



WORKING PAPER

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**FIFTH MEETING OF THE AVIATION SECURITY AND FACILITATION REGIONAL
 GROUP (AVSEC/FAL/RG/5)**

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- Agenda Item 4: Programmes and Projects - Aviation Security (AVSEC)**
4.4 Report on Transit cargo security programme – Coordinator State: Nicaragua

METHOD FOR CARGO SECURITY IN TRANSIT

(Presented by Nicaragua)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This working paper summarizes the accumulated experience of the State of Nicaragua, in managing threats related to drug trafficking, human trafficking, weapons and items of value, through air cargo, in which the organized crime has been seen as an easy way to transport and attempting to correct use of civil aviation; particularly, on that cargo in which our States have not had any involvement in inspection and to ensure that it is transported properly secure, an example of this is what happens to transit cargo. For this reason, the State of Nicaragua in conjunction with the states of Argentina, Belize, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala and Jamaica have developed the following procedure in order to counteract the threats above-mentioned and simultaneously, propose to ICAO, is taken into account this initiative to develop guidance material and recommended method for inspection and cargo protection in transit.

Action:	Suggested actions are presented in Section 3.
<i>Strategic Objectives:</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security & Facilitation
<i>References:</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Annex 17 – Security • Doc. 8973 – Aviation Security Manual • DGAC/CAP/97 – WP/15 • AVSEC/FAL/RG/4

1. Introduction

1.1 The transportation of cargo and mail by air must take place in an environment of unique operations and complying with parameters of basic principles such as:

- a) Aircraft carrying cargo must operate from a secure environment.
- b) The cargo and mail shall be subjected to appropriate security controls, including inspection before they are loaded on an aircraft and transfer from abroad.
- c) The controls and additional security measures that were applied to the load will be determined by the Civil Aviation authorities of the Contracting States, according to risk assessments carried out by the competent authorities.
- d) Security checks and inspections that apply to cargo on board commercial aircraft; it shall be protected against unauthorized intrusion until it leaves the origin State.

1.2 Taking into account that the State of Nicaragua does not have a procedure or validation agreement with States that carry cargo to our country, as defined in Annex 17, currently applies additional security measures with transshipment cargo and transit to prevent drug trafficking and items endangering flight safety.

1.3 Nicaragua has integrated, as a Government policy, the fight against drug trafficking, serving as a bulwark against this criminal activity and considers it necessary to seriously address this issue and deal united against these threats, together with all States in the region.

2. Development

2.1 Scope

2.1.1 This procedure is applicable to all cargo arriving aboard from foreign commercial aircrafts to any Contracting State in the region, whether transshipment or transit and for some reason this was segregated or manipulated by airport authorities or not from airline personnel.

2.1.2 The circumstances under which a cargo in transit will be subject to additional screening in the arrival State, will be the following:

- a) Originated from a state where it is known that their security controls are weak and therefore considered vulnerable state.
- b) When the whole load or part of it is taken down, then put in again in order to accommodate it, to ensure proper weight and balance of the aircraft.
- c) In the case of perishable and because the aircraft must remain some time on the ground, to be lowered to protect them from deterioration and stored in cold rooms.
- d) If for reasons of technical malfunctions in the aircraft, the cargo or mail have to be transshipped to another aircraft.

2.2 Procedure

2.2.1 Security controls will be under the responsibility of a competent authority to which it has delegated this activity in collaboration with security agencies operating within the airport, in order to prevent a criminal act occurs or unlawful interference.

2.2.2 The cargo in transit or transshipment may be inspected by authorized personnel, with the purpose of discovering objects or substances that risks flight safety. For this purpose, the inspector in charge may be aided by the techniques necessary for this activity, including:

- X-ray
- Portable trace detectors
- Technique canine
- Visual inspection
- Other techniques

2.2.3 If detected within the load items or suspicious substances considered hazardous for the flight, it will be subject to further revision including the opening of other packages if considered necessary.

2.2.4 If during inspection the presence of weapons or undeclared items that endanger the flight safety or other restricted substance consumption in that state is evident risk, the competent authority responsible for inspection shall communicate air operator that the aircraft and its crew are retained on the ground until corresponding investigations and the degree of culpability of those involved is determined.

2.2.5 All costs and damages arising from the retention of the aircraft and its crew shall be the sole responsibility of the air operator, as well as other expenses incurred by any other originating cause of the finding.

2.2.6 The airport authorities will take preventive measures with suspicious lumps with positive evidence of containing prohibited items or endangering flight safety personnel, proceeding as follows:

- a) If it is certain that the found object or substance is an explosive, then no member of the inspection team, will play the suspicious package;
- b) Should be contacted immediately for specialized personnel in bomb disposal.
- c) Determine which areas are at risk and ordered the immediate evacuation of those areas considered an imminent explosion;
- d) Notified the discovery to the local aviation authority and this in its matter will notify the units as its sphere of competence; for example, the main office of the air operator, the State of registration of the aircraft, the State of the Operator air if appropriate and to the aeronautical authorities of origin and intended destination.

2.2.7 To comply with facilitation principles, these inspections should be held during the stay period of the aircraft on the ground in order to not disrupt flight schedules established by the airline, as long as no irregularities were detected in the cargo and / or mail;

2.3 Penalties

2.3.1 When aircraft operators or crews refuse to submit to such controls or additional safety inspections by the competent authorities, a report should be elaborated of the event and notify to the aviation authorities, who will deny the flight continuity, and the application of sanctions such as: fines, disqualification, suspension, revocation or cancellation of air operator certificate in accordance with their national laws provisions.

3. Suggested Actions

3.1 The Meeting is invited to:

- a) take note of the information provided;
- b) evaluate risk assessment flight with these characteristics and establish similar procedures, especially on those aircraft originating from States considered vulnerable.
- c) invite States to establish these agreements or validation procedures with other Contracting States carrying baggage, cargo and mail to their respective States.

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