*International Civil Aviation Organization*
CAR/SAM Regional Planning and Implementation Group (GREPECAS)
**Fifteenth Meeting of the CAR/SAM Regional Planning and Implementation Group (GREPECAS/15)**
(Río de Janeiro, Brazil, 13 to 17 October de 2008)

**Agenda Item 3: Assessment of regional air navigation and security infrastructure development**

**3.2 Report of the AVSEC /COMM/6 Meeting**

(Presented by the President of the AVSEC/COMM)


| **SUMMARY** | |
|---|---|
| This working paper presents the results of the Sixth Meeting of the Aviation Security Committee (AVSEC/COMM) for approval by the meeting.<br>Action by GREPECAS 15 is proposed in paragraph 6. | |
| **References**:<br>• AVSEC/COMM/6 Report<br>(Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, 22-25 July 2008). | |
| **Strategic Objective B** | *Enhance Global Aviation Security* |


## 1. Introduction

1.1 The Sixth Meeting of the GREPECAS Aviation Security Committee (AVSEC/COMM/6) reviewed the work of the AVSEC/COMM/5 Meeting and the Conclusions approved at GREPECAS/14. This working paper presents a summary of the discussions and 30 Draft Decisions and Conclusions adopted by AVSEC/COMM/6, which are presented in **Appendix A** to this working paper for approval by the GREPECAS/15 Meeting. During the meeting, a new Task Force (AVSEC/ASSESS/TF) was created for evaluating the threat of narcotics and contraband trafficking and its effects on aviation security, regularity and efficiency of civil aviation.

## 2. Review of the AVSEC/COMM/6 and GREPECAS/14 Meeting Results

2.1 The Meeting reviewed and updated the AVSEC/COMM/5 and GREPECAS/14 meeting conclusions. As a result, the following conclusions have been **completed** or **superseded**: **Conclusions**: 14/7, 14/8, 14/10, 14/13, 14/14, 13/8, **Decisions:** 4/14, 4/15.

2.2 The Meeting also reviewed and took note that the following Conclusions remain valid: **Conclusions – Valid:** 14/9, 14/11, 14/12, 13/4, 13/5, 13/7, 13/9, 13/10.

2.3 The Meeting was informed that even though many tasks were completed, in some cases the actions or responses from States were not effective. The Meeting also determined that States which had not yet formalized their National Civil Aviation Security Programme (NCASP) and all other related security programmes should do it as soon as possible, delivering the pertinent parts of the NCASP to all aviation security stakeholders in order to ensure the proper implementation of national regulations in their States.

2.5 The Meeting agreed that States should take appropriate action on the decisions and conclusions adopted by the AVSEC/COMM. The Meeting adopted **DRAFT DECISION 6/1** - *AVSEC implementation survey.*

**3. Review of Global and Regional AVSEC Developments and Activities**

3.1 The Meeting reviewed global and regional AVSEC developments and activities; the requirements of Annex 17; the revision of the *Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation against Acts of Unlawful Interference* (Doc. 8973 – Restricted); the new structure of the ICAO Planning, Coordination and Implementation Branch (PCI); the new Implementation, Support and Development (ISD) Sections for Safety and for Security and the Security Guidance Material (SGM) Section.

3.2 The Secretary informed the Meeting that ISD-Security, in coordination with the RO/AVSEC for the NAM/CAR/SAM Regions, will continue with the planning, coordination and implementation of aviation security assistance to the States; the future implications on aviation security; the management of the Aviation Security Training Programme; the management of the *ICAO/ Transport Canada Training Awareness Programme Phase II*; assistance to States with resolving aviation security deficiencies found during ICAO Universal Security Audit Programme (USAP) audits; the establishment of a solid AVSEC infrastructure according to ICAO Annex 17; preparation of all ICAO's guidance material in the aviation security field; assistance with the resolution of challenges that arise in aviation security.

3.3 The Meeting noted that the *Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation against Acts of Unlawful Interference (*Doc. 8973 – Restricted), is in the final revision phase for approval, that Volume V – *Crisis Management and response* of the new edition of this manual is already published, and that the other volumes will be published by the end of 2008.

3.4 The Meeting was informed that ICAO continues to teach regular courses, and that ICAO and Transport Canada, through the *Awareness Training Programme on Aviation Security - Phase II*, had conducted several workshops since 2006 on the methodology to develop a National Civil Aviation Security Programme (NCASP); Airport Security Programme (ASP); National Quality Control Programme (NQCP); and a workshop that included the criteria and procedures that States need to consider when implementing their AVSEC National Screeners Certification Programme for all States in the CAR/SAM Regions. **Appendix B** to this working paper contains the schedule for remaining workshops and courses for 2008 and the first trimester of 2009 for AVSEC instructors and the National Civil Aviation Security Training Programme (NCASTP).

3.5 The Meeting was also informed that even though ICAO endeavors to implement the *Awareness Training Programme on Aviation Security - Phase II*, it is regrettable that not all States take advantage of having their civil aviation authority AVSEC personnel attend, thereby losing the benefit of improving the qualifications of its personnel with this training. In many cases, participants of private concessionaries or air carriers are the ones that benefit from the training.

3.6 The Meeting noted that ICAO continues to recruit professionals in the aviation security field as short term experts (STE) to perform, on behalf of ICAO, security assistance missions to States in all aviation security areas referred in paragraph 3.2. The Meeting also recognized the importance of supporting the ICAO AVSEC Plan of Action.

3.7 The Meeting acknowledged that ICAO continues the fellowship agreement with the Inter American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE) of the Organization of American States (OAS), and that many States of the NAM/CAR/SAM Regions have benefited from that support by allowing them to participate in different training activities sponsored by ICAO. The Meeting noted that Annex 9 – *Facilitation* regarding Machine Readable Travel Documents (MRTD) seminars and regional workshops were included in the fellowship agreement.

3.8 The Meeting noted the importance for States to participate in ICAO's Point-of-Contact (PoC) Network for AVSEC/FAL; to implement the recommended guidelines regarding security controls for Liquids, Aerosols and Gels (LAGs) inspection; and to provide ICAO with the reports on acts of unlawful interference in their States.

3.9 The Meeting adopted **DRAFT CONCLUSION 6/2 -** *Developments for improvement of aviation security* and **DRAFT CONCLUSION 6/3 -** *Implementation of a security survey*.

3.10 The Meeting was informed that ICAO had established the Audit Report Review Branch (ARRB), which analyzes the progress of State implementation of corrective action plans (CAPs) and will be the entity that, when appropriate, through the Secretary General, will issue correspondence to civil aviation authorities requiring their attention to adhere to their corrective action plans, maintaining the possibility to inform other States of that State's position with respect to compliance with aviation security Standards and Recommended Practices.

3.11 The Meeting was briefed by the Secretariat regarding the activities and results of the development of the Universal Security Audit Programme (USAP) in the NAM/CAR/SAM Regions, and the progress of State implementation of corrective action plans in compliance with the Standards and Recommended Practices of Annex 17. The Meeting recognized the need for States to finalize, approve and implement their National Civil Aviation Security Programme (NCASP); National Civil Aviation Security Training Programme (NCASTP); National Civil Aviation Security Quality Control Programme (NQCP); Contingency Plan, Airport Security Programme (ASP); and Aircraft Operator Security Programme (AOSP), and the effective activation of their National Civil Aviation Security Committees (NCASC) or similar arrangements. The Meeting adopted **DRAFT CONCLUSION 6/4 -** *General review of state corrective action plans for deficiencies in aviation security*.

3.12 The Meeting agreed on the importance of implementing all AVSEC programmes in each of their States and to consider the new methodology that the USAP Second Cycle audits will apply with respect to the eight critical elements within State AVSEC system. The Meeting adopted **DRAFT CONCLUSION 6/5 -** *Implementation of a security survey on the eight critical elements.*

3.13 The Meeting took note of the initiative that Colombia presented on behalf of GEASSA concerning the benefits of having an AVSEC Shared Information Network (SIN), which includes improved access and effective dissemination of information on threats to the global aviation system through activities aimed at developing crisis information management capabilities. The Meeting agreed on evaluating and analyzing the benefits and economical implications of the implementation of the GEASSA initiative by the States. Technical information is presented in **Appendix C** to this working paper. The Meeting adopted **DRAFT DECISION 6/6** - *Implementation of a security shared information network.*

3.14 The Meeting discussed the GEASSA initiative presented by Colombia regarding certification or licensing of civil aviation authority inspectors and/or auditors and the need to have guidelines on the specific requirements for this personnel. The Meeting agreed to send this issue to the ICAO AVSEC Panel. The Meeting adopted **DRAFT CONCLUSION 6/7** - *Certification or licensing for civil aviation authority inspectors and/or auditors.*

## 4. Development of the AVSEC/COMM Work Programme and its future functions

### 4.1 Hold Baggage Screening Task Force Developments (AVSEC/HBS/TF)

#### 4.1.1 Passenger/Cabin Baggage Screening Seminar

4.1.1.1 The Meeting was informed regarding the results from the Passenger/Cabin Baggage Screening Seminar-Workshop (AVSEC/PAX/BAG) for the NAM/CAR/SAM Regions held in Montego Bay, Jamaica, 28 to 30 January 2008, which included an interesting syllabus. The Meeting took note that eighty five representatives from 19 NAM/CAR/SAM States, 4 International Organizations and 8 AVSEC industry companies participated in this event. The Meeting encouraged States to implement the information shared during this seminar.

#### 4.1.2 Final Report of the AVSEC/PAX-BAG/TF/1 Meeting and Action Plan

4.1.2.1 The Meeting took note of the results, proposal and plan of action of the AVSEC/PAX-BAG/TF/1 Meeting. The Meeting discussed several issues including the size recommended for cabin baggage and its relationship to the tunnel size for conventional X - ray equipment (60 cm x 40 cm), among others.

4.1.2.2 The Meeting also acknowledged that aircraft operators are implementing charges for passenger hold baggage due to rising fuel prices. The Meeting considered that this situation will adversely affect the international AVSEC system as passengers will increase cabin baggage to avoid charges and congest security check points making screening and analysis by AVSEC screeners more difficult. This does not even consider the safety effects that overweight and oversize cabin baggage loaded in the overhead bins of aircraft could cause. The Meeting adopted **DRAFT DECISION 6/8** - *Cabin baggage.*

4.1.2.3 The Meeting noted that Advanced Technology Image X-Ray (ATIX) is still in the development, testing and certification stage and the importance for NAM/CAR/SAM States/Territories to conduct a cost benefit analysis when considering purchasing such equipment. The Meeting adopted **DRAFT DECISION 6/9 - *Advance Technology Image X-Ray (ATIX).***

4.1.2.4 The Meeting was informed that Brazil shared information regarding its AVSEC personnel certification process during the AVSEC/PAX/BAG Seminar-Workshop, and that Nicaragua was also willing to share information requested by any State regarding its experience with their certification process. The Meeting adopted **DRAFT CONCLUSION 6/10 - *Certification of AVSEC personnel.***

4.1.2.5 The Meeting also noted the importance that States should complete development, approve and implement their National Civil Aviation Security Training Programme (NCASTP) and their National Civil Aviation Quality Control Programme (NCAQCP) to improve the oversight mechanism within their States. The Meeting adopted **DRAFT CONCLUSION 6/11 - *National Civil Aviation Security Training Programme (NCASTP) and National Civil Aviation Quality Control Programme (NCAQCP) as oversight mechanisms within NAM/CAR/SAM States.***

4.1.2.6 The Meeting noted the importance of harmonizing the calibration for Walk-Through Metal Detectors (WTMD) considering risk assessment and based in three risk levels: Level 1- 70 grams for normal conditions; Level 2- 20 grams; and Level 3 –20 grams plus 100% physical search. The Meeting adopted **DRAFT DECISION 6/12 - *Walk-Through Metal Detectors (WTMD).***

4.1.2.7 The Meeting discussed certain aspects that have affected air transportation including the increased volume of passengers to be screened through the Security Check Point (SCP) and the urgent need to implement certain procedures to avoid long waiting lines for passengers at SCP. The Meeting recognized the importance of airport infrastructure, technology, human factors and implementation of procedures. These factors, when well-balanced, in addition to the adoption of best practices will avoid long waiting lines in the SCP, e.g., from 30 minutes (acceptable) to 10 minutes (ideal). Where the workforce is skewed to a single gender, same gender screening should be facilitated at passenger request. The Meeting adopted **DRAFT CONCLUSION 6/13 - *Security check point waiting line*s.**

4.1.2.8 The Meeting took note of the importance that States should pay to Standard 3.2.4 of Annex 17 regarding the architectural and infrastructure requirements to be considered for ensuring that security measures be integrated into the design and construction of new facilities and alterations to existing facilities at airports, and that sanctions and fines be considered when security requirements in airport planning and development have not been implemented. The Meeting adopted **DRAFT DECISION 6/14 - *Enforcement of aviation security regulations in case of lack of consideration for security requirements in airport planning and development.***

4.1.2.9 The Meeting noted that it is essential that law enforcement at different government administration levels have knowledge of aviation security matters and that they be duly prepared in the event of an act of unlawful interference and other situations, e.g., the capability to deal with unruly passengers, crowd control, and crisis management. The Meeting adopted **DRAFT CONCLUSION 6/15 - *Knowledge of aviation security matters by law enforcement.***

4.1.2.10 The Meeting took note that coordination among governmental entities involved in responding to an act of unlawful interference is also essential when implementing Standard 5.1.4 of Annex 17 and the frequency of AVSEC contingency exercises. The Meeting adopted **DRAFT CONCLUSION 6/16** - *Contingency plans against acts of unlawful interference.*

4.1.2.11 The Meeting also noted the need to implement appropriate signage for passengers at SCPs regarding Liquids, Aerosols and Gels (LAGs) restrictions. The Meeting adopted **DRAFT DECISION 6/17** - *Graphic signage of the aviation security process for liquids, aerosols and gels (LAGs) restrictions.*

4.1.2.12 The Meeting was briefed by the Representative from IATA regarding the benefits that an Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS) could bring to States. When implemented, the information could be shared by customs, immigration and any other entity involved. After some discussions, the Meeting adopted **DRAFT DECISION 6/18** - *Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS).*

4.1.2.13 The Meeting noted the need for having harmonized criteria and procedures for passenger behavioral pattern recognition; therefore, the Meeting adopted **DRAFT CONCLUSION 6/19** - *Passenger behavioral pattern recognition.*

4.1.2.14 The Meeting took note of the importance when designing SCPs to consider environmental and ergonomic factors related to AVSEC activities in order to obtain optimum results and performance from personnel assigned to the SCPs. The Meeting adopted **DRAFT CONCLUSION 6/20** – *AVSEC related environmental and ergonomic factors.*

4.1.2.15 The Meeting discussed the importance of classifying airports based on passenger flow when designing security check points. It was agreed to consider other factors besides the number of passengers, such as available equipment, technology, and transiting and transfer passengers. The Meeting adopted **DRAFT DECISION 6/21** - *AVSEC classification of airports based on passenger flow.*

4.1.2.16 The Meeting encouraged States to develop and implement their own Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for different normal and emergent situations, no matter what entity (whether governmental or privately contracted) is involved in the screening of passengers and cabin baggage. The Meeting adopted **DRAFT CONCLUSION 6/22** - *Standard and Operating Procedures (SOPs) for screening passengers/cabin baggage.*

4.1.2.17 The Meeting analyzed the importance of having detailed information and procedures available for the implementation of LAGs restrictions in order to have a clear understanding of the 100ml (3.4 oz.) restriction. Due to the problem experienced by some States regarding the cost of using re-sealable bags, it is important to have more clarification on this issue and additional guidance on the implementation of Specifications for Security Tamper Evident Bags (STEBs) from the appropriate group of experts. The Meeting also noted the importance of implementation of LAGs restrictions by States considering domestic, regional and international operations and the need to harmonize procedures regarding these restrictions.

4.1.2.18 The Meeting adopted **DRAFT CONCLUSION 6/23** - *Liquids, aerosols and gels (LAGs) restrictions*, and also adopted **DRAFT CONCLUSION 6/24** - *Liquids, aerosols and gels (LAGs) restrictions for domestic, regional and international travel.*

### 4.2 Development of the AVSEC Cargo Security Task Force

#### 4.2.1 Progress Report on the AVSEC/Cargo/TF

4.2.1.1 The Meeting noted that due to economic restrictions, the task assigned to the AVSEC/Cargo/TF was accomplished via e-mail coordination among its members. The Meeting noted the development of the Cargo Security Programme Model (**Appendix D** to this part of the Report). The Meeting adopted **DRAFT CONCLUSION 6/25** - *Cargo Security Programme Model.*

### 4.3 Separation of AVSEC/COMM from GREPECAS and the future regional mechanism for addressing and sharing information on threats to civil aviation

4.3.1 The Meeting took note of the activities performed by the AVSEC/COMM since its creation and of the ICAO Council resolution to maintain the terms of reference of the Planning and Implementation Regional Groups (PIRGs), except for the regional groups of Africa (AFI) and the CAR/SAM Regions (GREPECAS), whose terms will be amended to exclude aviation security issues. The Regional Director of the ICAO NACC Regional Office informed the Meeting that the reason for separating the AVSEC/COMM from the GREPECAS is that Air Navigation Commission (ANC) is not the appropriate entity for managing security issues, and clarified that ICAO is not disbanding this group.

4.3.2 The Meeting supported the need to continue the work of the AVSEC/COMM as an independent entity. The Meeting recognized the need to establish itself as a multi-regional forum to harmonize and efficiently unify the efforts of smaller regional groups in order to avoid duplicating efforts and exhausting the limited resources of States. It was also recognized to include Annex 9 – *Facilitation* aspects. The Meeting adopted **DRAFT CONCLUSION 6/26** - *Aviation Security Committee Future Mechanism.*

## 5. Agenda Item 5 - Other Business

5.1 The Meeting was provided a presentation from the LACAC representative on the legal, economic and political activities of that Commission and its future activities.

5.2 The Meeting took note that despite an overall decrease in acts of unlawful interference, there continues to be an increase in disruptive/unruly passenger incidents, and recognized the urgent need for all GREPECAS member States to ensure development, enactment, and implementation of strong legislation regarding disruptive/unruly passengers, and that such incidents should be resolved by States and co-operation should exist among Contracting States to ensure effective prosecution for all incidents.

5.3 The Meeting recognized the importance of using ICAO issued Circular 288 – *Guidance Material on Legal Aspects of Unruly/Disruptive Passengers* (June 2002), and ICAO Doc. 9811 – *Manual Implementation of the Security Provisions of Annex 6* (2002). The Meeting adopted **DRAFT CONCLUSION 6/27** - *Unruly/disruptive passenger legislation.*

5.4 The Meeting was informed on the IATA Security Management Systems (SeMS), which considers the role of management systems in the aviation security environment and identifies the benefits of a security management system-type approach endorsed by all AVSEC stakeholders. The Meeting also was informed on the IATA Secure Freight Programme Initiative that sets industry standards and procedures to secure cargo at the first point-of-entry within the supply chain where cargo can be identified as intended for carriage by air and thereafter protected from unlawful interference until it has been loaded onto the aircraft as established in Annex 17. **Appendix E** and **F,** respectively, contain more information regarding these two matters.

5.5 The Meeting adopted **DRAFT DECISION 6/28** - *Implementation of Security Management Systems (SEMS)*, and also adopted **DRAFT DECISION 6/29** - *IATA Secure Freight Programme Initiative*.

5.6 The Meeting recognized the threat of narcotics and contraband trafficking in a regional context, highlighting that they pose the most significant risks and potential negative effects on the security and safety of international civil aviation. It was determined that there is a need for the security authority, in conjunction with the appropriate authority in this matter, to develop and enforce certain countermeasures against illicit trafficking to prevent entrance into the civil aviation environment.

5.7 The Meeting also noted that this illegal activity could be associated with terrorism or organized crime accessing civil aviation by taking advantage of aviation security deficiencies at airports, resulting in catastrophic damage to civil aviation. Therefore, it is necessary that security countermeasures should not only consider the detection of arms, explosives and other dangerous articles but should also include the detection of narcotics while screening passengers, baggage and cargo.

5.11 The Meeting adopted **DRAFT DECISION 6/30** - *Security implications of narcotics and contraband trafficking.*

## 6. Actions Suggested to the Meeting

6.1 The Meeting is invited to:

a) note the information contained in this working paper; and

b) review and approve the Draft Decisions and Conclusions shown in Appendix A to this working paper, as well as the other Appendices.

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**APPENDIX A**
**CONCLUSIONS TO AVSEC/COMM 6**

**DRAFT DECISION 6/1 AVSEC IMPLEMENTATION SURVEY**

That States give proper attention to decisions and conclusions taken by the AVSEC/COMM so that all activities are completed in a timely manner to achieve those decisions and conclusions.

**DRAFT CONCLUSION 6/2 DEVELOPMENTS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF AVIATION SECURITY**

That States take action to:

a) contribute to the ICAO Plan of Action on aviation security, and provide Short Term Instructors/Experts for instruction as well as assistance;

b) ensure that personnel from their administrations participate in the instruction activities sponsored by ICAO;

c) send information to ICAO Aviation Security and Facilitation Branch regarding their Points-of-Contact on Facilitation (FAL) as well as Aviation Security (AVSEC), if not already done so;

d) maintain recommended guidelines for security controls for the inspection of liquids, aerosols and gels; and

e) comply with ICAO notification in case your State has been affected by an attempt or act of unlawful interference.

**DRAFT CONCLUSION 6/3 IMPLEMENTATION OF A SECURITY SURVEY**

That ICAO conduct a survey to verify State implementation of recommendations for liquids, aerosols and gels (LAGs) and security tamper evident bags (STEBs) **by 31 October 2008.**

**DRAFT**
**CONCLUSION 6/4 GENERAL REVIEW OF STATE CORRECTIVE ACTION PLANS FOR DEFICIENCIES IN AVIATION SECURITY**

That the States take action to:

a) ensure the backup and support for AVSEC entities within their administration for the establishment, approval and effective implementation of their AVSEC National Civil Aviation Security Programmes and the activation of their National Civil Aviation Security Committees or similar arrangements;

b) ensure effective completion and implementation of their corrective action plans regarding recommendations of the USAP audit report before receiving the follow-up visit, and at the most before the USAP Second Cycle Audit, notifying ICAO of the progress of their action plans; and

c) officially notify ICAO should any differences identified during the audit remain unaddressed, under Article 38 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation.

**DRAFT**
**CONCLUSION 6/5 IMPLEMENTATION OF A SECURITY SURVEY ON THE EIGHT CRITICAL ELEMENTS**

That ICAO conduct a survey requesting State information regarding the status of the eight critical elements within their State, in preparation for the USAP Second Cycle Audit **by 31 October 2008.**

**DRAFT**
**DECISION 6/6 IMPLEMENTATION OF A SECURITY SHARED INFORMATION NETWORK**

That States review the technical content presented by GEASSA and analyze the economic and any other implications involving implementation of the Shared Information Network and inform the Secretariat of the AVSEC/COMM by **31 October 2008**, of their position regarding that network.

**DRAFT**
**CONCLUSION 6/7 CERTIFICATION OR LICENSING FOR CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY INSPECTORS AND/OR AUDITORS**

That:

a) ICAO review the feasibility of establishing a requirement in Annex 1 for certification or licensing of civil aviation authority inspectors and/or auditors and establish guidelines regarding the minimum requirements for these inspectors/auditors; and

b) States insert the minimum requirements that inspectors and auditors from civil aviation authorities should have in order to perform security oversight tasks into their national law and regulations.

**DRAFT**
**DECISION 6/8 CABIN BAGGAGE**

That, where NAM/CAR/SAM States/Territories choose to establish a recommended size, quantity or weight restriction of cabin baggage, they should consider using IATAs recommend guidance of 56 cm x 45 cm x 25 cm for baggage size.

**DRAFT**
**DECISION 6/9 ADVANCE TECHNOLOGY IMAGE X-RAY (ATIX)**

That as new technology is still in the development and testing stage, it is recommended that NAM/CAR/SAM States/Territories conduct a cost benefit analysis when considering purchasing such equipment.

**DRAFT**
**CONCLUSION 6/10 CERTIFICATION OF AVSEC PERSONNEL**

That:

a) NAM/CAR/SAM States/Territories include professional AVSEC personnel certification by category of function performed in their National AVSEC Training Programme; and

b) the AVSEC/COMM establish regional training programme guidelines for professional AVSEC personnel certification **by 31 December 2008.**

**DRAFT**
**CONCLUSION 6/11 NATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY TRAINING PROGRAMME (NCASTP) AND NATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION QUALITY CONTROL PROGRAMME (NCAQCP) AS OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS WITHIN NAM/CAR/SAM STATES**

That NAM/CAR/SAM States/Territories finalize, approve and implement their National Civil Aviation Security Training Programme (NCASTP) and National Civil Aviation Quality Control Programme (NCAQCP) before the follow-up audit or the USAP Second Cycle Audit.

**DRAFT**
**DECISION 6/12 WALK-THROUGH METAL DETECTORS (WTMD)**

That NAM/CAR/SAM States/Territories consider calibrating the Walk-Through Metal Detector (WTMD) based on the following three level risk assessments:

Level 1- 70 grams (in normal conditions);
Level 2- 20 grams;
Level 3 –20 grams plus 100% Physical Search.

**DRAFT**
**CONCLUSION 6/13 SECURITY CHECKPOINT WAITING LINES**

That NAM/CAR/SAM States/Territories,

a) adopt best practices in order to reduce waiting lines at security checkpoints (from 30 minutes (acceptable) to 10 minutes (ideal)) as soon as possible (Appendix A to this part of the Report-***Attachment 1*** *to this Appendix*); and

b) where the workforce is skewed to a single gender, facilitate same gender screening should a passenger request it.

**DRAFT**
**DECISION 6/14 ENFORCEMENT OF AVIATION SECURITY REGULATIONS IN CASE OF LACK OF CONSIDERATION FOR SECURITY REQUIREMENTS IN AIRPORT PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT**

That NAM/CAR/SAM States/Territories consider applying sanctions and fines where security considerations in airport planning and development have not been implemented, notably at passenger screening checkpoints.

**DRAFT**
**CONCLUSION 6/15 KNOWLEDGE OF AVIATION SECURITY MATTERS BY LAW ENFORCEMENT**

That NAM/CAR/SAM States/Territories ensure that law enforcement:

a) receives adequate, relevant and effective aviation security training; and

b) has the capability to deal with unruly passengers, crowd control, and crisis management at the airport and national level before the follow-up audit or the next USAP Second Cycle Audit.

**DRAFT**
**CONCLUSION 6/16 CONTINGENCY PLANS AGAINST ACTS OF UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE**

That NAM/CAR/SAM States/Territories:

a) conduct partial AVSEC exercises and full scale drills intermittently every two years ensuring the implementation of Standard 5.1.4 of Annex 17; and

b) establish MOUs with relevant agencies required to respond to acts of unlawful interference to aviation.

**DRAFT**
**DECISION 6/17 GRAPHIC SIGNAGE OF THE AVIATION SECURITY PROCESS AND LIQUIDS, AEROSOLS AND GELS (LAGs) RESTRICTIONS**

That NAM/CAR/SAM States/Territories, which have LAGs restrictions, should ensure that appropriate graphic signage of the security process and LAGs restrictions are posted before entering the security checkpoints by **31 December 2008,** in order to facilitate and achieve optimal screener performance at the security checkpoints.

**DRAFT**
**DECISION 6/18 ADVANCED PASSENGER INFORMATION SYSTEM (APIS)**

That NAM/CAR/SAM States/Territories should consult with the recommended World Customs Organization (WCO)/ICAO/IATA guidelines on Advanced Passenger Information (March 2003 ) when implementing APIS.

**DRAFT**
**CONCLUSION 6/19 PASSENGER BEHAVIOURAL PATTERN RECOGNITION**

That ICAO develop guidelines for Passenger Behavioral Pattern Recognition as soon as possible.

**DRAFT**
**CONCLUSION 6/20 AVSEC-RELATED ENVIRONMENTAL AND ERGONOMIC FACTORS**

That NAM/CAR/SAM States/Territories consider including environmental and ergonomic factors when designing screening checkpoints and security posts into their National Civil Aviation Security Programme (NCASP) in order to enhance AVSEC personnel performance.

**DRAFT**
**DECISION 6/21 AVSEC CLASSIFICATION OF AIRPORTS BASED ON PASSENGER FLOW**

That NAM/CAR/SAM States/Territories, when determining the quantity of screening checkpoints and the methodology for aviation security screening, should adopt a classification of airports based on passenger throughput during peak hours included in **Appendix B** to this part of the Report-***Attachment 2*** *to this Appendix***.**

**DRAFT**
**CONCLUSION 6/22 STANDARDS AND OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOPs) FOR SCREENING PASSENGERS/CABIN BAGGAGE**

That NAM/CAR/SAM States/Territories develop Standards and Operating Procedures (SOPs) for screening passengers/cabin baggage during both normal operations and contingency situations as soon as possible, but not later than **31 December 2008**.

**DRAFT**
**CONCLUSION 6/23 LIQUIDS, AEROSOLS AND GELS (LAGs) RESTRICTIONS**

That ICAO:

a) develop and disseminate detailed information and procedures for the implementation of liquids, aerosols and gels (LAGs) restrictions in order to improve training of AVSEC personnel;

b) provide additional clarification in order to harmonize the 100ml. liquids, aerosols and gels (LAGs) restrictions as soon as possible; and

c) provide additional guidance on defining sealed or resealable bags as soon as possible and additional guidance on the implementation of Specifications for Security Tamper Evident Bags (STEBs).

**DRAFT**
**CONCLUSION 6/24 LIQUIDS, AEROSOLS AND GELS (LAGs) RESTRICTIONS FOR DOMESTIC, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL**

That NAM/CAR/SAM States/Territories, through the AVSEC/COMM, conduct a study to determine the level of implementation of the liquids, aerosols and gels (LAGs) restrictions on domestic, regional and international travel by **September 2008** and States implement it by **July 2009**.

**DRAFT**
**CONCLUSION 6/25 CARGO SECURITY PROGRAMME MODEL**

That States analyze the Cargo Security Programme model presented by the AVSEC/Cargo/TF and provide their comments to the Secretariat by **31 October 2008,** in order to forward that information for consideration by the AVSEC Panel.

**4.3 Separation of AVSEC/COMM from GREPECAS and the future regional mechanism for addressing and sharing information on threats to civil aviation**

**DRAFT**
**CONCLUSION 6/26 AVIATION SECURITY COMMITTEE FUTURE MECHANISM**

That:

a) ICAO continue as Secretariat providing support and guidance for civil aviation security issues through a multi-regional mechanism that will assist States with compliance of the Standards and Recommended Practices of Annex 9 and Annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation;

b) NAM/CAR/SAM States continue to provide input to the ICAO AVSEC Plan of Action and ensure the participation of their aviation security and facilitation experts in order to maintain continuous improvement and sustainability of AVSEC measures and procedures for the protection of international civil aviation;

c) the name of the AVSEC/COMM be changed to AVSEC/FAL/COMM

d) NAM/CAR/SAM States/Territories/International Organizations support hosting future meetings of the AVSEC-FAL/COMM.

**DRAFT**
**CONCLUSION 6/27 UNRULY/DISRUPTIVE PASSENGER LEGISLATION**

That NAM/CAR/SAM States:

a) as applicable, develop, enact and enforce legislation against unruly/disruptive passengers based on the model provided in ICAO Circular 288/2002;

b) ensure that through national laws, as well as bilateral and multilateral agreements, all cases of unruly/disruptive passengers are prosecuted for any offence occurring in its territorial and/or flag jurisdiction;

c) inform ICAO of action taken in adopting national legislation on unruly/disruptive passengers; and

d) develop a mechanism for collection of unruly/disruptive passenger incident data by the AVSEC/COMM.

**DRAFT**
**DECISION 6/28 IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (SEMS)**

That NAM/CAR/SAM States/Territories consider, at their convenience, the benefit of implementing the IATA Security Management System (SeMS) by their national aircraft operators.

**DRAFT**
**DECISION 6/29 IATA SECURE FREIGHT PROGRAMME INITIATIVE**

That NAM/CAR/SAM States consider the convenience and benefits of implementing the IATA Secure Freight Programme by their national aircraft operators without prejudice to comply with national regulated agent requirements and develop their own Cargo Security Programme.

**DRAFT**
**DECISION 6/30 SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF NARCOTICS AND CONTRABAND TRAFFICKING**

The AVSEC/FAL/COMM create an ad-hoc Task Force to analyze this threat and present the next Meeting with relevant information to establish conclusions for submission to the ICAO AVSEC Panel by the end of the first quarter of 2009.

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## ATTACHMENT 1 TO APPENDIX A

## CENTRALIZED SECURITY CHECK NUMBER RULES OF THUMBS

The centralized security check system is also designed to process the check-in maximum throughput to ensure overall capacity balance.

The rule of thumb is used to determine the number of security servers required. The following procedure is used:

A) Calculate the peak 10-minute check-in counters throughput.

B) Calculate the number of security check servers.

C) Calculate the maximum number of passengers queuing (Max # Q) assuming a single (bank) queue.

**Step A)** Calculate the peak 10-minute check-in counters throughput.

Peak 10-minute demand = #CIY * (600 / PTci) +%J

Where:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| #CIY | = | number of economy class check-in servers assuming common use |
| PTci | = | average processing time at check-in in seconds |
| %J | = | % of business class passengers |

**Step B)** Calculate the number of security check servers

#SC = Peak 10-minute demand from A) x (PTsc / 600)

Where:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| #SC | = | number of security servers |
| PTsc | = | average processing time at security check in seconds |

**Step C)** Calculate the maximum number of passenger queuing (Max # Q) assuming a single queue:

Max # Q = (MQT x #SC x 60) / PTsc

Where:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| MQT | = | Maximum queuing time in minutes |
| #SC | = | number of security servers |
| PTsc | = | average processing time at security check in seconds |

**Example**

A) Peak 10-minute check-in throughput

Previously calculated, the 38 economy class desks plus the business class desks generate a peak 10-minute demand of 175 originating passengers. The average processing time is 12 seconds.

Peak 10-minute demand = #CIY x (600 / PTci) x (1+%J)

Peak 10-minute demand = 38 x (600/150) x (1.15)

Peak 10-minute demand = **175 passengers**

B) Number of security check servers

#SC = Peak 10-minute demand from A) x (PTsc / 600)

#SC = 175 x (12/600)

#SC = 3.5 = **4 servers**

C) Maximum number of passenger queuing (Max # Q) assuming a single queue at a maximum queuing time of 3 minutes

Max # Q = (MQT x #SC x 60) / PTsc

Max # Q = (3 x 4 x 60) / 12

Max # Q = **60 passengers**

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## ATTACHMENT 2 TO APPENDIX A

## CLASSIFICATION OF AIRPORTS BASED ON PAX THROUGHPUT DURING PEAK HOURS

Airport Classification

1. Fewer than 5 million passengers
2. 5-15 million passengers
3. 15 – 25 million passengers
4. 25-49 million passengers
5. Over 40 million passengers.

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## ATTACHMENT 2 TO APPENDIX A

## CLASSIFICATION OF AIRPORTS BASED ON PAX THROUGHPUT DURING PEAK HOURS

Airport Classification

1. Fewer than 5 million passengers
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**APPENDIX B**
**ICAO/CANADA TRAINING PROGRAM**
**PROGRAMA DE INSTRUCCIÓN OACI/CANADA**
**2008-2009**

| **REGULAR PROGRAM: Training Program Course**<br>**PROGRAMA REGULAR: Programa Nacional de Instructores** | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Host State/Territory**<br>**Estado Sede** | **Dates**<br>**Fechas** | **Venue**<br>**Sede** | **Participants**<br>**Participantes** |
| ASTC Trinidad & Tobago | 14-24 OCT 2008 | ASTC Port of Spain | CAR/SAM English Speaking Countries<br>Países de habla inglesa de la Región CAR/SAM |
| ASTC Argentina | 4-14 NOV 2008 | ASTC Buenos Aires CIPE | CAR/SAM Spanish Speaking Countries<br>Países de habla española de la Región CAR/SAM |
| **ICAO CANADA TRAINING PROGRAM: Screener Certification Workshop**<br>**PROGRAMA DE INSTRUCCIÓN OACI-CANADA: Taller sobre Certificación de personal operador de equipos de seguridad de la aviación** | | | |
| 1. México | 24-28 NOV 2008 | Morelia, Mexico | Mexico |
| 2. Colombia | 1-5 DEC 2008 | Bogotá, Colombia | Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela |
| **ICAO CANADA TRAINING PROGRAM: Instructors Course**<br>**PROGRAMA DE INSTRUCCIÓN OACI-CANADA: Programación de Instrucción** | | | |
| 1. Brazil | 21-29 OCT, 2008 | Brazil | Brazil |
| 2. Panama | 18-26 NOV 2008 | Panama | Costa Rica<br>Nicaragua<br>Panama |
| 3. Peru | 2-10 DEC, 2008 | Peru | Bolivia<br>Chile<br>Peru |
| 4. Bahamas | 2-10 DEC, 2008 | Bahamas | Bahamas<br>Belize<br>Jamaica |
| 5. Uruguay | 20-28 JAN 2009 | Uruguay | Argentina<br>Paraguay<br>Uruguay |

| REGULAR PROGRAM: Training Program Course<br>PROGRAMA REGULAR: Programa Nacional de Instructores | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Host State/Territory<br>Estado Sede** | **Dates<br>Fechas** | **Venue<br>Sede** | **Participants<br>Participantes** |
| 6. French Antilles | 27 JAN -4 FEB 2009 | Martinique, French Antilles | French Guiana<br>Haiti<br>French Antilles |
| 7. Aruba | 20-28 JAN 2009<br>20-28 ENE 2009 | Aruba | Aruba<br>Guyana<br>Netherlands Antilles<br>Suriname<br>Trinidad and Tobago |
| 8. El Salvador | 3-11 FEB 2009 | El Salvador | El Salvador<br>Guatemala<br>Honduras |
| 9. Antigua and Barbuda | 3-11 MAR 2009 | Antigua and Barbuda | Antigua & Barbuda<br>Barbados<br>Dominica<br>Grenada<br>St.Kitts & Nevis<br>St.Lucia<br>St.Vincent & the Grenadines |
| 10. Cuba | 3-11 MAR, 2009 | Cuba | Cuba<br>Dominican Republic |
| 11. Venezuela | 10-18 MAR, 2009 | Venezuela | Colombia<br>Ecuador<br>Venezuela |
| 12. Mexico | 17-25 MAR, 2009 | Mexico | Mexico |

**Note.- Starting the second trimester of 2009, there will be more workshops and courses regarding National Cargo Security Programme for all States. States will keep the same grouping for this new training.**

**Nota.- Durante el segundo trimestre del 2009, habrá más talleres y cursos correspondientes al Programa Nacional de Seguridad en la Carga para todos los Estados. Para dicha instrucción, se mantendrán los mismos grupos de países que en el programa anterior.**

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**APPENDIX C**
**LETTER OF COMMITMENT BETWEEN CANADA**

**AND**

**(NAME OF THE STATE INTERESTED)**

**CONCERNING THE PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE IN DESIGN AND TESTING OF THE GEASSA INFORMATION SHARING NETWORK**

**WHEREAS**, the need to increase the sharing of aviation security information amoungst member states of the Western Hemisphere's Group of Experts on Aviation Safety and Security Assistance (GEASSA) was initially identified at their 6th annual meeting; and,

**WHEREAS**, Transport Canada subsequently secured the technical expertise of contractor to conduct a feasibility study and provide recommendations on how to address the identified need; and,

**WHEREAS**, the results of the feasibility study with recommendations were shared with GEASSA member states during presentations at their 7th annual meeting in Panama.

**NOW, THEREFORE**, the undersigned agree as follows:

**ARTICLE I**

***Parties***

This Letter of Commitment (herein referred to as "LOC") is made and entered into by and between Canada, (Name of state interested), herein referred to as "the Parties".

**ARTICLE II**

***Purpose***

1. LOC has as its purpose the promotion of cooperation between the Parties and their agents during the design, testing and implementation phases of the GEASSA Shared Information Network.

2. This LOC is not a contract and neither participant intends that the understanding contained herein represent a binding agreement, however future developing for this initiative and the successful implementation of the Network will require that the roles and responsibilities contained herein are fulfilled by the Parties.

**ARTICLE III**

**Term of LOC**

This LOC is effective upon the day and date last signed and executed by the duly authorized representatives of the Parties to this LOC and shall remain in effect during the development and testing phases leading up to the final implementation and beyond into the fully operational phase of the GEASSA Shared Information Network.

**ARTICLE IV**

**Technical Cooperation**

Technical cooperation will be in operational and management disciplines and will require the Parties work collectively during the various phases of design, testing and acceptance of the shared information network system. Roles, responsibilities and activities include, but are not limited to, the following:

- Establish a 'Terms of Use' agreement.
- Provide contact information and role for every person participating in the project.
- Ensure and confirm that participating users are properly equipped to use the ISN such as minimum workstation configuration and INTERNET connectivity.
- Ensure that participants can communicate with network developers by e-mail, or other means.
- Participate in User Interface definition (look and feel, page flow, etc.).
- Assist in defining desired business rules for various system processes.
- Clarify and/or confirm ambiguous or additional business rules that may come up during the development phase of the initial product.
- Post sample documents.
- Post sample point of contact information.
- Test sending of e-mails and broadcasts to Points of Contact (PoCs).
- Review translation and provide feedback to assist in verifying terminology used.
- Participate in user training session.
- Post actual PoC information.
- Keep posted PoC contact information and relevant aviation security information current.
- Commit to long-term participation in necessary ongoing development and system enhancement.
- Work to ensure the future viability, sustainability and enhancement of the network with the approval of GEASSA.

**ARTICLE V**

## Principal Contacts

In order to facilitate the efficient flow of information during project development each of the Parties have identified the following principal operational contacts, as well as an alternate:

| CANADA | COLOMBIA CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY- UAEAC |
|---|---|
| **PRINCIPAL CONTACT:**<br><br>**Alternate:** | **PRINCIPAL CONTACT:**<br><br>**Alternate:** |

The names of the officers cited above may be changed by simple notification without formal amendment to this LOC.

## ARTICLE VI

## Amendments

This LOC may be amended by mutual consent of the Parties and formalized through written communications which specify the date on which such amendments are to take effect.

## APPROVALS

The effective date of this LOC is the date of the signature last affixed to this page.

**For Canada:**

_____ _____
**Name and title** Date

**For the Name of the State Interested:**

_____ _____
**Name and title** Date

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**APPENDIX D**

Available Only in Spanish

**PROGRAMA NACIONAL MODELO DE SEGURIDAD DE LA CARGA**

**INDICE**

## CAPITULO 1. INTRODUCCIÓN Y ANTECEDENTES

Las medidas excepcionales de seguridad que actualmente se aplican a todos los pasajeros y su equipaje tanto de mano como facturado, son de una alta eficacia de forma general, ello puede representar que los terroristas dirijan sus ojos a otras opciones menos protegidas, como pudiera ser la carga aérea, donde sería más fácil llevar a cabo un acto de interferencia ilícita.

El volumen de carga aérea que se esta moviendo en el mundo es enorme y su evolución sigue siendo positiva, los sistemas de carga son públicamente conocidos, hasta el punto de que hoy podemos enviar una mercancía por vía aérea sabiendo con antelación cual es el vuelo que la transportara (Transporte de Carga con Reserva Previa), por lo tanto los terroristas son capaces de apuntar a determinados vuelos como objetivo de sus planes.

Por otra parte debemos reconocer la dificultad de inspeccionar algunos envíos, y a ello se unirá el hecho de que en los ataques perpetrados por el terrorismo contra la carga aérea, los riesgos para los terroristas han sido mínimos.

Basamos las medidas preventivas en que si el paquete o el envío ha sido empaquetado con seguridad inicialmente, y se han custodiado con seguridad de allí en adelante, el requisito fundamental de inspeccionar, se reduce de forma considerable, pero para ello será necesario que contemos con la seguridad absoluta de que esto ha sido así.

CAPITULO 2. DEFINICIONES

Para este documento emplearemos las siguientes definiciones:

- Actos o tentativas, destinados a comprometer la seguridad de la aviación civil y del transporte aéreo, es decir:
  - Apoderamiento ilícito de aeronaves en vuelo;
  - Apoderamiento ilícito de aeronaves en tierra;
  - Toma de rehenes a bordo de aeronaves o en los aeródromos;
  - Intrusión por la fuerza a bordo de una aeronave, en un aeropuerto o en el recinto de una instalación aeronáutica;
  - Intrusión a bordo de una aeronave o en un aeropuerto de armas o de artefactos( o substancias) peligrosos destinados a fines criminales;
  - Comunicación de información falsa que compromete la seguridad de una aeronave en vuelo o en tierra, o la seguridad de los pasajeros, tripulación, personal de tierra publico en un aeropuerto o en una instalación de aviación civil.
- **Agente Acreditado.-** Agente, expedidor de carga o cualquier otra entidad que mantiene relaciones comerciales con un operador y proporciona controles de seguridad, que están aceptados o son exigidos por la autoridad competente con respecto a la carga, las encomiendas de mensajería y por expreso o correo.
- **Auditoria de Seguridad**. Examen en profundidad del cumplimiento de todos los aspectos del Programa Nacional de Seguridad de la Aviación Civil.
- **Accidente.-** Cualquier ocurrencia originada en la prestación de los servicios especializados aeroportuarios que ocasionan lesiones graves o mortales a alguna persona o daños de consideración a la propiedad.
- **Almacenaje.-** acto por el cual se almacenan mercancías en una Terminal de almacenamiento durante un tiempo determinado y en un lugar adecuado según el tipo de mercancía de que se trate.
- **Aeronave.-** Toda maquina que puede sustentarse en la atmósfera por reacciones del aire que no sean las reacciones de la misma contra la superficie de la tierra.
- **Aeropuerto.-** Es el aeródromo de uso publico que cuenta con edificaciones, instalaciones, equipos y servicios destinados de forma habitual a la llegada, salida y movimiento de aeronaves, pasajeros y carga en la superficie.
- **Aeródromo.-** Área definida de tierra o agua (que incluye todas sus edificaciones, instalaciones y equipos) destinada total o parcialmente a la llegada, salida y movimiento en la superficie de aeronaves.
- **Aprobado.-** Acto por el cual, previo a su estudio, análisis y/o revisión, la AAC le acepta su uso o empleo.
- **Administrador Aeroportuario.-** (u Operador Aeroportuario). Empresa que administra y opera un aeropuerto, para lo cual cuenta con la debida autorización y certificación de la AAC.
- **Aviso de llegada.-** Salvo estipulación en contrario, el transportista debe avisar al destinatario de la llegada de la carga, tan pronto como esta llegue.
- **Carga.-** Es el conjunto de bienes que se transportan en una aeronave excepto el correo, los suministros y el equipaje acompañado.
- **Contrato de transporte aéreo.-** es aquel celebrado entre un expedidor o remitente con un transportista, mediante el cual el transportista se compromete a trasladar de un lugar a otro, por vía aérea y en aeronave, determinadas mercancías, para su entrega al destinatario o consignatario, previo cumplimiento de las disposiciones de la Ley General de Aduanas y su Reglamento; el transporte aéreo abarca desde la aceptación de la carga en la Terminal de carga de origen hasta su entrega al destinatario en la Terminal de carga del explotador aéreo o transportista en destino.
- **Carga.-** Acción de colocar mercancías, correo, equipaje o suministros a bordo de una aeronave para ser transportados en un vuelo.
- Carga Consolidada

- Carga Agrupada.-Envío que incluye varios paquetes remitidos por mas de una persona cada una de las cuales hizo un contrato para el transporte aéreo de los mismos con una persona que no es transportista regular.
- **Correo.-** Es todo despacho de correspondencia y otros objetos que las administraciones postales presentan a los explotadores aéreos con el fin de que los entreguen a otras administraciones postales.
- **Carta de Porte Aéreo.-** Air Waybill. Guía Aérea. Ver definición Conocimiento Aéreo.
- **Certificación de la AAC.-** Autorización técnica concedida por la AAC a operadores y explotadores que se encuentran regulados a la RAB.
- **Carga agrupada.-** Envío que incluye varios paquetes remitidos por más de una persona, cada una de las cuales hizo un contrato para el transporte de los mismos con una persona que no es transportista regular.
- **Condiciones de transporte.-** Son los términos y condiciones generales establecidas por un transportista para su propio transporte.
- **Conocimiento Aéreo.-** Es un título que se emite por o por cuenta del expedidor y que prueba el contrato entre el transportista y el expedidor para el transporte de mercancías por las rutas del transportista.
- **Control de Seguridad**. Medios para evitar que se introduzcan armas, explosivos u otros objetos o substancias peligrosas que puedan utilizarse para cometer actos de interferencia ilícita.
- **Destinatario.-** La persona cuyo nombre figura en la carta de porte (guía aérea o conocimiento de embarque) como aquella a la que el transportista debe entregar las mercancías.
- **Despacho de mercancías.-** Realización de las formalidades aduaneras necesarias a fin de que las mercancías puedan ser importadas para el consumo interior, exportadas o colocadas al amparo de otro régimen aduanero.
- **Dispositivo unitario de carga.-** Cualquier tipo de contenedor en el cual se puede transportar una expedición sin importar que el contenedor sea o no considerado como equipo de la aeronave.
- **Descarga.-** Acción de sacar las mercancías, correo, equipaje o suministros de una aeronave después del aterrizaje.
- **Edificio de Mercancías.-** Edificio por el cual pasan las mercancías hasta que se efectúa su transferencia al transporte aéreo o terrestre.
- **Equipaje no Identificado.** El equipaje que se encuentra en un aeropuerto con o sin etiqueta que ningún pasajero recoja en el aeropuerto o cuyo propietario no pueda ser identificado.
- **Estudio de Seguridad** Evaluación de las necesidades en materia de seguridad, incluyendo la identificación de los puntos vulnerables, que podrían aprovecharse para un acto de interferencia ilícita y la recomendación de las medidas correctivas.
- **Flete.-** La cantidad a pagar por el transporte de mercancías.
- **Incidente de aviación.-** Es todo suceso relacionado con la utilización de una aeronave, que no llegue a ser un accidente, que afecte o pueda afectar la seguridad de las operaciones.
- **Inspección.** La aplicación de medios técnicos o de otro tipo, destinados a identificar y/o detectar armas, explosivos u otro artefacto, objetos o substancias peligrosas que puedan utilizarse para cometer un acto de interferencia ilícita.
- **Inspección de Seguridad.** Examen de la aplicación de los requisitos pertinentes del Programa Nacional de Seguridad de la Aviación Civil, por una línea aérea, un aeropuerto u otro organismo encargado de la seguridad de la aviación.
- **Operadores de Servicios Especializados Aeroportuarios.-** Personas naturales y jurídicas que prestan servicios aeroportuarios especializados, certificadas por la AAC.
- **Operación de Transporte Aéreo Comercial.** Operación de de aeronave que supone el transporte de pasajeros, carga o correo por remuneración o arrendamiento.
- **Pertenencia.-** cualquier tipo de carga embalada

- **Plataforma.-** Área definida en un aeródromo terrestre, destinada a dar cabida a las aeronaves a los fines de embarque o desembarque de pasajeros, correo o carga, equipaje, abastecimiento de combustible, estacionamiento o mantenimiento.
- **Peso bruto.-** El peso de una expedición incluyendo todos sus componentes (paquetes, piezas, etc.) También se incluyen, si fuera requerido, el peso de la plataforma, amarras especiales, etc.
- **Peso neto.-** El peso de las mercancías excluyendo el embalaje.
- **Prueba de Seguridad**. Prueba secreta o no de una medida de seguridad de la aviación en la que se simula un intento de cometer un acto de interferencia ilícita.
- Seguridad. Protección de la aviación civil contra los actos de interferencia ilícita. Este objetivo se logra mediante una combinación de medidas, recursos humanos materiales.
- **Servicios Especializados Aeroportuarios.-** Servicios prestados dentro y fuera de la plataforma, por operadores de servicios aeroportuarios nacionales e internacionales vinculados a servicios prestados directamente a aeronaves o con ocasión del transporte aéreo, cuando para su ejecución se utilizan equipos e infraestructura especializada.
- **"Master Air Waybill" (MAWB).-** Es una Carta de Porte Aéreo que cubre una expedición consolidada, indicando al consolidador como expedidor.
- **"House Air Waybill" (HAWB**).- Es el documento que acredita cada envío individual en una mercancía consolidada. Es emitido por el consolidador y contiene instrucciones para el agente desconsolidador.
- **Transportista.-** Es el Operador Aéreo.
- **Terminales de carga del explotador aéreo o transportista aéreo.-** Es la Terminal de carga del transportista o encargado por este, para recibir y entregar la mercancía debidamente individualizada al destinatario o su agente. Le corresponde realizar las actividades necesarias para la entrega de la mercancía al destinatario o su representante.
- **Terminal de almacenamiento.-** Almacenes destinados a depositar la carga y correo que se transporta por vía aérea.
- **Zona de mercancías**.- Todo el espacio y las instalaciones en tierra proporcionados para la manipulación de mercancías. Incluye las plataformas, los edificios y almacenes de mercancías, los estacionamientos de vehículos y los caminos relacionados con estos fines.

## CAPITULO 3. OBJETIVO

El objetivo que se pretende alcanzar con estas “Medidas de Seguridad Apropiadas a la Carga Aérea”, es disponer las reglas de operación a las que deben someterse, tanto los transportistas aéreos como los agentes acreditados y administradores postales, a fin de proteger cualquier envío de carga, correo y encomiendas por vía aérea, de cualquier acto de interferencia ilícita, con el objetivo final de lograr un transporte aéreo seguro y eficaz.

Estas medidas aquí estipuladas son acordes tanto con la Legislación Internacional como con la Nacional, todo ello al margen de otras legislaciones especificas, como las aduaneras, policiales, etc.

# CAPITULO 4. NORMATIVA

## 4.1. NORMATIVA INTERNACIONAL

El Anexo 17 al Convenio de Aviación Civil Internacional, en su edición de Abril de 2.006, establece:

4.6.1 Cada Estado contratante asegurará que la carga y el correo se sometan a controles de seguridad antes de cargarlos en una aeronave que realice operaciones de transporte aéreo comercial de pasajeros.

4.6.2 Cada Estado contratante asegurará que la carga y el correo que se transporten en una aeronave comercial de pasajeros estén protegidos de interferencias no autorizadas desde el punto en que se aplican los controles de seguridad hasta la salida de la aeronave.

4.6.3 Cada Estado contratante establecerá un proceso para la aprobación de agentes acreditados, si dichos agentes participan en la aplicación de controles de seguridad.

4.6.4 Cada Estado contratante asegurará que los explotadores no acepten transportar carga ni correo en una aeronave que realiza operaciones del transporte aéreo comercial de pasajeros a menos que un agente acreditado confirme y demuestre que se aplican controles de seguridad, o que el envío se someta a controles de seguridad apropiados.

## 4.2. NORMATIVA NACIONAL

Se deberá promulgar las leyes nacionales que ponen en vigor los convenios Internacionales, es fundamental que el Estado promulgue la legislación que establece la autoridad legal básica para el desarrollo de las actividades de seguridad de la aviación en el Estado. Dicha legislación debería nombrar la autoridad competente del Estado designada responsable de la seguridad de la aviación y asignarle poderes y facultades legales apropiadas para hacer cumplir normas, reglamentos y procedimientos de seguridad de la aviación civil. Los Estados deberán enumerar las leyes nacionales pertinentes que dan vigencia al Programa Nacional de Carga.

Determinar claramente la normativa nacional que establece: “Responsabilidades del transportista aéreo y agente acreditado”

a) Todo transportador aéreo deberá :

   1.- Presentar y llevar a delante su Programa de Seguridad

   2.- Decidir el nivel de control de seguridad que ha de aplicarse a cualquier envío.

   3.- Aplicar los controles de seguridad adecuados al nivel requerido.

   4.- Proteger el envío frente a interferencia ilícita, cuando este bajo custodia de la línea aérea.

   5.- Garantizar que todos los envíos han sido asegurados a un nivel apropiado antes de colocarse en la aeronave.

   6.- Debe garantizar que todos los envíos colocados a bordo de la aeronave han sido anotados en el manifiesto de la aeronave.

7.- Debe elaborar y aplicar medidas para asegurarse de que la carga, los paquetes de mensajería y por expreso y el correo se someten a controles de seguridad. Estos controles deberían de incluir el requisito de que la carga se someta a inspección tecnológica.

b) Todo Agente Acreditado deberá:

1.- Presentar y llevar a delante su Programa de Seguridad

2.- Decidir el nivel de control de seguridad que ha de aplicarse a cualquier envío determinado.

3.-Aplicar los controles de seguridad adecuados al nivel requerido

4.- Demostrar que el nivel de inspección es aceptable

5.- Proteger el envío frente a interferencia ilícita, cuando este bajo su custodia.

## CAPITULO 5. PROCEDIMIENTOS

La expresión **"Carga Aérea**" en lo que se refiere a la seguridad de la Aviación Civil, comprende, las mercancías normales, las expediciones refundidas, los transbordos de carga, los artículos de mensajería no acompañados, el correo, la valija diplomática, las piezas de repuesto de las compañías y el equipaje no acompañado que se envía como carga en una aeronave que transporte pasajeros.

La carga aérea debe de estar protegida frente a interferencias ilícitas y debe de saberse donde se encuentra exactamente en cada etapa de su viaje.

### 5.1. EL PROCEDIMIENTO

En términos generales, el procedimiento es el siguiente:

- El Expedidor de las mercancías empaquetará las mismas en un entorno seguro
- Se certificará que las mercancías han sido sometidas a controles de seguridad y que se han remitido a la Línea Aérea o Agente Acreditado por conducto de vehículos seguros.
- Al recibir los envíos el transportista aéreo verificará los envíos y la documentación para demostrar que no ha habido interferencia, se anotará que se han recibido con seguridad y se almacenarán en una zona segura.
- En su momento, se remitan al siguiente expedidor, si existe, o encargado de integrarla o al transportista y se certificará que se recibe en condiciones seguras.

### 5.2. CONCEPTOS FUNDAMENTALES EN LOS PROCEDIMIENTOS DE SEGURIDAD DE LA CARGA AEREA

EXPEDIDOR

Se considera que es:

- El originador de las mercancías
- El lugar donde se preparan las mercancías para su transporte
- El lugar donde se reconocen las mercancías como carga aérea.

EXPEDIDOR CONOCIDO

Un Agente Acreditado o una Línea Aérea puede reconocer a un cliente o expedidor como expedidor conocido, estableciendo y anotando la identidad y dirección del expedidor y la del agente autorizado para transportarla en su nombre y exigiendo que el remitente declare que:

- Se han preparado los envíos en locales seguros.
- Tiene personal fiable que prepara los envíos

- Ha protegido los envíos frente a interferencias
- Ha aceptado las inspecciones por motivos de seguridad
- Certifica que el envío no contiene ninguna mercancía prohibida

AGENTE ACREDITADO

Es el Agente, expedidor de carga o cualquier otra entidad que mantiene relaciones comerciales con un explotador y proporciona controles de seguridad, que son precisamente los exigidos y aceptados por la Autoridad competente para la carga, las encomiendas y el correo.

CARGA CONOCIDA Y DESCONOCIDA

La expresión “CARGA CONOCIDA “significa:

“Un envío de carga aérea de un Expedidor Conocido o de un Agente Acreditado al que se han aplicado los adecuados controles de seguridad “.

“Un envío de carga desconocida que ha sido subsiguientemente sometido a controles adecuados de seguridad”

Los envíos recibidos de Agentes No Acreditados

- Se consideran Carga Desconocida
- Han de someterse a medidas de seguridad adecuadas.

**5.3. FUNCIONES DEL EXPLOTADOR DE LA AERONAVE**

El explotador de la aeronave tiene como funciones:

- Decidir el nivel de control de seguridad que ha de aplicarse a los envíos
- Aplicar los controles de seguridad adecuados
- Proteger el envío frente a interferencias ilícitas
- Garantizar que los envíos han sido asegurados antes de su colocación en la aeronave
- Garantizar que todos los envíos colocados a bordo están reflejados en el manifiesto de carga

Si los envíos se aceptan como “carga desconocida” han sido sometidos al nivel apropiado de seguridad y por lo tanto se han convertido en “Carga Conocida”.

**5.4. FUNCION DEL AGENTE ACREDITADO**

El Agente Acreditado tiene como funciones:

- Decidir el nivel de control de seguridad que ha de aplicarse a cualquier envío
- Aplicar los controles de seguridad adecuados al nivel requerido
- Mostrarse satisfecho de que los niveles de inspección de seguridad son aceptables
- Proteger el envío frente a interferencias ilícitas, cuando esta bajo su custodia, principalmente cuando ha sido clasificado como “Mercancía Conocida”.
- Si cualquier envío de carga no satisface los criterios precedentes, debe de entregarse a la Línea Aérea o a otro Agente Acreditado como “Carga Desconocida”

**5.5. REGISTROS DOCUMENTALES**

Debe seguirse la pista a la **“Carga Conocida**”, desde el momento en que se designa como tal, hasta que la recibe el Agente Acreditado o el Transportista Aéreo.

Este Registro debe de incluir:

- Declaración de Seguridad del envío firmada por el remitente conocido.
- Verificación de identidad de la persona que entrega la “carga conocida”.

**5.6. DEPOSITO**

Todos los envíos de carga, tanto “conocida “como “desconocida” en trámites de ser asegurados, deben custodiarse en almacenes o locales seguros

**5.7. TRANSPORTE. CONTROLES DE ACCESO**

La carga aérea deberá únicamente ser transportada por:

- Vehículos de transporte propios del remitente, del Agente Acreditado o del Explotador de la aeronave
- Transportistas con procedimientos de seguridad aprobados por el Agente Acreditado o por el Explotador.
- El conductor del vehículo deberá presentar el pase de seguridad o el documento de identidad de la empresa.
- Control de Seguridad antes de ser cargado el vehículo, y precintado una vez terminada esta
- El conductor no deberá abandonar el vehículo sin cerrarlo ni deberá hacer paradas no programadas.

Control de acceso:

- Es conveniente realizar un control de acceso en puntos determinados de control y no deberá de existir otro punto de acceso más que el controlado.

- Debe de existir personal de seguridad en cada control de acceso.

- Debe de realizarse control de personal y visitantes mediante un sistema adecuado bien sea manual o automático

**5.8. VERIFICACIÓN DE ANTECEDENTES**

Todo el personal empleado en la preparación y entrega de la carga aérea deberá ser objeto de verificación de antecedentes policiales, para establecer verdaderamente su identidad y antecedentes criminales

**5.9. FORMACIÓN**

El personal encargado de la preparación y entrega de la carga deberá de recibir la suficiente formación que le faculte para comprender y desempeñar adecuadamente su trabajo y sus responsabilidades en materia de seguridad.

La formación siempre será previa al momento en que se permita al trabajador acceder a la carga aérea

## CAPITULO 6. REQUISITOS QUE DEBE CUMPLIR EL AGENTE DE CARGA ACREDITADO

El Agente de Carga Acreditado cumplirá los requisitos siguientes, para su acreditación para el transporte de carga, mensajería y correo por vía aérea.

1. Establecerá y mantendrá un registro de la identidad y dirección del expedidor y comprobará las credenciales de la persona que realiza la entrega. El registro se mantendrá hasta que el envío llegue a su destino.

2. Requerirá del expedidor una declaración del contenido del envío.

3. Se asegurará que, mediante los controles adecuados, los envíos no contienen objetos o productos prohibidos.

4. Se asegurará de que los envíos están protegidos contra interferencia ilícita desde su recepción hasta su entrega.

5. Seleccionará y formará adecuadamente a todo el personal.

6. Responsabilizará a todo el personal del cumplimiento de todas las normas de seguridad.

7. Garantizará que los siguientes tipos de envíos:

- Equipajes no acompañados transportados como carga aérea.
- Envíos de agentes no acreditados
- Envíos entregados por expedidores desconocidos
- Envíos entregados por persona distinta al expedidor conocido o persona autorizada por este.
- Envíos cuyo contenido no coincide con la descripción proporcionada.
- Envíos en los que el expedidor conocido no segura que no contengan objetos prohibidos.

SERAN SOMETIDOS A ALGUNA DE LAS SIGUIENTES MEDIDAS DE SEGURIDAD:

- Inspección por rayos x
- Inspección por cámaras de simulación
- Inspección manual
- Otras medidas como detectores de explosivos o perros.

8. Se asegurará de que cada envío que se entrega a una Línea Aérea, se acompaña de documentación con la información siguiente:

- Nombre y dirección del Agente de Carga Acreditado
- Nombre y dirección del expedidor
- Contenido del envío
- Declaración expresando que se han llevado a cabo las medidas de seguridad exigidas a los Agentes de Carga Acreditados.

9. Dotará a la persona que realiza la entrega en el Aeropuerto de un documento que manifieste su pertenencia a la empresa.

10. Informará al expedidor que la carga puede ser sometida a inspección aleatoria de seguridad.

11. Dará todas las facilidades a la Autoridad Aeroportuaria para efectuar las inspecciones que considere adecuadas.

12. Establecerá los procedimientos adecuados relacionados con la seguridad del Transporte de Animales Vivos.

13. Establecerá los procedimientos operativos y de emergencia y el adecuado programa de instrucción sobre estos puntos.

14. Presentará a la Autoridad competente su propuesta de Programa de Seguridad

## CAPITULO 7.- REGISTRO DE AGENTES DE CARGA ACREDITADOS

La Autoridad Competente en materia de Seguridad de la Aviación Civil publicará el "REGISTRO DE AGENTES DE CARGA ACREDITADOS DEL ESTADO", en la que incluirá a todos aquellos de los que se ha constatado mediante adecuada certificación, el cumplimiento de los requisitos que hemos estipulado en el anterior Capitulo 6.

Para ello la Empresa dirigirá la solicitud a La Máxima Autoridad de Aviación Civil, con los siguientes datos:

- Razón Social
- Domicilio
- Número de Identificación Fiscal
- Teléfonos, Fax y Celulares
- Número de empleados
- Volumen de carga transportada el año anterior.
- Descripción del tipo de mercancía que transporta habitualmente
- Nombre y cargo del responsable de seguridad
- Nombre y cargo del firmante de la solicitud

Junto con la solicitud, el solicitante remitirá:

1. Datos de los almacenes:
    - Dirección
    - Teléfonos etc.
    - Superficie aproximada
    - Nombre y cargo del responsable de Seguridad
    - Breve descripción de sus medidas de seguridad
2. Nombre de las Líneas Aéreas con las que mantiene una relación comercial más habitual.
3. Fotocopia del Acta Notarial de la Inscripción de la Empresa

**CAPITULO 8. REQUISITOS QUE DEBE CUMPLIR LA ADMINISTRACIÓN POSTAL ACREDITADA.- CONFORMIDAD DE LA OPERACIÓN**

La Administración Postal Acreditada, deberá cumplir los requisitos siguientes:

a) Deberá asegurarse de que el correo de expedidores no conocidos no contiene objetos prohibidos.

b) Se asegurarán de que el correo esta protegido contra actos de interferencia ilícita desde su recepción hasta su entrega.

c) Deberá seleccionar y formar adecuadamente al personal contratado.

d) Responsabilizar a todo el personal que trabaja en sus dependencias del cumplimiento de las medidas de seguridad.

e) Designar un responsable de seguridad en la empresa.

f) Asegurarse de que los siguientes tipos de correo:

- Correo de Autoridades o Administraciones Postales NO Acreditadas.
- Correo entregado por Expedidores Postales NO Conocidos
- Correo en el que el Expedidor Conocido no asegura que el envío no contiene objetos prohibidos.

NO SON ENTREGADOS A LA COMPAÑÍA PARA SU TRANSPORTE A MENOS QUE SEAN SOMETIDOS A ALGUNA DE LAS SIGUIENTES MEDIDAS:

- Controles de Rayos X.
- Registro Manual
- Otras técnicas como olfateadores de explosivos, perros etc.

g) Asegurarse de que cada expedición de correo se entrega a la Compañía Aérea acompañada de la documentación en la que consta el nombre de la Administración Postal Acreditada.

h) Dotará a la persona que realiza la entrega en el Aeropuerto de un documento en el que conste su pertenencia a la empresa o administración.

i) Facilitará las inspecciones que la Autoridad competente considere adecuadas.

j) Presentará a la Autoridad competente su propuesta de Programa de Seguridad.

## CAPITULO 9. PROGRAMA DE SEGURIDAD

De conformidad con lo dispuesto en la Normativa Nacional se exige tanto a los Explotadores de Aeronaves como a los Agentes de Carga Acreditados, que presenten para su aprobación por parte de la Autoridad Aeronáutica un “Programa de Seguridad “.

El Programa de Seguridad determinará los medios para prevenir el ingreso no autorizado de cualquier tipo de explosivo o dispositivo incendiario en el interior de un envío por vía aérea.

El Programa de Seguridad deberá también:

- Señalar las medidas de seguridad que permitan que la carga no sea manipulada por personas ajenas y que el acceso a la carga sea restringido.

- Señalar las medidas de protección cuando la carga aérea es transportada por vehículos terrestres.

- Estar propuesto y firmado por el representante autorizado en la empresa transportadora o Agente Acreditado.

- Incluir un sistema de salvaguardas de seguridad aceptadas por la Autoridad Aeronáutica.

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**APPENDIX E**
**IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (SEMS)**

## 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Security Management System (SeMS) essentially uses principles and concepts central to Safety Management Systems. The worldwide improvement of safety performances following global endorsement of Safety Management Systems suggests that similar improvement can be expected in the area of Security if SeMS principles are globally accepted by stakeholders and regulators.

1.2 IATA believes that given the current operating environment, implementing Security Management System at this moment makes sense. Security is a priority for regulators and the travelling public. Therefore, any initiative to improve AVSEC measures should be welcomed. Further to that, a high turnover of staff as well as growing numbers of new air carriers makes the need for standardized consistent security processes, staff training and oversight even more pressing.

## 2. IATA'S SECURITY MANAGEMENT INITIATIVE

2.1 Air carriers need to implement a vast quantity of security processes in order to comply to security requirements. In order to improve the quality of compliance, it is important to develop tools to facilitate the harmonization and standardization of processes to meet regulatory requirements.

2.2 In order to achieve this, since March 2007, IATA has been mandating its Member Airlines to have implemented the core elements of a Security Management System. To date, over half IATA's Member Airlines have successfully put in place these core elements in their security operations.

2.3 IATA ensures compliance of this requirement through its IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA) programme which is a condition of IATA membership and a globally-recognized programme aiming to improve safety and security in airline operations and management.

2.4 Whilst the current requirement is for its Members Airlines to solely have core elements implemented, a growing number of air carriers are integrating these elements as a central component of their operations and business model. In order to encourage a greater number of air carriers begin integrating security management system components in their operations, they need to be confident that there will be some recognition of their Security Management System approach by the regulatory authorities in their State of Registry and of Operations, and that it will be compliant with air carrier security programme requirements.

## 3. SECURITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IN THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT

3.1 IATA has been committed to Security Management System implementation well before its introduction at AVSEC Panel/17. Whilst IATA has been focusing a significant amount of resources to ensure that all its Members are compliant to the Security Management System requirement, it has also promoted it to regulatory authorities.

3.2 Because Security Management System is a system-wide approach to security, its success is dependent on its endorsement by all stakeholders including regulators. The AVSEC Panel's continued and escalating endorsement of SEMS principles constitute a very important step in reaching this goal

3.3 At AVSEC Panel/18, it was concluded that SeMS be included on Panel's list of Security Strategic Objectives. Building on the conclusions of AVSEC Panel/18 (Section 3.1.8) regarding Security Management System, IATA believes that there should be a continued and more concerted effort to provide additional guidance to ensure a more widespread awareness and knowledge.

3.4 In order for air carriers to successfully implement SEMS within their operations, it is paramount that States endorse this approach as being in compliance with security requirements of ICAO Annex 17 – *Security* as well as with individual regulators. Further, a growing number of Contracting States are currently exploring the development of Security Management System regulations.

3.5 There is also a growing number of States implementing outcome or performance based regulatory framework, which facilitates the implementation of Security Management System. States are also encouraged to draft regulations such regulations rather than prescribe actual procedures necessary to be in compliance. Allowing flexibility to those entities responsible for the implementation of security measures to meet the stated standards in the best possible, will lead to an overall more effective and efficient usage of resources. Outcome or performance based regulations also facilitates the quality control oversight that a State needs to exercise on various stakeholders by limiting the oversight responsibility to ensuring that the security Standards are met, without focusing on the particulars of the procedures.

3.6 In order to support these initiatives and encourage more Contracting States to follow Suite, ICAO has taken the initiative of including IATA's Security Management System guidance material in its upcoming seventh edition of the *Security* ICAO Doc. 8973 – *Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference* as well as including guidance material for its Contracting States in this document.

## 4. KEY BENEFITS OF MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS IN SECURITY

4.1 IATA considers that a comprehensive systems managed approach to security regulation, as offered by Security Management System, will enable States to more effectively maintain compliance with the provisions of Annex 17 both now and in the future. This recognises the benefits inherent in integrating risk assessment and regulatory quality control programmes together within a comprehensive and aligned organisational structure and culture that ensures a more cohesive and standardised approach.

4.2 By way of specific example the ongoing conduct of timely and accurate risk assessment activity can be supported by an effective quality control system that ensures continuous correction and improvement of assessment procedures. This contributes to the ongoing development of robust regulatory requirements to address identified and potentially emerging threats and vulnerabilities.

4.3 Air Carriers who have implemented Security Management System for their operations rapidly see the benefits as it becomes a pro-active approach to security management due to its inter-connectivity with a threat assessment mechanism. Implementation of Security Management System signifies that air carrier security processes will be determine to a greater extent by a data driven agenda based on input received from threat assessment mechanisms.

4.4 Also, and in recognition of the fact that regulatory resources are not unlimited, effective risk assessment processes offer the potential to allow State to focus their oversight activities in a timely manner in those areas that require it most.

4.5 Very importantly a SEMS approach in no way distracts from or lessens the need for effective Quality Control systems - a need which is reinforced in Amendment 11 with its promotion to Standard level of prior guidance material on this subject contained in ICAO Doc 8973 – *Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference.* Rather SEMS provides a framework for these systems to be aligned and harmonised together with wider organisational process to ensure a cohesive and standardised approach to aviation security within and across ICAO Contracting States. This provides opportunities for overall better and more uniform standards of service delivery and achievement of Annex 17 SARPs.

## 5. OUTCOMES OF AVSEC PANEL/19

5.1 During the last AVSEC Panel/19 held in Montreal on 26-30 May 2008, Security Management System was extensively discussed. Further, IATA along with Canada and New Zealand proposed that guidance material be developed to facilitate Security Management System implementation at the regulatory and airport level.

5.2 Also, it was also proposed that a Recommended Practice also be included in the next revision of Annex 17. Proposed text from IATA for the Recommended Practice can be found in Appendix 1.

5.3 Following a very positive discussion on SeMS by Panel Members and Observers, the Panel concluded that: “Security Management Systems (SeMS) should be further considered with a view to developing appropriate guidance material and provisions for inclusion in Annex 17 in the future”

5.4 In addition, a seminar on Security Management System will be hosted by New Zealand in the fall of 2008. The purpose of this seminar will be to help define Security Management System from a regulatory perspective.

## 6. ACTION BY THE AVSEC COMM

6.1 The AVSEC COMM is invited to:

6.1.1 Note the outcomes of ICAO AVSEC Panel/19 on Security Management System

6.1.2 Note IATA’s Security Management Systems initiative and ensure that Contracting States accept this approach as being in compliance with their national aviation security regulatory requirements

6.1.3 Strive to develop and implement performance-based regulations rather than prescriptive and procedural regulations.

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**ATTACHMENT TO APPENDIX E**
**DRAFT RECOMMENDED PRACTICE**

"Each Contracting *should* require, as part of their security programme, that an operator implements a security management system acceptable to the State of the Operator that, at a minimum:

a. Ensures security procedures implemented are appropriate to operational environment and the risk level based upon a security risk assessment carried out by the relevant national authorities;

b. provides for continuous monitoring and regular assessment of the security level achieved; and

c. aims to make continuous improvement to the overall level of security."

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**APPENDIX F**
**SECURE FREIGHT PROGRAMME**

## 1. Introduction

1.1 Air cargo is critical to the world economy. Its primary selling proposition is the efficient, fast and uninterrupted flow of goods. It is speed of delivery that differentiates "air" from other transport modes.

1.2 A major percentage of cargo is "transhipment" i.e. cargo, which is carried in the hold of more than one aircraft between more than two countries. There is no internationally recognised standard for verifying its security status on arrival at the airport of transhipment.

1.3 ICAO Annex 17 was first adopted in March 1974. One of its objectives was – and remains – standardisation. Current air cargo security regulation is primarily national. There is little harmonisation of requirements and less mutual recognition of programmes.

1.4 190 states have contracted to Annex 17. Contracting States are required in chapter 3.4 to enact Quality control and in chapter 4.6 Measures relating to (the security of) cargo, mail and other goods. Many states do so - maintaining good quality cargo security programmes - others do not.

1.5 There is a public expectation that cargo will be transported in a safe and secure manner and industry and governments must work together to ensure that that this is achieved as effectively and efficiently as possible.

1.6 IATA's mission is to represent, lead and serve the airline industry. In the context of air cargo, IATA recognises the absolute inter-dependence of supply chain operators and aims to work with affected stakeholders, governments and industry to develop solutions accordingly.

## 2. DISCUSSION

2.1 To complement and reinforce the criticality of ICAO's work, IATA is developing an air cargo supply chain security quality assurance system, entitled "Secure Freight Programme".

2.2 IATA will ensure that Secure Freight is built upon Annex 17 Standards and Recommendations and existing recognised security tools e.g. IATA SeMS Cargo Addendum.

2.3 The Secure Freight Programme will recognise effective regulatory programmes. It will not strive to replace, usurp, duplicate or compete with them. Rather, it will address local vulnerabilities, which remain.

2.4 The purpose of Secure Freight Programme is to set industry standards in order to secure cargo at the first point, within the supply chain, at which the cargo can be identified as intended for carriage by air; and thereafter to protect it from unlawful interference until it has been loaded on the uplifting aircraft.

2.5 IATA does not have enforcement powers and therefore the Programme will be voluntary. However IATA's competence in the disciplines of industry standard setting and auditing are established. IOSA (IATA Operational Safety Audit) is now recognised by an increasing number of regulatory authorities; indeed some states require air carriers operating into their territory to be IOSA certified. In due course, the aim is to achieve similar recognition of the Secure Freight Programme.

2.6 IATA's traditional membership is comprised of airlines and their agents; it has not maintained a relationship with other supply chain operators. However these entities are of material importance to the Secure Freight Programme, and therefore they – as well as willing regulators - are being actively invited to (at best) participate in and (at least) comment upon, its development.

2.7 Through the Secure Freight Programme, IATA aims to create a quality assurance system, which will initially secure trade lanes and ultimately addresses vulnerabilities, which remain in the global air cargo network.

2.8 Key elements of this quality assurance system will include:

- Security standards and procedures for each type of supply chain operator.
- An enhanced IATA Cargo SeMS Addendum.
- A set of baseline generic security requirements.
- A security audit specific to each type of operator.
- Inclusion of secure operators in a global registry.
- A set of elevated threat measures (their need being based on threat assessment).
- The application and use of technology.
- Risk management and insurance cover.

## 3. ACTION BY THE AVSECP

3.1 The AVSECP is invited to note and comment upon this paper.

— END —