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INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION
AFI COMPREHENSIVE REGIONAL IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR AVIATION
SECURITY AND FACILITATION IN AFRICA
(AFI SECFAL PLAN)

NINTH STEERING COMMITTEE MEETING
Virtual Session (28 July 2020)

Agenda Item 3.16   Status of Implementation of ICAO TRIP Strategy, PKD, API in Africa and the African Passport project

(ICAO Secretariat)

<table>
<tr><td colspan="2" align="center">EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">This working paper highlights recent developments of the facilitation programmes in Africa and the proposed next steps in line with Amendment 28 of Annex 9 – <i>Facilitation,</i> ICAO TRIP strategy, Public Key Directory as well as with the regional initiatives such as the issuance of an African ePassport.</td></tr>
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<tr><td><i>References</i></td><td>Doc 10140, <i>Assembly Resolutions in Force (as of 4 October 2019)</i>
Annex 9 ― <i>Facilitation</i> (15th Edition)
Doc 9303, <i>Machine Readable Travel Documents (MRTDs)</i>
Doc 10042<i>, Model for a National Air Transport Facilitation Programme</i>
AT-SD 210/1
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1.   INTRODUCTION

1.1   The 40th Session of the ICAO Assembly (A40) confirmed ICAO's emphasis to ensure that Annex 9 — *Facilitation* to the *Convention on International Civil Aviation* (Chicago Convention), is current and addresses the contemporary requirements of Member States as well as their appropriate obligations towards the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions with respect to border control management and security of travel documents. Additional Member States' obligations under Annex 9 provisions are notably the administration of cargo and passengers and their related advances in technologies, the handling of and responses to health-related and other disruptive events to aviation, and the management of unaccompanied minors.

1.2   Assembly Resolution A40-16, *consolidated statement of continuing ICAO policies related to facilitation*, urges Member States to ensure that all relevant agencies and departments that have a role in the implementation of Annex 9 ─ *Facilitation*, including but not limited to, civil aviation administrations, immigration and customs agencies, health and quarantine authorities, travel document-issuing entities, air traffic control, law enforcement, postal authorities, border police, and foreign affairs, collaborate and coordinate their efforts through the national air transport facilitation committees or similar arrangements.

2.   ANNEX 9 – *FACILITATION* RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

2.1   The Eleventh Meeting of the Facilitation Panel (FALP/11), held at ICAO Headquarters in Montréal, from 13-16 January 2020, resulted in Amendment 28 (some with relevance for aviation security) to Annex 9 ─ *Facilitation* to the Chicago Convention. The final report and other documentation of the meeting can be found on the FALP/11 website at: https://www.icao.int/Meetings/FALP/Pages/FALP11-2020.aspx.

2.2   The Panel made several recommendations adopted in Amendment 28 related notably to Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS) on the collection, use, processing and protection of passenger name records (PNR) data in line with the UNSC resolution 2396 (2017). In particular, PNR Standards were adopted regarding the development of capacity to collect, use, process and protect PNR data, the purpose limitation, the safeguards, the redress mechanisms, the independent oversight, the sensitive data content, the data retention and the related operational considerations.

2.3   Additional ICAO PNR Standards spell out a global framework regulating PNR data transfer based on Standards contained in Chapter 9, Section D of ICAO Annex 9, which taken together represent a multilateral framework that can be applied to solving the PNR data transfer impasse, as defined more specifically below:

   a)   one ICAO Annex 9 PNR Standard mandates that ICAO Member States cannot inhibit or prevent PNR data transfer to another Member State provided that Contracting States' PNR programme is compliant with the PNR Standards contained in Section D, Chapter 9 of ICAO Annex 9. The Standard goes on to state that equally Contracting States retain the ability to introduce or maintain higher levels of PNR data protection through additional arrangements with other Contracting States; and

   b)   a further Standard mandates that States shall demonstrate their compliance with said ICAO Standards to any requesting Member State. A demonstration of compliance with the PNR Standards shall take place as soon as possible and States shall work through this process in good faith and in a timely manner.

2.4   On 23 June 2020, the ICAO Council adopted Amendment 28 to Annex 9 ─ *Facilitation*. The Council prescribed that Amendment 28 will become effective on 30 October 2020,

except for any part concerning which a majority of Member States may have registered their disapproval before the effective date; and resolves that the Amendment to the extent it becomes effective, will be applicable on 28 February 2021.

2.5   The completion of the Annex 9 Compliance Checklist (CC) in the Electronic Filing of Differences (EFOD) System is important, being the primary method to gauge States' compliance with Annex 9 SARPs and enables the ICAO Council to determine if further action should be taken in this regard. Therefore, it is important for African States to ensure that the CC is duly completed as stipulated in State letter EC 6/3–18/55 dated 2 May 2018.

2.6   Effective coordination amongst civil aviation authorities, airports, airlines and relevant government departments/agencies, such as customs, immigration, health and quarantine in a State, is crucial, in ensuring that there is an effective, safe, secure, efficient and sustainable air transport system. Its importance is reflected in Standard 8.19 of Annex 9. The National Air Transport Facilitation Committees (NATFC) provides a forum for consultation and information--sharing about facilitation matters amongst government stakeholders including public health authorities, government representatives of other air transport-related communities and industry at the national and airport levels. In establishing and developing the National Facilitation programmes and its committees, States are encouraged to make reference to ICAO Doc 10042 – *Model National Air Transport Facilitation Programme*

2.7   A new ICAO Training Package (ITP) entitled ICAO Annex 9 – *Facilitation*, has been successfully developed and available in virtual and face-to-face classroom formats. The ITP was validated the last week of May 2020, and was accepted in the Trainair Plus Electronic Management System (TPEMS) library on 30 June 2020. The training is available in English and will be translated to all ICAO Languages in due course.

3.   STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TRIP STRATEGY IN AFRICA

3.1   To assist Member States in implementing the ICAO Traveller Identification Programme (TRIP) strategy, a dedicated implementation roadmap for each of the five TRIP elements, was developed by the Secretariat and approved by the Air Transport Committee (ATC) (AT-SD 210/1, refers), with the understanding that the roadmap should impose no obligation on States beyond the Annex 9 SARPs related to the ICAO TRIP Strategy. In January 2019, the updated roadmap (available on the ICAO public site [https://www.icao.int/Security/FAL/TRIP/Documents/Revised%20ICAO%20TRIP%20Implementatio n%20Roadmap.%20Jan%202019.pdf]) was endorsed by the ATC (AT-SD 216/1 refers) incorporating notably 16 new and/or revised provisions (Appendix A refers) introduced by the Amendment 26 of Annex 9 related to the ICAO TRIP Strategy.

3.2   Building on the longstanding ICAO leadership on matters related to Machine Readable Travel Documents (MRTDs), the roadmap provides guidance on the entities responsible at the national level, for the implementation of the ICAO TRIP Strategy, through a National Air Transport Facilitation Committee or a similar coordinating body.

3.3   ICAO has continued to actively support United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions 2178 (2014), 2309 (2016), 2368 (2017), 2396 (2017) and 2482 (2019) which address the acute and growing threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters (FTF). ICAO is one of the six partners of the UN Countering Terrorist Travel (CT Travel) Programme which is a new flagship initiative of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), aiming at assisting Member States in enhancing their detection capacity against foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) and serious criminals using Advance Passenger Information (API) and PNR data. This "All-of-UN" coordinated approach

provides comprehensive and tangible support to Member States in ensuring regional and international cooperation.

3.4   The relevant UNSC resolutions urged Member States to require airlines to provide API data which is an Annex 9 Standard applicable since 23 February 2018 and a component of the ICAO TRIP Strategy. In the context of the ICAO Universal Security Audit Programme–Continuous Monitoring Approach (USAP-CMA), the Annex 9 provisions that support both border management and security objectives are audited, including the three API Standards related namely to the regulatory framework, the API system implementation and the adherence to the API Guidelines, in particular regarding the data elements available in machine readable format in the MRTDs in conformity with the Doc 9303, *MRTDs* specifications. Appendix B presents the results for the AFI States of the 11 TRIP – related Annex 9 Standards audited in the USAP-CMA.

3.5   Regarding the status of implementation of the TRIP strategy in Africa, 1 African State, has implemented an API system out of 85 Member States at the world level, while only 49 States (no African State) have implemented a PNR data system. Much as workshops, and seminars were held in Africa to sensitize the Region on API and PNR and ICAO TRIP Strategy implementation, State action continues to be very slow.

3.6   Furthermore, State letter EC 6/3 17/92 dated 24 July 2017 invited States to submit data to the Interpol Stolen and Lost Travel Document (SLTD) database as per Annex 9 Standard 3.10 and to comply, as practicable, with RP 3.10.1 by using the database for checking passports at border. Twenty African States reported that they are consulting the SLTD database to check passports at the borders.

3.7   ICAO guidance material is available for the elements of the TRIP Strategy at https://www.icao.int/Security/FAL/TRIP/Pages/Publications.aspx. In that context and as part of the support provided to States, the twelve parts of the seventh edition of Doc 9303, *Machine Readable Travel Documents*, are published in all ICAO languages since 2018. The eighth edition of Doc 9303 will be published in 2021. Regarding the implementation of the 3.12 Standard related to Machine Readable Convention Travel Documents (MRCTD), the joint guidelines developed by ICAO and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) were updated and a revised version was published in February 2017, available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/52b166a34.html. Seventeen African States issue MRCTDs. The 2019 Compliance Update published by UNHCR shows that 78 States to 1951 Refugee Convention, now issue MRCTDs to refugees in conformity with international standards, thereby supporting refugees to travel abroad legally for work, studies, family reunification, medical services and other purposes. Only 32 States Parties (36%) are reported to issue MRCTDs to stateless persons in conformity with international aviation standards.

3.8   With regards to training, the ICAO Training Package (ITP) ''Control of the Authenticity and validity of Travel Documents at Airport borders'', funded by the Government of Canada under the Sahel project, has been delivered in English and in French to around 50 trainees in Africa, since its implementation under the auspices and funding of the AFI SECFAL Plan.

4.   EPASSPORTS AND THE ICAO PUBLIC KEY DIRECTORY (PKD) IN AFRICA

4.1   The ICAO PKD is a repository of the public key certificates needed for authentication of the chip inside the ePassport and the data stored thereon. By downloading the certificates from the PKD and using them within the infrastructure for passport checking, State authorities can quickly and conveniently detect fraudulent passports and/or modifications of the biographic or biometric identity data stored on the chip. ePassport-issuing states can also upload their

own certificates to the PKD, thus easing the burden of disseminating certificates to others so that one's own ePassports can be authenticated by others.

4.2   Participation of African States in the ICAO PKD has positively increased in 2019 and 2020 with Egypt, Togo, Uganda, and the United Republic of Tanzania becoming new participants.

4.3   Nevertheless, it is vital for reasons of security and facilitation that more African countries continue to participate. The four new participants mentioned join Benin, Botswana, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria and Seychelles to bring the number of African States that are current PKD participants to 11. Yet at least 40 African States (13 ESAF, 17 WACAF, 1 EUR/NAT and 2 MID) issue e-Passports (Appendix C) and it may be assumed that all process ePassports at their borders and elsewhere. Those non-participants issuing ePassports are thus failing to leverage the main benefits of their investment in such passports while security challenges arise when those checking ePassports at their borders do not have the certificates necessary for authentication of the ePassport chip.

4.4   Non-participating African States are urged, therefore, to join the ICAO PKD at the earliest opportunity in line with Assembly Resolution A40-16. All participants are also requested to make full use of their connection to the PKD in line with the Resolution and to upload all relevant data on their own certificates to the PKD in preparation for the coming into effect of new standards on PKD within Amendment 28 to Annex 9. Information on how to join the PKD is provided in Appendix D to this paper as well as on the following link https://www.icao.int/Security/FAL/PKD/Pages/How-to-Participate.aspx.

4.5   ICAO published its first master list of CSCA certificates (the 'anchor' certificates in ePassport infrastructure) in March 2020, as highlighted in State Letter 2020/68. States can (and should) use these certificates as part of their ePassport authentication processes. ICAO's publication of the list makes those certificates that it holds – provided by national representatives during physical meetings at ICAO HQ and thus trusted – available for such processes. It also makes the CSCA public key certificates of ePassport issuing States more widely available than before, improving sharing. The resource provides more value to participating States than ever before, with participants getting first access to the lists and being able to avail of full support for use of the lists.

4.6   The 2020 ICAO PKD Board meeting will be hosted by Uganda (pending feasibility in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic). The PKD Board and its members offer the possibility to offer a workshop or similar support to African States, particularly those in neighbouring countries, to highlight the benefits of PKD participation and to fully detail and explain technical processes around connection to and use of the PKD. Interested parties are invited to contact the PKD Officer at icao-pkd@icao.int.

5.   AFRICAN ePASSPORT

5.1   In an attempt to address the broader picture at the continental level, as opposed to the current sub-regional approach, the African Union (AU) launched the project of a common African passport, with the objective that every African citizen would be eligible for the same centralised passport (in terms of design and security features) issued by its country of citizenship.

5.2   The African ePassport is planned to replace national passports and give each African citizen the freedom to travel within the AU without a visa. Different steps have been or planned to be taken, notably establishing its continental design and technical specifications, meeting of Chiefs of Immigration and Experts (involving ICAO technical experts), harmonization of laws, policies and procedures to accommodate its issue and use, issuance to citizens and public awareness to promote it. ICAO and AFI SECFAL Secretariat have continued to provide technical support and guidance to the AU at the different stages of African Passport development.

6.   ACTION BY THE STEERING COMMITTEE

6.1   The Steering Committee is hereby invited to:

a) urge AFI States to implement all the Annex 9 Standards related to the ICAO TRIP Strategy, including removing all non-Machine Readable Passports from circulation, reporting stolen, lost and revoked travel documents in the INTERPOL SLTD database, issuing MRCTDs and implementing an API system;

b) request AFI States to ensure that their respective Annex 9 CC are duly completed in the EFOD system;

c) call on AFI States to establish a National Air Transport Facilitation Programme and associated Committees in accordance with relevant provisions of Annex 9;

d) encourage AFI States to enrol in the new Annex 9 - *Facilitation* ITP;

e) urge all AFI States issuing e-Passports to join the ICAO PKD if optimisation of the benefits of issuance of eMRTDs are to be achieved; and

f) call on the AFI SECFAL Plan, in collaboration with the Air Transport Bureau, to monitor the African ePassport project to ensure that it meets the Doc 9303 specifications in order to enable its full interoperability at the borders.

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APPENDIX A

The Implementation Steps of an Advance Passenger Information (API) System

1.   Why your State should establish an API system?

On the basis of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 2178, 2309, 2395, 2396 and 2482, as well as ICAO's Standard 9.5 (included in Amendment 26 to Annex 9 of the Chicago Convention and adopted on 23 October 2017). There are many **benefits to an API system**, including strengthening of **border integrity** by helping to improve border control and to combat irregular immigration more effectively. API can generally improve **Facilitation** by speeding up the processing of bona fide travelers and improving citizens' perception of security. API also increases **efficiency** and reduces the workload of border management officers through the use of technology and automated means. API complements existing data vetting processes, including checking passenger passports against watch lists and **INTERPOL databases**.

TEXTBOX: What is API?
API consists of biographical data about passengers, plus information concerning the specific flight involved that is transmitted to a border agency before, or as the aircraft departs. The data is generated during airline check-in process by the Departure Control System (DCS). API may apply to airlines operating into a country, in some cases, departing from a country or for flights which overfly a territory but do not depart or arrive in the territory itself. In some cases, the same data is also required for crew members on the flight, crew API is sent separately.

Batch API is the simplest form of API to implement and was designed originally for the control of arriving passengers by the destination or transit country. In a Batch API programme all passenger details for a particular flight are transmitted together, usually upon closure of the flight boarding process, limiting government intervention to the time of arrival. Validation of data quality is limited, and no-real time correction can be requested. **Interactive API** (iAPI) is more complex and costly form to implement and passenger details are transmitted in real-time to requesting States on a per passenger basis as they check-in. An iAPI system allows for real-time document validation against databases and watch lists, but also requires a real-time response to the airline providing a Board/No-Board response after national authorities have determined if any issues are preventing the passenger from entering the destination country, leaving the origin country and to deny boarding.

2.   Initial Steps for a State to implement an API System

A State should determine which agencies will make use of API data, such as Border Police, Customs, Intelligence, INTERPOL National Central Bureau (NCB), including through the National Air Transport Facilitation Committee (NATFC). The State needs to set a strong legal basis for requesting API, defining data elements and allowing for inter-agency and international police cooperation, through a **Passenger Data Single Window** (an inter-agency targeting bureau) to facilitate data sharing, systematic checking of API data against both national and INTERPOL databases. The best API implementation programmes are developed by States who involve stakeholders early in the process. Communication between State authorities and stakeholders, particularly airlines, leads to better initial structural decisions and to a better final system design. By engaging early with airlines, your State will **be able to know what can and cannot be accomplished** with airlines' existing systems. For example, in terms of timing, it is easier for airlines to comply with API systems that are in alignment with international standards (compliance within 3-6 months) than with those who are not (compliance within 24-36 months).

To seek technical and financial support, States can turn to the United Nations (UN) Countering Terrorist Travel Programme and the "goTravel" software solution, the World Customs Organization (WCO) Global Travel Assessment System (GTAS), the United States Automated Targeting

System-Global (ATS-G) Programme and European Union (EU) Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA II).

What is a **Passenger Data Single Window (PDSW).**
The PDSW is a baseline requirement to make effective law enforcement use of passenger data. When States require the transfer of passenger data from airlines it serves the interest of a number of border security agencies within one State. Thus, data should be received by a single data entry point within a State and not by multiple security agencies within a State. The advantage to a PDSW is that this single-entry point facilitates border integrity because it allows various Government agencies with legal remit to access passenger data to make use of the data in an efficient manner resulting in enhanced facilitation and border clearance processes for low-risk travelers.

For more information on the international regulatory framework and API and PNR message guidance materials please consult https://www.icao.int/Security/FAL/ANNEX9/Pages/Publications.aspx.

Passenger Name Record (PNR) data

1.   Why is everyone talking about Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data?
United Nations Security Council has passed several resolutions on PNR, namely 2395, 2396 and 2482.

The ICAO Facilitation Panel formed a PNR Task Force to align ICAO Annex 9 with UNSCR 2396, which "*urges ICAO to work with its Member States to establish a standard for the collection, use, processing and protection of PNR data.*"

What is PNR Data?
A PNR is airline reservation data recorded by reservation systems for each journey booked by or on behalf of any passenger. PNR data are used by airlines for their own commercial and operational purposes in providing air transportation services. This data can be sent to States to fulfil border and national security purposes.

PNR data content varies from airline to airline and even from passenger to passenger. PNR contains only as much as the airline or booking agency collects in the process of its travel bookings. At the same time, airline industry systems are programmed to transfer the entire contents of a PNR to States and do not want to filter out data which may want to be considered sensitive. Thus, States need to set up their own data filtering and protection systems to deal with sensitive data.

The airline industry cannot guarantee the accuracy of PNR data, as reservation data is filled with self-asserted and unverified data collected for commercial purposes during the time of booking. The names of passengers in a PNR may not match the name on the passport used for travel and even passport data in the PNR is subject to change, since a passenger may lose, renew or otherwise change his passport after a booking is made. Advance Passenger Information (API) data remains the key tool for States to receive validated passport details in advance of flight arrival.

Reservation systems are also changing and can include other elements of a passenger's travel routing, such as a hotel reservation or rental car booking.

2.   Benefits of PNR

PNR was traditionally used by Customs authorities to help identify contraband and smuggling routes. Today, PNR is being used for a wide range of law enforcement measures, including preventing terrorism and organized crime. PNR plays an important role in risk assessment and analysis and helps States to identify unknown or suspicious people, trends or patterns. Analysis of PNR data requires strong analytical computing tools to identify unknown travel routing and connections among individuals (including non-travellers), as well as between individuals and entities.

3.   PNR and the Role of ICAO
Annex 9 – *Facilitation* to the Chicago Convention is the international legal framework regulating Passenger Data Exchange Systems, including for PNR. ICAO publishes and maintains the Guidelines

on PNR Data as ICAO Doc 9944, which contains practical information about PNR transfer, including the data elements that can be requested. Each Contracting State requiring PNR data shall align its data requirements and its handling of such data with the ICAO PNR Guidelines.

4.   An Overview of PNR Data Transfer

PNR data for all passengers on a given flight are sent together in one message, though single messages are sometimes parcelled to make PNR data transfer more economical. Typically States request that the first PNR message is sent to them 48 hours before departure, with additional messages being requested up to the time of departure of the aircraft. PNR data is collected and stored in multiple databases and can thus be sent from multiple sources, including an airline Reservation System (RES), a Global Distribution System (GDS), a tour operator and an airline Departure Control System (DCS).

Some reservations are extremely rich in information, while other PNR's may contain as little information as a name, itinerary, generic contact information and ticket indicator. For example, a reservation can include all types of information on a passenger including full name, passport details, contact and address information, frequent flyer data, form of payment, seat assignment, baggage allowance, special service request, etc., whereas a tour operator can "block" a ticket only with its own generic contact information (not the passengers), creating a ticket indicator on an itinerary for a charter flight. The name of the passenger and other details are then only made known to the operating carrier on the day of departure when the passenger presents the coupon for travel.

There is no PNR for crew.

5.   PNR and Data Privacy

The reasons for requiring PNR data should be clearly expressed in the appropriate laws or regulations of the State or in explanatory material accompanying such laws or regulations, as appropriate. PNR is commercial data of a personal nature which a traveller would not normally provide to a State, unless for example there is a visa requirement.

Because PNR data is sensitive, many States have instituted strong data protection and privacy laws and measures to ensure that PNR is processed lawfully and in the interests of the general public. Currently there are conflicts of laws regarding the transfer of PNR data in which the law of one State requests PNR data from an airline, whereas the law of another State inhibits the transfer of this data to other States. The human rights considerations for Member States regarding the collection, transmission, use, retention and sharing of PNR data are quite complex. One common baseline which Member States could apply might be the International Covenant on the Protection of Civil and Political Rights, a universal instrument that has placed a prohibition on arbitrary or unlawful interference with human rights and fundamental freedoms.

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APPENDIX B

RESULTS OF THE ELEVEN TRIP-RELATED AUDITED STANDARDS

FOR THE AFI REGION

## (34 STATES AUDITED IN THE AFI REGION UNDER USAP-CMA AS PER JULY 2020)

ANNEX 9 STANDARD	USAP-CMA PROTOCOL QUESTION	STATUS (OUT OF 34)
8.17	**FAL 9.001** Has the State established a National Air Transport Facilitation Programme (NATFP) based on the facilitation requirements of the Chicago Convention and of Annex 9 thereto?	**24 States Satisfactory 73%**
8.19	**FAL 9.005** Has the State established an NATFC and Airport Facilitation Committees (AFCs) as required, or similar coordinating bodies, for the purpose of coordinating facilitation activities between departments, agencies and other organizations of the State concerned with or responsible for various aspects of international civil aviation, as well as with airport and aircraft operators?	**17 States Satisfactory 50%**
3.7	**FAL 9.010** Does the State incorporate security features in its current travel documents and plan to periodically update security features in new versions of its travel documents to guard against their misuse and to facilitate detection of cases where such documents have been unlawfully altered, replicated or issued?	**26 States Satisfactory 76%**
3.8	**FAL 9.015** Has the State established controls to safeguard against the theft of its blank travel documents and the misappropriation of newly issued travel documents?	**29 States Satisfactory 85%**
3.8.1	**FAL 9.020** Has the State established appropriate controls over the entire travel document application, adjudication and issuance processes to ensure a high level of integrity and security?	**27 States Satisfactory 79%**
3.10	**FAL 9.021** Has the State established a policy to promptly report accurate information about stolen, lost, and revoked travel documents, issued by the State, to INTERPOL for inclusion in the SLTD database?	**15 States Satisfactory 44%**
3.10	**FAL 9.022** Has the State designated an office or entity as responsible for reporting information about stolen, lost, and revoked travel documents, issued by the State, to INTERPOL?	**17 States Satisfactory 50%**
3.10	**FAL 9.023** Has the State developed guidelines for reporting information about stolen, lost, and revoked travel documents to INTERPOL?	**9 States Satisfactory 26%**

ANNEX 9 STANDARD	USAP-CMA PROTOCOL QUESTION	STATUS (OUT OF 34)
3.10	**FAL 9.024** Has the State established measures to ensure that accurate information about stolen, lost, and revoked travel documents, issued by the State, is promptly reported to INTERPOL for inclusion in the SLTD database?	**11 States Satisfactory** **32%**
3.11	**FAL 9.025** Are all passports issued by the State machine readable, in accordance with the specifications of Doc 9303?	**33 States Satisfactory** **97%**
3.12	**FAL 9.027** Are travel documents for refugees and stateless persons issued by the State (Convention Travel Documents) machine readable, in accordance with the Doc 9303 specifications?	**11 States Satisfactory** **32%**
9.5	**FAL 9.070** Has the State established an API system?	**1 State Satisfactory** **3%**
9.6	**FAL 9.073** Has the State ensured that the API system is supported by appropriate legal authority?	**6 States Satisfactory** **18%**
9.8	**FAL 9.075** Is the API system consistent with internationally recognized standards for API?	**1 State Satisfactory** **3%**

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AFRICAN STATES ISSUING e-PASSPORTS VIS-a-VIS THE PKD PARTICIPANTS

LIST OF AFRICAN STATES ISSUING ePASSPORTS BUT NOT PARTICIPATING IN THE ICAO PKD (As of July 2020)

Region	Member States
Eastern and Southern African Office (ESAF)	Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, and Zimbabwe.
European and North Atlantic Office (EUR/NAT)	Algeria.
Middle East Office (MID)	Sudan.
Western and Central African Office (WACAF)	Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, Senegal and Sierra Leone.
Total	**32 out of 57**

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APPENDIX D
How to Participate in PKD

In order to participate in the ICAO Public Key Directory (PKD), States are required to follow the procedure outlined below:

1. Complete and send the Notice of Participation (Attachment A of the ICAO PKD MoU [https://www.icao.int/Security/FAL/PKD/Documents/PKDMoU%28includeslanguagever sion%28s%29%29/NoticeofParticipation-Model.pdf]) to the Secretary General of ICAO. This Notice should also be sent via email to icao-pkd@icao.int;
2. Make arrangements with the ICAO Secretariat to pay the PKD registration fee as established in Attachment B of the ICAO PKD MoU; and
3. Once payment is credited to ICAO's account, your State will receive the required documentation for establishing technical connections to the PKD, performing the required tests and fully participating in the PKD.

The signed original Notice of Participation should be sent to the following address:

Secretary General
International Civil Aviation Organization
999 Robert-Bourassa Boulevard
Montréal, Québec
Canada
H3C 5H7

For more information, please contact ICAO-PKD@ICAO.INT

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