

Airbus Americas

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Preventing Runway Excursions

ICAO Runway Excursion
Prevention Seminar

Lima, Peru 9-10 October
2014



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Flight Tests to Determine Maximum Crosswind

2

Flare and Landing Technique

3

Go-Around Decision and Execution

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Runway Overrun Protection

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Securing the Takeoff

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
5

Securing the Takeoff

Crosswind assessment during Flight Tests



Initial step to assess Flight Control performance and Power



Using simulation and flight test data



Incremental approach to crosswind

Crosswind assessment during Flight Tests

Wind reference

FAA model for computation

10 ft



20
sec



Experienced wind (steady and gust) is assumed

Actual wind experienced along the trajectory but at the aircraft height

Crosswind assessment during Flight Tests

1. CS25 only requires:

- Crosswind certification on a dry runway
- Theoretical analysis for wet or contaminated runway

2. No flight test on Wet or Contamination

- Wet or Contaminated runway: reduced friction. The more slippery the RWY, the less crosswind component is acceptable

3. REV thrust has a negative impact on the lateral control

- Not taken into account

4. Crosswind experienced

- Not considered as the limit: published as a demonstrated crosswind.

Crosswind assessment



Wind values from tower:

- May be different due to local effects



ND provides wind indication

- A rough guide - but errors can be up to 5-7kts



Always be prepared for a Go-Around if necessary

Maximum Crosswind – 3 Types of Values



**Maximum
Demonstrated
Crosswind (FCOM – LIM)
Flight tests**



**Maximum
Crosswind (FCOM RCAM matrix)
Contaminated runways**



**Maximum
Crosswind Engine
Limits (AFM A380)**

Crosswind: Maximum Values

WIND LIMITATIONS

MAXIMUM CERTIFIED CROSSWIND FOR TAKEOFF AND LANDING

Maximum certified crosswind at takeoff (gust included) 35 kt

Note: The maximum certified crosswind value is an AFM limitation. It is an engine limitation.

Maximum demonstrated crosswind 40 kt (gust included)

Note: The maximum demonstrated crosswind value is not an Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) limitation : It is the maximum crosswind condition experienced during the aircraft certification campaign. Airbus recommends that operators should not intentionally operate

MAXIMUM RECOMMENDED CROSSWIND ON CONTAMINATED RUNWAYS

It is not recommended to take off or land on contaminated runways with a crosswind component higher than the one that appears in the table below.

RUNWAY SURFACE CONDITIONS	Maximum Crosswind for landing (gust included)
Damp	40 kt
Wet - 3 mm (1/8") or less of water	40 kt
3 mm (1/8") or less of: - Slush - Dry Snow	35 kt

Which maximum crosswinds?

Maximum Crosswind – Airline Policy

WIND FOR TAKEOFF AND LANDING

Maximum certified crosswind at 35 kt
takeoff (gust included)

Maximum certified crosswind at 40 kt
landing (gust included)




- *Choose the most restrictive values*
- *Do not intentionally operate in crosswinds conditions that exceed the maximum values provided by Airbus*

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Crosswind Introduction

Airbus recommendations

Always ensure the pilots seats and rudder pedals are in the correct position, so as to allow **full and immediate** control movement to be exercised over all flight controls, and the brakes

and
remember


During rollout in high crosswinds, **asymmetric braking may be required**, if full rudder is insufficient for directional control



Crosswind Introduction

Airbus recommendations

A Crabbed Approach



Autopilot Logic

Wings Level and Crabbed Approach

Flare

Decrab

Ground Control

50
ft

30
ft

Touchdown




Localizer antenna location



Manual Flying Technique for Final Approach



X-Wind



During a crosswind approach fly:
Wing Level and Crabbed
Approach

Manual flight – final approach

- In crosswind conditions
 - Fly a **stabilized** approach
 - Keep the aircraft on the correct lateral flight path, **localizer centered**
 - When disconnecting the AP for a manual landing, avoid the temptation to make large inputs on the side-stick
 - Do not align the longitudinal axis of the aircraft with the center line when initially becoming visual.
- Remember AP logic:

Wing Level and Crabbed Approach

Manual flying technique for the Flare

- Flare the aircraft at a normal height

A high, or an **extended flare significantly increases** the landing distance

During an extended flare the **crosswind will move the aircraft** away from the centerline

- Remember AP logic:


Flare and immediately land the aircraft

Flying Technique for De-Crab

Use the rudder to align the aircraft with the runway centerline during the flare

The aircraft will rotate around a vertical axis close to the center of gravity due to the yaw moment by deflecting the rudder.

This will induce a lateral force



Flying Technique after the De-Crab

- When the main landing gear touches the ground, a pivoting moment is created around a vertical axis located at the level of the main landing gear by the combined effect of the lateral friction of the tires on the surface and by the inertia force applied at the center of gravity.
- This moment tends to turn the aircraft so as to align the aircraft longitudinal axis with the ground speed vector
- Simultaneously, the sideslip created by this rotation creates an opposite moment tending to yaw the aircraft towards the wind by weather cock effect and must be counteracted by the rudder

Flying Technique for Landing

- In high crosswind conditions and especially on contaminated runways
 - A **partial de-crab** may be required prior to touchdown, using a combination of bank angle and crab angle
 - **Avoid downwind drift.**
 - Use roll control only to maintain the aircraft on the centerline before flaring
 - **Use appropriate lateral inputs**


High X-Wind 



Flying Technique for Landing



Flying Technique for Landing



Flying Technique for Rollout

Be prepared for wind effect

- Large and immediate inputs on the rudder pedals may therefore be necessary to maintain the centerline.
- Be ready to use **differential braking** if needed.
- Have your **feet in a position** so that **full rudder deflection** combined with **full braking**, even differential, can be **applied instinctively** and **without any delay**.
- Use of Auto Brake is highly recommended.



Your input

Feet position on pedals feedback

0

Question – One answer per airline “Does your airline encourage”:

TO & LDG

1

TO

2

LDG

TO


3

LDG



Airbus Recommendations - Touchdown and Rollout

- During a crosswind landing, or aborted takeoff, cornering force is the primary means to maintain the aircraft on the runway.
- Reverse thrust resultant force is resolved in 2 components:
 - parallel to the runway, actually stopping the aircraft
 - perpendicular to the runway, increasing crosswind effects




Airbus Recommendations - Touchdown and Rollout

If a directional control problem occurs

- Consider reducing reverse thrust
- If braking manually, consider reducing braking temporarily or use differential braking

After directional control has been recovered and the runway centerline has been regained:

- Manual braking can be re-applied
- Reverse thrust can be re-applied.



Flying Technique for Rollout

Take care of the destabilizing effect of reversers

Rudder effectiveness reduces with decreasing speed

Training – Crosswind landing

- Demonstrate de-crab and flare with auto pilot
 - Gradually increase to maximum crosswind limit for auto land
- Demonstrate de-crab and flare in manual flight
 - As the instructor demonstrate, if necessary, the manual handling of the aircraft during crosswind landings
- Trainee training for crosswind landings
 - Gradually increase to the maximum crosswind limit
 - Respect the maximum crosswind limits on contaminated runways
 - Pay attention to the simulator friction models on contaminated runways

Training – Feet position

- Use rudder pedals to steer aircraft on the ground.
 - Taxi with small turns, rapid runway exits
- PM rest his feet on the pedals.
- PF apply brake pedals inputs and PM should call out the input during ground manoeuvres.
 - During training exercises only.
- PM monitors and advises PF of inadvertent brake pedals input during take off roll.

Conclusion – Airbus recommended flying technique

Approach

Stabilize the Aircraft for the approach

Fly a Wings level
Crabbed approach

No important changes at AP disconnection

Flare

Use a coordinated drift angle reduction through out the flare

Prompt landing after flare



Ground roll

Be ready to correct with the rudder and asymmetric braking

Be aware of reverser destabilization

Ensure you can achieve full rudder AND full asymmetric braking

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Forewords

Operational Review of Go-Around Survey

At Low Height

- TOGA thrust required
- Climb always necessary

At Higher Height


- TOGA thrust may not be required when all engines are operative
- Climb or Level-Off may be considered

- Amongst these Go-Arounds, more than **96%** are performed with thrust levers in **CLB**


Internal Airbus Review to identify potential clarification or enhancements

Drivers

- Simple
- Straightforward
- Intuitive



Go-Around: Airbus SOP




Go-Around

Note: This engages the correct FMA modes

SOPs extract

If TOGA thrust is not required, set the thrust levers to TOGA detent then retard the thrust levers as required. This enables to engage the GO-AROUND phase, with associated AP/FD modes.

TOGA gives high energy



Set the thrust levers to TOGA
But....

MAN TOGA	SRS OP CLB	GA TRK	CAT 1 DH 100	AP 1 1FD2 A/THR
-------------	---------------	--------	-----------------	-----------------------




THR CLB	CLB ALT	NAV	CAT 1 DH 100	AP 1 1FD2 A/THR
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High energy

Go-Around




TOGA then CL detent is an option



When conditions permit

1. Set the thrust levers to TOGA,
2. Check your FMA (MAN TOGA/SRS/A/THR blue)
3. Then immediately to CL (A/THR white)


TOGA or not TOGA?




Discontinuing the approach




At or above the FCU altitude
It is possible to discontinue the approach without TOGA
Note: all engines operative, no RNP AR...



Below the FCU altitude
TOGA




Discontinuing the approach without TOGA



3000

1. Deselect APPR mode(s)
2. Select a heading or NAV
3. Select a V/S, or level off
4. Adapt the speed
5. Enter a new DEST




No action on thrust levers




“Classic” Go-Around

Thrust levers on TOGA



FROM	UTC	SPD/ALT	AIB1	↔
LFB014R	----	----	----	----
C143	BRG 142°	5NM		
LFB05←	----	----	+900	
C017°	----	11		
INTCPT	----	6		
C332°	----	15		
D028J	----	----		
C028°	----	----		
NETRO	----	----		
DEST	UTC	DIST	EFOB	
LFB014R	----	70	----	↑↓

“Classic” Go-Around



FROM	UTC	SPD/ALT	AIB1	↔
LFB014R	---	---	---	---
C143	BRG142°	5NM		
LFB05	---	---	+900	
C017°	---	11		
INTCPT	---	---	---	---
C332°	---	6		
D028J	---	---	---	---
C028°	---	15		
NETRO	---	---	---	---
DEST	UTC	DIST	EFOB	
LFB014R	---	70	---	↑↓

	UTC	SPD/ALT	AIB1	↔
C017°	0755	131 / 4000		
INTCPT				
C332°		6NM		
D028J	0758	" / "		
C028°	TRK028°	15		
NETRO	0804	" / "		
B0503	0814	" / 23	*3080	
C143°		7	-3.0°	
F114R	0817	" / 1760		
DEST	UTC	DIST	EFOB	
LFB014R	0819	66	1.9	↑↓

- When the FMS transitions to the GO AROUND flight phase, the missed approach is sequenced
- If a published missed approach exists, it is followed by a flight plan discontinuity and then the original approach
- In some cases, the previous approach can be automatically selected and sequenced

Discontinuing the approach



1. Select a heading or NAV
2. Adapt the speed
3. Enter a new DEST

- The FMS sequences the missed approach
 - The FMS remains in Approach phase
- When overflying the runway threshold**
- The FMS does not sequence the previous approach
 - The FMS has no DEST

FROM	UTC	SPD/ALT	AIB1
LFB014R	0805	3000	↔
C143	BRG142°	5NM	
LFB05←	0807	130/ *3190	
C017°		11	
INTCPT	0812	0	
C332°		6	
D028J	0815	*2980	
C028°		15	
NETRO	0821	4000	
DEST	UTC	DIST	EFOB
---	---	---	---

```

LAT REV FROM LFB05
43°34.5N/001°25.3E

LL XING/INCR/NO
[ ]°/[ ]°/[ ]
NEXT WPT [ ]
<HOLD
ENABLE [ ]
<ALTN NEW DEST [ ]

<RETURN
    
```

Conclusion

Go-Around:

1. Select TOGA thrust,
2. Then, if TOGA thrust not necessary, select CL detent

OR

Discontinued Approach:

1. Press again APPR pb
2. Select appropriate Vertical & Lateral guidance
3. Adapt the speed
4. Enter a new DEST

Detailed in the Training and Operational materials since end of 2013

Go-Around:

1. Select TOGA thrust,
2. Then, if TOGA thrust not necessary, select CL detent

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
Review of ROPS Design

Runway Overrun Prevention System (**ROPS**) is a safety enhancement function that helps the flight crew to anticipate an overrun risk during the landing phase by computing in real time braking distances and comparing them to the Landing Distances Available (LDA) or remaining runway length.

This enhanced feature provides:

- an automatic detection of the landing runway
- and, in case of detection of runway overrun risk, it triggers visual and/or aural alerts to the flight crew during final approach and landing.

ROPS = ROW + ROP




ROW - ROP transition point

- After confirmed touchdown
- Confirmed pilot intent to stop
- Go-around unlikely

ROW – Runway End Overrun Warning

ROW



ROW uses the current **energy** and **position** of the aircraft to predict the distance necessary to stop the aircraft.

Row alert is triggered when the distance necessary to stop the aircraft is longer than the remaining runway length.

If predicted stop distance on a **WET** runway is longer than remaining runway length
Visual Alert - IF WET : RWY TOO SHORT

If predicted stop distance on a **DRY** runway is longer than remaining runway length
Visual Alert - RWY TOO SHORT
+
Aural Alert - “RUNWAY TOO SHORT”

ROW – Runway End Overrun Warning

ROW prediction of distance necessary to stop is based on TALPA hypotheses and consistent with Airbus In-Flight Landing Distances

- Threshold crossing at 50ft
- Air Phase of 7 seconds
- Application of Max Braking two seconds after touchdown
- Thrust Reverse Assumption
 - Idle Reverse on DRY runways
 - Max Reverse on WET runways
- 15% safety margin

ROW – Runway End Overrun Warning

The strength of ROW is the ability to continuously monitor aircraft **position** and **energy** with regards to the remaining runway length.

Consequently, any changes during the approach are immediately captured and the resulting distance to stop is updated

For example:

- Changing winds affect the ground speed and thus the predicted touchdown speed
- Above glide-slope may affect the predicted threshold crossing point
- Long flares affect the predicted touchdown point

ROP = Runway Overrun Protection

ROP

ROP uses the current **deceleration** and **position** to determine if the **current aircraft predicted stopping distance** is sufficient to stop on the remaining runway length

ROP provides alerts in case of runway overrun risk


**Visual Alert: MAX BRAKING
MAX REVERSE**

And contextual aural alerts in order of priority:

If brake pedals not deflected to maximum
Aural Alert: BRAKE, MAX BRAKING

If max reverse not set
Aural Alert: SET MAX REVERSE

At reverse cut-off speed
Aural Alert: KEEP MAX REVERSE



ROP Runway State Selection

The ROP system for Single Aisle has **no** explicit selection of the runway state. Therefore the system makes an implicit selection **at touchdown**

- IF the predicted **WET** stopping distance is less than LDA
 - The system makes the hypothesis that the runway **could be WET**. Therefore ROP protection is based on a **WET** runway
- IF the predicted **WET** stopping distance is greater than LDA
 - **IF WET RWY TOO SHORT** visual alert is on the PFD
 - If pilot continues the landing the hypothesis is that the runway **must be DRY**
 - Therefore ROP protection is based on a **DRY** runway

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Take-Off Securing

Objectives of TOS function:

- ✓ To provide a **safety net** within avionics regarding erroneous takeoff parameters.
- ✓ To reduce **risks** of tail strike and runway overrun due to erroneous takeoff parameters.
- ✓ Detect gross **inconsistency** between takeoff parameters inserted in FMS.

Take-Off Securing

- ✓ 1 check to catch entry errors on **ZFW range**
- ✓ 3 checks to catch entry errors on **TO speeds**
- ✓ 1 check to detect **TO speed not inserted**
- ✓ 1 check to detect inappropriate **trim setting**
- ✓ 1 check to detect inappropriate **high lift configuration setting**

Take-Off Securing

Detection of erroneous weight initialization in the FMS

```

INIT                                     ←→
TAXI                                     ZFW / ZFWCG
0 + 5                                   □□□ + □ / □□ + □
TRIP / TIME                             BLOCK
--- + - / ---                            □□□ + □
RTE RSV / %                             10 + 1
--- + - / ---
ALTN / TIME
--- + - / ---
FINAL / TIME
--- + - / ---
MIN DEST FOB
--- + - / ---
ENTRY OUT OF RANGE

```

Check ZFW range:

$$ZFW_{\text{MIN}} \leq ZFW \leq ZFW_{\text{MAX}}$$

Check performed as soon as ZFW is entered or modified.

When check fails: « **ENTRY OUT OF RANGE** » message and

ZFW entry is rejected.

Take-Off Securing

Detection of erroneous take-off speeds initialization in the FMS

```

TAKE OFF RWY 33L
V1 FLP RETR
142 F=--- NOISE>
VR SLT RETR
146 S=---
V2 CLEAR
144 O=---
TRANS ALT I
5000
THR RED/ACC ENG OUT ACC
2000/2000 2000
UPLINK NEXT
<TO DATA PHASE>
V1/VR/V2 DISAGREE
    
```

Check TO speeds consistency:

$$V1 \leq VR \leq V2$$


Checks performed as soon as all the 3 TO speeds are inserted in the PERF TO page, or each time a TO speed is modified.

When check fails: « **V1/VR/V2 DISAGREE** » message.

- ✓ Available on FMS / MCDU
- ✓ Enhancement under development to provide ECAM alert for A320, A330/A340 and A380 programs

Take-Off Securing

Detection of erroneous take-off speeds initialization in the FMS



Check VMC limitation:

$$V1 \geq K_{V1VMCG} * V_{MCG}$$

$$VR \geq K_{VRVMCA} * V_{MCA}$$

$$V2 \geq K_{V2VMCA} * V_{MCA}$$

Checks performed:

- When ZFW, BLOCK and CONF are inserted on the MCDU.
- When ZFW, BLOCK, CONF or TO thrust setting are modified.
- At engine start.

When check fails: «T.O SPEEDS TOO LOW » message.

Check Vs1G/VMU limitation:

$$VR \geq K_{VR} * V_{RMIN}$$


$$V2 \geq K_{V2} * V_{S1G}$$

✓ Available on FMS / MCDU

✓ Enhancement under development to provide ECAM alert for A320, A330/A340 and A380 programs

Take-Off Securing

Detection of take-off speeds not inserted:



Check insertion of take-off speeds:

Checks performed when V1, V2, VR or FLX TO data have been entered and takeoff runway is changed:

« **CHECK TAKE OFF DATA** » MCDU message*

and TO data fields revert to amber boxes and previously entered values are written next to the amber boxes.

*Message is also displayed (but TO speeds not invalidated)

- when TO shift is inserted
- when Flap setting is change d
- when Secondary Flight Plan is activated

✓ Available on FMS / MCDU


✓ Enhancement under development to provide ECAM alert for A320 and A330/A340 programs

Take-Off Securing


Detection of inappropriate trim setting

- The monitoring compares pilot inserted value with flight controls computations and the actual trim setting.
- Checks performed when pushing TO CONFIG pb and at T.O. power.
- When check fails, ECAM alert is triggered:

**F/CTL PITCH TRIM/MCDU/CG
DISAGREE**



A320 Family design:



Take-Off Securing

Detection of inappropriate high lift configuration setting

- The monitoring compares pilot inserted value on MCDU and actual high lift configuration setting
- Checks performed when pushing TO CONFIG pb and at T.O. power.
- When check fails, ECAM alert is triggered:
F/CTL FLAPS/MCDU DISAGREE
- Under development for A320 program and available for other programs

Take-Off Securing

Availability per program and systems impacted

Checks	Message	Systems impacted	Availability			
			A320 Family	A330/A340 Family	A380	A350
ZFW refined range	ENTRY OUT OF RANGE	FMS	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Take Off speed order	V1/VR/V2 DISAGREE	FMS	Yes *	Yes *	Yes *	Yes
Take Off Speed too low	T. O SPEEDS TOO LOW	FMS	Yes *	Yes *	Yes *	Yes
Take Off Speed not inserted	CHECK TAKE OFF DATA	FMS	Yes *	Yes *	Yes	Yes
TRIM settings consistency checks	F/CTL PITCH TRIM/MCDU/CG DISAGREE	FMS FWS EIS FAC(A320Fam)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
CONF settings Consistency check	F/CTL FLAPS/MCDU DISAGREE	FMS FWS EIS	Under development	Yes	Yes	Yes

* Enhancement under development to provide ECAM alert

Thank You !

