



*International Civil Aviation Organization*

CAR/SAM REGIONAL PLANNING IMPLEMENTATION GROUP (GREPECAS)

**Fifth Meeting of the GREPECAS Aviation Security Committee  
(AVSEC/COMM/5)**

Buenos Aires, Argentina, 11 to 13 May 2006

AVSEC/COMM/5-WP/17

07/04/06

---

**Agenda Item 5      Other Business**

**AIRPORT PERIMETER FENCING AND ACCESS CONTROL POINT INTEGRITY**

(Presented by the international Air Transport Association [IATA])

**SUMMARY**

In recent times, Contracting States have been investing large sums of money and resources to implement additional security procedures in the hopes of further reinforcing the security of the international civil aviation environment. However, the additional security measures can be rendered useless if basic perimeter security and access control procedures are not being implemented accordingly.

**1.                    Introduction**

1.1                Following the tragic events of 9/11, the civil aviation community was required to reconsider the methods and procedures in place to protect the civil aviation infrastructure from acts of unlawful interference.

1.2                The ICAO High-Level Ministerial Conference on Aviation Security in February 2002 resulted in the endorsement of a global strategy for strengthening aviation security worldwide. Amendment 10 and 11 of Annex 17 – Security saw the emergence of a multitude of additional Standards and Recommended Practices requiring Contracting States to implement a variety of new aviation security procedures.

1.3                Air carriers and airports also worked in co-operation with Contracting States in the development of additional security measures to ensure the safety and security of every flight.

1.4                The installation of reinforced cockpit doors, implementation of 100% hold baggage screening for all international flights and many other security procedures have provided added reinforcement to the civil aviation security infrastructure.

1.5                With additional Provisions come additional costs. In the years since the tragic events of 9/11 it is estimated that IATA Member Airlines have spent US\$5 billion annually on security. It is assume that Contracting States and airports have spent similar amounts each year.

1.6                Additional investment in security, when there is a marked improvement in the overall performance in the reduction of acts of unlawful interference is justified. However, if security incidents continue to occur at similar frequency the investment becomes questionable.

1.7 Very often security incidents continue to occur not because the new security measures implemented are inefficient but rather because basic security requirements such as airport perimeter barriers and access control points do not meet international standards.

## **2. Layered Approach to Security**

2.1 A layered approach to security has always been the preferred method to implement aviation security measures. By having many layers of security measures superimposed and complementing each other, the overall quality of the system is improved.

2.2 There is no completely perfect security process or measure. Every layer has a gap somewhere. The more layers you have the less likely a perpetrator can reach their intended target if the gaps do not align themselves.

2.3 However, even if there are many layers in the civil aviation security system, no one layer should be lax. Any weakness or deficiency should be identified and quickly repaired. Further, an ineffective system in one area, or layer, can put unnecessary stress on other security measures and potentially render them ineffective.

## **3. Perimeter Security and Access Control**

3.1 Establishing a security perimeter around the airport airside area and controlling access are basic ICAO requirements as per Section 4.2 of ICAO Annex 17 – Security. Further, these are measures which can be implemented relatively easily and can have a great impact on securing the civil aviation infrastructure of a Contracting State.

3.2 There have been a number of instances recently where Contracting States in the CAR/SAM region have had deficiencies highlighted in maintaining the integrity of their perimeter barrier and access control points.

3.3 Contracting States should therefore ensure that the integrity of the airport perimeter fence is maintained and regularly inspected for the entirety of the perimeter. Random and regular patrol should be scheduled to inspect the barrier with a particular focus on areas where breaches or attempted breach are more likely to occur. Evidence of breaches and attempted breach should be reported and dealt with in an urgent manner. Further, people wandering near the perimeter fencing, on either side, without a valid motive should be challenged as they might be attempting to smuggle dangerous items in airport restricted area, over, under or through the perimeter barrier.

3.4 Access control points represent a weakness in the perimeter barrier because by definition it will represent an opening in the fence, therefore special care should be taken. If access control points are not staffed 24/7, they should be locked when not in use and regularly inspected. If possible, means for constantly monitoring access control points should be installed. Otherwise frequent patrols to ensure the integrity of the access control point is maintained should be scheduled. When in function, standard operating procedures for employees working at access control points should ensure that only authorized personnel and vehicles are allowed in the security restricted area. Additionally, procedures to ensure no dangerous and unauthorized items are carried in the security restricted area should be implemented.

3.5 If perimeter and access control security measures continue to be deficient, Contracting States will run the unfortunate risk of negating the massive investment put forward by all stakeholders to implement new security measures, such as 100% hold baggage screening, by failing to meet basic ICAO airport security requirements.

**4. Action by the Committee**

4.1 The AVSEC Committee is invited to note the present paper and ensure that Contracting States have effective perimeter and access control mechanism in place as well as procedures to ensure that the integrity of these airport security features is maintained

- END -