



INFORMATION PAPER

AVSEC/FAL/RG/10 — IP/03
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**Tenth Meeting of the ICAO/LACAC NAM/CAR and SAM Aviation Security and
 Facilitation Regional Group (AVSEC/FAL/RG/10)**

Foz de Iguazú, Brazil, 25 to 27 March 2020

Agenda Item 4

Programmes and Projects - Aviation Security (AVSEC)

4.1 Report on the presentation of IP to AVSECP/30 Meeting held in May 2019

KEY OUTCOMES FROM THE THIRTIETH MEETING OF THE AVSEC PANEL

(Presented by the Secretariat)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	
This summary has been prepared to highlight key discussions and outcomes of AVSECP/30 in an abbreviated format. The Panel’s full report is accessible to registered users via https://portal.icao.int	
Strategic Objectives:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security & Facilitation
References:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Annex 17 – Security • Doc 8973 – Restricted, Aviation Security Manual • Doc 10118 – Global Aviation Security Plan • Report AVSECP/30 Meeting

1. Introduction

1.1. The ICAO Council, at the first meeting of its 215th Session on 29 October 2018, agreed to convene the Thirtieth Meeting of the Aviation Security Panel (AVSECP/30) in Montreal, Canada, from 13 to 17 May 2019.

1.2. This IP presents a summary prepared in an effort to highlight key discussions and outcomes of AVSECP/30 in an abbreviated format. The Panel’s full report is accessible to registered users at <https://portal.icao.int>

2. Current threats and risks to civil aviation

1.3. In reviewing global threats and risks to civil aviation, the Panel made the following assessment:

- a) Person-borne improvised explosive devices (PBIED). The risk posed by PBIEDs remains at

the highest level, with an emphasis on insiders, as terrorists continue to show interest in the use of such individuals to carry out or facilitate such attacks;

- b) Remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS). The risk associated with the use of RPAS to attack aviation facilities has increased from **MEDIUM-LOW** to **MEDIUM**. States should give urgent consideration to such threats and share mitigation approaches and detection solutions amongst themselves and with ICAO, while noting that the use of anti-RPAS systems may also pose a safety risk to aviation systems;
- c) Threat posed by chemical agents:
- States should be proactive and implement interim measures (e.g. volumetric restrictions on powders that may be carried) on the basis of a risk assessment, as required by Annex 17 Standard 3.1.3;
 - States and industry should share best practices on mitigating the threat posed by chemical agents to aviation, including the detection of such agents;
 - security and safety experts should continue to work together to develop a consistent and sustainable long-term global response to the threat; and
 - emergency response procedures mitigating the effects of a chemical attack should include not only on-board procedures, but also general and adaptable emergency response procedures that could be applied on the ground (e.g. when an aircraft has landed following a potential on-board chemical attack, or when a potential attack takes place on airport grounds).
- d) Reporting of acts of unlawful interference (AUI) to ICAO. The fact that not all AUIs are officially reported by States makes it difficult to infer patterns of activity. The Panel recommends that ICAO Regional Offices be engaged to help monitor security incidents in their respective region and actively seek information on potential AUIs in accordance with Standards 5.3.1 and 5.1.6.

3. Draft Amendment 17 to Annex 17

3.1 The Panel submitted proposals for Amendment 17 to Annex 17, which include new and/or revised provisions on: vulnerability assessments; information sharing between States and stakeholders; training programmes and certification systems; access control; and staff screening.

3.2 Subject to Council approval, the draft amendment will be circulated to Member States in mid-June for comments, which should reach ICAO by **30 September 2019**. The comments received will form the basis for a final draft, which would be presented to the Council for adoption in late November 2019.

4. Guidance material

4.1 The Panel endorsed the following guidance material, which will be issued according to ICAO's schedule:

- a) Updated ICAO Aviation Security Global Risk Context Statement (Doc 10108);

- b) Updates to the ICAO Aviation Security Manual (Doc 8973), including:
- sensitive aviation security information (Chapter 2);
 - recruitment, training, and certification (Chapter 8);
 - screening using explosives trace detection equipment (Chapter 11);
 - assessing the threat posed by persons through behaviour detection (Chapter 11);
 - protection of secure cargo and mail (Chapter 13);
 - in-flight and airport supplies (Chapter 14); and
 - chemical, biological and radiological incidents (Appendix 44).

5. Review of the USAP-CMA methodology

5.1 The Panel endorsed the recommendations by the Secretariat Study Group (SSG) on the USAP to ensure the audit methodology continues to evolve, is fit for its purpose, and maintains States' confidence in the global aviation security system. A total of 26 recommendations for improvement will be reviewed by Council in mid-June.

5.2 The recommendations include: ensuring the accurate measurement of GASeP implementation targets through more operationally-focused compliance monitoring; the provision of well-qualified auditors; risk-based prioritization of USAP audits; and addressing serious deficiencies in a timely manner.
