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Milan Linate runway incursion, October 2001





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- **Linate - Milan “city” airport**
- **Accommodates GA and Commercial Air Traffic**

Aircrafts involved:

MD-87 (SAS FLT 686), 110 occupants

Cessna Citation CJ2, 4 occupants


118 Fatalities





On the day of the accident:


- Thick fog
- Visibility of 50 meters (at the time of the collision)
- Busy Traffic
- Disrupted ATC communication







BREAKDOWN OF THE ACCIDENT



D-VX

• D-VX approaching S4. (8.08.23)

gnd

• D-Vx Roger confirm position? (8.08.28)

D-VX


• D-Vx approaching the runway..... S4. (8.08.32)


gnd

• DIEVX roger maintain stop bar, I'll call you back. (8.08.36)

D-VX

• Roger, ... hold position (8.08.40)





gnd

- DVX continue your taxi on the main apron, follow the Alpha Line. (8.09.19)

D-VX


- Roger continue the taxi in main apron, Alpha Line the... DVX. (8.09.28)

gnd

- That is correct and please call me back **entering the main taxiway.** (8.09.37)

D-VX

- DIEVX I'll call you **on the main taxiway.** (8.09.38)



06:09:41



06:09:41



ANSV



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From the accident investigation report:

- Linate Airport had no Aerodrome manual.
- Aerodrome safety was not on the agenda for previous meetings for the Airport Technical Safety Committee (CASO).
- No effective performance agreements did exist between involved organizations regarding safety matters. Evidence of lack of coordinated efforts.



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From the accident investigation report (cont'd):

- No functional Safety Management System was in operation.
- Aerodrome standards – especially with regards to visual aids (signage, markings) - did not comply with ICAO Annex 14.
- Safety audits resulted in poor communication between organizations on safety matters, late decisions and slow handling of safety issues with loss of important information with respect to incidents and deviations.



From the accident investigation report (cont'd):

- No recurrent training program for ATC personnel had been provided.
- The competence, maintenance and requirements for recent experience for ATC personnel did not fully comply with ICAO Annex 1.
- Missing Runway Guard Lights; Surface Movement Radar was not operational for a long time.
- The punitive environment that existed and the fear of sanctions discouraged the self reporting of incidents and individual mistakes.



From the accident investigation report (cont'd):

- No quality System was established regarding, among other things, aeronautical data.
- No well functioning deviation reporting system was in operation.
- Runway 36 incursion alarms did not work as they were switched off for years before to avoid unnecessary alarms triggered by wildlife or other airport vehicles.

Video



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Thank You