

ICAO Action

Safety Recommendation 2015-038 will be referred to the Aerodrome Design and Operations Panel (ADOP) for further study. In reviewing the recommendation, the ADOP, including its various specialized working groups, will take into account possible contributing factors such as additional pavement width at the beginning of the runway and the need for appropriate fog dispersal at aerodromes. The next meeting of the relevant ADOP Working Group is scheduled for the first quarter of 2016.

Subsequent Action

The matter was reviewed by the Visual Aids Working Group (VAWG/14), an expert group of the Aerodrome Design and Operations Panel (ADOP). The VAWG concluded that to address instances where the hazard is aerodrome specific, such as the Biggin Hill incident, the procedures in Chapter 3 of *Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS) - Aerodromes* (Doc 9981) may be considered to recommend that the aerodrome operator conduct a safety assessment, as part of the risk management process of the aerodrome safety management system, with consideration to modifying the complex movement area environment.

Other related guidance can be found in Doc 9157, *Aerodrome Design Manual, Part 1 — Runways, Part 2 — Taxiways, Aprons and Holding Bays* and *Part 4 — Visual Aids* and Doc 9870, *Manual on the Prevention of Runway Incursions*. No amendment to Annex 14 was considered necessary.