



MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE ON AVIATION SECURITY AND FACILITATION IN AFRICA

WINDHOEK, NAMIBIA, 4-8 April 2016

Agenda item 2.2: Enhancing Aviation Security in Africa: CRASAC perspective

(Presented by CRASAC)

SUMMARY
This note presents the status of safety, Security and Facilitation in Africa, major challenges and progress made.
ACTION: the action taken by the meeting is found in paragraph 3.1

1. Background

1.1 In the 1980s, following a plane crash of the UTA DC10 in the Tenere Desert, France decided to help improve aviation security in Africa.

1.2 In this connection, it set up a network of correspondents dispatched in 18 countries in West and Central Africa, Comoros and Madagascar, to build the capacity of immigration security Advisors (CSI) on Civil Aviation.

1.3 In 1998, it established a Regional Aviation Security Support Unit to coordinate and enhance the CSI action.

1.4 Today, I have the honour to head the Unit which is under the supervisory authority of the Department of International Cooperation of the Ministry of Interior.

1.5 Since the establishment of the network, CRASAC and the CSI are focused on meeting the needs expressed by aviation authorities, regarding both the designing of an adapted regulatory instrument, and training.

1.6 In order to enhance such action, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs set up a Sustainable Priority Support Fund with 1.5 million Euros, to help CRASAC increase its operations and especially training of enforcement agents, managers, specialists, trainers and instructors on aviation security. On the whole, this major action made it possible to train some 4,000 trainees of all levels and skills.

2. A contrasting balance-sheet: strengths and weaknesses

2.1 Having spent 10 years as Director of Air France Security in charge of assessing every stopover the Company makes, I expressed the desire when I took office at CRASAC 2 years ago, to take stock of these past actions and check their efficiency.

2.2 It is obvious that the energy and budget allocated to this approach did not yield enough fruits.

2.3 Of course, today, we observe that although nearly all the States have a regulatory instrument required by ICAO, and many African experts are ready to help achieve the desired results, many airports do not yet meet the required international security standards.

2.4 This situation that requires airlines to take additional measures constitutes a major handicap and serious danger to the development of air transport for the following reasons:

- a. although additional measures help fill the major gaps observed in the treatment of passengers, their luggage and cargo, they do not help achieve the high-level security required by the recent waves of air terrorism; I am referring here to the recent attacks against METROJET and DALLO AIRLINES flights;
- b. the cost of additional measures affects the price of airfare, cargo transportation, and in fact, hampers the development of air transport in your Continent; and
- c. it complicates the management of airport space devoted to security, slows down boarding procedures, and inconveniences travellers, thereby hindering the full implementation of the facilitation required by ICAO.

2.5 It is important today, to reflect on the reasons for the partial failure so as to orientate our actions towards achieving significant and sustainable aviation security enhancement.

3. Identified obstacles to security enhancement

3.1 The responsibility is shared. In our case, we probably did not properly adapt our actions to suit the real needs and local constraints. We rather increased cooperation in all the countries where we operate and we were satisfied with statistical results, the number of training courses organized, and the number of trainees trained, instead of effectively focusing on the scope of our actions.

3.2 Somehow, we carried out superficial activities instead of devoting more efforts overtime, to help the most determined countries set up sustainable mechanisms. In a way, we fluttered and did not provide after-sales service.

3.3 This partial failure may be observed in the two areas of actions we prioritized over the last 2 years, namely fluoroscopic imaging and training on prevention of MANPADS risk.

3.4 With regard to fluoroscopic imaging, we successfully designed a training and fluoroscopic imaging software in the 18 countries where we operate, and we also organized the training of local trainers and security agents.

3.5 It is obvious that our method was inefficient and that we did not devote sufficient time to the implementation of this tool for, today, only one-third of the countries equipped with the tool regularly use it for initial training and the training of security agents. Besides, in spite of their initial commitment, a very small number of countries paid their low-cost charges to renew the software licence.

3.6 The situation is almost identical regarding training on MANPADS risk prevention which has the following goals:

1. awareness-raising of local officials on such risk;
2. training them to assess the vulnerability of their airports; and
3. helping them draw up an emergency plan to respond to a security attack.

3.7 Even at this level, the final goal was not achieved and we have very little positive feedback on the implementation of an emergency plan.

These two examples clearly show that we have to review our approach in order not only to train and give support but also monitor and provide after-sales service of our actions.

3.8 That is why we launched, in one State, a project to set up a mechanism that comprises training in fluoroscopic imaging, quality control and support to the implementation of a certification mechanism for agents. It is a more than 18 months long project that we hope will help partner countries become fully autonomous on aviation security issues. We do hope other countries will be interested in such an approach.

3.9 In fact, we absolutely need to prove to our authorities that we can do better and that our actions are meaningful in a world hit daily by terrorist attacks.

3.10 After having discussed our part of the responsibility, I would now like us to sincerely examine together, security enhancement challenges. All these reasons have been mentioned in the AFI SECFAL plan, but I wish to focus on two of them:

- a. the need for a robust political determination to prioritize aviation security and facilitation; and
- b. the need to give the competent authorities more powers on aviation security issues.

3.11 Until recently, most countries did not feel concerned about terrorism which was wrongly considered to be the preserve of some areas in some countries.

The spread of terrorist attacks against many territories today, clearly shows that we all are targets and that all our airports just like Charm El Cheick, may be hit at any time, and it may be reasonably thought that it is only from that time that political authorities may consider it a priority.

3.12 The second reason is that of organization, and the sharing of responsibility between aviation services and public services in charge of taking measures. Since this has been observed in many countries, Directors General in charge of civil aviation are not capable of ensuring required surveillance and setting up required quality checks. As such, they cannot take the necessary corrective measures.

4. Some aspects of real enhancement

4.1 I wish to table some aspects for your scrutiny:

The first aspect may be what the European Union has done. In fact, France and many other European countries in the same situation acknowledge Europe's action. Indeed, when border, and air transport police, and Customs services, airports and airlines were reluctant to apply the European aviation security rules, the installation of

a seasoned efficient team of auditors by the European Commission forced European countries to confer on aviation authorities, the powers to take corrective measures adopted by the audit report.

The French DGAC could then report public service weaknesses and force them to take appropriate measures.

Why can other countries not set up a supra national control body instituted by an agreement between your countries to oversee your own mechanisms.

You already have CAFAC and regional organizations that can support such tool.

- a. The second aspect consists in providing real incentives to the partners of your Ministries of Interior and Defence, and raises their awareness on the need to comply with aviation security standards.

You are in charge of civil aviation and they are in charge of fighting terrorism. Therefore, it is important to establish or re-establish a link between the scourge and such activity.

As far as France is concerned, we are discussing on how to support you in your endeavour and to organize a ministerial conference on terrorism and its impact on civil aviation. In fact, we will involve all interested Ministries.

- b. The third aspect concerns the externalization of the implementation of security measures

In the 1990s, we operated a major change in France. Since I was in charge of the Border Police in several airports and operated such major change, I can assure you that we obtained only positive results.

1. incompetent police officers were replaced by qualified and well-trained security agents;
2. civil servants governed by special rules and regulations were replaced by private agents who could be dismissed in case of poor performance;
3. very highly-paid police officers were replaced by private agents with lower salaries;
4. police officers were given a more noble role of supervising security measures;
5. a “corps” of security agents was set up: staff were trained and checked permanently, which was not the case with State agents; and
6. the major advantage is that with the private sector, aviation authorities have a better understanding of the entire mechanism, with the Police seen as partners in the supervision of the mechanism.

4.2 In a meeting on aviation security I attended in Dakar a few years ago, I was asked what I thought of externalization. As Director of Air France Security then, I carefully avoided a very categorical appraisal of the aspect and simply said that out of some 20 stopovers Air France made in Africa where it took additional measures on checking passengers, the only stopover where I cancelled such measures was at the only airport in which security was externalized.