviation industry

#### **ACTION REQUIRED:**

- Take note of the information provided in this working paper:
- Consider the inclusion of the IATA initiatives in the AFI SECFAL plan to enhance aviation security and facilitation

#### **REFERENCE(S):**

### 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Today, the civil aviation industry truly operates in a global, interconnected environment — complete with rapidly advancing technology and capabilities. Consequently, IATA's strategy largely reflects the urgent need for collaboration between regulators and aviation sector value chain members. Our aim is to protect passengers, freight, and our transportation network in a constantly changing, unpredictable environment same time keeping the traveling public safe, cargo secure and provide a positive travel experience.

## **2. DISCUSSION**

2.1 IATA supports the development and implementation of safe and sensible security programs capable of responding to an ever-changing, unpredictable environment. Airlines today must contend with known or suspected terrorists as well as those with no known affiliations. Prohibited items, guns and knives, must be found along with a small quantity of explosives that may be well-concealed among the millions of bags or passengers that are flown every day.

2.2 Passengers must be subject to basic security procedures while at the same time deploying elements of randomness and unpredictability. The need for continuous improvement of security process – merging state of the art technology with well-honed practices – is abundantly clear.

2.3 To address the security and facilitation challenges the aviation industry is facing, IATA has launched and participated to a number of initiatives, projects and campaigns.

### **2.1 SECURITY**

#### **2.1.1 Emerging threats**

2.1.1.1 As noted by the 27<sup>th</sup> ICAO AVSEC Panel improvised explosive devices (IEDs) remain the terrorists' primary weapon of choice in attacking aviation interests.

2.1.1.2 Recent incidents in Somalia and the Sinai demonstrate that terrorists have the will, capability and the intent to launch successful attacks at civil aviation. Terrorists are opportunistically exploiting vulnerabilities and system weaknesses. They are making use of recipes for constructing IEDs, artfully concealing them and utilizing evasion tactics, described in readily available terrorist propaganda publications.

2.1.1.3 These events also highlighted the potential airport security vulnerabilities that could be exploited for terrorist and criminal activity being the consequence of insider threats.

2.1.1.4 The insider threat is a type of a threat characterized by unlawful actions from persons having inside information about a company and using it with the aim of arming the company or its activities. When directed against aviation such persons may act on their own or be directed by terrorist groups. Each entity at any level of its organization may be faced with this risk.

2.1.1.5 IATA is developing guidance for its member airlines on insider threats and will continue raising situational awareness and responses to emerging and evolving threats within the airlines community.

#### **2.1.2. Security risk assessment process**

2.1.2.1 IATA continues promoting the development of the **Security Management System (SeMS)** which allows entities to identify, prioritize and systematically mitigate security risks during the course of their operations. Continuous risk assessment process constitutes an essential element of SeMS and risk-based approach towards aviation security.

2.1.2.2 In order to encourage a systematic use of SeMS principles and promote security culture, IATA permanently reinforces SeMS related standards within its auditing programs IOSA and ISAGO, and cooperates with the appropriate authorities to demonstrate and promote the value of the security audits contained in those. Further IATA intends to launch information sessions and workshops for its member airlines.

2.1.2.3 The tragic crash of Malaysian flight MH17 has demonstrated that there is an asymmetry of security information detained by the various ICAO States. IATA has largely contributed to the response to the Dutch Safety Board recommendations published in the crash report and has been advocating for States to share the relevant information in their possession about their own airspace and the airspace of other states in a timely manner to airlines and air navigation services.

2.1.2.4 Another area of concern is the growing concern over the reliability of IT systems protection measures and cyber-security. Being a member of the Industry High Level Group (together with ICAO, ACI1, CANSO2 and ICCAIA3) IATA presented a draft declaration on cyber security to the 27th ICAO AVSEC Panel which has been very well welcomed and will be broadened to not only reflect aviation security concerns but also the threat on the whole industry. This declaration will be presented to the 39th ICAO Assembly.

2.1.2.5 Internally IATA runs a number of initiatives to raise awareness of cyber security topics among its members but also more widely within the aviation community. A number of trainings have been designed to educate aviation workers at all levels of an organization (operational to C-level). Further IATA has designed an Aviation Security Cyber Toolkit that allows its members to self-assess their level of protection.

2.1.2.6 In terms of capacity building in aviation security and facilitation IATA develops adapted trainings and consulting services and participates to a number of initiatives. In that regards IATA has recently engaged in a joint European Commission - ECAC (European Civil Aviation Conference) lead project (CASE) which aims at providing assistance in terms of aviation security in Africa and Arabian Peninsula.

2.1.2.7 Finally, the organization continues supporting solutions benefiting from robust security regimes and resulting in the recognition of aviation security standards among like-minded States (Recognition of Equivalence – RoE). Alternatively and as presented in ICAO guidance material, this recognition may be unilateral when bilateral or multilateral arrangements are not foreseen. IATA is ready to support States who wish to consider implementing this concept (for training, screening of passenger, baggage etc.). When mature and developed to its full extend this process leads to one-stop-security type of programs.

### **2.1.3 Cargo Capacity Building**

2.1.3.1 Commencing in 2008, the IATA Secure Freight pilot program has established itself as an effective tool for Appropriate Authorities to develop secure supply chains and meet the requirements of ICAO Annex 17 and other regulatory regimes. Noting this success, Secure Freight transitioned from a Pilot program to a fully operational capacity building activity.

2.1.3.2 IATA has developed tailored value added services that guide and provide technical support on air cargo security to a number of stakeholders; including State regulators and industry participants. The following capacity building products are made available to countries who are seeking to implement substantial long-term cargo security improvements.

#### Component 1 (free of charge):

- Provision of the capacity building document materials which includes:
  - Cargo Security Capacity Building Best Practices manual (SSCBP)
  - Cargo Security Capacity Building Guidance Material manual (SSCGM)

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<sup>1</sup> Airport Council International

<sup>2</sup> Civil Air Navigation Services Organization

<sup>3</sup> International Coordinating Council of Aerospace Industries Associations

- Cargo Security Capacity Building template
- Initial regulatory review of the country's national cargo security regulations against the IATA capacity building document materials followed by the provision of an initial report on regulatory gaps.

Component 2:

IATA's assistance will be delivered through the provision of the following elements:

- Regulatory element
  - Detailed analysis of the air cargo elements of the country's National Civil Aviation Security Program against IATA's cargo security document materials, followed by the provision of a detailed report and proposed action plan; and
  - Delivery of a proposed National Supply Chain Security Program (NSCSP), either as a stand-alone document or as part of the NCASP
- Operational element
  - Site visit assessments to key stakeholders and delivery of site visit assessment reports including corrective action plans;
  - Follow-up site assessment visits;
  - Mapping and detailed analysis of the current air cargo supply chain process (handover process); and
  - Drafting of an enhanced air cargo secure supply chain process (secure supply chain handover process) in compliance with international standards.
- Training element
  - Provision of air cargo security educational materials
  - Delivery of air cargo supply chain security awareness workshops to key regulatory stakeholders.

2.1.3.3 Mechanism of funding could be direct funding arrangement or financial support of a third party donor country or agency. IATA could assist States in finding donor subject for the States to formally commit to undergo the Cargo Capacity Building program.

## **2.2. FACILITATION**

### **2.2.1 Passenger data exchange**

2.2.1.1 The number of States that have implemented Passenger Data Exchange regimes, namely Advance Passenger Information (API) and/or Passenger Name Record (PNR) requirements as part of their border control strategies has increased significantly.

2.2.1.2 Today, more than 70 States obtain passenger data prior to the arrival, and in more and more cases, departure of international flights. That information supports pre-arrival risk assessment activities which measurably improve border control effectiveness. Those same vetting processes can also significantly improve facilitated entry (or departure) processing for the vast majority of travellers who are found to represent no or little risk to States.

2.2.1.3 Unfortunately, in many cases, the processes being implemented have not been aligned with existing Standards or internationally agreed best practices, resulting in increasing costs, system complexity and operational impacts in airports all over the world.

2.2.1.4 In an effort to respond to the increasing number of non-standard passenger data programs globally, IATA launched an educational campaign in 2013 in cooperation with ICAO and the World

Customs Organization (WCO) to increase awareness amongst immigration, customs and other border control authorities.

2.2.1.5 Eleven (11) workshops have been conducted across the world to date involving official participants from more than 80 countries. To support this initiative, an on-line Passenger Data “Toolkit” was developed to serve as a reference and resource for those seeking to learn more about the standards and best practices adopted to support globally aligned data exchange programs.

2.2.1.6 Expanding upon the concept of outreach and education, IATA has joined a new global initiative sponsored by the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) Counter-Terrorism Centre (CCT) and also involving other stakeholders such as ICAO, WCO, International Organization for Migration (IOM) and INTERPOL.

2.2.1.7 This activity was developed in response to the adoption of the United Nations Security Council’s Resolution 2178, which calls upon all States to implement API programs in a global effort to prevent the movement of foreign terrorist fighters to and from the Syrian/Iraqi conflict zones.

2.2.1.8 During 2016, a total of 5 regional API workshops are planned with up to 78 States to be invited as participants. One of the workshops will be held in Africa.

2.2.1.9 Beyond the UN Workshops, IATA will also continue to sponsor similar regional activities as warranted, as well as activities targeted to the needs of individual States.

## **2.2.2 FAST Travel**

2.2.2.1 Through its Fast Travel project, IATA is promoting the use and standardization of self-service solutions based on new technologies to enable a seamless passenger journey. This includes campaigning for regulatory acceptance of automated check-in kiosks, mobile boarding passes, self-tagging options for checked baggage, automated bag drop solutions, passenger identification applications when accessing security area and automated boarding gates - particularly on domestic flights.

## **2.2.3. Automated Border Control (ABC)**

2.2.3.1 IATA, in cooperation with Airports Council International (ACI) and European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX), has co-authored an “ABC Implementation Guide”, the 3rd Edition of which was released in November 2015. The Guide is intended for project managers in charge of implementing ABC solutions at airports.

2.2.3.2 At the same time, IATA is monitoring the progress made by the ECAC regarding its own developing ABC guidelines. IATA promotes the use of ABC systems globally, monitors ABC implementations/upgrades, and supports governments and airports implementation by providing guidance material and case studies.

## **3. ACTION REQUIRED BY THE MEETING**

- 3.1 The meeting is invited to:
- a) Take note of the information provided in this working paper;
  - b) Consider the inclusion of the IATA initiatives described above in the AFI SECFAL plan to enhance aviation security and facilitation.

