



International Civil Aviation Organization

CAR/SAM REGIONAL PLANNING IMPLEMENTATION GROUP (GREPECAS)

**Fifth Meeting of the GREPECAS Aviation Security Committee
(AVSEC/COMM/5)**

Buenos Aires, Argentina, 11 to 13 May 2006

AVSEC/COMM/5-WP/04

27/04/06

Agenda Item 4

Development of the AVSEC/COMM Work Programme

4.1 Hold Baggage Screening Task Force Developments (AVSEC/HBS/TF)

4.1.1 Final Report of the AVSEC/HBS/TF/1

REVIEW OF THE FINAL REPORT OF THE FIRST MEETING OF THE HOLD BAGGAGE SCREENING TASK FORCE OF THE GREPECAS AVIATION SECURITY COMMITTEE (AVSEC/HBS/TF/1)

(Presented by the Rapporteur)

SUMMARY

This working paper presents for the review of the Meeting, the Final Report of the AVSEC/HBS/TF/1 Meeting.

References:

- Final Report of the HBS Task Force Meeting
(Monterrey, Nuevo Leon, Mexico, December 2005)

1. Introduction

1.1 The First Meeting of the Hold Baggage Screening Task Force (AVSEC/HBS/TF/1) met in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon from 1 to 2 December 2005 in order to analyse the results and recommendations made by the ICAO Hold Baggage Screening Seminar for the NAM/CAR/SAM Regions that also took place in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon, from 28 to 30 November 2005.

1.2 The Final Report of the AVSEC/HBS/TF/1 is included in the **Appendix** to this Working Paper.

2. Action required by the Meeting

2.1 The Meeting is invited to:

- review the Final Report of the AVSEC/HBS/TF/1 and, if necessary, to prepare the relevant Draft Conclusions related to the subject; and
- use the Final Report of the AVSEC/HBS/TF/1 as reference material during the Ad Hoc Group convened through WP/05.



INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

CAR/SAM REGIONAL PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION GROUP

(GREPECAS)

**FIRST MEETING OF THE HOLD BAGGAGE SCREENING TASK FORCE OF THE
GREPECAS AVIATION SECURITY COMMITTEE**

(AVSEC/HBS/TF/1)

REPORT

Monterrey, Mexico
1 to 2 December 2005

Prepared by the Rapporteur
December 2005

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INDEX

Contents	Page
Index	i-1
Historical	ii-1
ii.1 Duration and site of the Meeting	ii-1
ii.2 Opening Ceremony	ii-1
ii.3 Organization of the Meeting	ii-1
ii.4 Working languages	ii-1
ii.5 Agenda	ii-2
ii.6 List of Working Papers	ii-3
ii.7 List of Information Papers	ii-4
ii.8 Schedule and Work Mode	ii-4
ii.9 Attendance	ii-4
List of Participants	iii-1
List of Participants – General Information	iv-1
Report on Agenda Item 1	
<i>HBS Systems</i>	1-1
Appendix A	1A-1
Appendix B	1B-1
Report on Agenda Item 2	
<i>Equipment Testing & Calibration</i>	2-1
Appendix A	2A-1
Appendix B	2B-1
Report on Agenda Item 3	
<i>Training</i>	3-1
Appendix A	3A-1
Appendix B	3B-1
Report on Agenda Item 4	
<i>Quality Control of Equipment</i>	4-1
Appendix A	4A-1
Appendix B	4B-1

INDEX

Contents	Page
Report on Agenda Item 5	
<i>Conveyor Systems</i>	5-1
<i>Appendix A</i>	5A-1
<i>Appendix B</i>	5B-1
Report on Agenda Item 6	
<i>Best Practices By States – Research, Development & Training</i>	6-1
<i>Appendix A</i>	6A-1
<i>Appendix B</i>	6B-1
<i>Appendix C</i>	6C-1
<i>Appendix D</i>	6D-1
Report on Agenda Item 7	
<i>Resources</i>	7-1
<i>Appendix A</i>	7A-1
<i>Appendix B</i>	7B-1
Report on Agenda Item 8	
<i>Advantages and Disadvantages of HBS Equipment Technology</i>	8-1
<i>Appendix A</i>	8A-1
<i>Appendix B</i>	8B-1
<i>Appendix C</i>	8C-1
Report on Agenda Item 9	
<i>Establishment of HBS Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) Model</i>	9-1
<i>Appendix A</i>	9A-1
<i>Appendix B</i>	9B-1
<i>Appendix C</i>	9C-1
<i>Appendix D</i>	9D-1
Report on Agenda Item 10	
<i>Any Other Business</i>	10-1

HISTORICAL

ii.1 Duration and Site of the Meeting

The First Meeting of the Hold Baggage Screening Task Force of the GREPECAS Aviation Security Committee (AVSEC/HBS/TF/1) was held on the premises of the Crowne Plaza Hotel in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon, Mexico, from 1 to 2 December 2005.

ii.2 Opening Ceremony

Mr. David Flores, Regional Officer, Aviation Security of the ICAO North American, Central American and Caribbean Regional Office addressed the Meeting and welcomed the participants to the two-day Task Force Meeting. Recognition was given to the interest being shown by the States in the NAM/CAR/SAM Regions as the original Task Force team had 8 members but had grown substantially as seen by the representation at the meeting. Special welcome was given to the Consultants from the USA, UK and Canada who shared during the Seminar and had also made themselves available to assist the Task Force in this very important area of security. Members of international organizations, such as, ICAO -Technical Cooperation Bureau, Transport Canada International Relations, LACLAC, IATA, ACI, COCESNA/ACSA and TSA were acknowledged for their support.

Mrs. Judith Goodison Chief Inspector Security of the Jamaica Civil Aviation Authority and Rapporteur of the AVSEC/HBS/TF also addressed the participants and welcomed them. The Chairman and 1st Vice President of GREPECAS, Lt. Col. Oscar Derby, was acknowledged and the representative from Barbados was congratulated for the State's 39th year of Independence which was celebrated on the first day of the meeting.

ii.3 Organization of the Meeting

The Meeting was conducted by the Rapporteur Mrs. Judith Goodison and by the Secretary of the Committee Mr. David Flores, Regional Officer, Aviation Security. Mr. Flores and the ICAO team in Mexico must be thanked for the major support that they gave and continue to give the Rapporteur who had not undertaken such a task before.

ii.4 Working Languages

The working languages of the Meeting were Spanish and English. The documentation was available to participants in English and two papers were presented in Spanish. We were fortunate to have the services of the translators from the Seminar so that all participants at the Task Force meeting could communicate, share their views, express concerns and share experiences.

ii.5 **Agenda**

Agenda Item 1 HBS Systems

- 1.1 Conventional x-ray equipment
- 1.2 Advanced Technology systems
- 1.3 Explosive Detection
- 1.4 Trace Detection
- 1.5 Research & New Development

Agenda Item 2 Equipment Testing & Calibration

- 2.1 Standard Test Piece (STP) & ASTM Step Wedge
- 2.2 Calibration & Testing
- 2.3 Conclusion
- 2.4 Working Paper

Agenda Item 3 Training

- 3.1 Structured HBS Training Programmes
- 3.2 Human Factors
- 3.3 Policy & Management Decision Makers
- 3.4 Draft Conclusion
- 3.5 Working Paper

Agenda Item 4 Quality Control of Equipment

- 4.1 Factory Acceptance/Site Acceptance Tests
- 4.2 Performance Testing
- 4.3 Routine Performance Tests
- 4.4 Draft Conclusion
- 4.5 Working Paper

Agenda Item 5 Conveyor Systems

- 5.1 General Consideration
- 5.2 Working Paper

Agenda Item 6 Best Practices By States – Research, Development & Training

- 6.1 Possible Locations for Hold Baggage Screening & Considerations During Airport Planning Stage
- 6.2 Current Best Practices by States
- 6.3 Research Developments
- 6.4 IATA Categorization of Airport Sizes
- 6.5 Conclusion

Agenda Item 7

Resources

- 7.1 Funding, Funding Alternatives & Technical Assistance
- 7.2 Consultants
- 7.3 Conclusion
- 7.4 Working Paper

Agenda Item 8

Advantages & Disadvantages of HBS Equipment Technology

- 8.1 Procurement vs. Rental
- 8.2 Decisions on the Type of Technology to Select & Install
- 8.3 Maintenance
- 8.4 Conclusion
- 8.5 Working Paper

Agenda Item 9

Establishment of HBS Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) Model

- 9.1 Standard Operating Procedures – Mexico
- 9.2 Standard Operating Procedures – IATA
- 9.3 Conclusion
- 9.4 Working Paper

Agenda Item 10

Any Other Business

- 10.1 Upcoming AVSEC/COMM and LACLAC AVSEC Group of Experts Meetings
- 10.2 Working Paper

ii.6

List of Working Papers

WORKING PAPERS				
Number	Agenda Item	Title	Date	Prepared and Presented by
WP/00	- -	Draft Agenda	01/12/05	Rapporteur
WP/01	3	Hold Baggage Screening Technology currently available	01/12/05	AVSEC/TRAIN Task Force Rapporteur and IATA
WP/02	5.1	General considerations for conveyor systems	01/12/05	Rapporteur
WP/03	6	Best practices by States	01/12/05	Rapporteur
WP/04	7.1	Funding and Technical Assistance	01/12/05	Rapporteur
WP/05	3	Implementation of globally accepted standard operating procedures for the successful implementation of 100 per cent hold baggage screening	01/12/05	IATA

WORKING PAPERS				
Number	Agenda Item	Title	Date	Prepared and Presented by
WP/06	1	Hold Baggage Screening – A view of the available technology	01/12/05	Brazil
WP/07	4	Quality Control	01/12/05	Antigua and Barbuda
WP/08	9	Establishment of HBS Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) Model	02/12/05	Mexico
WP/09	8	The problems related to procurement and Rental	01/12/05	Chile
WP/10	6	Possible locations for Hold Baggage Screening and factors for consideration during the planning stages	02/12/05	IATA
WP/11	2.2	Calibration and Testing	02/12/05	Antigua and Barbuda

ii.7 List of Information Papers

INFORMATION PAPERS				
Number	Agenda Item	Title	Date	Prepared and Presented by
IP/01	--	General Information	19/09/05	Secretariat

ii.8 Schedule and Work Mode

The Meeting agreed to hold three daily sessions of 90 minutes, with adequate breaks. The meeting also agreed to work as a whole, leaving the possibility open to establish Ad-hoc Groups to take full advantage of the expertise of the delegates and to ensure completion of the Agenda Items.

All representatives of the 18 States, representatives of international organizations and consultants must be commended for their interest and participation in the HBS Task Force Meetings to develop systems that will benefit our Regions and individual States. Special credit must also be given to representatives of States, both Agenda Item Presenters and those who assisted in the preparation of those presentations but were unable to attend the meetings. These persons worked late into the night to complete Agenda Item papers after daily attendance at the HBS Seminar and their sacrifice was much appreciated.

ii.9 Attendance

The Task Force Meeting was attended by 35 participants from 18 States located or having territories in the NAM/CAR/SAM Regions, observers from 5 international organizations, and 2 consultants in the AVSEC/HBS Field. A list of participants is shown in pages iii-1 to iii-2 and iv-1 to iv-6.

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Agenda Item 1 HBS Systems

1.1 Conventional x-ray equipment

1.1.1 More recently X-ray equipment has increased imaging and detection capabilities and is now used more widely. Hold baggage X-ray equipment is a fast and convenient way of seeing inside without the need to unpack or damage items, as well as, unnecessarily aggravating the already anxious traveller.

1.2.2 The equipment can be bought with various tunnel sizes depending on the types of X-ray screening to be conducted, such as, passenger carry-on baggage, hold baggage and air cargo. This flexible capability allows most objects to be passed through the equipment and produce an X-ray image.

1.2.3 In all modern equipment, independent of size, the image is built up using the linescan principle. As the baggage passes through the tunnel of the X-ray system, the conveyor moves at a constant speed and as each portion of the bag passes through the X-ray beam its image is taken and stored. The image is built up and panned onto the display monitor.

1.2.4 Nearly all modern baggage X-ray equipment has the capability to display material types in different colours. Typically, some explosives, drugs, etc. are displayed in orange; metals such as steel and copper are displayed in blue; and a mixture of organic and metallic, as well as, aluminium and glass are displayed in green. Some items like thick metal absorb a lot of the X-rays and appear black on the image. The indication of the material type helps the system operator decide if certain objects present a threat or could be potential contraband.

1.2.5 Nearly all baggage X-ray equipment and explosive detection systems have several built-in image enhancement features that help the operator to examine the image more effectively. These features allow the operator to modify the contrast of the image allowing it to be tuned for viewing light or dark regions; edge enhancements can be used to define things like wires; and it is possible to view just the organic content or non-organic content. Individual manufacturers will have a range of such features available and more. These can be specified and set on the equipment control console depending on the equipment's intended use.

1.2.6 As with any X-ray system, detection depends on the operator's ability to recognize the components of a bomb, therefore, operators must be given suitable training.

1.2 Advanced Technology Systems

1.2.1 Advancements in X-ray screening technology is steadily improving so that conventional X-rays have been superseded by Advanced Technology (AT) X-ray systems. AT X-ray systems process bags at a high rate and make explosive detection decisions by the addition of Computed tomography of the X-ray (CTX) image. Some AT systems use multiple transmission views and dual energy to help with the explosive detection decisions.

1.2.2 AT is usually placed at Level 1 of an in-line hold baggage screening system which is completely automated. The "Bags per hour (Bags/h) throughput" ranges from a high of 1,800 bags/h to a low of 1,500 bags/h. Manual feed of the bags for X-ray screening, if used as a stand-alone in an airport lobby or basement is drastically reduced to approximately, 160 bags/h. The stand-alone equipment or

manual system is labour intensive, slow, and prone to contributing to personnel injuries from their having to lift heavy bags.

1.2.3 This type of equipment cost can run from a high of US\$800,000 to 900,000 – 1800 bags/h with multi-view/dual energy, or a low of US\$400,000 – 160 bags/h, manual operation. An AT system with dual energy alone can cost between US\$350,000 – 1500 bags/h to a low of US\$250,000 – 1800 bags/h.

1.3 Explosive Detection Systems (EDS)

1.3.1 Some types of baggage X-ray equipment are known as explosive detection systems (EDS). This category of system can discriminate, to a degree, between explosives and other materials and indicate this visually, by a number of means, to the operator. These systems, when used in the airport in-line hold baggage screening system, are operated in the “automatic mode” where a detection of an explosive-like material in a bag will activate a diverter and allow the image to be examined by an operator.

1.3.2 These systems are extremely heavy, and costly starting from a high of US\$1.5 million with a 600 bag/h throughput to a low of US\$1 million with a 300/350 bags/h throughput, dependent on the manufacturer. These machines weigh approximately 10,000 pounds and large, measuring on average 24' x 6' x 6'. The advantage of using an EDS over Explosive Trace Detection (ETD) machine is that the threat detection is automated and their throughput rate is much higher. The EDS, however, produces higher false alarms and operators must resolve those alarms by either using on-screen alarm resolution or by using ETD.

1.3.3 Thus far, there is one manufacturer that has recently produced and obtained TSA certification for an EDS which is smaller, light weight, less expensive and uses dual energy and computed tomography. This recently produced EDS costs between US\$300,000-400,000 with a 100 bag/h throughput. Additional advantages of this EDS includes the ability to be used in an automated system as well as a stand-alone unit, needs no airport structural strengthening of floors and runs on single phase power.

1.4 Trace Detection

1.4.1 Trace Detection equipment is capable of detecting explosives and drugs from the vapours they give off or the particulate traces spread when they are handled. As some explosives and drugs are more volatile than others, vapour detection is more appropriate to some materials while trace detection is more appropriate for others. Plastic explosives, for example, are best detected sampling particulate traces.

1.4.2 It is important to note that vapour detecting equipment relies on the presence of explosive vapour and is not capable of detecting explosives which do not vaporize, or if the vapour is contained.

1.4.3 There are three main components in the process when using a vapour and trace detector, which includes: the sampling through vapour gathering or searching for particulate traces by wiping surfaces with a small piece of paper or cloth; an analytical system; and the data processing system which is carried out automatically by computer software which allows an alarm to be generated and the type of drug or explosive to be indicated.

1.4.4 False alarms can occur from a non-target substance, however, it must be noted that the effect of raising the detection threshold is to reduce sensitivity, decreasing both false alarms and detection performance.

1.4.5 Whichever analysis technique is selected, it needs to be able to cope with the dirt and debris that is collected along with any explosive or drugs traces. It needs to be sensitive enough to detect very small quantities of any explosive or drug that are available in many operational scenarios.

1.4.6 Generally, drugs and explosives are too different to allow the same instrument to detect them at the same time. It was noted, however, that ion mobility spectroscopy-based instruments can often be fairly easily switched from explosives detection to drugs detection.

1.4.7 Several companies offer trace detection equipment that are capable of narcotic and explosive detection. They range in cost from as high as US\$60,000 to as low as US\$29,000 and all have a 30-60 bag/h throughput.

1.5 Equipment Maintenance

1.5.1 The correct maintenance of explosive detection equipment is essential if the equipment is to continue to provide the ultimate detection capabilities it is designed for. Maintenance will keep the operational integrity of equipment and ensure a constant performance level.

1.5.2 A strict maintenance management programme should be implemented and adhered to. The programme should include the preventive maintenance schedule to minimize equipment failure through periodic and systematic equipment inspections. Corrective maintenance should also be conducted to repair or remedy any failure, incident or accident that has adversely affected the functioning of the equipment.

1.5.3 Technicians trained and equipped by the manufacturer of the equipment are to be used to conduct maintenance in keeping with the manufacturer's instructions and guidance. Ideally, a maintenance training programme should be included in the sales contract for the equipment, with its content and duration forming part of the initial contract specifications. Where an airport does not have personnel or material resources to organize in-house equipment maintenance, use should be made of a sub-contractor bound by a maintenance contract which includes: a warranty period for the equipment, components, repair work and parts; a minimum response time between the time of the call and the arrival of trained technicians on site; a maximum permissible equipment down time; a preventive maintenance inspection programme (nature and description of associated warranties); identification of the subcontractor's suitably trained and accredited maintenance personnel; and equipment manufacturer's certification issued to the subcontractor and associated warranties.

1.5.4 Equipment service records need to be maintained in keeping with international practices and local laws. A parts inventory of replacement equipment is also required as this will effectively reduce the equipment down time.

1.5.5 Equipment maintenance costs must be factored into the procurement of security equipment systems. The manufacturer and other users of the equipment should be contacted regarding the level of investment needed to ensure the equipment remains serviceable and operationally effective. Provision should be made for the depreciation costs with the expected lifespan of the equipment until it is withdrawn from service or becomes technologically obsolete.

1.5.6 With the rapid growth in technology, security equipment manufacturers usually advise operators and the State's civil aviation authority about modifications or improvements that they have made to their equipment.

1.6 Research & New Development

1.5.1 Manufacturers and States that certify security screening equipment for hold baggage are constantly working to improve the equipment capabilities. Through the United States Transportation Security Administration (TSA) research and development, a software upgrade that enhances the capability of one manufacturer's EDS received certification in 2005. The upgrade provides improved detection, increased throughput capacity, improved reliability and reduced false alarm rates. As mentioned before, another manufacturer has received TSA certification for a lighter, and smaller EDS machine.

1.5.2 In looking ahead, both the United States and Canada are conducting research for improving technology in security-related areas. In the area of screening equipment, upgrades to provide improved detection, increased baggage throughput capacity, improved reliability and reduce false alarm rates are presently being achieved.

1.5.3 Emerging and revolutionary new technologies for the "New Generation" equipment are being encouraged and industry and academia are being challenged to apply innovation in the development of new screening systems. This is a long-term project that would not be deployable in the immediate future.

1.7 Draft Conclusions

1.7.1 A Regional approach to hold baggage screening equipment acquisition is proposed. This can be achieved through the umbrella of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to which our States are contracted members. Through the ICAO Technical Cooperation Bureau, screening equipment can be purchased at reduced costs because of the organizations link with the United Nations. It is perceived that with ICAO assistance this facility can be further extended to the Regional acquisition of security screening equipment. If at all possible, this should mean an additional reduction in equipment acquisition costs.

1.7.2 To achieve this end, consideration should be given to establishing Regional Aviation Security Screening Equipment Acquisition Committees in the respective Regions. These Committees should be comprised of, or have available to the committee, AVSEC specialists, certified screening equipment technicians, an international aviation lawyer, a financial expert, and possibly a consultant who is versed in all aspects of hold baggage screening systems and airport design.

1.7.3 A negotiating strategy, central, easily accessible location for meetings and establishment of equipment supplier's Regional office for ease of obtaining replacement parts or gaining service assistance should also be considered.

1.7.4 A sub-committee could possibly be formed to assist States that lack equipment expertise in determining their equipment needs. They could also formulate the proposals that would go from the official Acquisition Committee to the authority responsible to ICAO for civil aviation in the State.

1.8 Working Paper/06

1.8.1 WP/06 and the comments by States are attached to this part of the Report as **Appendices A and B** respectively.

APPENDIX A

AVSEC/HBS/TF/1-WP/06

01/12/05



International Civil Aviation Organization

CAR/SAM REGIONAL PLANNING IMPLEMENTATION GROUP (GREPECAS)

**First Meeting of the Hold Baggage Screening Task Force of the GREPECAS
Aviation Security Committee (AVSEC/HBS/TF/1)**

Monterrey, Mexico, 1 to 2 December 2005

Agenda Item 1: Hold Baggage Systems

HOLD BAGGAGE SCREENING – A VIEW OF THE AVAILABLE TECHNOLOGY

(Presented by Rogerio Benevides Carvalho/Christiano Miranda da Silva)

SUMMARY

This paper presents the main hold baggage technology available in order to give States guidance to achieve, at January 1st 2006, 100% hold baggage screening, to comply with Annex 17 Standard 4.4.8. The paper also recommends what equipments can be used at an international airport of the South America and Caribbean Region, based on its average of the top 30 major annual peak-hour passengers. However, the actual choice of systems must be based on a detailed requirements evaluation based on such things as peak baggage volumes, aircraft sizes, baggage characteristics, including possible seasonal variations, etc. which may modify the basic recommendations.

References

- Annex 17, Standard 4.4.8 – Hold Baggage Screening
- Manufacturers of Security Systems

1. Introduction

1.1 The most critical aviation security issues facing States today is the quickly approaching deadline for 100% percent hold baggage screening, which is to be implemented by January 1st 2006. The requirement is a result of Amendment 10 to Annex 17 and the expectation is to meet this requirement by employing realistic, reliable mechanisms for screening every bag that is loaded onto an originating international passenger flight.

1.2 The challenge is to ensure that the most effective means of baggage screening is used to protect the traveling public. States should be encouraged to consider the probability of detection when evaluating the various means available to achieve 100% hold baggage screening.

1.3 Besides that, States from South America and the Caribbean face serious budget constraints that lead them to search for a solution to achieve 100% hold baggage screening that fits with their particular problems. In order to help States choose the best technology available to be implemented, the discussion below presents an overview of each way or technique to best perform this task.

2. Hold Baggage Screening Techniques

2.1 The screening of hold baggage is a challenging process requiring a high commitment of manpower and resources to detect a small quantity of explosives that may be well concealed among the millions of hold bags that are flown daily.

2.2 As defined in Annex 17, the screening process means the use of “technical or other means” to detect prohibited items in hold baggage. This definition is very broad and allows different interpretations. Different types of equipment and methods, such as, Conventional X-ray, canines, Advanced Technology (AT) X-ray, Explosive Detection Systems (EDS), Explosive Trace Detection (ETD), physical searches which depend on high manpower usage, and Computer Tomography (CT) meet the requirements.

2.3. As mentioned before, even with the severe financial limitations of the Regions, it is strongly recommended that the adopted solution can provide the warrantee with its effectiveness. Below is an overview of the various technical options available to States with a discussion of their respective strengths and weaknesses. **Attachments 1, 2 and 3** show some equipment used in screening, carry-on baggage, hold baggage and people, respectively, and their characteristics.

2.4 Conventional and Dual Energy (Colour) X-ray Equipment

2.4.1 The use of Conventional X-ray equipment to screen hold baggage continues and is much improved from its development in the 1970s. Dual-energy X-ray models use dual levels of X-Ray energy to distinguish organic materials (low atomic number) that may be explosives from inorganic materials (higher atomic numbers and display each in a different colour. Thick objects that are not fully penetrated are identified to the screener in third colour (typically black). The specific colours used can vary between equipment manufacturers. Some X-rays add Computed tomography (CT) **which provides maximum sensitivity and accuracy for material detection and identification. CT can be used to specifically identify explosives and discriminate them from most other innocuous materials. CT images also have improved density resolution compared to Conventional X-ray images. The disadvantages of present CT system designs are their complexity, very high cost, higher package X-ray dose (current models are not film safe) compared to Conventional X-ray and slower operation.**

2.4.2 Although advances in technology make it easier to separate metallic clutter from the subtler image of a bomb, the limitations of **Conventional X-ray** technology remains significant and its use as the main tool to protect civil aviation is limited.

2.4.3 Unlike weapons, bombs have no pre-determined shape. The challenge facing regulators is that the **hold baggage screening** process is dependent on the training, motivation, perception, and vigilance of the screeners. Performance of the **screening** system is difficult to measure, and unannounced, random testing often reveals that the system does not attain a level of effectiveness needed to detect explosives. The use of this option as a stand-alone **system** is not recommended.

2.5 Explosive Trace Detection (ETD)

2.5.1 In the late 1990s, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States conducted tests on the expected contamination levels when a careful terrorist builds a bomb, conceals it in an object designed to evade visual inspection, and places the object in a hold bag.

2.5.2 Based on lessons learned from these tests and situations in which **explosive** trace detection is used for primary screening, the United States devised a strategy that requires a certain portion (percentage) of bags to be inspected on the exterior only; another portion (percentage) of bags to be inspected on both the exterior and interior; and, another portion requiring a complete screening of all objects large enough to conceal a bomb. High labour costs and slow processing times of **explosive** trace detection **equipment** limit this mixed strategy.

2.5.3 The challenge is not the speed of the equipment, which provides detection and the identification of the explosive in ten seconds, but rather in bag handling and sample acquisition by the screener. Experts have found that if the sampling process is not done systematically, detections will be missed.

2.5.4 The major trace detection technology involves detection by the technology Ion Mobility Spectrometry (IMS). The collection and analysis of minute, invisible amounts of organic material, called traces, that are microscopic amounts left through contamination or direct contact with explosives. A sample of interest is heated and vaporized; positive and negative ions are formed. Ions of the corresponding polarity are allowed to move into the drift region. The various ions travel at different, but characteristic, speeds according to the ions weight and size. The time required for ions to drift down the tube is precisely known and pre-programmed. So, target substances are detected and identified.

2.5.5 One example of the **explosive trace** detection using IMS is the Itemiser 3, from General Electric (GE), with a switching system that delivers simultaneous positive and negative ion detection from a single sample for the most comprehensive explosives and narcotics detection available. It achieves this through a proprietary ion “trap” that increases ionisation efficiency, the main factor determining detection sensitivity.

2.5.6 Traditional IMS instruments operate, in general, in either positive or negative mode, but not both modes simultaneously. While negative mode operation detects the majority of explosives, peroxide explosives (TATP) are among the substances more readily detected in positive mode. Therefore to rule out the presence an expanded list of target explosives, conventional IMS detectors require operators to sample and test in one mode, then switch modes and resample and test again.

2.5.7 Another example of ITMS is the VaporTracer2, from GE, where vapours are drawn through a nozzle directly into the detector for analysis or by a detachable vacuum sample wand draws vapours into a sponge-like sample trap, which is then inserted into the equipment for analysis. (RDX and PETN have very low vapour, and are hard to detect with this equipment).

2.5.8 ETD technology should be considered as a complementary tool and its use may be recommended as a second or third technical means to increase the effectiveness of the **hold baggage** screening process.

2.5.9 The table below shows some available equipment:

Table 1 - Trace Detection Equipment

Model	Company	Technology	Detection	Estimated Bags/h	Estimated Price US\$ x 1,000
Itemiser3	GE	Ion Trap Mobility Spectrometer (ITMS)	Narcotics and Explosives	30-60	45
VaporTracer2	GE	Ion Trap Mobility Spectrometer (ITMS)	Narcotics and Explosives	30-60	29
Ionscan 400B	Smith Detection	Ion Trap Mobility Spectrometer (ITMS)	Narcotics and Explosives	30-60	50
Ionscan 500DT	Smith Detection	Ion Trap Mobility Spectrometer (ITMS)	Narcotics and Explosives	30-60	60
Defender	Thermo Electron	High Speed Gas Chromatography with Differential IMS	Narcotics and Explosives	30-60	60

2.6 Advanced Technology (AT) Systems

2.6.1 Equipment manufacturers have developed Advanced Technology (AT) X-ray systems that process bags at a high rate and make explosive detection decisions by the addition of Computer Tomography of the X-Ray (CTX) image. Several equipment manufacturers have attempted to achieve automated detection with AT.

2.6.2 Note that the term Advanced Technology as used in this paper does not infer that the equipment has been purchased or approved by any state and in particular, should not be confused with same term when used to describe equipment purchased several years ago by the US Federal Aviation Administration for use at US airports.

2.6.3 Some of the AT systems employ multiple transmission views and dual energy to help with the explosive detection decisions. Several States have deployed these AT systems as the first level of hold baggage screening followed by on-screen alarm resolution and certified EDS Computed Tomography-based technology.

2.6.4 The United States has repeatedly tested this technology and determined that it does not meet the U.S. detection standards for all threat explosive categories. The vulnerability created by undetected critical threats leaves an exploitable gap in explosive detection. A system relying on AT as the first stage contains this vulnerability.

2.6.5 Generally, X-ray devices operate by passing X-rays through screened items and projecting an image of the contents being examined on a monitor. Potentially explosive materials are identified by their density, average atomic number, and appearance. The detection capabilities of these devices vary in terms of how the X-ray systems function - for example, by providing cross-sectional images or by using “reflected” energies known as backscatter. The devices also vary in terms of whether the presence of potential explosives is signalled by an automatic alarm or is manually identified by an operator.

2.6.6 The use of Advance Technology X-ray as the main resource in the screening process should be considered. The use of AT equipment in conjunction with an ETD, for “small” and “medium” airports, can be a good option that meets Annex 17 requirements. Besides that, **airports categorized as “large”**, with **their high volume of passenger/baggage traffic** can use AT X-ray at Level 1 of **the five levels of hold baggage screening**.

Table 2 - Advanced Technology Systems

Model	Company	Technology	Detection	Bags/h	Estimated Price (US\$ x 1,000)
MVT	L-3	Multi-View (3) Dual energy	Explosives	1,800	800-900
Vivid VIS 108	L-3	Dual energy	Explosives	1,800	250
10080EDS	Smith Detection	Dual energy	Explosives	1,500	300-350
EdtS (Fixed CT – 5 Views)	Smith Detection	Multi-View (5) Dual energy	Explosives	1,800	800-900
10080 EDS-2is	Smith Detection	Multi-View (2) Dual energy	Explosives	1,500	500-600
XRD1000	Rapiscan	Multi-View (2) Dual energy	Explosives	Manual 160	400
MVXR5000	Rapiscan	Multi-View (5) Dual energy	Explosives	1,800	700-800

*Note: Bags per hour (b/hr) is the manufacturers stated maximum when the bags are inserted at an optimal (automatic) rate. **Optimal b/hr** throughputs depend upon the feed mechanism. (i.e. The AT is integrated into an **in-line** baggage handling system) The b/hr throughput for bags that are manually fed into AT machine is less than one half of the figures cited.

2.7 Explosive Detection Systems (EDS)

2.7.1 Several States have adopted Computed Tomography (CT) based automated EDS as the primary method of screening hold baggage. EDS provides a high level of detection across the total threat base coupled with an operationally manageable false alarm rate.

2.7.2 The **machines** are heavy, large, expensive, and generally can be integrated into the baggage handling system to operate most efficiently. Regardless, the deployed systems have been operating reliably and do provide the highest level of protection to the travellers.

2.7.3 Some States include certified EDS technology within their baggage screening systems to resolve un-cleared alarms from AT and screener on screen alarm resolution. The problem with this approach is that the level one technology may have any number of missed detections, which could proceed to the aircraft. This must be a risk-based decision made by States recognizing no system has 100% detection.

2.7.4 Several States are conducting research and testing to identify more effective and efficient approaches to screening hold baggage and to expand the list of threats addressed. They are exploring combinations of innovative and new technologies.

2.7.5 The use of most EDS technology as **stand-alone screening equipment in the airport lobby** has great financial and operational implications due to the low number of bags **that it is possible to screen** per hour. This leads to the necessity to have a significant number of EDS units in the airport, which can be extremely expensive **and reduce lobby space**. The best use of EDS technology is as a supplementary tool, mainly for airports with a high volume of traffic, as a part of a complex and expensive five-level **HBS** screening system.

2.7.6 For medium airports, the new lighter and less costly EDS equipment should be considered as a viable option.

Table 3 - Explosive Detection Systems (Currently US FAA/TSA Certified)

Model	Company	Technology	Detection	Estimated Bags/h	Estimated Price US\$ x 1,000
Examiner 3Dx6500 and 3Dx6000	L-3	CT	Explosives	Up to 600	1,100-1,300
CTX9000 DSI	GE	CT	Explosives	542	1,400
CTX5500 DS	GE	CT	Explosives	-	1,000
CTX2500	GE	CT	Explosives	Manual	Greater than 700
Yxlon 3000	GE	Coherent X-ray Scatter	Explosives	60-80	Greater than 1,500
Yxlon 3500	GE	Coherent X-ray Scatter	Explosives	60-80	Greater than 1,500
Exact 6400	Analogic	Dual Energy CT	Explosives	600	Greater Than 1,000
CT-80	Reveal	Dual Energy CT	Explosives	100	300-400

*Note: Bags per hour (b/hr) is the manufacturers stated maximum when the bags are inserted at an optimal (automatic) rate. **Optimal b/hr** throughputs depend upon the feed mechanism. (i.e. The EDS is integrated into an **in-line** baggage handling system) The b/hr throughput for bags that are manually fed into EDS machine is less than one half of the figures cited.

2.8 Research Development

2.8.1 The **hold baggage screening equipment** technologies already presented are undergoing improvements **to provide improved detection, increased throughput capacity, improved reliability and reduced false alarm rates**. Other technology being developed by some countries, such as Argentina and Russia, is based on Quadrupole Resonance Analysis (QRA).

2.8.2 QRA is a technique related to magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) used in hospitals. QRA, unlike MRI, uses low intensity tuned radio frequency pulses to probe for the molecular structure of the target materials. Although QRA is a precise technique, it is limited to detecting a small range of explosives and does not produce an image, so it must be used in conjunction with Conventional X-ray imaging systems or manual/physical search. The advantage of QRA is that the configuration of the explosive, whether in bulk, sheet, distributed, etc. is irrelevant to detection and there is no performance degradation when detecting thin explosives. The primary disadvantage of the QRA method is the inability to detect materials enclosed in a metal container or foil. Iron or large amounts of non-ferrous metals in a package cause field distortion and reduce effectiveness.

3. Recommendation

3.1 At last, we recommend that the group should consider for discussion the following proposal:

As described during the paper, many issues should be considered in making a decision **regarding the type of HBS screening system that is required and justified for the individual airport**. However, one of the most important **aspects** is related to the effectiveness of the option selected. Considering the Mexico presentation at the HBS Seminar, as a preliminary step we recommend the following options for an international airport with:

- (average of the top 30 annual peak-hour passengers) ≤ 250
The use of a Conventional X-Ray, ETD and/or pre-established random physical search.
- (average of the top 30 annual peak-hour passengers) > 250
The use of AT, CTS and ETD automated system and pre-established some random physical search; or
- The use of CTX and ETD on an automated system and pre-established some random physical search.

3.2 Because of the challenge of screening 100% hold baggage, the actual choice of systems must be based on a detailed **airport** evaluation, to include: establishment of the peak baggage throughput plus 30, aircraft sizes, baggage characteristics, including possible seasonal variations, etc. which may modify the basic recommendations.

ATTACHMENT 1 – BAGGAGE CARRY-ON

Baggage Carry-on				
TRACE				
Use/Technology	Type	COMPANY	Status/Applicability	Comments
IMS	Desktop	GE, Smiths,	most deployed, mature technology	-
	Handheld	GE, Smiths,	less applicable	sensitivity and selectivity
GC	Desktop	Thermal Detection	COTS but limited deployment	-
MS	Desktop	Hitachi	COTS but emerging	-
BULK DETECTION				
Use/Technology	Type	COMPANY	Status/Applicability	Comments
X-Ray	B&W	Various	Not applicable	has no materials discrimination
-	Dual Energy	Smiths, L3, Rapiscan, Guillardoni	strong deployment	-
AT DUAL ENERGY				
Use/Technology	Type	COMPANY	Status/Applicability	Comments
-	single view	L3	size an issue, not normally deployed for this use	-
-	multi-view	L3, Smiths	size an issue, not normally deployed for this use	-
CT X-Ray	single energy	GE, L3	size an issue, not normally deployed for this use	-
-	dual energy	Analogic, L3, Reveal	size an issue, not normally deployed for this use	-
-	Non-rotating	Securescan	size an issue, not normally deployed for this use	-
QR	-	Rapiscan, G E, Argentina	emerging, limited pilot project deployment	some new models emerging coupled with dual energy X-ray for enhancing carry-on screening

ATTACHMENT 2 – HOLD BAGGAGE

Hold baggage				
TRACE				
Use/Technology	Type	COMPANY	Status/Applicability	Comments
IMS	Desktop	GE, Smiths,	deployed to enhance security value of dual energy and AT X-ray	Frequently used at level4/5 of multi-level systems to assist in resolution of uncleared bags
-	Handheld	GE, Smiths,	less applicable	sensitivity and selectivity
GC	Desktop	Thermal Detection	COTS but limited deployment	-
MS	Desktop	Hitachi	emerging but COTS	-
BULK DETECTION				
Use/Technology	Type	COMPANY	Status/Applicability	Comments
X-Ray	B&W	various	Not applicable	no materials discrimination
	Dual Energy	Smiths, L3, Rapiscan, Guilardoni ...	some deployment for HBS but usually with some additional hand search and trace detection	on its own has limited explosives detection capability
AT DUAL ENERGY				
Use/Technology	Type	COMPANY	Status/Applicability	Comments
-	single view	L3, (Smiths?)	deployed quite widely	"older" technology
-	multi-view	L3, Smiths	newer, enhanced performance	
CT X-Ray	single energy	GE, L3		
-	dual energy	Analogic, L3, Reveal	newly COTS, being deployed	better image clarity, lower threat weight detection, better materials selectivity
-	Non-rotating	Securescan	under development	performance specs not known
QR	-	-	emerging, limited pilot project deployment	normally good for detection of RDX and PETN, other explosives can be very problematic. May not provide location data for alarm resolution

ATTACHMENT 3 – PEOPLE SCREENING

PEOPLE SCREENING			
PORTALS			
Type	COMPANY	Status/Applicability	Comments
trace	GE, L3	emerging, pilot deployments	limited throughput, so normally selectee screening only, size an issue
X-Ray backscatter	AS&E, Secure 1000	emerging, pilot deployments	limited throughput, so normally selectee screening only, size an issue
millimeter wave	Safe View, Qinetiq	emerging, pilot deployments	limited throughput, so normally selectee screening only, size an issue
terra-hertz	? (UK and US)	under development	-
TRACE			
Type	COMPANY	Status/Applicability	Comments
Document scanner	GE, Smiths,	COTS but emerging, pilot deployment	-
"hand, finger" scanner	GE	COTS but emerging, pilot deployment	-

APPENDIX B

COMMENTS BY STATES & CONSULTANTS

Presentation Paper - Hold Baggage Screening Systems

Brazil – DGCA

- They still needed clarification for sizing airports as airport categorization was mentioned by the presenter, Christiano da Silva (Brazil).

Consultant - Ashcote Consulting Ltd. (ACL)

- Airports are classified by size.
- Consideration is also given to the peak periods when coming up with the airport classification. -- The **recommendation is to use peak hour + 30 to determine equipment needs.**
- Consideration must also be given to food (restaurants), traffic (tourists), etc.

Consultant - Aerospace Services Int'l Inc.

- It was observed that the paper did not mention two screening companies, the old Egis System and Hitachi.

Transport Canada (TC) – Director Security Technology

- Mr. Cartwright offered to work on the table presented in paragraph 2.5.9 of the presentation with the HBS team to come up with recommendations.
- Hand search needed to be mentioned as a part of the trace detection and we should not draw absolute lines but give guidelines.

ICAO – Regional AVSEC Officer

- He clarified that ICAO does not have detection standards for explosives as stated. Concurred with TC statement and informed the Group that it was being consulted.

Consultant –

- Manufacturers equipment was found not to be capable of meeting the published throughput rate of 1800 bags per hour (bph).
- The maximum achieved was 1200 bph.
- Advanced Technology (AT) equipment meets TSA detection standards but not on the false alarm rate.

Consultant –

- It was identified that Table 2 – Advanced Technology (AT) Systems had been expanded and we needed to include the revised copy here.

Consultant – Aerospace Services Int'l Inc.

- Mr. Vincent noted that paragraph 2.7.2 regarding weight and expense of explosive detection systems (EDS) does not apply to the latest explosive detection system from “Reveal”.
- It was observed that information in paragraph 2.7.3 needed to be clarified with current supplier's equipment, and information gleaned at the seminar was missing.
- He agreed that 1200 bags per hour (bph) was the maximum achieved in baggage screening from experience.
- Information on throughput was obtained from USA Government Accountability Office (GAO) study that was published.
- EDS unit installed inline will process approximately 450 bph.

- Table 3 – Explosive Detection Systems, paper was revised and there were typographical errors in the pricing column that needed to be corrected.

Consultant – ACL

- Reveal needed to be added to the list of available EDS models that are currently available on the market.

Transport Canada – Director Security Technology

- Paragraphs 2.8.1/2.8.2/2.8.3 Mr. Cartwright advised that we drop references to nuclear which could be misleading and add technical clarification he could provide.
- Paragraph 2.8.5, Quadruple was not a broad range of items that can be detected.

???

- Report needed to contain a Summary and the Introduction was to reflect what was noted and clarified.

???

- Airports were identified as small, medium and large but the international categorization of these was needed to give guidance to States. That is:
 - (a) Small airports – under 1 million passenger per year;
 - (b) Medium airports – 1-5 million passengers per year; and
 - (c) Large airports – 5 million plus passengers per year.
- Equipment recommendation for each category airport was given in the paper and it was recommended that really small airports with less than 500, 000 passengers should use conventional x-ray and physical search.

Consultant – Aerospace Services Int'l Inc.

- Quadruple Resonance was emerging technology and would not be ready for the next 5 years, therefore he recommended that we omit this reference from the paper.
- In looking at prices for equipment, we should not only consider the capital cost, but also the long-term maintenance costs.
- Where there was more manpower used, this led to more errors and more costs.
- US Invision System L-3600 was found to have high maintenance costs (electrical gantry) in the mechanical systems.
- The new Reveal had no mechanical gantry, and so far only operational costs would need to be looked at.

Brazil - DGCA

- This paper was a starting point for the work of the task force.
- They were aware of the additional costs for the next computer tomography (CT step).

Consultant – (ACL)

- New technology will when alarmed show ????

Peru – Chief AVSEC & Dangerous Goods

- Give options for States for them to make the best decisions when selecting security equipment.
- They need to know how to do screening and what to look for. Dangerous goods was touched on by the UK presentation.
- At level 1 in the in-line hold baggage screening system, dangerous goods are not properly looked on. This is viewed as a risk being faced.

Transport Canada (TC) – Director Security Technology

- Regulators struggle with this. Additional capability to identify prohibited items is needed in the presentation paper.

Consultant – Aerospace Services Int'l Inc.

- Ways are needed to detect gasoline, as contained in Annex 18 but he agreed that we should keep our comments at Annex 17 level.

Brazil - DGCA

- Will make the necessary revisions to the presentation paper before attachment to the report.

Agenda Item 2 Equipment Testing & Calibration

1 Standard Test Piece (STP) & ASTM Step Wedge

1.1 Manufacturers/suppliers of screening equipment normally provide the purchaser with a standard test piece (STP) or combined test piece (CTP) upon delivery of the equipment.

1.2 With the introduction of a new generation of more sophisticated x-ray systems that have been developed over the last few years, a new ASTM F792 Step Wedge has also been developed. This ASTM x-ray test object was developed by an independent security company and strictly complies with TSA and Transport Canada test requirements. The ASTM F792 Step Wedge was developed to assess an x-ray based screening system's image quality in 9 distinct areas.

1.3 The structure of the STP and ASTM Step Wedge are broadly similar as the latter was developed from the original STP.

1.4 Presently, the original STP is used in Europe to test x-ray based screening equipment.

2. Calibration & Testing

2.1 Screening equipment calibration and various testing standards are developed in Agenda Item 4 – Quality Control of Equipment.

3. Conclusion

3.1 It was concluded that although States are responsible for setting the standards for screening equipment testing, these standards should be standardized.

3.2 Submission of the proposal to develop standardized protocols for hold baggage security screening equipment testing is forwarded to the GREPECAS AVSEC/COMM for review and final resolution.

4. Working Paper/11

4.1 The AVSEC/HBS Task Force WP/11 was presented by Task Force member, Mr. Avery Henry, Safety/Security Oversight Officer from Antigua and Barbuda.

4.2 WP/11 and the comments by States are attached to this part of the Report as **Appendices A and B** respectively.

APPENDIX A



International Civil Aviation Organization
CAR/SAM REGIONAL PLANNING IMPLEMENTATION GROUP (GREPECAS)
First Meeting of the Hold Baggage Screening Task Force of the GREPECAS Aviation Security Committee (AVSEC/HBS/TF/1)
Monterrey, Mexico, 1 to 2 December 2005

AVSEC/HBS/TF/1-WP/11
02/12/05

Agenda Item 2: Equipment Testing & Calibration

(Presented by Avery Henry)

SUMMARY

In order for the requirement for 100% HOLD BAGGAGE SCREENING to be fully effective, there must be test and calibration methodologies designed to ensure that performance requirements for X-ray equipment used to support the Civil Aviation security measures are met and maintained.

References:

- Annex 17, Standard 4.4.8 – Hold Baggage Screening
- Manufacturers of Hold baggage screening equipment

1. Introduction

1.1 The routine testing of security equipment is important to ensure that the equipment is functioning correctly and the required standard before being used to screen objects in support of the standards that are laid down. This level of testing should be carried out on a regular basis, by suitably trained personnel who is responsible for the correct operation of the system.

2. Factory Test

2.1 **Explosive Trace Detection (ETD):** This test is normally conducted by the consultants coupled with the built-in test equipment.

2.2 **Conventional X-ray:** This test is normally conducted by the consultants, coupled with the step-wedge (ASTM) in the U.S.A and the STP in the ECAC.

2.3 **Advance Technology (AT):** This equipment is tested by the consultant, the step-wedge (image quality), explosives or stimulant.

2.4 **Computer Tomography (CT):** Testing of this equipment should be conducted by the consultants and a test which is supplied by the manufacturer.

2.5 **PORTALS:** This equipment is still under review, thus testing of this equipment is to be decided.

3. Daily Testing

3.1 **Explosive Detection Trace (EDT):** Test equipment is supplied by the manufacturer,(e.g. lipstick).

3.2 **Conventional X-ray:** Step-wedge

3.3 **Advanced Technology & Computer Tomography (CT) Equipment:** These are both tested using the test case.

4. Conclusion

- (i) It is necessary to have records for the life of the machines.
- (ii) Written protocols should be established in the methods of testing procedures.
- (iii) Software Control or Configuration Management should be U.S.A/TSA certified version.

APPENDIX B

COMMENTS BY STATES & CONSULTANTS

Presentation Paper – Equipment Testing & Calibration

Factory Test

1. Clarified that factory testing of the equipment is conducted by the manufacturers first.
2. An improved test bag is being developed by Transport Canada (TC) along with the TSA.

Conclusion

1. Add to item (iii) and not change software in the equipment during usage.

New Testing Equipment - Comments

ICAO -Regional AVSEC Officer

- Certification could include other Agencies such as Transport Canada and ECAC.

Consultant – Ashcote Consulting Ltd. (ACL)

- Certified CT equipment has approved software.
- As a part of equipment procurement; need to require manufacturer to upgrade equipment within 5 years.

Presenter - Avery Henry, Safety/Security Oversight Officer

- Confirm spacing of CT equipment.

Consultant (ACL)

- Daily testing is separate to factory testing standards.
- Self verification for machine is needed (power cycle) and for integrated tracking etc. of equipment downstream also has to be tested.

Consultant – Aerospace Services Int'l Inc.

- No expertise is available, he is willing to offer assistance to ICAO through David.

ICAO – David Flores

- Will accept assistance of both consultants on test objects and development of protocols for their use.

Consultant (ACL)

- CT and AT equipment both come with the manufacturers test bag. Equipment will alarm and prove that the machine is doing its job.
- Test objects, tests the operators alertness and cognitive skills.

Presenter – Safety/Security Oversight Officer

- Would like to add that the machines should be checked for safety and health of the operators as this point was omitted from the presentation paper.

Mexico – Deputy Director General Civil Aviation

- He concluded that all these tests needed to be done but standardization was needed.
- Suggested that we add this request to the GREPECAS AVSEC/COMM for review and resolution.

Rapporteur

- Agreed

Agenda Item 3 Training

3.1 Structured HBS Training Programmes

3.1.1 It was proposed that a framework or template be used to establish a structured HBS Training Programme for all categories of personnel at both the national, airport levels, including air operators and instructors, that are involved in the process of Hold Baggage Screening

3.2 Human Factors

3.2.1 The HBS Training Programme must identify and address human factors that will optimize Screeners' abilities and equipment performance to enhance the overall effectiveness of the HBS system. The standards should incorporate the ICAO Human Factors in Civil Aviation Security Operations (Doc 9808).

3.3 Policy & Management Decision Makers

3.3.1 During discussions, it was identified that policy and management decision makers who are responsible for the financing of training programmes needed to be sensitized to the importance for HBS training programmes. The consequences to the State should there be a failure in a State's system that caused an act of unlawful interference to be perpetrated, especially against another State, could be disastrous.

3.4 Draft Conclusion

3.4.1 It was proposed that the GREPECAS AVSEC/COMM coordinates and convenes an AVSEC Workshop on HBS Awareness/Training for national, airport and air operators with responsibility for civil aviation.

3.4.2 A sensitization package also be prepared for policy and management decision makers.

3.5 Working Paper 01

3.5.1 WP/01 and the comments by States and Consultants are attached to this part of the Report as **Appendices A** and **B** respectively.

APPENDIX A



International Civil Aviation Organization

CAR/SAM REGIONAL PLANNING IMPLEMENTATION GROUP (GREPECAS)

First Meeting of the Hold Baggage Screening Task Force of the GREPECAS Aviation Security Committee (AVSEC/HBS/TF/1)

Monterrey, Mexico, 1 to 2 December 2005

AVSEC/HBS/TF/1-WP/01

01/12/05

Agenda Item 3: Training

(Presented by Anthony Frederick, Rapporteur, AVSEC /TRAIN/TF and Yannick Lapchalle, International Air Transport Association (IATA))

SUMMARY

In order for the ICAO requirement for 100% Hold Baggage Screening to be fully effective, structured training Programmes must be used in conjunction with standardized procedures for all personnel directly and indirectly involved in the process of Hold Baggage Screening. This paper provides an analysis conducted by the HBS Task Force on HBS Technology currently available.

References:

- The Fourth meeting of the GREPEGAS Aviation Security Committee (AVSEC/COMM/4) held in Montego Bay Jamaica from 11th till 14th April 2005- establishment of Hold baggage Task Force (AVSEC/HBS/TF).
- (AVSEC/HBS/TF) Terms of Reference of the AVSEC/HBS/TF
- Annex 17 Standards 3.4.2 and 3.4.3.

1. Introduction

1.1 As established at the 4th meeting of the GREPECAS AVSEC/COMM held in Montego Bay Jamaica from 11th - 14th April 2005, the Hold Baggage Task Force (AVSEC/HBS/TF) initially comprised of representatives from 6 AVSEC/COMM member states, which was tasked with;

- a. Assessing HBS equipment and their capabilities
- b. Developing cost and benefit analysis of HBS equipment.
- c. Identifying the applicability for the different types of airports.
- d. Identifying two locations for Hold Baggage Seminars to be conducted for English and Spanish speaking countries in 2005.

1.2 The ICAO Hold Baggage Screening Seminar for the NAM/CAR/SAM Regions was held in Monterrey Mexico, from November 28 – 30 2005 at which several presentations were made by HBS and BHS manufactures, International Organizations and Airports highlighting;

- a. New and proposed future HBS Technology and their capabilities
- b. BHS Technology and Design
- c. States' experiences in the implementation of HBS systems to comply with Annex 17 Standard 4.4.8
- d. Consultants and Services
- e. Financial and Technical Assistance available to member States.

1.3 There was minimal information on awareness, training and certification of personnel directly and indirectly involved in the Hold Baggage Screening process. Manufactures of the HBS Systems provide training to its clients after purchase of equipment. This training varies depending on the clients, and countries. The training provided by these manufactures is normally valid for a period of time determined by the State, after which the State or Operator has to provide the necessary refresher training and recertification of personnel.

2. Analysis

2.1 The HBS Task Force has identified that there is a need for structured HBS Awareness/Training Programmes for personnel directly and indirectly involved in the Hold Baggage Screening Process to address emerging trends and types of Hold Baggage Screening Equipment. There is also a need for increase in a coordinated effort by members States to evaluate these new technologies and recommend a harmonized methodology or framework to assist in the development and delivery of structured Awareness/Training Programmes, particularly to ensure compliance with ICAO Annex 17 Standards 3.4.2 and 3.4.3.

3. Structured HBS Training Programme

3.1 To develop a framework or template for modules that could be used to establish a structured HBS Training Programme for all of the categories of personnel directly and indirectly involved in the process of Hold Baggage Screening including the following:

- a) National Authority Auditor/Inspector;
- b) Operators Quality Assurance Personnel;
- c) Operators Security Management Personnel;
- d) Operators Security Supervisors;
- e) AVSEC Screeners including Certification and re-Certification;
- f) Airport Law Enforcement Officers;
- g) Airline Ticket Agents, and
- h) Airline Baggage handlers.
- i) HBS Equipment Technician

4. Human Factors

4.1 To identify human factors principles to facilitate the optimization of Screeners abilities and equipment performance to enhance the overall effectiveness of the HBS system, making specific reference to the ICAO Human Factors in Civil Aviation Security Operations (Doc 9808). This could include pre-employment screening evaluation processes to ensure candidates have the necessary competences to be able to be trained and ways of monitoring and enhancing screener performance in an on-going program.

5. Draft Conclusion

5.1 That the GREPECAS AVSEC/COMM coordinates and convenes an AVSEC Workshop on HBS Awareness / Training for Airport and Airline Operators and National Authorities with responsibility for Civil Aviation to address structured Training Programmes and Human Factors.

6. Action Required by the Task Force

6.1 The Task Force is invited to review the contents of this Working Paper and to suggest Recommendations for the development of a framework or template that would facilitate structured HBS Familiarization / Training Programmes, consistent levels of performance for training / familiarization and certification of Screeners, taking also into consideration, industry best practices and internationally accepted practices. Part of this framework or template could be a recommended approach or process for each State to use when reviewing HBS requirements and evaluating options for implementation (i.e. a GREPECAS version of ECAC's Doc 30.)

APPENDIX B

CONSULTANTS COMMENTS
Billy Vincent
President and CEO
Aerospace International Inc.

ICAO EDS TRAINING ASTP

THE PROBLEM

The EDS technology consists of Computed Tomography (CT), Advanced Technology, X-ray diffraction, etc.; in essence we are faced with panoply of technologies being used in the EDS field. Moreover, this situation is exacerbated by the fact that the leading EDS equipment accomplishes their detection processes differently. There are no standard ICAO ASTP EDS training programs presently in existence.

PROPOSAL

That ICAO convene a panel of experts from the Canadian, UK, U.S and ??? Governments in Montreal to articulate the elements of an ICAO ASTP for EDS HBS. The essential elements/content of this EDS HBS training program should come from these Governments recent experience in their EDS HBS training arena as a result of their respective experience in deploying and using EDS in AVSEC. These EDS HBS experts should be assisted by ICAO's AVSEC technical training experts to ensure that the final EDS HBS ASTP incorporates ICAO ASTP standards.

COMMENTS BY **HBS TASK FORCE MEMBERS**

Item 1.1 During the introduction, Mr. David Flores, Secretary of the GREPECAS AVSEC/COMM stated that the membership of the HBS Task Force had increased to fifteen (15) members.

Item 5.1 The Presenter Anthony Frederick during the presentation mentioned that Ms. Maureen Katz , Senior Advisor International Relations – Transport Canada, to take note of the Training Needs to which she acknowledge.

Item 6.1 The Presenter Anthony Frederick on conclusion of the presentation invited comments from the members present.

General Comments

1. David Flores, Secretary of GREPECAS AVSEC/COMM commented on the fact that members states have indicated their need for training in the development the National Training Programme, Passenger Screening Programme and National Quality Control Programme and then invited further comments from the Consultants present. (Mr. Paul Bellamy, Operations Director, Aschote Consulting Ltd. & Mr. Billy Vincent President and CEO Aerospace International Inc.) and Mr. Nick Cartwright, Director Security Technology, Transport Canada.

2. Mr. Paul Bellamy commented that he supported coordinated training in large regions. He further added that Screener Training should be not construed with the manufactures specific training.

3. Mr. Roy Vasquez, Inspector, COCESNA / ACSA commented that he was happy to be a part of the HBS Task Force and noted that Training Centres were located in Argentina, Venezuela and El Salvador. He also commented that standardization for Screeners was important and a standard Course for all States was needed for new HBS equipment.

- He was concern as he saw no standardization in Training and gave an example Crisis Management.
- He further commented that Training Centres need to include on –the –Job training.

4. Mr. Marco Ospino, Secretary of LACAC commented that the ICAO has Regional Training Centres across the world that was different from States Training Centres. ICAO Training Centre has Standard Training, Instructor and Student Manuals. He added that the National Training Centres have standards like this.

He further stated that it is important to identify what topics are included in the training Programme and get the ICAO to prepare the training programme.

5. The representative from Venezuela indicated that Venezuela had training standards and that he would make these available to the Training Task Force. Training was divided into theory and practical. On a Regional and world-wide level, training centres comply with the approved training courses. The centre has seven (7) conventional x-ray machines, used for basic training. They have TIP capability with more than twelve hundred (1200) images.
6. Mr. Yannick Chappelle, Coordinator Security Services – IATA said that there should be standardization of image interpretation as this could be affected by environmental conditions. IATA has assisted States in the development of training and recommends computer-based training. There is difficulty in conducting OJT if there are not enough HBS machines available. He further recommended that AVSEC awareness training be provided when new HBS is introduced.
7. Billy Vincent: In response to comments from IATA, stated that there was need for more information on the subject. In the case of EDS training, he went on to explain the importance of starting with the selection of screeners who had cognitive skills, however, there was a difficulty in determining these skills as there were no proven testing method available. He further stated that there is a need for ICAO to develop an ASTP for all technology (basic 2-week course), including practical training for instructors to actually use the HBS equipment. He stated that some simulations were available in training courses and ended by saying that specialized training was needed.

-
8. Nick Cartwright suggested that we look at the solution already proposed by Billy. He expressed that the rapid turn over of the screener population required that more persons be trained and that the criteria be timely. He highlighted the fact that training needed to be available, cheap and that web-based training was available. He went on to say that once web-based training was developed, there would be significant reduction in cost to run the training.
 9. Major Aaron Villar, Civil Aviation Security Deputy Director, Mexico: He said that we should divide the knowledge that screeners needed to have and ensure that they had procedures that coordinate with the airport operations.
 10. Cesar Matos Díaz, Chief of AVSEC, Lima, Peru: He agreed with the position taken by Mexico, but stated that ICAO should be in charge of developing the training course.
 11. Mr. Rogerio Benevides, Chief of Division, Department of Civil Aviation: He said the ICAO has no course related to hold baggage screening. A HBS specific course was need and he identified that TSA and TC have experience and we should obtain information for the Task Force.
 12. Mr. John Pierce, UK AVSEC Consultant: Expressed that States should set their own training standards. The Regulator should develop the national training standards and the operator develop training programmes for approval. Included in the national training programme would be the requirement for train-the-trainer course. The trainers should be trained by training consultants. UK was willing to share some training information with the Task Force.
 13. Mr. Billy Vincent stated that we needed ICAO involvement along with screener/equipment training experts from TC, TSA and UK.
 14. Mr. Nick Cartwright recommended that we educate from the top level, that is, the policy/management levels to get their support. There should be a prepared package available to present to them at their meetings.
 15. Cesar Matos Díaz commented that ICAO should centralize everything for all States.

COMMENTS BY STATES & CONSULTANTS

Presentation Paper – Training

Trinidad – Aviation Security Inspector

- Invited participation from the group present to identify training needs.

Secretary, GREPECAS AVSEC/COMM

- Proposed GREPECAS AVSEC/COMM continuation f or national training programme, passenger screening programme and national quality assurance programme.
- Would like to hear from the consultants.

Consultant - Ashcote Consulting Ltd .

- Supported coordinated training, as it is a large area. HBS screenin g raining should not be mixed up with manual equipment specific training (like buying a car).

COSESNA ACSA – Inspector AVSEC

- Stated that he was happy to be a part of the task force. There were a lot of training centres, located in Ecuador, Argentina, Venezuela and El Salvador.

Costa Rica – Inspector AVSEC -FAL

- Stated that standardization was important for screeners. A standard course was needed for using these HBS machines by all States.
- No standardization was seen in crisis management.
- Training centres need to include on -the-job (OJT) training in their training courses.

Secretary LACAC

- Stated that ICAO had regional training centres that were separate to training centres of respective States.
- ICAO training centres have standardized training, i nstructors and student manuals.
- National training centres also had standards like ICAO.
- We need to identify what topics need to be trained and get ICAO to provide the standardized training course(s)

Venezuela – Chief AVSEC Project Officer

- Was willing to give Venezuelan training standards to the Task Force.
- He identified that training was divided into theory and practical
- On Regional and worldwide levels, their training centre compies with the approved training courses.
- The training centre has seven (7) conventional x -ray machines for basic training, with more than 1200 images.

IATA – Coordinator Security Services

- IATA had two (2) papers on this but only one (1) was presented.
- Image interpretation, all equipment do not have the some functio ns.
- From an operational environment, disruption in the in -line system was not included and must be covered.
- IATA is prepared to develop HBS training with States .
- Regarding OJT, difficulty experienced when there are not enough machines available for training.

Agenda Item 4 Quality Control of Equipment

4.1 Factory acceptance/site acceptance Tests

4.1.1 Manufacturers of Hold Baggage Screening Equipment are required to have an objective assessment of their specifications and performance claims through the State of Manufacturer's testing and certification of each piece of equipment before they are offered on the market. The two State standards that are recognized and accepted are the United States Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and European Civil Aviation Committee (ECAC).

4.1.2 Once the screening equipment has been certified, the manufacturer should be asked to confirm in writing that the machine meets the requirements before purchase. Acceptance of the equipment by the purchaser should be dependent on the equipment meeting the requirements when installed.

4.1.3 Upon delivery of the equipment to a prospective purchaser, the manufacturer will conduct site tests. These include calibration of the equipment and testing of the screening equipment using a combined test piece (CTP) supplied by the manufacturer. The purchaser will decide how many "test pieces" they require and order these from the manufacturer. These test pieces are marked with the manufacturer's code and serial number.

4.1.4 Basic training of the purchaser's operators in calibration and testing of the screening equipment upon delivery is a part of the sales and delivery service of such equipment.

4.2 Performance Testing

4.2.1 Presently conventional x-ray equipment is still being used to support hold baggage and other AVSEC screening, supplemented by hand searches. With the rapid advancement in technology, the States and airport authorities have moved to using x-ray screening equipment which incorporates the best features of current technology, leaving scope for further development in their HBS planning designs.

4.2.2 Performance testing of screening equipment by State, airport and air operators is conducted with a CTP to determine whether the x-ray machine meets the standards established by the State of the Manufacturer and/or the State in their AVSEC Quality Assurance programme, in terms of image quality parameters.

4.2.3 During performance testing, both metallic and non-metallic objects are required to be detected

4.3 Routine Performance Tests

4.3.1 A combined test piece (CTP) has been designed for routine testing of x-ray equipment to ensure that performance requirements for x-ray equipment are met and maintained. Both hardware and software tests are required to be conducted daily and weekly, with records maintained by the operators.

4.3.2 The routine test procedure is not intended to be used on x-ray equipment that can detect the presence of explosive material or the components of an explosive device when the machine is used in the fully automatic mode. If the equipment, however, is used so that it requires an operator to make a decision based on an image (indicative mode), this image must be to the same standard as a conventional x-ray machine.

4.4 Draft Conclusion

4.4.1 A Quality Control template for screening equipment testing should be developed to assist States.

4.4.2 The AVSEC/COMM should conduct a quality control workshop in conjunction with ICAO Member States in the NAM/CAR/SAM Regions.

4.5 Working Paper 07

4.5.1 WP/07 and the comments by States are attached to this part of the Report as **Appendices A and B** respectively.

APPENDIX A

AVSEC/HBS/TF/1-WP/07
01/12/05



International Civil Aviation Organization
CAR/SAM REGIONAL PLANNING IMPLEMENTATION GROUP (GREPECAS)
First Meeting of the Hold Baggage Screening Task Force of the GREPECAS
Aviation Security Committee (AVSEC/HBS/TF/1)
Monterrey, Mexico, 1 to 2 December 2005

Agenda Item 4: Quality Control of Equipment

QUALITY CONTROL

(Presented by Avery Henry)

SUMMARY
This paper invites the Meeting to adopt our recommendation of developing and implementing a Quality Control Mechanism for the continued effectiveness for the 100% Hold Baggage Screening System.
References: <ul style="list-style-type: none">Annex 17 Standards 4.4.8 and 3.4.4

1. Introduction

1.1 States should develop a Quality Control Programme as a key component in the successful application of civil aviation security measures to ensure that controls are continually applied in a manner that provides effective and sustainable security.

1.2 States should ensure that formal written procedures, legislation and regulations are contained in such a programme.

valid for a period of time determined by the State, after which the State or Operator has to provide the necessary refresher training and recertification of personnel.

2. Objective

2.1 States should ensure the effective implementation and administration of aviation security measures. The effectiveness of such a programme should be measured by conducting tests, surveys, audits and inspections.

3. Recruitment

3.1 It is necessary to ascertain that the recruit is a suitable character and has sufficient integrity to carry out aviation security duties.

- 3.1.1 Background checks:
- Education
 - Previous employer
 - Community
 - Training
 - Criminal Record
 - Physical and Mental Fitness

4. Training

- Initial training/OJT
- Computer-based training
- Manufacturers training
- Assessment
- Certification – equipment/personnel
- Refresher training
- Re-certification

5. Security Inspection and Audits for Effectiveness of HBS System

- Inspection
- Security Audits/Surveys
- Testing

6. Airport Design

- Planning criteria
- Airport Threat and Risk Assessment
- Layout of Facility
- Position of screening equipment
- Support operation – for threats
- Cargo & Mail handling facilities – monitoring 70% on passenger aircraft
- Power-supply (backup) & temperature

7. Detection Technologies and Equipment

- Health and Safety issues
- Type of explosives and detection sensitivity – privacy issues
- Procurement Consultation
- X-ray detection equipment
- Other forms of detection (dogs) and their certification

8. Baggage Security

- Off airport check in
- Protection of screened baggage
- Passengers baggage reconciliation and authorization
 - Procedures to ensure that only accompanied baggage and unaccompanied baggage which have been subjected to the necessary controls are loaded onto the aircraft.

9. Human Factors

- Human Factors – ICAO Doc 9808
- Working Conditions

10. Conclusion

10.1 A Quality Control template should be developed to assist States.

10.2 The AVSEC/COMM should conduct a quality control workshop in conjunction with ICAO Member States in the NAM/CAR/SAM Regions.

APPENDIX B

COMMENTS BY STATES & CONSULTANTS

Presentation Paper – Quality Control of Equipment

Consultant – Aerospace Services Int'l Inc.

- ICAO was testing a Quality Assurance course towards development. That may provide States with help.
- TSA through a funding agency was presenting seven (7) three-day seminars around the world. Miami and Buenos Aires were two of the venues in our Region. These would show how to set up a Quality Assurance programme.

ICAO – Regional Officer

- ICAO held a Quality Assurance Workshop in June 2005.
- ICAO would be holding another programme next year also.

Secretary LACAC

- LACAC signed to receive two (2) training programmes with TSA.
- LACAC monitors with ICAO, its an on-going process.
- LACAC chooses company that is known (selected IATA).
- FAA fostered these opportunities for cost-free assistance.
- All information is considered by LACAC.

ICAO – Regional Officer

- For Quality Assurance, ICAO may propose a model programme.

Brazil – DGCA

- Clarification was sought as HBS/TF had 30 days to file the report.

ICAO – Regional Officer

- TC Senior Advisor Int'l Relations, ICAO CAR/SAM Regional Director and AVSEC Regional Officer discussed the possibilities of a workshop in Quality Control for Phase II of the ICAO/Canada Training Programme.

Transport Canada – Director Security Technology

- Stated that HBS performance needs to be high-lighted in the Quality Assurance.
- Security Management System was a more forward looking view, the onus now was on performance (new concept).

ICAO – Regional Officer

- Inquired from the HBS Consultants on who should be the targeted audience and duration of an HBS Workshop.

Transport Canada – Director Security Technology

- Design course so that policy and management get briefed on the needs.
- Supervisors get briefed at the end of the course.
- He could not answer how long or how much time would be needed for the workshop or the required activity before their arrival.

Consultant – Ashcote Consulting Ltd.

- Keep it small and focused, keep it manageable, less than 10 persons.

Consultant – Aerospace Services Int'l Inc.

- Regarding the duration of training, it depends on how much information is to be imparted.
- USA, TC, UK, Singapore are States that data can be obtained from.
- Training day is usually 6-8 hours due to fatigue factor.
- Inform those Executives who need-to-know.
- Management system – they must understand the consequences of failure. Course time, one (1) week or less.

Peru – Chief AVSEC & Dangerous Goods

- Comment not noted.

Secretary LACAC

- All Regulators to sit for one week could be difficult.
- LACAC has specific panels of how to work. There is a short time for this information to be obtained.

ICAO – Regional Officer

- Guidance is necessary to ensure appropriate audience is targeted.

Secretary LACAC

- Ministry participation even more difficult.

ICAO – Director Technical Cooperation Bureau

- Airport authority, privatizations heads would need to be trained.
- So as not to duplicate effort, coordination was needed.

ICAO – Regional Officer

- Comment not noted.

Brazil – DGCA

- Persons responsible for security in the main airports needed to be included.

Venezuela – Chief AVSEC Project Officer

- Based on political structures, QA training was necessary at the national level.

ICAO – Regional Officer

- Used the example of the HBS Seminar, where National AVSEC Officials were targeted to receive OAS Fellowships and ensure their attendance.

Agenda Item 5 Conveyor Systems

5.1 General Consideration

5.1.1 In designing the airport in-line system, look at the system that is needed, keeping it simple and including redundancy in the design to ensure that all bags are screened to the same standard, especially when there is equipment down-time.

5.1.2 Research suppliers of conveyor systems before selecting and check all references, as there are several companies available. Be aware that airport consultants might also be able to design a cost effective conveyor system based on the needs of the specific airport.

5.1.3 Ensure that flexibility is built into the system for Explosive Detection Systems (EDS) so that there is adequate spacing between bags. This is based on the average bag size and that provisions are made for over-size or long bags, such as golf bags.

5.1.4 The conveyor system must be able to integrate the different screening equipment used at the five levels of the in-line Hold Baggage Screening (HBS) system.

5.1.5 One person should be made responsible to resolve problems that arise with screening equipment and baggage handling in the HBS system.

5.2 Working Paper 02

5.2.1 WP/02 and the comments by States and Consultants are attached to this part of the Report as **Appendices A** and **B** respectively.

APPENDIX A



International Civil Aviation Organization
CAR/SAM REGIONAL PLANNING IMPLEMENTATION GROUP (GREPECAS)
**First Meeting of the Hold Baggage Screening Task Force of the GREPECAS
Aviation Security Committee (AVSEC/HBS/TF/1)**
Monterrey, Mexico, 1 to 2 December 2005

AVSEC/HBS/TF/1-WP/02
29/11/05

Agenda Item 05: Conveyor Systems
5.1 General Considerations

(Presented by Judith Goodison)

SUMMARY
This paper provides the meeting with factors that States need to consider when purchasing conveyor systems for in-line hold baggage screening.
References: <ul style="list-style-type: none">Annex 17, Standard 4.4.8 – Hold Baggage ScreeningManufacturers of Conveyor Systems

1. Introduction

1.1 During the Regional ICAO CAR/SAM Hold Baggage Screening Seminar conducted in Monterrey, Mexico from November 28-30, 2005 presentations were given by companies that provide conveyor systems that are currently in use at airports around the world as a part of the in-line hold baggage screening system.

2 Conveyor Companies

2.1 The conveyor companies that made presentations included Siemens Conveyor Systems and Glidepath, both providing international services of their conveyor systems. They can assist airports in planning and conceptualizing integration of screening equipment and implementation of hold baggage screening system.

3 Services

3.1 The companies offer a wide range of services including baggage management, from check-in to delivery, and connections of the bags. They will assist airports in new terminal development to minimize the impact of baggage screening on the overall airport operations. In the case of existing terminals that tend not to have enough space for the screening equipment and levels of screening required, they will assist the airport in coming up with the solutions to their problems.

3.2 The conveyor companies provide and stock spare parts for simple conveyors, to more complex systems, such as, carousels used for baggage delivery. High speed conveyor delivery is possible and provided at large airports where bags are moved from one terminal to another in less than 20 minutes so that bags can connect. One of the company's that presented indicated its capability to integrate the passenger and bags at all times through their baggage handling system.

3.3 Maintenance services are offered and ranges from specialists assistance, software, preventative maintenance and 24-hour emergency assistance. Maintenance response times are, however, dependent on the contract, and the type of maintenance – hardware or software. Conveyor systems are being enhanced with touch screen and graphics to assist the operator who is watching the baggage screening process. These companies have successfully merged the various baggage screening equipment that are used at the different levels during the in-line screening process; systems, such as, L-3, Smiths and G.E. In-vision. They are able to track the bags, in keeping with IATA requirements and provide multiplexing (*different layers of conveyor and tracking systems*).

3.4 New products, such as a high speed diverter for bags to move from one lane to another along the in-line conveyor system has been introduced by one company. This replaces the use of the "pusher" which was used before and caused damage to a high number of bags. Damage resulted in dissatisfaction to the traveler and replacement costs to the airport/airline operators involved.

4 Financing & Costs

4.1 The conveyor companies have the capability to offer its clients financing for all phases of the project.

4.2 It must be borne in mind that costs are dependent on several factors, such as, the size of the conveyor system, the passenger through put at the airport, the levels of screening, the mix of equipment being used to screen the bags, and the width of the conveyor.

4.3 When designing a system it is important to note that the IATA standard from check-in to delivery of the bags to the aircraft is 9 minutes. This time can increase from 10-15 minutes, depending on the layout of the baggage screening system.

5. Factors to Consider

5.1 When designing an integrated in-line hold baggage screening system, it is important to consider internationally accepted standards for baggage screening time, such as, those established by the Transportation Security Administration and European Civil Aviation Conference.

APPENDIX B

COMMENTS BY STATES & CONSULTANTS

Presentation Paper – Conveyor Systems

Consultant – Ashcote Consulting Ltd. – Operations Director

- Suppliers will promise anything, and there are several suppliers out there.
- Look at the in-line system that is needed, keep it simple, and include redundancy in the design as this is paramount to ensure that all bags are screened to the same standard when there is any equipment down -time.

Transport Canada – Director Security Technology

- Guiding principle to use is to keep it simple.
- One (1) person must be responsible for equipment and baggage handling to resolve problems.
- Must check all references received and due diligence is vital.
- Flexibility at Explosive Detection Systems (EDS), that is, spacing between bags, is critical as the fourth bag will shut down the system if this is not factored in.

Brazil – DGCA

- Directed to the Consultant from ACL, not easy to follow the general guideline for airport dependent on size, throughput of bags, and passengers. Advance Technology (AT) included in an in-line system will screen 1200 bags per hour (bph) , but as stand-alone equipment, only 450 bph.

Transport Canada – Director Security Technology

- Restated that there was the need to keep it simple.
- In developing a baggage handling system (BHS), there must be a clear definition of what the airport wants to do.

Consultant – Aerospace Services Int'l Inc . – President & CEO

- Agreed with what was said and stated that at larger airports, 2 systems were needed so that no down time would affect the screening process. The systems should be independent for screening but also reliable for on -time departure of aircraft.
- EDS capabilities and the delivery of bags also had to be looked at.
- Conveyor suppliers, Ashcote and BNP were also excellent designers and they not sell the product.

Consultant – ACL, Operations Director

- There was also the need to establish the number of screening points and the associated costs.

Agenda Item 6 Best Practices by States – Research, Development & Training

6.1 Possible Locations for Hold Baggage Screening & Considerations During Airport Planning Stage

6.1.1 This paper was presented by IATA and attached to it was Section 5 “Possible Locations for Screening of Hold Baggage” and Section 6 “Planning HBS Facilities”. These are extracts from the IATA Position Paper on 100% Hold Baggage Screening.

6.1.2 WP/10 and the comments by States and Consultants are attached to this part of the Report as **Appendices A** and **B** respectively.

6.2 Current Best Practices by States

6.2.1 This was a second paper which gave an overview of the “Best Practices” of States that were presented at the Seminar, and included information gleaned from Mexico and Chile. Transport Canada’s research developments for improving air cargo and mail security, as well as, the performance based approach by IATA which includes the Security Management System (SEMS) were presented.

6.2.2 The lessons learnt by States like Mexico and Spain who had already installed in-line hold baggage systems were invaluable and will assist other States in not making the same mistakes. Some of these considerations included:

- the airport design and planning for the HBS system, must take in all the security considerations;
- equipment selection, climates with extreme cold/heat have to consider this as these temperatures affect equipment performance;
- integration of the various machines so that they all work as required;
- airport installation considerations to include: location, other systems, light, air conditioning for the equipment, fire, elements for down-line maintenance, re-enforcement of the structure to support the equipment;
- motors, etc, were not to be linked to other systems as these will prevent optimum performance of the equipment;
- baggage tray selection was important, they should be of plastic so the material does not set off alarms and the manufacturer has to validate the material of these trays;
- planning for placement of redundancy equipment; and
- preventive, scheduled maintenance should be scheduled for nights to prevent disruption to airport operations and passenger facilitation.

6.3 Research Developments

6.3.1 Air cargo transportation concerns were aired and the new technological research that was being conducted by Transport Canada was discussed. Cargo screening and technology for tracking cargo during its journey is a part of this development. The new research technology for mega Computer Tomography (CT) for cargo would not be ready until another five (5) years.

6.3.2 Research was also being conducted by Transport Canada into security systems that would include access control/physical security using biometrics for personnel. The system would also be capable of operating mechanical access control gates.

6.3.3 It was also brought out during the Seminar and Task Force Meetings that the USA is conducting and advancing research in several areas of technology, such as, in security screening equipment upgrades to provide improved detection, increased baggage throughput capacity, improved reliability and reduced false alarm rates. They are also conducting research and development on the next generation technology solutions to further expand our capabilities to detect weapons and explosives.

6.4 IATA Categorization of Airport Sizes

6.4.1 It was determined from the presentations that during airport planning for the HBS system, the airport size needed to be looked at. IATA has established a categorization for airports which are:

- **Small Airports (under 1 million Passengers p.a)**
- **Medium Airports (1-5 million Passengers p.a)**
- **Large Airports ($5 \geq$ Million Passengers p.a)**

6.4.2 It was reiterated that the peak baggage throughput plus 30, however, is the primary factor that is used to determine and justify the types of hold baggage security screening equipment that individual airports need. (*Refer to Agenda Item 8 Report "Advantages and Disadvantages of Equipment Technology" for details*)

6.5 Draft Conclusion

6.5.1 Support for a Regional approach to equipment acquisition was forthcoming from the Consultants, and States. This proposal for States to be guided on how to comply with the Standards through a Regional approach is forwarded to AVSEC/COMM for review and resolution.

6.1.2 WP/03 and the comments by States and Consultants are attached to this part of the Report as **Appendices C** and **D** respectively.

APPENDIX A



International Civil Aviation Organization

CAR/SAM REGIONAL PLANNING IMPLEMENTATION GROUP (GREPECAS)

**First Meeting of the Hold Baggage Screening Task Force of the GREPECAS
Aviation Security Committee (AVSEC/HBS/TF/1)**

Monterrey, Mexico, 1 to 2 December 2005

AVSEC/HBS/TF/1-WP/10

01/12/05

Agenda Item 6: Best Practices by States

(Presented by Avery Henry)

SUMMARY

In order for the ICAO requirement for 100% Hold Baggage Screening to be fully effective, a best practices approach must be implemented by all the stake holders involved in the process of Hold Baggage Screening. This paper provides an evaluation by the HBS Task Force on the best practices approach methodology.

References:

- (AVSEC/HBS/TF) Terms of Reference of the AVSEC/HBS/TF.
- ICAO Hold Baggage Screening Seminar for the NAM/CAR/SAM regions at Monterrey, Mexico, 28 to 30 November 2005.

1. Introduction

1.1 During the period November 28 till the 30, 2005 the ICAO Hold Baggages Screening Seminar was held in Monterrey, Mexico. Presentations were made by government agencies, international organizations, manufactures and experts highlighting various concepts of “best practices” approach.

2. Best Practice Approach

2.1 It is important to note that in the process of formulating a Best Parctice approach, this will vary from Territory to Territory since it is dependent on :

- Threat levels;
- Airport size (Small, Medium and Large);
- Economic impact;
- Passenger flow (P/Hr and P/Yr);
- High risk Flights;
- Technical and Human support;
- Training demands;
- Oversight mechanism; and
- Management system.

3. Best Practice by Mexico

3.1 Mexico's Best practice principles included a review of:

Costs, effectiveness, efficiency, transformation, expansions, type of airports (*General aviation – International airports*), threat and risk assessments; training and equipment needs; and costs, facilitation, passenger profiling, contingency planning and quality control.

4. Best Practice by Chile

4.1 Chile's Best practice principles consist of:

Development of a total system for Aviation Security and Facilitation. Prevent queuing of passengers, aircraft or/and vehicles. Life cycle cost for equipment. Training costs for all security and airport personnel, inspectors and instructors. Preventative maintenance costs.

5. Best Practice for Air Cargo and Mail

5.1 Best Practice principles on Air Cargo and Mail was presented by Transport Canada. The presenter highlighted the increase demand in Air Cargo and the economic impact it has on the industry.

6. Performance Based Approach – IATA

6.1 The IATA presenter emphasized on the Performance based Approach which includes the Security Management Systems (SEMS). The SEMS is the equivalent of the quality control concept.

7. Conclusion

7.1 The AVSEC/HBS/Taskforce likes to entertain discussion on the above captioned topic so as to develop a way forward in guiding the ICAO NAM/CAR/SAM region member States to be able to implement Best Practice principles and philosophy.

APPENDIX B

COMMENTS BY STATES & CONSULTANTS

Presentation Paper – Best Practices by States

Antigua & Barbuda – Presentation

- Wanted us to look on the best practices for our Regions

Consultant – Ashcote Consulting Ltd (ACL) – Director Operations

- Suggested Regional equipment procurement as costs would be lower.
- Elect one (1) State to negotiate with supplier on behalf of the Region and include maintenance and spare parts in negotiations.

Jamaica - Rapporteur

- Agreed with the Regional approach to equipment acquisition.

Trinidad & Tobago – AVSEC Inspector

- Supported Regional approach for HBS and the possible benefits from this as supplier could have a Regional office making them more accessible to individual States.

APPENDIX C

AVSEC/HBS/TF/1-WP/03
01/12/05



International Civil Aviation Organization
CAR/SAM REGIONAL PLANNING IMPLEMENTATION GROUP (GREPECAS)
**First Meeting of the Hold Baggage Screening Task Force of the GREPECAS
Aviation Security Committee (AVSEC/HBS/TF/1)**
Monterrey, Mexico, 1 to 2 December 2005

Agenda Item 6: Best practices by States

POSSIBLE LOCATIONS FOR HOLD BAGGAGE SCREENING AND FACTORS FOR CONSIDERATION DURING THE PLANNING STAGES

(Presented by International Air Transport Association (IATA))

SUMMARY

One of the most important decision a State or Airport Authority must make when implementing a Hold Baggage Screening System is determining which is the best location for that system. The various options are presented in this paper with a list of advantages and disadvantages. The selection of a location and equipment type must be made following considerations of a number of factors which are included. IATA hopes that the excerpts of its Position Paper on 100% HBS included here can facilitate the States or Airport Authority's decision making process.

References:

- Possible Locations for Hold Baggage Screening (excerpt from IATA Position Paper on 100% Hold Baggage Screening) Appendix 1.
- Planning HBS Facilities (excerpt from IATA Position Paper on 100% Hold Baggage Screening.) Appendix 2.

1. Introduction

1.1 Every airport operates under a unique operational environment. Each will have specific characteristics regarding passenger volumes, terminal layout, space available, cultural issues, etc.

1.2 The screening method and layout applied should be a system that suits local conditions. Each airport needs to consider the impact of cost, capacity and local operating conditions when developing appropriate solutions for both the location of screening and the methods/technologies to be used.

1.3 IATA encourages States to meet the ICAO deadline of 1 January 2006 as some States have indicated that they would not allow air carrier to service Stations within their State if they are departing from States where there is no 100% HBS system in place.

1.4 IATA wishes to reiterate that implementation of 200% HBS should be a State responsibility and whilst air carrier could potentially be most directly affected by non-compliance to this Standard, all stakeholders would ultimately be penalized.

2. Key Considerations

2.1 IATA strongly believes that each airport should be looked at individually and that a solution for one airport is probably good for one airport. However, there are some key elements that we believe should be included when an HBS system is designed.

2.2 A multi-layered system is referred because it provides the possibility to screen a large amount of bags with high throughput machines and then concentrate on those that cannot be cleared with the use of more advance technology or adding a human element.

2.3 The system must provide screening solutions for all types of hold baggage. (originating, transfer, crew and oversize, etc.)

2.4 The impact on valuable airport and terminal capacity should be minimized, while maintaining acceptable security and customer service standards.

2.5 There is a need to balance all elements of the Baggage Handling System with the HBS process to ensure sufficient capacity to meet forecasted peak hour demand at the time the system will go live. This should be confirmed with the help of simulation.

2.6 Investment in buildings, equipment and personnel should be minimized, while maintaining acceptable security and customer service standards.

2.7 There should be minimal inconvenience to the airport operation and the traveling public, both during construction and installation and day-to-day operation.

2.8 Preference should be given to implementing a system that would enable the passenger and their bag to be reunited before any threat item is permitted into the baggage handling system (BHS). If this cannot be done, the reconciliation of the bag and the passenger, should there be an alert, should be facilitated in order to avoid delays. However, care must be taken to ensure the security status of the bag is ascertained before loading and that bags whose status remain unresolved are handled and stored such that they do not pose a hazard to passengers, employees or the facility itself.

2.9 There is a need to strive for implementation of systems which incorporate screening systems using equipment which meet internationally recognized standards (e.g. ECAC, TSA, etc.) and processes such as those to deal with alarms involving airport operators, air carriers and screening authorities.

3. Location of Hold Baggage Screening System

3.1 There are many locations within an airport and in some cases, outside of the airport environment where Hold Baggage screening systems can be located. These include:

- Off airport check-in (city centre, hotels, etc.)
- Sterile terminal complexes
- Sterile security area before check-in
- Screening in front of check-in
- Screening devices at or behind check-in
- Screening downstream in the baggage system

3.2 Section 5 of the IATA Position Paper on 100% Hold Baggage Screening goes in great details describing the advantages and disadvantages of each location.

4. Factors for consideration when planning and developing HBS Facilities

4.1 It is essential that hold baggage security facilities and procedures are able to operate effectively within the overall airport environment. In order to implement the most effective HBS system, many factors need to be taken into considerations as mentioned below.

4.2 When these factors are being discussed and addressed, it is important to involve all the relevant organizations in the development and discussion of the options with a view to identifying all the issues and establishing an agreed, practical solution.

4.3 The following factors also need to be taken into consideration when planning an HBS facility:

- Testing Phase
- Traffic Characteristics
- Passenger Traffic Flows – including peak demand
- Baggage Types
- Demand Forecast
- General Constraints
- Space Requirement and Location
- Airport Structures
- Check-in Islands and Zones
- Existing Handling Facilities and Modes of Operation
- Operational Issues
- HBS Issues
- Detection Performance
- Throughput Reject Rates
- “False Alarm” Rates
- Consistency with Passenger and Cabin Baggage Screening
- Space Requirements
- Integration with Layered Security Architectures
- Passenger Reconciliation
- Transfer and Transit Baggage
- Pre-Screening Prior to Check-in

- Size and Weight of Security Equipment
- Operation Environment of Equipment
- Redundancy of Equipment
- Operational Specifications of Equipment (including Staff Issues)
- Legislative Changes

4.4 Section 6 of the IATA Position Paper on 100% Hold Baggage Screening goes in great details describing the various factors to be considered during the decision making process.

5. IATA Position Paper

5.1 The industry has developed a policy position/guidance document on 100% HBS. A summary of this document is presented as an attachment to this paper. The position paper itself was originally developed by the Airports Council International (ACI) and slightly modified by IATA to account for additional air carrier issues. IATA fully supports the ACI position and for that reason used their document as the basis for the air carrier industry position. This document fully accounts for recent changes to civil aviation regulations introduced since 11 September 2001.

5.2 This document builds on other industry papers on HBS as well as the work carried out by the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) Security Working Group in its guidance paper to Member States, in which IATA and ACI played a significant contributory role offering essential operational experience in baggage screening processes already in daily operation at many airports around the world.

5.3 IATA hopes that the work it has done in highlighting the advantages, minor disadvantages and major disadvantages for different locations for Hold Baggage Screening systems, which is found in Section 5 of the IATA Position Paper on 100% Hold Baggage Screening can help States in determining which locations is most suitable for HBS screening at the airports within their territory. The IATA Position Paper should serve as one of many guidance documents to be used by a State or Airport Authority. Other factors to be considered when planning and implementing HBS systems are included in Section 6 of the 100% Hold Baggage Screening.

5.4 The HBS Task Force is invited to note the IATA position paper on 100% HBS as guidance material to facilitate the implementation of 100% HBS system at airports as required. The complete position paper is available by contacting Mr. Yannick Lachapelle, IATA Security Services (lachapelly@iata.org)

APPENDIX D

COMMENTS BY STATES & CONSULTANTS

Presentation Paper by IATA – Best Practices by States (HBS Screening Locations & Planning Factors)

Consultant – Ashcote Consulting Ltd (ACL) – Operations Director

- Good coverage by IATA.
- Off-line screening in the baggage hall.

Jamaica – Rapporteur

- Requested clarification on departing bags in hall that needed screening.

Consultant – Ashcote Consulting Ltd (ACL)

- Response not recorded.

Jamaica – Rapporteur

- Note air/sea off airport check in.

Chile – Chief, National AVSEC

- Comment not recorded.

Consultant – ACL

- Clarify security of bag after screening process.

IATA – Coordinator Security Services

- Raise some point as Consultant said
- Off airport, different to screening all bags.

Jamaica – Rapporteur

- Facilitation... (not recorded)

Belize – Operations Officer AVSEC

- Directed question to Consultant – ACL, For screening to be done in the front of the building, the airport would have to be made security or re-locate the check in.
- TSA mandates to airlines require continuous search during check in.

Consultant – Aerospace Services Int'l Inc. – President & CEO

- Experience around the world shows that cabin baggage is not inspected prior to check in.
- Extensive testing has been carried out around the world, could move that cabin baggage be checked.
- Off airport check in – the concern is for the chain of custody for the hold baggage.
- Agreed with response.
- More check-in from terminals, who pays for it?
- IATA concern, new thoughts for check-in, new facility designed to minimize wait.

ICAO – Regional AVSEC Officer

- Once 100% HBS is introduced, inquired if it will it be necessary to continue hand searches?

Consultant – Aerospace Services Int'l Inc.

- 3 stations for hand search ????

United Kingdom (UK) – Regional AVSEC Advisor

- Follow up with experience, not withdrawn in London, England.
- Anguilla, where States need to press for removal of this TSA measure. For example, Bermuda, every bag is searched. TSA standard is lower than that done, as operators say the bag was already hand searched.
- TSA standards is a visible deterrent to terrorists.

Peru – Chief AVSEC & Dangerous Goods

- TSA requirements for flights into the USA, what is the standard for other flights to other States in the Region?

Honduras – Chief AVSEC Department

- Original comment from Belize, screening is done at check in. TSA screeners are an additional TSA demand.

IATA – Coordinator Security Services

- 2 comments. TSA requires random hand search, where 100% HBS is a burden on States and carriers will try to change.
- Terminal screening causes large congregation of persons and facilitation is to move passengers through the airport.

United Kingdom (UK) – Regional AVSEC Advisor

- Reduce 3 random searches to 2 or 1 depending on the airport. This can be done through the airlines US Primary Security Inspector (PSI). If using less than required, they will not reduce.

COCESNA/ACSA - AVSEC Inspector

- He believes that TSA will consider this proposal to some extent.
- TSA also requires another check point before boarding to check passengers and their cabin baggage.

Consultant - Aerospace Services Int'l Inc

- In magazine USA Today article, he suggested we read. This regarded TSA relaxation of prohibited items. Scissors, etc. would be allowed back in the aircraft cabin. Political constraints and TSA was not an individual entity.

Mexico – Deputy Director General Civil Aviation

- Lighters were forbidden but we as independent States do not have to follow. Airports do not have to suffer, only carriers going to the USA.

Peru – Chief AVSEC & Dangerous Goods

- This Task Force must guide us on how to comply with the Standards.
- Standard 2.3.1 requires us to abide by what a State requires for 100% screening. What is the Regional acceptance?

Mexico – Deputy Director General Civil Aviation

- Ask Task Force to add task as to what States are doing to solve this problem.

Jamaica - Rapporteur

- Request will be added to the Report and proposed to AVSEC/COMM for review and resolution.

Agenda Item 7 Resources

7.1 Funding, Funding Alternatives & Technical Assistance

7.1.1 Project funding and technical expertise are made available to individual States that request assistance from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Technical Cooperation Bureau. Both the funding and technical expertise are provided by other Member States of ICAO. Ten per cent of the project funding is retained by the Technical Cooperation Bureau to defray their services.

7.1.2 The ICAO Technical Cooperation mechanism supports Regional initiatives in all areas, including equipment purchase. The Technical Cooperation mechanism extends to international procurement for leasing or purchasing security equipment. The advantages of using this mechanism is that ICAO can control prices, there is transparency, impartiality, and ICAO is committed to pay for the equipment purchased. Money is also saved in costs because of the ICAO link with the United Nations.

7.1.3 The Inter-American Committee on Terrorism/Organization of American States on the other hand primarily provide training, technical assistance and cooperation, in conjunction with other international organizations, such as ICAO. They fund training, fellowships to attend Seminars and Workshops and will also provide funding for certain State assessments and technical assistance.

7.1.4 The International Air Transport Association (IATA), directly or indirectly through tender bids, is able to assist airports to design hold baggage screening (HBS) systems, provide technical support, procure new and modified HBS systems, and provide project management at a cost to the State or airport operator.

7.1.5 Manufacturers/suppliers of HBS and conveyor systems have the capabilities to provide project financing, equipment financing and leasing to respective clients, on a client to client basis.

7.1.6 Assistance is also extended to States and airport operators through the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and Multi-lateral Investment Fund (MIF) for strengthening aviation security at national and airport levels. The project is put to international tender and awarded. The disadvantage here is that as a part of this arrangement, the State's security-related documents are required by the bank as proof that the work has been done.

7.2 Consultants

7.2.1 There are internationally recognized consultants of Hold Baggage Screening and Baggage Handling systems that can work with States and/or airport operators. These consultants can provide a range of expertise in the selection and procurement of Explosive Detection Systems, Computer Tomography, Advanced Technology and Explosive Trace Detection Systems, conveyor systems, as well as, providing installation oversight for the project.

7.3 Conclusion

7.3.1 Developing States should strongly support the Regional approach for funding and hold baggage screening equipment acquisition. States should avail themselves of the options that are open to them and be cognizant of the need for proper due diligence in obtaining funding and acquiring services before committing themselves.

7.4 Working Paper 04

7.4.1 WP/04 and the comments by States and Consultants are attached to this part of the Report as **Appendices A** and **B** respectively.

APPENDIX A



International Civil Aviation Organization
CAR/SAM REGIONAL PLANNING IMPLEMENTATION GROUP (GREPECAS)
First Meeting of the Hold Baggage Screening Task Force of the GREPECAS
Aviation Security Committee (AVSEC/HBS/TF/1)
Monterrey, Mexico, 1 to 2 December 2005

AVSEC/HBS/TF/1-WP/04
01/12/05

Agenda Item 07: Resources 7.1 Funding & Technical Assistance

(Presented by Judith Goodison)

SUMMARY

This paper provides the meeting with possible resource options that are available to States to assist with the acquisition of hold baggage screening systems through funding and technical assistance.

References:

- Annex 17, Standard 4.4.8 – Hold Baggage Screening
- ICAO Technical Cooperation Bureau
- Manufacturers of HBS Systems

1. Introduction

1.1 During the Regional ICAO CAR/SAM Hold Baggage Screening Seminar conducted in Monterey, Mexico from November 28-30, 2005 presentations were made by the ICAO Technical Cooperation Bureau for the Americas and the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE), highlighting the financial and technical assistance available to member States for training, scholarships, assessments, technical assistance missions, acquisition of security equipment, technical corporation, project management and financing.

2. ICAO Technical Cooperation Bureau

2.1 The ICAO Technical Cooperation Bureau provides a wide range of technical and financial assistance to member States through its seven regional offices across the globe. These Offices are independent and autonomous in each State and provides staff and equipment to train at local and international levels, human resource development and procurement services to hire or purchase for best conditions.

2.2 More specifically, the mechanism is pursuant to the Standards and Recommended Practices of Annex 17. It includes help to member States to solve corrective actions identified in the ICAO Universal Audit Security Programme, such as, Annex 17 Standard 4.4.8 – Screening of Hold Baggage, regional and national financing and funding for ICAO ASTP training.

2.3 The mechanism extends to international procurement for leasing or purchasing Security equipment. Privatized airports within States may benefit from the mechanism with the knowledge of the national authority with responsibility for civil aviation.

2.4 Technical Cooperation Bureau of ICAO will undertake projects in member States, including total financing from which a percentage is retained for services. Several advantages can be obtained through the use of this mechanism. These include: ICAO controlling prices, transparency, impartiality, and commitment by ICAO to pay for equipment. Also, through the United Nations, money can be saved in costs.

3. Inter-American Committee on Terrorism / Organization of American States

3.1 The Inter-American Committee on Terrorism (CICTE) work in collaboration with the Organization of American States and coordinate training and technical assistance through a single point of contact within the State. Primarily, they provide training and technical assistance and international cooperation working with International Organizations such as the ICAO. It noted that these Organizations cannot fund equipment and salaries, but can fund training, fellowships and funding for certain assessments and technical assistance missions.

4. International Air Transport Association (IATA)

4.1 International Air Transport Association (IATA) is willing to assist Airports to design HBS Systems and can provide expert technical support, procurement of new and modified HBS Systems, project management and technical oversight of the project and can also develop and implement HBS.

5. Manufactures of HBS and Conveyor Systems

5.1 Some manufactures of HBS and Conveyor Systems have the capabilities to provide to their respective clients for project financing, financing and equipment leasing. This facility is made on a client by client basis.

6. Consultants for Hold Baggage Screening and Baggage Handling Systems

6.1 States need to be aware of the availability of Consultants who are internationally recognized in the field of Hold Baggage Screening and Baggage Handling Systems. These Consultants can work with States Airport design team to provide a range of expertise in the selection and procurement of EDS/CT, AT and ETD, including installation oversight of the project.

APPENDIX B

COMMENTS BY STATES & CONSULTANTS

Presentation Paper – Resources – Funding & Technical Assistance

ICAO – Regional AVSEC Officer

- Directed to the Consultants. What should States ask when considering obtaining the services of consultants.

ICAO – Director of the Technical Cooperation Bureau

- All support will be given to States.
- Other States are willing to support a State that is in need through the Technical Cooperation Bureau.
- Regional projects are very beneficial for equipment purchase. Support from OAS, EU and TC.
- Will give information to us. Any State can get assistance, funds are received from entities to fund projects, such as that for the Eastern Caribbean.

Consultant – Aerospace Services Int'l Ins. – President & CEO

- Three (3) areas to look at:
 - (1) To Regional AVSEC Officer, honesty and integrity; Technical competence is key, get several references and talk to companies that have received their services.
 - (2) Most important item on an agenda after item (1) is how to buy and maintain the equipment; and
 - (3) Cost of the equipment over 3 -7 year period and creating new employment base at a small fee will pay for these items.
- Through ICAO Mechanisms, any funding for AVSEC for 189 States go to a fund dedicated for States.

United Kingdom (UK) – Regional AVSEC Advisor

- Problem they have in all UK Territories is that funds go to a central fund. The funds are collected for AVSEC but all the fund does not go for the designated use. Governments would be embarrassed if major incident occurred.

ICAO – Director Technical Cooperation Bureau

- States are aware of the international requirement for security fund investments. We need to make Governments aware, outside of this.

Brazil – DGCA

- There is a list of equipment being selected in Brazil, ICAO input is important before buying equipment.
 - Perspective of long term planning.
-

Agenda Item 8 Advantages and Disadvantages of HBS Equipment Technology

8.1 Procurement vs. Rental

8.1.1 Hold Baggage Screening equipment purchase and rental are both available to States, and the relevant option should only be pursued once the appropriate due diligence has been conducted. The options to purchase or rent equipment are available through international organizations, such as ICAO et al and Suppliers of hold baggage screening equipment, on a client by client basis.

8.1.2 It must be borne in mind that should a Regional approach to acquisition of hold baggage and other screening equipment be taken there are the advantages of lowering purchase and maintenance costs, spare parts would be more readily available through the possible relocation of equipment supplier service personnel within the Region for timely repairs. Equipment upgrades and acquisition of new equipment technology should be built into the Regional contracts for States that choose this option.

8.2 Decisions on the Type of Technology to Select & Install

8.2.1 State and airport operators need to look at their individual airports to make a determination regarding the type of technology to be installed. These decisions are based on the passenger baggage through put plus 30 (*the established norm that is used in the industry*).

8.2.2 The decision for equipment technology should be based on the International Air Transportation (IATA) categorization for bags per hour (b/hr) through put:

Category "A" <999b/hr	Manual Sortation, Low technical, Semi-automatic;
Category "B" >=1000<4999b/hr	Medium/High, Automatic;
Category "C" >=5000b/hr	High Technology, Fully automatic

8.2.3 A Hold Baggage Screening Solutions decision tree, prepared by Ashcote Consulting is attached as **Appendix A** for guidance to States in establishing the type of technology that is needed for their airport.

8.2.4 The decision should be based on: the size of the airport, the long-term plan, to include the existing airport terminal facilities and possible expansion plans; the passenger and baggage through put, projected growth of the airport over the next ten plus years, the likely contents of passenger baggage based on their geographical location and experience, the number and types of equipment needed, including their initial and maintenance financial costs and training needs.

- Category C: an in-line hold baggage system, with five (5) levels of hold baggage screening which integrates different screening equipment technology (AT X-ray, EDS CT) used at different levels, operator viewing stations, conveyor systems and redundancy (extra equipment) for equipment down time. (Suitable for large airports with >=5000b/hr);
- Category A-B-C: a stand-alone Explosive Detection System (EDS) Computer Tomography (CT) or advanced technology (AT) X-ray which can be installed in the check-in concourse or in the baggage system "downstream" of check in; or

- Category A: other cost effective security measures such as physical hand search and/or Conventional X-ray and Explosive Trace Detection (ETD). (Suitable for low volume locations – small airports <999b/hr).

8.3 Maintenance

8.3.1 It is important to ensure that States factor in the need for scheduled maintenance programmes for their screening equipment, based on the suppliers' recommendations. Unscheduled maintenance down time should also be borne in mind and, as stated before, the need for redundant screening equipment to be available so that all hold bags are consistently screened to the established standard.

8.3.2 The airport operator should have an inventory of the equipment parts that wear out and require replacement, the availability of spare parts, including the timeframe for delivery of such parts once they become defective should be ascertained during contract negotiations.

8.3.4 Apart from the suppliers' technicians who may have to be called in for major equipment servicing, as a part of the contract, States should ensure that airport operators acquire training and certification of maintenance personnel that will be responsible for routine scheduled and non-scheduled servicing of the screening equipment. The need for technician up-grade training to match technology changes is to be factored into the negotiations.

8.3.5 All hold baggage screening equipment maintenance schedules and servicing records, including service personnel training records are required to be maintained and be available for inspection.

8.4 Conclusion


8.4.1 It was proposed during discussions on this Working Paper that letters should be sent out to States within the Region to ascertain which States were interested in forming a Regional Body and to identify the State(s) that would be the representative Body to negotiate screening equipment acquisition on behalf of the Region.

8.5 Working Paper 09

8.5.1 WP/09 and the comments by States and Consultants are attached to this part of the Report as **Appendices B** and **C** respectively.

APPENDIX A

Hold Baggage Screening Solutions - Decision Tree



APPENDIX B



Organización de Aviación Civil Internacional

GRUPO REGIONAL DE PLANIFICACIÓN Y EJECUCIÓN CAR/SAM (GREPECAS)

Primera Reunión del Grupo de Tarea sobre Inspección del Equipaje de Bodega del Comité AVSEC del GREPECAS (AVSEC/HBS/TF/1)

Monterrey, México, del 1 al 2 de diciembre de 2005

AVSEC/HBS/TF/1-NE/09

01/12/05

Agenda Item 8

Ventajas y desventajas del equipamiento tecnológico del HBS

LA PROBLEMÁTICA DE COMPRA O ARRIENDO

(Presentado por un miembro del grupo de trabajo)

RESUMEN
La inspección del 100% del HBS y la problemática de equipamiento, el financiamiento, el soporte y mantenimiento
Referencias:
<ul style="list-style-type: none">Anexo 17, norma 4.4.8Grupo de tarea HBS

1. Introducción

1.1 El cumplimiento de la norma 4.4.8 del anexo 17 por parte de los Estados y que entra en vigencia el 01 enero del 2006, pone a estos ante un nuevo escenario con mas interrogantes y dudas que soluciones, por ejemplo: que equipo va utilizar, quien lo va operar (Estado, concesionario o el explotador aéreo) y lo más importante como el financiamiento de los sistemas a utilizarse.

2. Análisis

2.1 La norma establece que es responsabilidad de cada Estado y esto significa que lo primero que hay que hacer es un análisis de las realidades operacionales de cada aeropuerto (itinerarios, cantidad de pasajeros por hora en horas pico, tipos de aeronaves etc.). Posteriormente se podría establecer que tipo de sistema de inspección vamos a instalar (AT, EDS, ETD) y finalmente como lo vamos a financiar, el Estado, concesionario, explotador aéreo o los pasajeros.

3. Adquisición vs. arriendo

3.1 Si la autoridad aeronáutica es la que tiene que instalar el equipo, se debe considerar los siguientes factores:

- La ubicación geográfica en la región.
- Empresa conocida en el mercado con representación en el país.
- Referencias en otros aeropuertos.
- La modalidad de implementación.
- Los niveles de mantenimiento.
- El entrenamiento requerido.

3.2 Si la implementación considera, la adquisición por parte del Estado o los operadores, esta modalidad presenta mas desventajas que ventajas, en este aspecto hay que destacar el alto costo, la desactualización de los software, tiene que considerarse alternativas por las fallas, necesariamente debe considerar todos los niveles de mantenimiento y finalmente el reemplazo del equipo.

3.3 Una de las alternativas más viables siempre y cuando se cuente con mecanismo de financiamiento seguro, es el arriendo del equipo y esta presenta como única desventaja el no haber elegido una empresa responsable, en cuanto las ventajas estas serian mas, como por ejemplo la inversión no seria nuestra, se puede actualizar el software como el equipo acorde a la nueva tecnología, se puede exigir que el respaldo sea de iguales características y finalmente remplazar el equipo que haya aparecido en el mercado con una mejor tecnología, esta modalidad si requiere considerar la inspección, supervisión y evaluación constante por parte del Estado para verificar que se cumplan las especificaciones técnica del contrato.

4. Mantenimiento y repuestos

4.1 Se debe tener presente que en este tipo de equipos necesariamente requiere tener un mantenimiento permanente en virtud a que son vitales y no pueden fallar, por lo tanto debe estar asociado a la compra de servicios a la misma empresa ya que nos aseguraría un mejor tiempo de repuesta, por parte de la autoridad aeronáutica requiere tener claro cual es el nivel de falla mas común que tipo de piezas o dispositivo que más falla, de tal manera se evalúa las debilidades y las fortalezas del sistema.

4.2 En lo referido a los repuestos si se tiene el análisis de cual es el repuesto que mas falla es ese el que hay que tener en stock, si el equipo es único en la región el tiempo de respuesta es más largo, afectando la operatividad del sistema. De la misma manera si se dispone de los mismos equipos en la región es más factible que la empresa cuente con un stock de repuestos, beneficiando en forma significativa la continuidad del servicio.

5. Conclusión

5.1 Para cumplir esta norma se debe buscar la compatibilidad de los conceptos de la eficiencia y eficacia, por tal motivo debemos analizar y estudiar todos la alternativas, buscando las soluciones que sean mas acorde a nuestras realidades y lo mas importante tratar de cumplir las normas porque esta forma estaremos cumpliendo con lo establecido con la seguridad de la aviación civil.

APPENDIX C

COMMENTS BY STATES & CONSULTANTS

Presentation Paper – Advantages & Disadvantages of HBS Equipment Technology

Presented by: Chile in Spanish

Notes from Presentation

- Looking at how to fund HBS in-line system through State responsibility, air operator and passengers.
- Looking at types of system available and how to implement.

Factors

1. Geographical location in the region, difficult if only one State is using the particular equipment;
2. Co- in the market; and
3. Ask other airport authorities about the equipment and its suitability in the screening process, including maintenance levels, training, and how easy was the equipment to use.

High Cost

- Can be accrued from lack of updating of screening equipment;
 - Need to consider maintenance levels as well as, the need for replacement of equipment; and
 - Funding mechanism.
- Constant evaluation by the State was needed.

Maintenance & Spare Parts

- This is the most common area of failure, evaluation on assessment and advantages;
- Identification of spare parts that fail the most was needed;
- Equipment delivery of repair parts take longer time to receive.
- Regional approach, would make parts more readily available
- Need to do a study to get best solutions and ensure that these comply with AVSEC Standards.

COMMENTS

Consultant Ashcote Consulting Ltd. (ACL) – Director Operations

- Good summary of issues.
- Procurement negotiation was recommended, and negotiations should be from one place (State) for the Region.

Mexico – Deputy Director General Civil Aviation

- From their experiences with various airports, they got purchases with different payments, prices fluctuate, closed communication and they not disclose these.
- Maintenance and software in monthly price (1.4 million – equipment).
- US\$100,000 yearly for maintenance and preventive maintenance.
- Demand Regional representation for largest airport

ACL – Director Operations

- Agreed

Chile – Chief National AVSEC

- Product for screening used in prisons, train stations, etc.
- In some States, they are just hearing of these machines.
- They have Computer Tomography (CT) equipment – it takes 2 days for equipment to arrive.

Mexico – Deputy Director General Civil Aviation

- Another experience, a increase in price up to US\$80,000 because of distance, part of the negotiations and they not tell where the spare parts would come from.

Peru – Chief AVSEC & Dangerous Goods

- Suggestion that the group should send letters to member States and determine which States are interested.

Jamaica – Rapporteur

- Will route the suggestion through AVSEC/COMM.

Mexico – Deputy Director General Civil Aviation

- He is not convinced of equipment performance till manufacturer installs the equipment at your airport to show you how it operates.
- No charge, free to see how machine works for another operator.

ACL – Director Operations

- Excellent suggestion. Manufacturer will do this to sell the machines. Invite all to give free samples and collect data.

Aerospace Services Int'l Inc. – President & CEO

- He was being more cautious than ACL in that the L-3 6500 dual energy/CT was not readily available. The logistics of setting up the machine could be difficult. Problem was prevent a proper analysis. Bag sets were different depending on where the passenger was traveling to, e.g. plum pudding, etc.
- He suggested that the group visit San Francisco and look at the In-Vision 9000, In-Vision 5500 etc. and get practical data.

Mexico – Deputy Director General Civil Aviation

- Invited us to the airport group Azur January 2006 solutions for medium and small airports in Mexico.

Costa Rica – Inspector AVSEC-FAL

- Has had a concern for several years.
- We are acquiring HBS to take away items from passengers.
- Companies were selling items to make a profit. Items were available in sterile areas of the airport, such as: large wooden knives, matches for smoking, metal knives in First Class and bottles. We have not addressed this.

Mexico – Deputy Director General Civil Aviation

- Regarding that comment, Mexico has developed their prohibited items list from ICAO, USA and Mexico. We have not followed from books.

ICAO – Regional AVSEC Officer

- Thank Walter from ICAO Technical Cooperation Bureau.

Aerospace Services Int'l Inc. – President & CEO

- Agree with ACL Director Operations. The reason airports get into trouble – usually suppliers come in and the airport operator picks equipment based on the sales pitch.
- The equipment is not able to do our procedures. The manufacturer/supplier will tell you and competition will not be able to do, but will not tell you what their equipment is incapable of doing.
- Our lack of knowledge, based on airport financial and long term plan is needed. If we go for cheap, good and fast – we are vulnerable.

Peru – Chief AVSEC & Dangerous Goods

- He had 3 questions.
 - (1) What is the main difference between approval and certified?
 - (2) Parameters, what is the minimum amount of equipment testing for quality assurance? Manufacturer told him that was restricted.
 - (3) Integrated Level 1 was not able to detect weapons.

Aerospace Services Int'l Inc. – President & CEO

- HBS was not designed for weapon detection plus (comment not recorded).

Jamaica – Rapporteur

- Supported the point, as weapons have been found in bags into our State. This is a concern of other control authorities.

Aerospace Services Int'l Inc. – President & CEO

- Advance Technology (AT) has been approved by ECAC. Trace Detection System (TDS) has been tested and is satisfactory but there is no scientific standard.
- TSA has certified Computer Tomography (CT) which measures the density of materials and is based on throughput and false alarm rates.
- TSA data is classified and is only shared if it is protected.

ACL – Operations Director

- Screening machines are only used for explosive or drug detection and they only do one of these at a time.

Mexico – Deputy Director General Civil Aviation

- Regarding certification, the screening machine is certified from the factory. It is a document that verifies that the machine is working.

Aerospace Services Int'l Inc. – President & CEO

- TSA certification applies to manufacturer for a specific unit.
- There are 6 categories but the EU only has 4 categories for certification.
- No equipment is 100% perfect.

ACL – Operations Director

- Agreed. No equipment is 100% perfect.

Chile – Chief National AVSEC

- Made a query about explosive detection for mining, etc.

ACL – Operations Director

- Individual States were responsible to determine threat levels and detection procedures, not....

Aerospace Services Int'l Inc. – President & CEO

- TAPT – home made explosive used in the Middle East, was extremely volatile.
- Has not been tested on Explosive Detection Systems (EDS), Trace Detection Systems (TDS) can screen for these.
- Black powder and sheet explosives – there was a problem in detecting these. In Computer Tomography (CT) it was difficult to detect, but they are working on improving this.

ICAO – Regional AVSEC Officer

- Mostly national AVSEC level persons are responsible for ensuring proficient screening and these areas are evaluated during audits.

ACL – Operations Director

- Human factors needed to be looked at.
- HBS relied on the operator, if there was no operator or the operator got bored after not seeing anything then this could lead to deficiencies in the system.
- Suggest that the baggage screening room be designed so that screeners are placed in the middle where they can see each other and not have to take their eyes off the screen to talk and miss a bag.

Aerospace Services Int'l Inc. – President & CEO

- As with air traffic controllers, who have filled time by playing pranks, errors tend to occur during the period of low activity.
- Audits and inspections mostly will take care of this during the national level system.

COCESNA/ACSA – Inspector AVSEC

- 800 passengers at some airports, using conventional x-ray and only 1 ETD in one airport
- With HBS do we need EDS now? Are airlines and airports responsible?

ACL – Operations Director

- Individual States are to decide on this, based on the needs and the routes they are serving.

Aerospace Services Int'l Inc. – President & CEO

- Agreed. You do not need EDS, it may be more efficient with physical and ETD depending on how many bags are opened.
- There have been a lot of injuries from lifting heavy bags, this is a liability that has to be considered.

ACL – Operations Director

- Consideration for using ETD – through put is labour intensive, also persons involved in military or mining will be contaminated.

ICAO – Regional AVSEC Officer

- Queried the group's thoughts on "Reveal", new technology which was working well although it had not had the full scope of field testing.
- Reveal CT80 is certified state of the art CT. Has dual energy added should reduce false positive levels.
- No extensive operation.
- Long term maintenance.

ACL – Operations Director

- Systems integration engineering.
- CT-80 is light weight and would not have to cause re-building of airport for installation.

- a benefit is that power only needs local distribution 220v outlet, others need...(not recorded)

Mexico – Deputy Director General Civil Aviation

- Reveal has been installed at American Airlines in Mexico City, operators...
- Throughput is 80 bags per hour (bph), will take 110-120 bph once operators ... (not recorded)
- Can identify drugs, detect all persons using drugs.

Agenda Item 9 Establishment of HBS Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) Model

9.1 Standard Operating Procedures - Mexico

9.1.1 Mexico presented a paper on their present operating protocols. Some of the hold baggage screening that they conduct is in conjunction with other control authorities of their State based on threat/risk analysis from the originating State of the airline coming into Mexico and the security problems that the State faces.

9.1.2 Mexico has various airport sizes and therefore has started the process of upgrading their hold baggage screening equipment, in keeping with new technology requirements.

9.2 Implementation of Standard Operating Procedures – IATA

9.2.1 The International Air Transport Association (IATA), working on behalf of their member airlines has adopted and tweaked a position paper on 100% HBS that was developed from the Airports Council International (ACI). The IATA position paper also took into consideration the ECAC Security Working Group guidance to its Member States.

9.2.2 IATA agrees that there should be globally harmonized standards for hold baggage screening procedures, and Section 7 of their Position Paper focuses on best practices in all aspects of the hold baggage screening process. This document provides IATA policy as well as guidance to industry.

9.2.3 IATA also supports the view that one authority should be responsible for all elements of the Hold Baggage Screening System.

9.3 Conclusion

9.3.1 It is agreed that there should be standard operating procedures developed for the Hold Baggage Screening system. The minimum standards for the operation of the Hold Baggage Screening system, to include equipment and personnel requirements, etc., should be established by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).

9.3.2 This proposal is forwarded to the GREPECAS AVSEC/COMM for review and final Resolution.

9.4 Working Papers 08 and 05

8.5.1 WP/08 and the comments by States and Consultants are attached to this part of the Report as **Appendices A** and **B** respectively; WP/05 and the comments by States and Consultants are attached to this part of the Report as **Appendices C** and **D** respectively.

APPENDIX A



International Civil Aviation Organization

CAR/SAM REGIONAL PLANNING IMPLEMENTATION GROUP (GREPECAS)

**First Meeting of the Hold Baggage Screening Task Force of the GREPECAS
Aviation Security Committee (AVSEC/HBS/TF/1)**

Monterrey, Mexico, 1 to 2 December 2005

AVSEC/HBS/TF/1-NE/08

02/12/05

Agenda Item 9

Establishment of HBS Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) Model

ESTABLECIMIENTO DE UN MODELO DE LOS PROCEDIMIENTOS ESTÁNDARES DE OPERACIÓN PARA LA INSPECCIÓN DE EQUIPAJE DE BODEGA

(Presentado por Aarón Villar Bernal DGAC [México])

RESUMEN

Proponer las líneas generales para obtener un modelo de procedimientos estándares de operación para la inspección de equipaje de bodega, observando los diversos preceptos legislativos de los Estados, pero unificando los tópicos genéricos que sirvan como guía para fundamentar los niveles mínimos de seguridad que mediante la inspección se proporcionen a tal equipaje.

Referencias:

- Norma 4.4.8 del Anexo 17 "Seguridad" al Convenio sobre aviación civil internacional.
- Procedimientos para la inspección en proceso de implementación por México.
- Otras referencias internacionales.

1. Introducción

1.1 Contar con procedimientos genéricos mínimos para la inspección del equipaje de bodega, asegura la eficacia, la eficiencia de la medida de seguridad, y la coordinación de esfuerzos entre los Estados para obtener niveles de seguridad similares en ella, lo cual a su vez conlleva a la facilitación del tránsito de los usuarios por los aeropuertos y su abordaje en las aeronaves, estandariza en lo posible los tiempos de las transferencias, unifica los criterios de tratamiento de los artículos prohibidos y peligrosos, y los aplicados a los pasajeros que los transportan en su equipaje de bodega.

1.2 Concordar el contenido mínimo de los procedimientos de inspección proporciona una base firme para crear cooperación, entendimiento y equivalencias entre la seguridad de la aviación civil de diversos Estados.

2. Propuesta de contenido mínimo de los Procedimientos de Operación para la Inspección.

- 2.1 Objetivos y alcances de los procedimientos.
- 2.2 Definiciones y abreviaturas.
- 2.3 Disponibilidad y actualización del documento.
- 2.4 Métodos de inspección.
- 2.5 Estructura organizacional para la inspección.
- 2.6 Responsabilidades en la inspección (inspectores, inspectores en jefe, supervisores, medios de comunicación y coordinación, controles de contaminación de equipos ETD, filmación y/o fotografía de la inspección, operación, calibración, prueba y mantenimiento de los equipos, bitácoras de los equipos y de eventos en la inspección; equipo y herramientas para seguridad industrial; requisitos para la seguridad operacional).
- 2.7 De la apertura de las facilidades para la inspección y cierre (antes y después de una jornada de trabajo, después de un mantenimiento, después de una contingencia o emergencia, etc.).
- 2.8 Procedimientos de inspección (incluyéndolos en el documento por cada tipo de equipo, definición de situaciones específicas durante la inspección como su rechazo, y procedimientos especiales tales como los dedicados a valijas diplomáticas, animales vivos, objetos religiosos, evidencia judicial, órganos humanos para donación, etc.).
- 2.9 Procedimientos de inspección física de equipajes y artículos específicos.
- 2.10 Procedimientos de inspección alternos con definición de circunstancias de aplicación.
- 2.11 Materiales peligrosos, sus procedimientos de inspección y excepciones.
- 2.12 Control de calidad de la inspección de equipaje de bodega: Evaluaciones, Auditorias y Pruebas (dirigidas al recurso humano y al recurso material).
- 2.13 Procedimientos para resolución de alarmas y coordinación en su caso con las autoridades policiales y de manejo de explosivos.
- 2.14 Coordinación con otras medidas de seguridad al equipaje de bodega, antes y después del proceso de inspección.

3. Recomendación.

- 3.1 Se recomienda al grupo de trabajo que analice el contenido de la propuesta y tome la resolución necesaria para presentarla como propuesta de Contenido Mínimo de los Procedimientos de Inspección de Equipaje de Bodega al Comité AVSEC/COMM del GREPECAS, con el fin de que se apruebe y se haga llegar a los Estados para su opinión.

APPENDIX B

COMMENTS BY STATES & CONSULTANTS

Presentation Paper – Establishment of HBS Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) Model by Mexico

ICAO – Regional AVSEC Officer

- Based on Mexico's current procedures, details were not included. Only minimum requirements and general points were there.

Mexico – Deputy Director General Civil Aviation

- How long it took to complete the document and the lessons learnt? Four (4) months to write the procedures for Mexico and 18 months to get approved. There was lack of industry cooperation and resistance to implementation.
- HBS screening is based on threat/risk based on origin of aircraft operating into Mexico. 4 out of 10 bags are inspected outside.

Consultant – Aerospace Services Int'l Inc.

- Explosive Detection System (EDS) operator sees what may be explosive, but no wires etc. has been seen. Has this been considered?

Mexico – Deputy Director General Civil Aviation

- Money laundering, dangerous goods, drugs were all considered. Federal police also look at images.

Consultant - Aerospace Services Int'l Inc.

- Suggestion, review of operating protocols.

Jamaica - Rapporteur

- Comment not recorded

Peru – Chief AVSEC & Dangerous Goods

- HBS or more global view, when passenger considered to be in flight. Annex 13 (Aerodrome) consideration given to Annex 17 (Security) which starts at check in.

COCESNA/ACSA – AVSEC Inspector

- Change of risk, he not agree with the comment.

Costa Rica – Inspector AVSEC-FAL

- Role of the company that manages the airport with illegal interference
- External, armed support needed.

Chile – Chief National AVSEC

- Most recommend equipment be placed before the counter
- 50 passengers or less screened before the counter.

APPENDIX C



International Civil Aviation Organization
CAR/SAM REGIONAL PLANNING IMPLEMENTATION GROUP (GREPECAS)
**First Meeting of the Hold Baggage Screening Task Force of the GREPECAS
Aviation Security Committee (AVSEC/HBS/TF/1)**
Monterrey, Mexico, 1 to 2 December 2005

AVSEC/HBS/TF/1-WP/05
02/12/05

Agenda Item 9: Establishment of HBS Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) Model

IMPLEMENTATION OF GLOBABALLY ACCEPTED STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR THE SUCCESFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF 100 PER CENT HOLD BAGGAGE SCREENING

(Presented by the International Air Transport Association (IATA))

SUMMARY

In order for the ICAO requirement for 100% Hold Baggage Screening to be fully effective, technical screening methods must be used in conjunction with standardized procedures for all directly and indirectly involved in the process of Hold Baggage Screening. This paper present the IATA view on how best to implement 100% HBS and ensure that screening procedures are formalized in order to ensure that screening standards meet globally accepted standards.

References:

- IATA Position Paper on 100% Hold Baggage Screening – Executive Summary (**Attachment 1**)
- Key Factors in Screening Process (Excerpt from IATA Position Paper on 100% Hold Baggage Screening) (**Attachment 2**)

1. Introduction

1.1 The air transport industry operates in an extremely complex environment. In order to properly service their customers, air carriers must operate a multiplicity of routes, through numerous transfer and transit points involving numerous States, airports and often air carriers.

1.2 Superimposed on this already complex network are decisions made by individual States regarding the security and facilitation standards that they require within their territories as well as security and facilitation measures to be adopted by their registered air carriers when they operate in another State. This regulatory/operational environment has been made even more complex and difficult since the tragic events of 11 September, 2001.

1.3 This makes it essential for industry to participate with the regulatory and border control agencies and other security related organizations in their States at an early stage in the planning process so as to ensure that hold baggage screening (HBS) is introduced in the most cost-effective way and to avoid unnecessary costs which may otherwise be imposed upon them.

2. STATES WITH 100% HBS ALREADY IMPLEMENTED

2.1 ICAO Annex 17 - Security Standard 4.4.8 states: "From 1 January 2006, each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure that originating hold baggage intended to be carried in an aircraft engaged in international civil aviation operations is screened prior to being loaded into the aircraft." This is currently a Recommended Practice in Annex 17. IATA full supports implementation of 100% HBS as a critical element of the aviation security system.

2.2 Numerous States have already implemented 100% HBS, however the efficiency and effectiveness of these systems varies substantially from State to State and often from airport to airport within a State.

2.3 The efficiency and effectiveness of the HBS system in a particular airport can have a major impact on facilitation of passengers. As an example, the speed with which hold baggage is processed has a direct impact on originating passenger processing time as well as the Minimum Connect Time (MCT) for those passengers transiting or transferring through a particular airport.

2.4 The impact of HBS systems on passenger processing not only directly impacts on the efficiency with which passengers can be handled and therefore the customer service that they receive, but also on the operational efficiency of the air carriers. Longer processing times place restrictions on the number of flights that an air carrier can operate out of a certain airport in a given period of time, which in turn has a direct financial impact on that air carrier.

2.5 Additionally the efficiency of an HBS system often has a direct impact on the screening effectiveness of the system. The industry has learned through years of experience that there is often a direct correlation between the efficiency of a particular HBS system and its effectiveness in screening out potential threat items.

2.6 The implementation of an efficient and effective 100% HBS system will also facilitate the implementation of the so-called "one-stop security" concept not only on a regional basis but globally. Key to implementation of such a concept, from industries point of view, is the exemption from the need to screen transfer and transit bags. This not only provides tremendous benefits to industry in the form of shorter MCTs but also to States and their designated screening authorities who are able to free up resources for other tasks.

2.7 The screening authority (be it airport operator or other specified screening authority) should be responsible for all elements of the HBS system. This would include the baggage reconciliation system (BRS), as appropriate, which preferably should be automated and run concurrent with the technical screening systems.

3. STATES IN THE PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTING 100% HBS

3.1 The deadline for ICAO Annex 17 Security Standard 4.4.8 to come into effect is fast approaching and some States have yet to completely implement 100% HBS. However, in many cases States have reported that they have implementation plans that will be completed by 1 January 2006.

3.2 IATA encourages States to implement an HBS system that is suitable to the configuration of the airport as well as to the operational requirements (baggage throughput, etc.). States should also consider projected increased capacity when determining the most suitable HBS option. Implementing 100% HBS, may result in temporary disturbances of normal airport operations, frequent refurbishment should, as far as practicable, be avoided.

3.3 IATA hopes that States and Airport authority will consider implementing permanent solutions immediately rather than utilize temporary measures to meet the ICAO proposed deadline date of 1 January 2006 and then develop permanent solutions later on. Whilst installation of temporary 100% HBS would probably only cause slight disturbance to airport operations, it would nonetheless cause a duplication of operational disturbance and resources allocated to this project. Also, temporary HBS system may not be as effective as permanent solutions as they may not be perfectly suited to their environment.

3.4 IATA encourages States to meet the ICAO deadline of 1 January 2006 as some States have indicated that they would not allow air carrier to service Stations within their State if they are departing from States where there is no 100% HBS system in place.

3.4 IATA wishes to reiterate that implementation of 100% HBS should be a State responsibility and whilst air carrier could potentially be most directly affected by non-compliance to this Standard, all stakeholders would ultimately be penalized.

4. HBS STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

4.1 The most important factor when determining what procedures should be developed to facilitate the Hold Baggage Screening process is that they assist all involved in meeting the screening standards determined by the State

4.2 Standard Operating Procedures, whilst always designed to meet globally harmonized and accepted screening standards, should be developed according to the operational environment of the particular airport.

4.3 As such, whilst the Appropriate Authority for Aviation Security should have oversight and quality assurance roles in the establishment of screening procedures, the procedures themselves should be developed by the entity responsible for performing the screening (often known as Screening Authority) at the particular airport, in co-operation with all other stakeholders affected by the introduction of Hold Baggage Screening which includes but is not limited to air carriers, airport authority and the Appropriate Authority for Aviation Security.

4.4 All Standard Operating Procedures should have a common goal of providing screening personnel tools and methods to ensure that no un-cleared baggage are loaded on an aircraft, and provide the screening personnel with the procedures to inspect and clear all types of hold baggage in an efficient and effective manner.

4.5 Standard Operating Procedures also need to be developed for all stakeholders with an indirect role in the Hold Baggage Screening Process, to ensure that their daily activities and duties do not interfere negatively with the screening of hold baggage.

4.6 Screening Procedures should be developed in a manner that does not negatively impede on the safety, inherent speed of civil aviation and the service level provided to air carriers and other airport tenants.

5. IATA POSITION PAPER

5.1 The industry has developed a policy position/guidance document on 100% HBS. A summary of this document is presented as an attachment to this paper. The position paper itself was originally developed by the Airports Council International (ACI) and slightly modified by IATA to account for additional air carrier issues. IATA fully supports the ACI position and for that reason used their document as the basis for the air carrier industry position. This document fully accounts for recent changes to civil aviation regulations introduced since 11 September 2001.

5.2 This document all builds on other industry papers on HBS as well as the work carried out by the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) Security Working Group in its guidance paper to Member States, in which IATA and ACI played a significant contributory role offering essential operational experience and advice. In addition, the document also takes into account recent technological advances and experience in baggage screening processes already in daily operation at many airports around the world.

5.3 IATA recognises the benefits of having mutually accepted Hold Baggage Screening procedures that meet globally harmonized standards. As such section 7 of the IATA Position Papers focuses on best practices concerning all aspects of the Hold Baggage Screening process.

5.4 The AVSECP is invited to note the IATA position paper on 100% HBS as guidance material to facilitate the implementation of 100% at airports as required. The complete position paper is available by contacting Mr. Yannick Lachapelle, IATA Security Services (lachapelly@iata.org)

Attachment 1

IATA 100% Hold Baggage Screening (HBS) Industry Position Paper Executive Summary

1. Introduction

The IATA 100% Hold Baggage Screening (HBS) Industry Position Paper was drafted by the IATA Security Committee. The paper is based on the Airports Council International (ACI) position paper and builds on other industry documents and the work carried out by the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) Security Working Group. The position paper also takes into account recent changes to international civil aviation security regulations and the measures introduced as a direct consequence of the tragic events of 11 September 2001.

The screening authority (be it airport operator or other specified screening authority) should be responsible for all elements of the hold baggage screening (HBS) system. This would include the baggage reconciliation system (BRS), as appropriate, which preferably should be automated and run concurrent with the technical screening system.

Ground Security:

IATA supports development of effective, efficient and operationally manageable ground security measures which meet or exceed the provisions of ICAO Annex 17, to be applied using a globally agreed Risk Management Matrix, on the basis of the level of risk as assessed by the appropriate national authority.

Passenger and Baggage Security Controls:

IATA supports the development of long term solutions to screen and reconcile passengers and their hold baggage through effective application of new technology and procedures, which do not impede the flow of traffic.

IATA believes that governments must combine resources in a co-operative manner to share information and research and development costs for explosive detection technology and other technologies to enhance the current systems of screening passengers and baggage.

IATA believes that airports, airlines and regulatory authorities should jointly develop measures that would improve the flow of passengers and their hand baggage through security checkpoints.

2. Methods Available for Screening Hold Baggage

Advantages and limitations of different screening methods are addressed. The screening methods discussed are:

- Manual Search
- Trace Detection
- Explosive Detection Dogs (K-9)
- Conventional X-ray
- Computer Assisted (Smart) X-ray Systems
- Passenger Risk Assessment Techniques

3. Possible Locations for Screening Hold Baggage

Each airport differs in its design and traffic characteristics, the screening method applied should be a system that suits local conditions. Each airport needs to consider the impact of cost, capacity and local operating conditions when developing appropriate solutions for both the location of screening and the methods/technologies to be used. For each possible HBS location the paper highlights the advantages, moderate disadvantages and major disadvantages.

The section is designed to be a guide to assist stakeholders determine which solution is best suited for their environment keeping in mind that each airport is very unique. The locations for HBS discussed are:

- Off-Airport Screening
- Sterile Terminal
- Sterile Security Area Before Check-in
- Screening in Front of Check-in
- Screening During Check-in
- Manual Screening
- Screening Downstream in the Baggage System (Conventional X-ray Equipment)
- Certified EDS Lobby Installations
- Combined Technologies: Three models are discussed in details:
 - i. Certified EDS – Profile Filter (C'EDS-PF)
 - ii. Certified EDS Automated Filter (C'EDS-AF)
 - iii. German Option (Developed by the German Ministry of the Interior – Civil Aviation Security and tested at Nuremberg Airport)

4. Planning HBS Facilities

As each airport has its own characteristics, there is no single solution that is suitable for all airports. The fundamental aim is to ensure that the system that is developed can deal with current baggage throughput (including peak demand) and future forecasts (i.e. the planning has to be demand-led) and delivers an effective and efficient screening process that meets the required standards at a viable cost.

Key considerations in the successful management of HBS systems with the introduction of an in-line integrated baggage handling system include:

- The requirement to synchronise the belt speed of conveying equipment to the processing speed and capacity of the explosive detection system (EDS) technology employed
- The elimination of any potential 'bottle-necks' from hindering facilitation and the baggage transfer process by minimising inclines on the baggage sortation system and baggage handling systems
- The minimisation of inclines on the baggage sortation system, where any alterations are made to integrate with or accommodate the HBS solution in operation.

The following factors also need to be taken into consideration when planning an HBS facility:

- Testing Phase
- Traffic Characteristics
- Passenger Traffic Flows – including peak demand
- Baggage Types
- Demand Forecast
- General Constraints
- Space Requirement and Location
- Airport Structures
- Check-in Islands and Zones
- Existing Handling Facilities and Modes of Operation
- Operational Issues

- HBS Issues
- Detection Performance
- Throughput Reject Rates
- 'False Alarm' Rates
- Consistency with Passenger and Cabin Baggage Screening
- Space Requirements
- Integration with Layered Security Architectures
- Passenger Reconciliation
- Transfer and Transit Baggage
- Pre-Screening Prior to Check-in
- Size and Weight of Security Equipment
- Operation Environment of Equipment
- Redundancy of Equipment
- Operational Specifications of Equipment (including Staff Issues)
- Legislative Changes

5. Key Factors in the Screening Process

All relevant baggage must be searched/screened by a means acceptable to the relevant regulatory body. It is recommended that security staff should adopt the principle that, before security controls are carried out, the status of each bag presented for examination is assumed to be "uncleared". A bag can be designated as "clear" only when it is determined that the bag and its contents do not contain any prohibited articles. Where a bag screened by X-ray has not been "cleared", further examination procedures must be applied in an attempt to resolve the cause of the concern. The bag cannot be allowed to proceed for carriage until such concerns are resolved fully and effectively.

Where a multi-level search process is adopted, the following general principles should be applied:

- The number of search levels must be kept to a minimum.
- Relevant information must be passed on from one level to the next.
- Each successive search level must provide added security value.
- The search process should always be "fail safe".

Each successive screening level should provide clear additional security value derived from increased depth, quality and or detail of the examination.

Where the status of a bag is ambiguous, the bag should be treated as "uncleared" and subjected to the appropriate screening procedures. It is essential to ensure that no assumptions about the clearance status of a bag are allowed. X-ray operators must not clear a bag unless they are satisfied that no prohibited article is present, or in other words they must reject any bag about which they have any reservations or doubts. The system should reject automatically when:

- The operator fails to make a decision
- The bag mistracks within the HBS system
- The screening equipment fails to make a decision because insufficient information was obtained

Also, operational issues are discussed and guidelines are provided for the following topics:

- General Screening Principles (including screening of dense/opaque materials)
- Hand Searches
- Process for Out-of-Gauge (OOG)/Super-Out-of-Gauge (SOOG) Baggage
- Explosive Trace Detection Equipment
- Time on Task for X-ray Operators
- Minimum/Preferred Time for Viewing Images
- Operator Proficiency Testing

- Procedures for Dealing with Firearms, other Non-IED Prohibited Articles, Contraband and Dangerous Goods
- Communication
- Record and System Information
- Control and Management of the System (Software and Hardware Management and Operating Protocols)

6. Contingencies

Effective contingency plans have to be in place to assure that, in the event of a breakdown or failure of the HBS system, all relevant bags can continue to be screened to required standards. Examples of contingency options include:

- Diverting bags to other available HBS facilities that are in operation
- Moving passengers to other check-in desks that are linked to operational HBS facilities
- Asking some passengers to take their baggage to central search facilities
- Setting up additional hand search facilities
- Bringing in mobile X-ray equipment, etc.
- Utilizing State approved emergency baggage screening mitigation techniques

A copy of the complete IATA Position Paper on Implementation of 100% HBS can be obtained by contacting the IATA Security Section at: lachapelly@iata.org.

Attachment 2

Key Factors in the Screening Process (IATA Position Paper on 100% Hold Baggage Screening (Excerpt) (Section 7)

7.1 General Principles

All relevant baggage must be searched/screened by a means accepted by the relevant regulatory body. For most airports this may mean one or more host States, such as the United Kingdom, the United States and the ECAC States.

It is recommended that security staff should adopt the principle that, before security controls are carried out, the status of each bag presented for examination is assumed to be “uncleared”. Each bag must be subjected to critical examination, whether by technical means, hand search or a combination of both, to determine whether the bag is clear of prohibited articles. A bag can be designated as “clear” only when it is determined that the bag and its contents do not contain any prohibited articles.

Where a bag screened by X-ray has not been “cleared”, further examination procedures must be applied in an attempt to resolve the cause of the concern. The bag cannot be allowed to proceed for carriage until such concerns are resolved fully and effectively. Where X-ray equipment is deployed (whether conventional, EDS or “certified technology”), this may require a variable number of levels or stages of examination (a multi-level search process).

Where a multi-level search process is adopted, the following general principles should be applied:

- the number of search levels should be kept to a minimum
- relevant information must be passed from one level to the next
- each successive search level must provide added security value
- the search process should always be “fail safe”.

Each search level is also a decision level which inherently involves some risk. Minimizing the number of levels in turn minimizes the risk of an incorrect decision.

Any screening process should be based on the principle of developing a more informed evaluation at each stage, building on the information obtained from previous levels.

If each stage in the process does not provide better and more complete information about the bag and its contents, the process will be inefficient and ineffective.

Information that is important for the evaluation of a bag and its contents must not be lost in the system. If the reasons for concerns identified at one level are not carried forward, additional time may be required while the operator fully reassesses the image, with the risk that the original reasons for the referral may then be overlooked. Where EDS equipment is used and the bag is rejected purely on the basis of threat or density alerts, these will be obvious to the operator at the next level. However, where concerns are not immediately obvious, they should be passed on to the operator at the next level for consideration.

Each successive level in the screening process should provide clear additional security value to enable the operator to make a more informed and reliable decision, which means that the amount and quality of information about the bag and its contents should be significantly better than at the preceding stage. The additional security value is derived from the increased depth, quality and/or detail of the examination.

This can, for example, be achieved by:

- examining the bag using screening technology with more powerful/accurate detection and diagnostic capabilities
- presenting an improved image of the bag
- using all appropriate enhancement facilities offered by the equipment where these were not used at the earlier stage in the process
- subjecting the bag and its contents to a different and more effective search technique, such as a hand search supported by trace detection analysis

However, despite the obvious advantages of such a system, there is also a danger that the operator will merely look at the potential threat item(s) highlighted and miss out on other threat items which may have been missed at the previous level(s). Perhaps technology will eventually be developed to match up highlighted areas by the two different levels of screening.

It should be noted that the provision of additional time for the operator to make an assessment does not in itself result in additional security value unless the time is used for a positive purpose. Typically, this may involve making significant additional use of the analytical and image enhancement functions of the equipment (for example, if screening at the previous level was time-limited and these facilities were not used fully).

To ensure a reliable and effective approach, it is important that equipment and procedures always “fail safe”. Where there is an equipment malfunction or failure, the system must ensure that the relevant baggage is not allowed to proceed for loading until the full screening process has been applied.

Where the status of a bag is ambiguous, the bag should be treated as “uncleared” and subjected to the appropriate screening procedures. It is essential to ensure that no assumptions about the clearance status of a bag are allowed, as these seriously undermine the integrity of the system. For example:

X-ray operators must not clear a bag unless they are satisfied that no prohibited article is present, or in other words they must reject any bag about which they have any reservations or doubts.

The system should automatically reject bags where:

- the operator fails to make a decision
- the bag mistracks within the HBS system
- the screening equipment fails to make a decision, for example because
- insufficient information was obtained

(Note: the system at the next level should ideally provide an automatic indication of the reasons for the rejection of the bag).

Where the operator is presented with an incomplete or flawed image, the bag should in all cases be referred for further screening/examination.

The process should ensure that all bags which have not been positively cleared are identified and referred to the next level of screening or examination accurately and reliably. Where cleared and uncleared bags are separated and diverted onto different tracks, the process should be checked regularly for accuracy.

Where a bag remains “uncleared”, the final stage in the resolution process may involve a “threat assessment” of the bag to determine whether it is to be treated as suspect. Even if the assessment is that the bag is not suspect and that no escalation in action or response is required, the bag must not be passed for carriage on a flight until the specific concerns about the bag and its contents which caused its referral are fully resolved by the accepted screening/searching procedures.

It is recommended that the procedures for the process of reuniting bags and passengers and hand searching bags are practised on a regular basis, where possible so that each security operative who exercises this responsibility can practise the procedure at least once a month.

It is also recommended that the procedures for the next level of screening are practised at least once every six months. This should help to familiarize all relevant personnel with the procedures and enable any necessary improvements to be identified and implemented

Upgrades in hardware or software should be adopted as soon as practicable.

7.2 Screening Principles

7.2.1 General

When items of hold baggage are screened by X-ray, the X-ray operator must:

- examine the entire X-ray image for prohibited articles, or components of prohibited articles, where appropriate making full and effective use of the equipment's image enhancement features. In particular (but not exclusively), the operator should look for components of improvised explosive devices, including detonators, wires, batteries and electronic or mechanical timing devices. The operator should pay particular attention where the image shows dense or opaque areas that might conceal prohibited articles and areas which are highlighted as containing a potential threat item;
- check that the shading of the bag's image is consistent throughout, since lighter edges may indicate the presence of a sheet explosive that does not completely line the top or bottom of the case;
- pay as much attention to the framework and appendages as to the contents;
- examine any metallic or channelled part of a case for apparent bulges or protrusions which could partially conceal a component of an explosive device.

Where an operator cannot fully satisfy her or himself that the bag and its contents do not contain any prohibited articles or components of prohibited articles, she or he must refer the bag for further examination. The operator should not feel under pressure to "clear" the bag, or in other words where the operator has any doubts or reservations, the bag must be referred for further investigation at the next level.

7.2.2 Dense/Opaque Objects

Where the degree of absorption of an X-ray beam is significant, the relevant area of the X-ray image will indicate this, either by allocating a specific colour to the area in the case of a conventional X-ray machine, or by generating an automatic alarm and highlighting the area(s) in question (a 'density alert').

A density alert displays areas within a bag that are too dense to be penetrated sufficiently for accurate analysis. In particular, the equipment cannot complete the analysis of the areas highlighted with sufficient accuracy to be able to determine whether explosive material is present. The areas are not necessarily X-ray opaque (although they may be) but, due to the degree of absorption of the dual energy X-rays, for example with the low energy beam being completely blocked, the information provided to the X-ray operator is limited, and often significantly so.

X-ray operators should therefore note that, although there may be occasions when the use of certain image enhancement functions may elicit more information, for example by using contrast adjustment, such information cannot be relied on to provide sufficiently meaningful information about the area(s) under examination. Operators must clearly understand the value and limitations of the enhancement functions of the equipment they are using in respect of dense areas and opaque objects. As such, X-ray operators must

exercise caution when forming a judgement about areas highlighted by a density alert. The following considerations should be noted in this respect:

- The X-ray operator should assess the size of the area/item highlighted by the alert and then consider whether it could house/shield a prohibited article, in particular an improvised explosive device. (N.B. it must be understood that an opaque area not only prevents information on articles behind the area from being presented to the operator, but also information about articles in front of it. This is because the absorption of the X-ray beam is such that the information on the bag's contents for the entire line of the beam is affected). Where small areas of alert overlap an organic mass, the X-ray operator should consider whether such dense areas might shield the components of an improvised explosive device.
- The item can be examined from different angles (e.g. at 90 degrees from the angle of the original presentation of the bag), which may enable the X-ray operator to establish the size and shape of the item more clearly. In certain circumstances, a different orientation may improve the penetration of X-rays through some or all of the item and allow an effective assessment of the item. If the area or item is considered insufficient to house/shield a prohibited article, the area may be deemed to be cleared. However, it is important that the entire image is fully and carefully assessed before a decision is reached.
- X-ray operators should adopt a cautious approach to assessing areas covered by a density alert. Where *any* doubt exists, the bag should be referred to an examination level that is capable of reliably resolving the doubt, which usually means by hand search.

In most cases, the best practice to resolve concerns about a dense area or opaque object effectively is to subject the bag to further X-ray examination using higher penetration X-rays, or to search the bag and its contents by hand (supplemented by explosive trace detection analysis where available).

7.3 The Hand Search Process

Wherever possible, hand searchers should have ready access to X-ray facilities and explosive trace detection equipment to support the hand search of individual items. The aircraft operator should ensure that hand searches of hold baggage are carried out at the location specified in the approved Hold Baggage Searching Operating Protocol and that each hand search is conducted as follows:

- items of hold baggage should normally be searched in the presence of the relevant passenger;
- baggage should be opened by the passenger (when present);
- baggage should be examined to ensure that there is no false bottom, using a straight-edge gauge-rule, rod or other device where necessary to establish whether there is a significant discrepancy between external and internal measurements;
- particular attention should be paid to linings, trim, seams, rims, studs, zip fasteners, locks, hinges, wheels and handles to identify signs of tampering or repair which may indicate the concealment of a prohibited article, and where suspicion is aroused, the area(s) should be subjected to explosive trace detection equipment;
- the contents should be removed layer by layer, each being examined until the bag is empty. The empty bag should be lifted by hand and assessed for balance and empty weight. If either give rise to suspicion that the bag is not of uniform weight, or of a weight consistent with being empty, the bag itself should be examined for concealment. If necessary, it should be screened by X-ray (ensuring that an X-ray image of the bag is presented to an operator for assessment and decision);
- electrical items which might conceal a weapon or explosive device (e.g. shavers, calculators, radios, clocks, cameras, personal stereos and their cassettes, etc.) should be examined to ensure they have not been tampered with, are of the expected weight, are balanced and have no additional batteries. If necessary, an item should be screened by X-ray to ensure that it has no additional power source or that there is no organic material within what should be an inorganic shell (ensuring that an X-ray image of the item is presented to an operator for assessment and decision) and subjected to explosive trace detection equipment;

- articles such as vacuum flasks, books, umbrellas, crutches, etc., should be examined in sufficient depth, by X-ray if necessary, to establish their bona fides;
- attention should be given to the contents of containers and bottles capable of holding volatile liquids;
- liquids must be rejected when there are grounds for suspecting that they may be used to commit an unlawful act;
- searchers should look for greasy stains and small holes in the exterior of the case and for the smell of almonds, nail polish, glue, perfume or other masking vapours which might indicate the presence of explosives; and
- bags should be closed and fastened on completion of the search.

Upon completion of the search, hold baggage should not under normal circumstances be returned to the passenger.

7.4 Process for Out-of-Gauge (OOG) and Super-Out-of Gauge (SOOG) Baggage

OOG and SOOG items are those which cannot be processed through the standard baggage system because of their size, shape or weight. Many of these items can be subjected to X-ray screening using an X-ray with a larger tunnel aperture. Items which cannot be X-rayed should be searched by hand, in accordance with the principles set out above.

Some items do not readily lend themselves to a conventional hand search (such as bicycles and skis). Such items should be subjected to a thorough physical and visual examination. Items which can be detached or removed (such as bicycle panniers) should be subjected to X-ray examination, where possible. It is useful to support this process with analysis using explosive trace detection equipment applied particularly to areas where explosives may be concealed or inserted.

7.5 Explosive Trace Detection Equipment (ETD)

Trials and tests of explosive trace detection (ETD) equipment confirm that it is highly effective in detecting minute traces of explosive material where they are present.

As with all advanced technology, it is essential that operators follow the correct and appropriate procedures for the application of ETD to ensure that the equipment is used effectively. It has been clearly established that precautions taken by bomb-makers affect the likelihood of traces of explosive material being present on the outside of a bag containing an improvised explosive device and an item of hold baggage *cannot* therefore be cleared for carriage on an aircraft on the basis of ETD indicating that there is no trace of explosives on the outside of the baggage. ETD can provide significant added value to the searching process, particularly for the examination of specific items and areas within a bag in support of the hand search process, including for:

- individual items *in* bags that are difficult to search effectively by hand and those that are difficult to screen effectively using X-rays, such as laptop computers, electrical/battery-operated items;
- items specifically referred for hand search (by the X-ray screen operator or highlighted by an automatic alarm), including most items which appear opaque to X-ray operators;
- the inner lining of bags, paying special attention to the seams, joins and closure points;
- appropriate areas or parts of OOG and SOOG items.

7.6 Time on Task for X-ray Operators

The issue of how long a security agent should undertake hold baggage X-ray assessment duties without having a break is a complex issue. There is no simple answer, as a person's performance over a period of time is strongly dependent on factors such as:

- the time of day
- the time in the shift
- the level of cumulative sleep loss
- the shifts worked previously
- the type of task and
- the workload.

X-ray assessment is a complex task and can therefore be mentally demanding. In one study, it has been observed that security staff reject more items in their first 15 minutes of monitoring. It is therefore a key principle that X-ray operators should have regular breaks.

X-ray operators should not undertake X-ray assessment duties for periods exceeding 45 minutes (Optimal assignment time being 20 minutes). A period of at least 15 minutes should then elapse before a security agent is required to resume responsibility for an X-ray monitor. (A period of duty in this context is defined as a continuous period of time during which a person has formal responsibility for X-ray assessment).

7.7 Minimum/Preferred Time for the Viewing of Images

An X-ray operator should be allowed sufficient time to make a reliable assessment of the image. The time allocated for this task is influenced by the nature and depth of the examination required at that stage of the process. For example, a key element in the added value of a specific screening level may be that no limit is placed on the time available to the operator to examine the X-ray image of a bag. This is often the case, for example, for a free-standing X-ray machine at Level 3. However, where the X-ray process is an integrated part of a continuous flow of bags (for example, at Level 2), the time available may be more limited if the baggage system is not to be disrupted significantly. In this context, the volume of bags running through a screening line may also influence the time available. The size of the bag and the complexity of its contents also affect the time required by the operator to assess the image effectively.

Nevertheless, current information suggests that operators should ideally have an average of between 10 and 15 seconds to make a reasoned and reliable decision. As a minimum, the image of every part of the item being searched should be capable of being displayed on the screen for no more than 5 seconds. Where the examination of the image takes place while the bag is continuing to move along the baggage system, the time available to an operator to make a decision is determined primarily by the distance between the X-ray machine and the divert/reject point and the speed of the conveyor system.

It is also important to take into account the time that the X-ray equipment takes firstly to analyse the data and then, where a bag is rejected, to present an image while the bag continues to travel along the conveyor. In addition, where one or more further bags are rejected in quick succession, this can reduce the time available for the presentation to the operator of the image of the second and subsequent bags.

An X-ray operator must not be made responsible for controlling more than one monitor in cases where the X-ray images presented on the monitors are time-limited. Even where the images are not time-limited, the general principle is that operators should only ever have responsibility for one monitor at any one time.

7.8 Operator Proficiency Testing

There is a need for ongoing proficiency testing of operators to ensure that they are performing their tasks at an appropriate level of competence. This testing can be undertaken in various ways including technological methods such as Threat Image Projection Systems (TIPS) which test operators by inserting images of threat items into the images of actual bags that are being processed and measure the ability of operators to spot these items automatically. Other non-technological methods such as the actual insertion of test pieces simulating threat items inserted into actual passenger bags (with passenger permissions) or test bags again assessing the operators ability to spot such items can also be used.

No matter which method is chosen the test results must be used as a performance enhancement tool and must be shared with the operators and should also be shared with the air carriers serving the airport.

7.9 Procedures for Dealing with Firearms, Other Non-IED Prohibited Articles, Contraband and Dangerous Goods

Operators should ensure that clear procedures are published for dealing with firearms, other prohibited articles, contraband and dangerous goods identified in hold baggage, and that all relevant staff are familiar with them. These procedures should identify the organization/person to be contacted initially, the contact procedures and the relevant contact numbers. This information should be readily available at the points at which baggage is examined. Where such items are not encountered regularly, it is recommended that the procedures are practised as contingency exercises to ensure that staff are familiar with them and can act promptly and correctly when required to do so.

7.10 Communication

As noted above, information that is important for the evaluation of the bag and its contents should be carried forward through the security process until the bag is cleared. Appropriate arrangements should be made to ensure that the reasons for the concerns identified at one level are communicated effectively to succeeding levels of the process.

It is essential for the communication process to support efficient and effective responses to a range of urgent situations which may arise. These may include, for example, the detection of firearms, dangerous goods or contraband, cases in which an operator believes that she or he has positively identified an improvised explosive device at any stage in the process, or a breakdown or failure affecting the HBS system.

Relevant staff should be familiar with the required procedures for dealing with such incidents and should have immediate access to the appropriate communication system. The relevant telephone numbers, radio channel call signs, etc., should be immediately and conveniently available. These procedures should be practiced on a regular basis.

7.11 Record and System Information

Records should be maintained for the following:

- routine equipment checks and maintenance operations
- routine compliance test results
- daily bag volumes processed at each level
- specific individual records of each bag referred for a hand search, including:
 - date, time and location of search
 - name of searcher
 - name and flight number of passenger
 - reason for referral
 - details of items found and results of the search

7.12 Control and Management of the System (Software and Hardware Management and Operating Protocols)

After the initial installation has been completed successfully, there should be strict controls to ensure that no unauthorized changes are made to the security equipment, both for hardware and software (including settings). The procedures should ensure that control and approval of any changes are confined to specific persons who are authorized to do so and any changes are formally cleared with the appropriate authority before implementation.

Staff should be fully familiar with the role and responsibilities to which they are assigned. Detailed procedures should be developed and provided to all relevant staff. Before commencing duties, staff must have effective training and familiarization for their specific role and responsibilities, together with an overview of the whole system, to ensure that they are familiar with the context in which they are operating. There should be strict controls in place to ensure that no changes are made to the established procedures unless approved by specific persons authorized to do so.

Operators may wish to consider whether the controls indicated above are to be applied through an operating protocol for each location. Such a protocol could include the equipment (software settings, etc.), maintenance and breakdown arrangements, training requirements, detailed screening/searching and resolution procedures at each level, the records to be kept, contingency plans, etc. Once established, there should be a defined process for approving changes to any element of the protocol.

APPENDIX D

COMMENTS BY STATES & CONSULTANTS

Presentation Paper – Establishment of HBS Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) Model by IATA

ICAO – Regional AVSEC Officer

- Inquired on IATA position of States who were compliant by January 1, 2006.

IATA – Coordinator Security Services

- IATA wanted to know the status on States for compliance with screening hold baggage. ICAO had requested response from States regarding this matter.
- IATA was focusing on international flights, informing airlines and advising of contingency plans for 100% HBS.

Peru – Chief AVSEC & Dangerous Goods

- Objection in Appendix 1 of the IATA presentation regarding the in-line screening proposed at Level 1 and Level 3. Information received was on five levels, is proposal accepted by ACI also?

IATA

- Described levels in their document in the absence of ICAO Standards. IATA work was based on ECAC guidance.
- Regarding ACI, yes, it is also their view.

Brazil – DGCA

- Sub-paragraph 3.5 Requirement for State responsibility for implementation of HBS and not air carriers.
- It was stated that the State works closely with the airlines who had the responsibility for screening and that the State does not have all the resources that the airlines have to put this in place.
- Other responsibilities belong to the State.
- He proposed that the Task Force change this paragraph.

IATA

- States responsibility to set Standards, provide oversight and do all processes.
- Screening equipment add value to airport, and there are liability issues, airlines should not be held responsible for.
- Additional staffing.

Brazil – DGCA

- Does not agree with this view. IATA representative works with Brazil who has 50 international airports, airlines and with Government oversight.

IATA

- There is a general policy for airlines and a special policy for small airports at locals.

United Kingdom (UK) – Regional AVSEC Advisor

- Agreed with Brazil, UK has split the function between airport equipment and airline screening responsibility.
- Airline passenger/baggage reconciliation is the responsibility of the airline to ensure that no unauthorized bags are added.
- Airline problem, lack of responsibility for Quality Assurance.

- Airlines must take responsibility.

Jamaica – Rapporteur

- Agreed with the UK on that point.

Consultant – Aerospace Services Int'l Inc. – President & CEO

- He has had a working history with IATA from Brian Wall and 1978 (Manpads) when Rodney forced carriers to do things.
- There is a basic difference with security versus facilitation.
- We must be mindful of the USA situation, and placing interest in bottom line over proper screening.
- Mindful of need for self and airlines to make profit.
- World class security and service can't have both at the same time. National Authorities decide based on their threat what they want before meeting with stakeholders. What they need to do and work out with stakeholders.

- Sub-paragraph 4.1, HBS SOPs must not assist but "procedures must do the job".
- The President Aerospace also did a paper with David English.
- Airline systems add ?????, PANAM failed.

IATA

- What States need to do, a good point made; threat-based implementation, then apply security measures.
- Threat levels, evaluate and establish base, medium and high levels.

Honduras – Chief AVSEC Department

- Want the State totally responsible for getting equipment and say they should be part of the State's responsibility.
- In their National AVSEC programme, airlines are responsible for HBS equipment and issue procedures whilst the State will provide oversight and supervise these.
- The present economic impact the State could not bear. Airline tickets include an increase in price of US\$2.50 so airlines can recover money.
- The State does not have the resources for this.

IATA

- They are aware of the situation in Honduras.
- All impacted, understand the limited resources in Honduras other States.
- They are against imposition by States without any agreement with stakeholders. In the case of Honduras, the stakeholders were involved.
- There is a danger of regulations that require airlines to be responsible.

Agenda Item 10 Any Other Business

10.1 Upcoming AVSEC/COMM and LACAC AVSEC Group of Experts Meetings

10.1.1 The Secretary of LACAC addressed the Task Force members which included fifteen States from Central, South American and the Caribbean.

10.1.2 An overview of the work of LACAC with regards to aviation security was given and included: the locations for ICAO approved AVSEC training centres in South America, the Regional approach to equipment acquisition and security audits and advised on the Regional systems that were being developed through Technical Cooperation for a Regional Surveillance System.

10.1.3 The dates for the up-coming AVSEC/COMM and LACAC AVSEC Group of Experts Meetings were finalized for May 29 - June 2, 2006 and will be held in Argentina.

10.2 LACAC

10.2.1 This is a Regional organization with 21 Member States from the Central, South American, and from the Caribbean, the island of Jamaica, and Mexico.

10.2.2 LACAC has eight (8) seats in the UK council.

10.2.3 Mexico and Brazil handle the largest passenger traffic.

10.2.4 Article 38, of the Chicago Convention States "as not able to comply with Annex 17, Standard 4.4.8.

10.2.5 LACAC had an AVSEC group working before the events of September 2001.

10.2.6 LACAC and ICAO AVSEC work together in a harmonized group.

10.2.7 Resolution on policy of LACAC is to meet every three (3) years, get observer status.

10.3 Implementation of AVSEC Matters

10.3.1 Regionally recognized ICAO training centres are established in Quito and Argentina

10.3.2 Civil Aviation courses are conducted in Panama.

10.4 Regional Approach

10.4.1 Security Equipment Agreement has been reached to acquire at lower costs.

10.4.2 Audits, a Regional mechanism is being put in place to conduct these within the Region.

10.4.3 Surveillance: Regional systems are being developed. Technical cooperation for regional Surveillance System.

10.5 Conference 2006

10.5.1 LACAC position

10.5.1.1 ICAO will be conducting Safety Audits of all Annexes except Annex 17 - Security and 9
– Facilitation.

10.5.1.2 LACAC Directors (not recorded)

10.5.1.3 The next Meeting is scheduled for May 29-June 2, 2006 in Argentina