



Agenda Item 2: Large Height Deviation (LHD) Analysis

ASSESSMENT OF CLASS M AND N LHD REPORTS AS COORDINATION INCIDENTS

(Presented by COLOMBIA)

SUMMARY	
This information paper is intended to inform the Meeting about the progress made in Colombia in sensitising ATCOs with a view to minimising the occurrence of LHDs and contributing to safety improvement.	
References:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Assessment of class M and N LHD reports- LHD training submitted to the GTE5 meeting- GREPECAS Conclusion 15/36- Change management document (Colombia SMS, in progress)	
ICAO Strategic Objectives:	A – Safety

1. Background

1.1 The common denominator of class M and N LHD reports is an operational deviation caused by those in charge of coordinating with adjacent FIRs. According to GREPECAS Conclusion 15/36, controllers must be sensitised as to the importance of avoiding making coordination loop errors instead of relying on technological aids that, in most cases, are fed by themselves, and to the fact that the possibility of error is inherent to the process.

2. Discussion

2.1 Taking into account the issues and operational risks caused by LHDs, Colombia is conducting a training process aimed at minimising risk, through the inclusion of LHD analysis in its training programme on basic aerodrome control, recurrence and monitoring, with emphasis on the coordination modules.

2.2 This initiative emerged as a first step in the implementation of SMS for air traffic (still under development), taking into account the change management document recommended in ICAO Doc 9859.

2.3 This process started with the establishment of regulations to serve as a basis for the process, and the issuance by the Operational Systems Secretariat of a circular on LHD processing. Based on information collected from the reported LHDs, a training project was developed, which has already been implemented in the monitoring courses provided at the centre for aeronautical studies in 2010.

2.4 Likewise, a process was conducted for raising awareness amongst controllers of the BOG and BAQ FIRs as to the use of the forms and the importance of avoiding operational deviations in the coordination loop, using actual examples of incidents caused by failures in this loop.

2.5 In late 2010 and early 2011, a process was carried out for the interconnection of control centres and radar units in Colombia at a low level. This process has been considered as a first step in the interconnection of the BOG and BAQ FIRs, where a technical problem is presently being resolved. Currently, this interconnection process is being carried out within the Colombian TMAs, which have a significant operational advantage that serves as a test bed for FIR interconnection, since TMAs have common boundaries.

2.6 It is foreseen that by late 2012, the BOG and BAQ control centres will be interconnected and ready to begin the process of entering into agreements with other States for the exchange of information, thus complying with the recommendation of GREPEAS Conclusion 15/36 regarding coordination loop automation.