International Civil Aviation Organization
CAR/SAM REGIONAL PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION GROUP (GREPECAS)
Eleventh Meeting of the GREPECAS Aeronautical Information Management Subgroup (AIM/SG/11)
Bogota, Colombia, 16-20 June 2008

Agenda Item 3: Review of AIM Planning and Transition issues

3.2 Proposal to CAR/SAM Region States regarding the identification and designation of current AIS, NOTAM and MAP (AIM) areas, such as restricted access areas, especially areas that manage aeronautical information/data from the web server and NOTAM and GIS databases.

(Presented by the Secretariat)

SUMMARY

This working paper presents the main considerations to request CAR/SAM States the designation of restricted areas which contains equipment with essential or critical aeronautical information for Air Navigation. This is due to the concern expressed by CAR/SAM States and by the ICAO itself, regarding the easy access to information which should be considered sensitive for the use in navigation automated systems.

References:

- Working Paper 20 of AIS/MAP/SG/10, presented by Cuba.
- Doc. 8126 AN/872 – Manual for Aeronautical Information Services.
- Annex 15
- *AIM STRATEGY. EUROCONTROL Ed. 4.0,* dated 25 March 2006

In line with ICAO Strategic Objective: **A – Safety**.

1. Introduction

1.1 During AIS/MAP/SG/10 Meeting, an interference situation distressing for all participants was presented and which is valid nowadays. It was also discuss the possibility that the content of a NOTAM issued by a State might be altered, and which might attempt against the safety of civil aviation. Also, the veracity and integrity of the information is being violated which in case of Cuba was published under a Quality Management System implemented and certified.

1.2 With the Quality System Implementation in States and International Organizations, all the work process carried out for the development for Aeronautical Information Integrated Documentation would be certified under a Quality Management System, which ensures that all available information process meets with the accuracy, resolution and integrity required by ICAO/ISO.

2. Discussion:

2.1 ICAO was aware of various States in different Regions which registered a similar event, but these cases are kept as isolated in spite of the severity of possible risks which involves the alteration of information with essential or critical data for Navigation. In spite of this, security measures have not yet been proposed in our Regions to reduce intrusion risks in areas that process or have aeronautical information/data classified as essentials and/or critical according to Annex in each Air Navigation field.

2.2 As it is well known by all aeronautical community, the function and importance of aeronautical information and data have being significantly modified as the Air Traffic Management/Communication, Navigation and Surveillance improve. Also, the Air Navigation Implementation, the required navigation performance, and the air navigation computer data on board have imposed quality requirements of information and aeronautical data (accuracy, resolution and integrity).

2.3 This condition turns out to be more evident, as stipulated in Annex 15, par. 3.2.8 a) in which: Contracting States are responsibly of the quality certain quality of aeronautical information/data when essential and/or critical data is described, indicating that: *"there is a high probability when using corrupted critical data that the continued safe flight and landing of an aircraft would be severely at risk with the potential for catastrophe"*. In this context, it is highlighted that:

a) State is responsible of aeronautical information accuracy provided by AIS, and

b) the function and the importance of the aeronautical information are significantly modified with the implementation of Air Navigation (RNAV) and with systems of computer navigation on board.

2.4 It is clear that the corruption or erroneous aeronautical data are a factor affecting air navigation safety, since the on board systems and ground base depend directly of them, therefore, it is urgent that each State ensure users (aeronautical industry, air traffic services, etc) receive in a timely manner the information and quality aeronautical data during the validity period for their specific use (AIRAC dates).

3. Confidential and sensitivity information

3.1 Any AIS system based on aeronautical information management networks focused on AIM should recognize that some of their data are sensitive for military use, national security, airlines, and commercial airports or with industry perspectives. An appropriate protection to sensitive data could be achieved only with a complete support from contributors in information process taking the necessary measures to avoid non-authorized use by applying restricted access methods with fundamental operations of control and review, as well as to implement a form to identify adverse situations that could impact the Aeronautical Information Management.

4. Suggested action:

4.1 The meeting is invited to:

a) take note of the content of this working paper;

b) present to GREPECAS the following conclusion:

CONCLUSION xx/11. **That States/Territories and International Organizations of CAR/SAM Regions take the following actions to protect the essential and critical information safety in AIM Areas ((AIS/MAP, NOTAM):**

a) Designate and AIM (AIS) as a restricted access area only for authorized personnel; and

b) Maintain strict control of information process under the respective quality management systems.

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