International Civil Aviation Organization
Latin American Civil Aviation Commission
ICAO/LACAC NAM/CAR/SAM Aviation Security and Facilitation Regional Group (AVSEC/FAL/RG)

WORKING PAPER

AVSEC/FAL/RG/6 — WP/07
25/09/17

SEVENTH MEETING OF THE AVIATION SECURITY AND FACILITATION REGIONAL GROUP (AVSEC/FAL/RG/7)

ICAO SAM Regional Office, Lima, Peru, 4 to 6 October 2017

Agenda Item 4.2: Report on Aviation Security Management Systems programme

CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM PROGRAM SeMS

(Presented by Colombia)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

It is essential to have a program that facilitates the implementation of the SeMS (Security Management System) and involves and prepares the Civil Aviation authorities of the States. Likewise, Airports, aircraft operators and all stakeholders who must comply with regulations in the risk management of Civil Aviation Security. Making it possible to have management and administration system of airport security services with high standards. In this regard, Colombia would like to present its experience through this document.

Action:	Suggested actions are detailed in paragraph 3 of this WP.
Strategic Objectives:	• Security & Facilitation
References:	• Annex 17 - Safety, 2.1 aims • Doc 8973-Aviation Safety Manual - Limited Distribution, Chapter 9 • SeMS guide • Document of the Working Group, AVSEC / FAL / RG / 5-WP / 08, Buenos Aires, participants: Argentina, Colombia, Cuba, Costa Rica, Honduras and Mexico. • AVSEC / FAL / RG / 6- WP / 08 Aviation Security and Facilitation • Fifth Meeting of the Regional Group on Aviation Security and Facilitation - NAM / CAR / SAM ICAO / CLAC - Final Report - Lima, Peru, 3-5 June 2015 • AVSEC / FAL / RG / 4-WP / 15 Aviation Security and Facilitation

1. Introduction

1.1 Based on initiatives proposed by Chile and previous contributions from Argentina, a program is that contributes to States is proposed for the implementation of Aviation Security

Management System - SeMS, harmonized with similar management systems such like (SMS of Safety Management System), presented in Appendix A of this Working Paper.

2. Description and scope of the proposal

2.1 The proposed program has as essential elements for its development: Policies, objectives, safety management, quality assurance and safety promotion. Each of these elements constitutes the key to a system whose main purpose is the timely management and administration of airport security services in an organized and systematical way. Contributing mainly to the inspection of passengers and their baggage, the identification of possible threats, the minimization of the associated risks, the decrease of the probability of incidents and the prevention of hidden entry of weapons, explosives or dangerous substances by a perpetrator. Also, the program includes an implementation plan that makes it smooth based on different proposed activities.

3. Suggested actions

3.1 Participating States are asked to analyze the submitted Working Paper and Appendix A and to contribute to its improvement so that the SEMS program presented constitutes a solid basis for that of other states.

3.2 States are encouraged to continue working to keep on enriching the documents provided by Chile, Argentina and the working group of collaborating countries, in order to implement the SeMS in each State in the short term.

3.3 States are asked to facilitate the support of technical staff and to achieve continuous improvement in the preparation, implementation and follow-up of the SEMS and its worldwide promotion.

3.4 As part of the strengthening of the security and development culture of the SeMS in our States, Colombia proposes the implementation of the First SeMS Workshop, to be held in 2018 in its territory so interested States get involved and share experiences and further progress be made to develop, implement and put into practice SEMS in member states.

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APPENDIX A

SECURITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM PROGRAM - SeMS

FOR AIRPORT SECURITY PERSONNEL PERFORMING THE CONTROL AND INSPECTION FUNCTIONS OF PEOPLE, BAGGAGE, CARGO MAIL AND VEHICLES

CHAPTER 1 – GENERAL INFORMATION

1.1 Purpose

To establish a management and administration system for airport security services in an orderly and systematic manner which contributes to the efficiency and effectiveness of passengers and baggage inspection to identify possible threats and, in a way that associated risks are minimized, deficiencies are strengthened and thus reduce the likelihood of incidents, preventing the hidden entry of weapons, explosives or dangerous substances by a perpetrator.

An Aviation Security Management System (SeMS) aims to provide the Colombian Civil Aviation Authority and all stakeholders who must comply with regulations (airports and aircraft operators) with a well-structured approach to safety management as an integral part of their overall activities.

The Colombian Civil Aviation Authority´s aim is to implement a SeMS to assist in the development of aviation security preventive practices and base on the application of current regulations with standard procedures and best practices in order to provide safe operations in civil aviation.

1.2 Background

- Program and draft work of the final report of the Fifth and Sixth Sessions of the ICAO / CLAC NAN / CAR / SAM Regional Group on Aviation Security and Facilitation.
- Annex 17, Amendment 14
- ICAO Document 8973 - Aviation Safety Manual, ninth edition
- RAC 160 - National Civil Aviation Security Program.

1.3 SeMS foundations

Personnel who perform security checks and inspections have a demanding job, they have to withstand the pressure of passengers, colleagues, users and various agencies, and all these factors affect the image analysis decision making process. The situation just described could cause errors such as having high false alarm rates and / or letting some dangerous items pass through. This staff tends to think that the delay in the inspection and displacement of the passengers can be seen as a negative reflection on their capacity and efficiency as inspection operators.

A similar situation occurs to passenger inspectors who analyse alarm activation on the Portico type metal detector, this fact has some effects so when performing additional inspection with the manual detector, this task loses effectiveness due to the high volume of passengers. As a result, he /she does not verify and / or discards threats, without stopping to observe suspicious behaviour.

The Civil Aviation Authority personnel that exercises the quality control activities, on the other hand, have a non-delegable responsibility before aviation community and in general before any

person who uses aeronautical and airport services, that is , to provide a continuous improvement to the security of civil aviation and promote the prevention of acts of unlawful interference intended to compromise the safety of civil aviation.

All of the above requires establishing an Aviation Safety Management System as a disciplined, systematic and risk-focused approach to detect and close all critical security breaches. This system helps provide the means to implement better security practices and clearly demonstrate an organization's dedication to aviation security through the emphasis on accountability and due diligence. It also helps integrate and manage security risks in a global and systematic way, optimizing costs for the Government and the civil aviation authority.
A SeMS, allows us to handle in a more preventive, timely and effective way threats and risks detected for a given operation, without requiring further regulatory changes; thereby encouraging to strengthen an operational security culture, facilitate new ideas, adopt best practices and implement technological improvements to achieve the highest levels of safety in the most efficient and cost-effective way.

A SeMS serves to improve those aspects that imply more security risk and which have a higher priority level; therefore, its complexity and cost determines the importance of the operation and the results of the threat assessment, risks and vulnerability. Analysis of the root cause of security incidents and weaknesses will also highlight priority areas where the highest risk level should be mitigated.

1.4 Scope

It applies to public airports with regular operation and aircraft operators which perform regular commercial operation responsible for the application of civil aviation security measures in compliance with Colombia`s Aeronautical Regulations 160.

1.5 Legal Framework

The development of the SeMS is framed in accordance with the provisions of the following legal framework:

1.5.1 ICAO Annex 17: Each Contracting State shall have as its primary objective to provide security to passengers, crews, ground personnel and the general public in all matters related to safeguards against acts of unlawful interference in civil aviation.

1.5.2 NATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY PROGRAM – Colombia’s Aeronautical Regulations 160: Chapter I - Civil Aviation Security Management System, 160,800.

1.6 Definitions

Acts of unlawful interference (definition given as an explanation). Acts, or attempts, which compromise the security of civil aviation, including the following:

- Illegal seizure of aircrafts;
- Destruction of an aircraft in service;
- Illegal seizure of aircraft in land;
- Taking hostages on board of aircraft or at aerodromes;

- Forcible intrusion on board an aircraft, at an airport or on the premises of an aeronautical facility;
- Entry on board an aircraft or at an airport of weapons or dangerous devices (or substances) intended for criminal purposes;
- Use of an aircraft in service for the purpose of causing death, serious bodily injury or serious damage to property or the environment; and
- Communication of false information that compromises the security of an aircraft in flight, or in land, or passenger's security, crew, ground personnel and all the community, at an airport or on the premises of a civil aviation facility.

Human performance. Human capacities and limitations that affect the security, protection and efficiency of aeronautical operations.

Short range weapons. General description that applies to all hand-operated firearms.

Restricted items. Items which in a specific context of aviation security, are defined as those items, devices or substances that may be used to commit an act of unlawful interference against civil aviation or which may endanger the safety of an aircraft and its passengers/crew members or the airport premises.

Tamper-resistant safety bags (STEB). Specially designed bags that should be used only for the sale of LAGs at airport stores or on board an aircraft.

Security control. Means to prevent the entry of weapons, explosives or other dangerous times, or substances that may be used to commit acts of unlawful interference.

Trace detection equipment. It is a technological system or combination of different technologies capable of detecting very small quantities of explosive materials and activating an alarm the presence of such materials in a baggage or other objects subject to analysis.

Security equipment. Those are specialized devices that are used, individually or as a part of a system in the prevention or detection of acts of unlawful interference in civil aviation and its facilities and services.

Facilitation. It is an efficient management of the necessary control process with the aim of speeding up the dispatch of goods or expedite passenger's inspection processes to prevent unnecessary operation delays.

Crisis management. Implementation of contingency measures in response to high levels of threat and implementation of measures and procedures in response to emergencies, including acts of unlawful interference.

Unpredictability. The application of security measures with irregular frequencies, in different places and / or using various means, according to a defined framework, with the aim of increasing its deterrent effect and its effectiveness.

Inspection. The application of technical or other means to identify and / or detect weapons, explosives or other dangerous items, objects or substances that may be used to commit acts of unlawful interference.

Crew members. People to whom an aircraft operator assigns obligations to be fulfilled on board during the period of flight service.

Disturbing passenger. A passenger who does not follow behavior regulations at an airport or on board an aircraft or who does not follow the instructions given by airport staff or crew members and therefore disrupts order and discipline at the airport or on board an aircraft.

Unruly passengers. Persons committing on board a civil aircraft, from the time the aircraft door is closed prior to take-off to the time it is re-opened after landing, an act of:

- Intentional aggression, intimidation, threat or reckless act that endangers the order or safety of property or persons;
- Aggression, intimidation, threat or interference in the performance of the duties of a crew member or diminishing the crew member's ability to perform such duties;
- Intentional reckless act or damage to an aircraft, its equipment or facilities and equipment that endanger the order and safety of the aircraft or the safety of its passengers ;
- Communication of information known to be false, thereby endangering the safety of an aircraft in flight; and
- Disobedience of legitimate orders or instructions given for the purpose of performing safe, orderly or efficient operations.

People with disabilities or with reduced mobility. Any person whose mobility is reduced by a physical disability (sensory or locomotion), mental deficiency, age, illness or any other cause that is an impediment to the use of transport and whose condition requires special attention adapting the needs of said services to all passengers.

Principles related to human factors. Principles that apply to design, certification, instruction, operations and maintenance and whose purpose is to establish a secure interface between human and other components of the system with due consideration of human performance.

Security test. Trial, secret or not, of an aviation security measure in which an attempt is made to commit an act of unlawful interference.

Permits system. A permit system is made up of I.D cards or other documents issued to persons employed at airports or to those who for other reasons need authorization to have access to the airport, the aeronautical side or the restricted security area. Its purpose is to identify people and facilitate access. Permits are also issued and used to vehicles for similar purposes and allow vehicle access. Sometimes, the permits are called identification cards or airport passes.

Security checks for LAGs and STEBs. Visual checks or safety checks by security personnel to detect signs of interference, including tampering with seals, theft and introduction of potentially dangerous devices, items or substances. Verifications should be carried out at the point of initial entry into the aeronautical side. All supplies from LAG and STEB should be verified to determine that they have been protected, that there are no traces or suspicions of tampering and that proper documentation is in order.

Restricted security zone. Those areas of the aeronautical side of an airport identified as priority risk areas where, in addition to access control, other security controls are applied. Such areas will normally include, inter alia, all passenger departure areas of commercial aviation between the point of inspection and the aircraft; the platform; baggage preparation facilities, including areas where

aircraft are put into service and checked baggage and cargo; cargo depots, mail centres and premises of the aeronautical side of food supply and aircraft cleaning services.

2.1 POLICIES / AIMS

2.1.1 Policies

The Airport Authority hereby declares that the functions of control, and inspection of persons, baggage, cargo, mail and vehicles, are the fundamental components for security and has set up the following policies:

a) Represent the values and principles of the Civil Aviation Authority.
b) Deliver a clear and explicit framework of duties and responsibilities.
c) Assume the commitment to develop and implement strategies to improve the management of the security service.
d) Maintain high standards in airport security through the implementation of new technology.
e) Provide quality of service through formal and recurrent training to airport security personnel.
f) Establish clear and expeditious channels of communication with staff.
g) Promote compliance with this policy, to all personnel directly related to airport security, users and officials of other State agencies.

2.1.2 Aims

To establish a SeMS in order to handle in an orderly and systematic way civil aviation security risks at airports and on aircraft operators based on compliance with the procedures established in current regulations.

Mission objectives have also been defined for mission success; these are intended to provide a modern, professional and committed security service to airport security.

a) To prevent acts of unlawful interference against the security of civil aviation.
b) Periodically verify compliance with certain safety standards and continuously improve their performance.
c) To comply with the National Civil Aviation Security Program.
d) To keep the Security Program updated and disseminated.
e) To maintain the Security Plan of the airport and aircraft operators updated and duly disseminated.
f) To carry out the Airport Security Committees.
g) To maintain the Airport Contingency Plan, updated, disseminated and exercised.
h) To conduct coordination meetings with State agencies to improve airport security management.
i) To maintain an annual Airport and aircraft operator training plan harmonized with the National Aviation Safety Training Program.
j) To maintain quality control through audits, inspections, vulnerability tests, studies and security investigations.
k) To advise airport and aeronautical industry as to implementation of best practices in civil aviation security processes.

In order to reach these aims objectives, the following activities are proposed:

ACTIVITY	COMMENTS
Set up a SeMS policy in accordance with the responsibility of the company (Airport / aircraft operator).	
Allocate resources for the implementation of the SeMS.	
Set up aims/ goals	
Make public the organization's disciplinary policy in relation to AVSEC (conforming behaviors / Not conforming to regulation. Types of reports).	
Let stakeholders know the set up policies.	
Conduct frequent policy and aims reviews.	
Develop a SeMS implementation plan.	
Create an archive registries center that corroborates the existence and operation of a SeMS.	
Develop processes and procedures in coordination with the work team of the Security Department according to each area needs.	
Assign procedures responsibilities.	
Work on a chart to keep SeMS records.	
Work on a chart to save SeMS documentation.	
Save SeMS documentation conducting an annual revision and / or updating.	
Conduct frequent revisions on SeMS documentation and/ or updating when required.	

2.2. Airport security management

This process seeks to develop and implement, in a systematic, orderly and effective way, civil aviation security procedures aimed at preventing acts of unlawful interference. Likewise, to implement a methodology for the analysis, evaluation and mitigation of airport security risks.

2.2.1 **Responsibilities**:

In order to achieve these aims, it is necessary to have qualified personnel, know their duties and functions of those responsible for the security of civil aviation, within the framework of authority, airports and aircraft operators:

2.2.1.1 Authority

a) The Colombian Civil Aviation Authority through its Secretariat and competent Directorate as a civil aviation security authority will prepare, execute and maintain a written National Program for the Security Management system.

b) The Colombian Civil Aviation Authority shall define and coordinate the implementation of a SeMS between the airports and aircraft operators of regular air transport and assign tasks that are necessary to those who must comply with aviation regulations.

c) The Colombian Civil Aviation Authority will require those who must comply with aviation regulations to implement a SeMS and will be responsible for carrying out the monitoring and follow-up processes which will be carried out based on the implementation plan of the SeMS submitted by those.

d) The Colombian Civil Aviation Authority will develop the mechanisms and procedures for the monitoring and follow-up of the SeMS and will have full autonomy to validate the data provided by the organization in the SeMS documentation developed by those who must comply with aviation regulations and delivered to the Colombian Civil Aviation Authority for its assessment, consultation and subsequent monitoring and enforcement.

2.2.1.2 Airport / Regular Air transport aircraft operators.

2.2.1.2.1 Airport Manager / Manager / Regular Air transport aircraft operators.
In order for the Airport Authority to maintain the minimum level of acceptable security risk, a Security Management System must be implemented, it has identified as necessary that the airport / aircraft operator must comply with the following commitments:

a) Lead airport security activities.
b) Comply with aviation security regulation documents.
c) Maintain on a permanent basis threat identification, and address the risks in an appropriate way.
d) Take into account human factors when inspecting passengers.
e) Provide personnel with necessary technology in the control and inspection of passengers.
f) Make sure that corrective measures necessary to mitigate the risks of acts of unlawful interference are applied.
g) Oversight permanently and assess frequently the management system.
h) Ensure the safety and occupational health of airport security personnel.
i) Provide security investigations to determine the causes and take corrective measures.

2.2.1.2.2 Head of Security

The Chief of Airport Security will keep technical documentation updated and also consider the following:

a) Airport Security Plan

b) Airport Contingency Plan
c) Airport Security Committees
d) Inspection procedures for passengers and their baggage
e) List of dangerous and /or prohibited items.
f) Alert notifications.
g) System of complaints and suggestions
h) Coordination in Shift Planning
i) Annual training program
j) Coordination in the annual Plan of holidays and vacations
k) Coordination in the Staff Qualification and Assessment Program
l) Coordination in the maintenance of clothing and equipment
m) Coordination in the Annual Plan of maintenance of security equipment.
n) Coordination when investigating errors associated with the AVSEC operation according to the established methodology.
o) Notify the Airport Manager / Administrator of any known or identified operational errors.
p) Coordination in the protection and communication of all information and documentation related to the Investigation of the fact.
q) Supervise the work positions to prevent the commission of errors associated with the AVSEC operation.
r) Provide and adopt preventive or corrective measures to avoid similar events.

2.2.1.2.3 Supervisors and Security Personnel

a) Comply with rotating shifts
b) Comply with current regulations, procedures and security measures,
c) Operate the equipment according to the procedures
d) Report failures of security equipment
e) Report any errors associated with the known or identified AVSEC operation.
f) Cooperate with the investigation of the error associated with the operation AVSEC.
g) Adopt the corrective or preventive measures generated from the investigation

2.2.2 Threat Assessment

Threats to civil aviation will take place through vulnerabilities of the airport security system of an airport, where security personnel are essential to prevent them from being executed:

These threats include:

a) Illicit seizure of aircraft
b) Terrorism
c) Taking hostages on board an aircraft or at aerodromes / hijacking
d) Kidnapping
e) Taking of hostages
f) Force entry on board an aircraft, at an airport or on the premises of an aeronautical facility
g) Communication of false information that compromises security
h) Entry an aircraft or at an airport of weapons or devices - metal and non-metal, for criminal purposes.
i) Internal threat

j) Use of an aircraft in service for criminal purposes

The Head of an airport should establish cooperation and notification mechanism with specialized agencies in identifying the probable threats to an airport.
In accordance with the civil aviation safety risk assessment and risk assessment program the threat level may be high, medium or low, these may be associated with security measures and more restrictive activities for airport employees, so greater concentration and commitment of airport security personnel will be needed.

2.2.2.1 Conditions or threat sources
Threat sources are associated with airport security, the vulnerabilities of an airport security system, staff, equipment and established procedures. Among the factors that may affect a threat are:

a) Geographical location (urban or rural): (incidence of public order situations, crime, social demonstrations.
b) Enclosure (lack of or poor technical specifications, lack of maintenance)
c) Lighting and signaling
d) AVSEC technology (false alarms, lack of calibration and / or maintenance, new operations, lack of reports and traceability, lack of timely technical attention)
e) Identification system (lack or inefficiency in the lost, overdue, subtracted card controls)
f) Access control (inefficient)
g) Communications and control centers (poor or inefficient)
h) Access roads (lack or poor condition)
i) Adjoining buildings
j) Terminal passenger infrastructure (design deficiencies, lack of effectiveness in the protection of roofs, sewers, number of access controls)
k) Security personnel (insufficient, lack of training, staff shortage, health problems)
l) Binomial (guide and canine) (lack of units)
m) Law enforcement personnel and other authorities (lack of units present and / or absence in security committees)
n) Civil aviation security testing and testing studies (outdated procedures, uncertified personnel, lack of supervision: poorly performed procedures, lack of staff rotation, and lack of records.)

2.2.2.2 Probability

Probability will be classified as follows:

Level	Descriptor	Description	Frequency
1	Low	Rhetorically believable scenario, with no background information nor attack indications or attack plot, and a rhetorical intention for which there is no evident capacity.	It hasn´t occurred in 5 years.
2	Low medium	Scenario for which there is no background information or the existing one, is not recent, but there is indication of an intention, although with an undeveloped methodology for an effective attach scenario or it has probably been replaced by other forms of attack	At least once in the last 5 years.
3	Medium	believable scenario with attack indications, evident capacity and possibly with background	At least once in the last 2

		information, but no with proofs of an attack being plot.	years.
4	Medium high	Clearly believable scenario with relative recent background or proofs of early attack planning or hostile recognition.	Once in the last year.
5	High	Highly believable scenario with background information of a similar attack which took place in recent years or proofs enough of attack capacity, intention or planning process.	More than once in the last year.

2.2.2.3 Impact:

The impact will be classified as follows:

Level	Descriptor	Description
1	meaningless	If the event took place, it would have a minimum impact on civil aviation safety.
2	Minor	If the event took place, it would have a low impact on civil aviation safety.
3	Moderate	If the event took place, it would have a medium impact on civil aviation safety
4	Critical	If the event took place, it would have a high impact on civil aviation safety
5	Catastrophic	If the event took place, it would have a disastrous impact on civil aviation safety.

2.2.2.4 Risks

As a result of the threats and vulnerabilities identification, a risk management process must be carried out, it will determine the aerodrome risk level and the measures that should be established, being defined as follows.

a) High Risk: Immediate security measures and actions are required because of a high risk of unlawful interference.

b) Medium Risk: Measures and attention are required for probable unlawful interference.

c) Low Risk: It is handled by normal safety procedures.

2.2.3 Risk management

The risk management should be reflected in a matrix that allows establishing the severity of damages: High, moderate or low; which may cause unlawful interference to civil aviation, all associated with the probability of occurrence, the estimation of both concepts should be represented as follows:

a) High 3: Risk whose materialization would damage SIGNIFICANTLY the normal development of civil aviation activities for passenger and cargo transportation.
b) Moderate 2: Risk whose materialization would cause minor damage, to the development of civil aviation activities for passenger and cargo transportation.
c) Low 1: Risk that may have a MINIMUM effect in the development of civil aviation activities for passenger and cargo transportation.

2.2.4 Error notification

2.2.4.1 The Airport Security Personnel must assume as an organizational culture, which means taking immediate action when a specific fact is known or identified, to prevent it from being triggered by as an error associated with the AVSEC operation, since its materialization may affect adversely civil aviation safety.

2.2.4.2 It should be beard in mind that an error, even if slight, its repetition does not ensure that what was previously mild, when repeated may be serious with potential safety risk.

2.2.4.3 Whenever an error associated with the AVSEC operation is identified or known by airport security personnel, denounced by a user, passenger or colleague, and caused or imputed to the airport security system, the personnel receiving the AVSEC operation complaint must communicate the fact to the supervisor or the Airport Security Chief who will immediately write a report and start an investigation.

2.2.5 Error Investigation

2.2.5.1 Whenever an AVSEC operation associated error occurs in a unit, it must taken into account that there is a problem that caused this fact and which will require a formal investigation.

2.2.5.2 The investigation should be carried out as soon as possible since the fresher the memories are, the more objective the versions of those involved will be. This research is necessary as they can often lead to more serious errors.

2.2.5.3 The main objective of the investigation of an error associated to the AVSEC operation is a compilation of facts and background intended to determine with the minimum delay what happened when in service, allowing to take the necessary preventive or corrective actions to avoid its taking place again; such as reporting significant events to the higher levels for analysis and determining the effectiveness of security measures, and to make adjustments or take further action if necessary.

2.2.5.4 Immediately after an error is known to have happened, and its validity determined, the Airport Manager / Administrator shall instruct the Chief of Security to proceed with the corresponding Investigation, and to take the pertinent steps to obtain the maximum information, concerning as follows:

a) Identify the actual or probable causes of the event.
b) Identify the personnel that intervened, and their work positions
c) Get statements from the personnel that were involved.
d) Get statements from the denouncing client, and eyewitnesses, when applicable.
e) Technical statements concerning the condition of the inspection or detection equipment related to the incident, if applicable.

2.2.5.5 Once useful information search instances have been exhausted, and the investigative process has been completed, A "Report Investigation of Error associated with the AVSEC operation" will be filled out, Annex A to be issued by the investigating team containing the information as follows:

a) Summary of the error and all other pertinent information, in a chronological sequence.
b) Identified or probable cause of the event.
c) Conclusions.

d) Recommendations and corrective measures proposed to avoid similar events.
e) Corrective actions taken at the time.
f) Attach as appendix the following records:

- ✓ Statements of all personnel involved.
- ✓ Statements of the complainant of the event, if applicable.
- ✓ Any technical statement concerning the condition of the equipment, if applicable.
- ✓ All other records deemed appropriate.

2.2.5.6 If, as a result of the Investigation, a Non-conformity is identified, the security chief shall establish a corrective action plan together with the supervisors.

2.2.5.7 The investigator should not suggest any disciplinary action on the personnel involved in the error.

In order to reach these aims, the following activities are proposed:

ACTIVITY	REMARKS
Identify responsible staff member.	
Assign manager responsible for the implementation and maintenance of an effective SEMS.	
Develop processes and procedures in conjunction with the work team of the Security Directorate, according to the needs of each area.	
Assign duties in procedures.	
Keep SEMS documentation, performing at least one review and,/or annual updating process.	
Keep an updated manual as part of the documentation.	
Security duties across the organization should be in writing.	
RISK MANAGEMENT AND ANALYSIS	
Plan risk notification procedures.	
Ensure coordination among the entities that participate in the contingency plan, participating actively in the simulations carried out.	
Identify the duties of organization members.	
Define hierarchy levels for decision-making on the tolerability of safety risks.	
Identify internal and external sources (reception channel) which will be used to collect risk information.	
Make a database with the collection and / or notification of reports.	

Work on a risk assessment matrix, in accordance with the National Contingency Program.	
Put together the information of all the reports in a centralized file classified by type.	
Develop a classification based on the statistics generated with consolidated reports of novelty and irregularity.	
Define what type of report is produced, according to the type of event, and point out which are mandatory and which volunteer.	
Design a format for Mandatory and Voluntary Reports.	
Carry out, document and implement a process that guarantees the analysis, assessment, and control of identified risks.	
Carry out an assessment (the analysis of risks), on the matrix according to the established process.	
Implement a database of internal consultation and for the community which may serve as a source of action plans implementation.	
Implement mitigation measures (action plans) which may be technological, training and / or regulation, according to the outcome of the evaluation.	
Carry out feedback - evaluation after the implemented measures.	

2.3 AIRPORT SECURITY ASSURANCE:

It has the purpose of maintaining security controls that allow to verify the performance and validate the effectiveness of these controls.

2.3.1 Quality control activities

The following instruments are established to verify compliance with +rules, procedures, programs and safety measures:

a) Security Audit: This is an in-depth examination of the compliance of each aspect of the airport security system's rules and procedures in order to establish if they are being applied correctly, this activity can be carried out by the airport manager / manager and the Civil Aviation Authority.

b) Security Inspection: It includes examinations of the application of one or more specific aspects of the regulations and procedures to the members of the airport security system to make sure they are being applied correctly. This activity can be carried out by the airport manager / manager / aircraft operator and the Civil Aviation Authority.

c) Safety Test: It includes activities to randomly evaluate safety personnel and equipment during regular operations at an aerodrome to determine regulations compliance, safety measures effectiveness, staff and technology equipment

performance. This activity can be carried out by the airport manager / manager / aircraft operator and the Civil Aviation Authority.

d) Security Study: It includes comprehensive assessments of safety conditions at an aerodrome and aeronautical sites to spot their strengths and vulnerabilities that may be used to commit an act of unlawful interference and establish security measures to be corrected or strengthened. This activity can be carried out by the airport manager / manager / aircraft operator and the Civil Aviation Authority.
e) Safety investigation: In the event of an act of unlawful interference or a situation that jeopardizes aviation safety and / or substantiated complaints from users regarding situations that affect safety, those facts will be investigated confidentially. This activity can be carried out by the airport manager / manager / aircraft operator and the Civil Aviation Authority, in accordance with their competency.

f) Drills: to evaluate an aerodrome contingency plan, this assesses whether or not participants are aware of their duties and functions. This activity can be carried out by the airport manager / manager / aircraft operator and the Civil Aviation Authority.

The drills, in accordance with the National Contingency Program, include the following items:

a) The response of all staff involved;
b) The Plan, its procedures and operational cards; and
c) Equipment and emergency communications.

In order to achieve these aims, the following activities are proposed:

ACTIVITY	REMARKS
Monitor compliance according to the indicators behaviour periodically.	
Follow-up of controls to verify the performance of technological equipment intended for security.	
Conduct a follow-up process on the fulfilment of the action plans, generated by the findings seen in the different inspections made to the different stakeholders who must comply with certain regulations (Airport Security Directorate, AVSEC Contractors, and Aircraft Operators, among others).	
Conduct periodic revisions to applicable regulations to ensure consistency with SeMS documentation.	
Control and evaluate all the processes implemented in the SeMS through internal evaluations and inspections.	
Set up a process to identify the risks caused by the Company's transfers/ innovations/ changes (infrastructure, documentation, etc.	
Conduct and consolidate investigations into reports.	

Analyse the collected data, record it and include it in the file system.	
Analyse trends to determine new AVSEC risks.	
Create and disseminate reporting systems and channels (mandatory and voluntary) for the community.	

2.5 Security disclosure

2.5.1 Factors to be considered with airport security personnel.

2.5.1.2 In the first place, the recognition of airport security personnel should be established as fundamental in security. To this end, leadership, teamwork, coordinated work and ongoing communication will be promoted will have as an outcome a high quality job.

2.5.1.3 In order to achieve these aims, informational meetings, briefing before each shift will be made, as well notify news, news about professional matters, these instances will serve to greet those who are on birthday, have had promotion or have done deserving of congratulations for a successful performed task or a contribution in their work.
2.5.1.4 Confidence should be shown taking into account that it works as a social welfare system that is concerned with resilience activities, such as sporting events, nominate the month´s employee, congratulate them when getting married, pay them a visit when sick and support them emotionally.

2.5.2 Internal training and communication

2.5.2.1 An annual Training Plan will be developed to consider the initial and recurrent training of civil aviation safety programs for each work team with AVSEC responsibility and the complementary one, for which the audits findings, inspections, vulnerability testing and safety investigations indicating as a result: needs gaps, in addition to the amendment to the programs and procedures, suggestions or staff requirements will also be accepted.

2.5.2.2 Training will be reinforced with specialized courses such as: Customer service.

a) Negotiation of conflicts
b) Detection of suspicious behaviour.
c) Dangerous goods
d) Terrorism

2.5.2.3 Formal communication channels will be available through security bulletins, alerts, talks and exhibitions on specific aspects.

2.5.2.4 In the informal channel through meetings, personalized attention, field checks, start-up briefing.

2.5.3 External training, communication

2.5.3.1 For the external scope, officials from state agencies, aircraft operators, airport terminals, service companies and other concessions, initial training on airport security awareness will be maintained. When applying for the airport credential, during the year talks will be held on the relevant parts of the airport security program and contingency plans.

2.5.3.2 Regarding communication, security committees and bulletins are considered to provide information. There will also be an information office for complaints and suggestions to gather the

opinion and participation of the employees and users of the airport. Finally, a generic mail for anonymous complaints will be considered.
In order to achieve these aims, the following activities are to be carried out:

ACTIVITY	REMARKS
Ensure that core and recurrent instruction covers all AVSEC topics in accordance with PNISAC.	
Having a training program, in accordance with PNISA, duly approved by the Civil Aviation Authority.	
Ensure that aims, procedures, and changes in them are communicated and informed on the performance trends, through official channels.	
Maintain a compulsory training compliance indicator, in accordance with current regulations.	
Program non-regulatory courses according to the needs of each area, based on internal management.	
Develop an information system for consulting the training of each person performing civil aviation duties.	
Develop and maintain a periodical communication system through internal and external bulletins on civil aviation security, based on consolidated reports, performance trends, regulatory changes, relevant situations of impact on the environment. Keep track of security communication processes.	
Develop and maintain a communication system as to the duties of each staff member that is part of the SeMS.	
Develop an evaluation method that guarantees the delivery and knowledge of the published information.	
Develop a booklet on the SeMS content.	
Develop and implement a link on the website of the airport / aircraft operator so that the airport community can consult information related to different AVSEC topics.	
Keep updated the information published on the website.	
Arrange a communication channel for the notification of complaints from the airport community.	
Encourage all staff within the Company to be fully aware of the SeMS.	
Ensure that all staff within the Company are fully committed to the SEMS.	

ANNEX "A" SECURITY INVESTIGATION REPORT

Report	
Procedure	
Background information (event description) **Mandatory taxonomy event** (e.g. act of unlawful interference, intrusion, neglected objects, use of license, non-compliance with income inspection**.** **Action plan** (management) **Venue** (inspection spot , perimeter , cargo, platform, baggage choosing, HBS) **Investigation** (possible causes: e.g. training, documentation, equipment inspection, technology and performed activities) **Evidence material** (videos, photographs, others)	
Suggestion	
Conclusion	

Names	
Date of initiation of the investigation.	
Report submision date	

- END -