



GTE/9

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

FINAL REPORT

**NINTH MEETING/WORKSHOP OF THE SCRUTINY
WORKING GROUP**

(GTE/9)

Guayaquil, Ecuador, 8 to 12 March 2010

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HISTORY OF THE MEETING

ii-1 PLACE AND DURATION OF THE MEETING

The Ninth Meeting/Workshop of the Scrutiny Working Group (GTE/9) was held in Guayaquil, Ecuador, from 8 to 12 March 2010.

ii-2 OPENING CEREMONY AND OTHER MATTERS

The Ecuadorian General Director of Civil Aviation, Eng. Fernando Guerrero, the Coast Civil Aviation Deputy Director, Mr. Marcelo Aguilar Orellana, the GTE Group Rapporteur, Mr. Madison Walton, the Head of CARSAMMA, Mr. Ricardo Dantas, and Mr. Jorge Fernández, RO/ATM/SAR of the ICAO South American Office, participated during the opening ceremony

Mr. Jorge Fernández, RO/ATM/SAR of the ICAO South American Office, greeted the participants, and highlighted the importance of the issues to be dealt with, and thanked the Ecuadorian aeronautical authority, the FAA, and CSSI, Inc. for the permanent support offered to the regional activities.

Mr. Walton also expressed his thanks to the Ecuadorian authority for the effort made in the organization and hosting of the event.

Eng. Fernando Guerrero Lopez, General Director of Civil Aviation of Ecuador, welcomed the participants highlighting the importance of the matters to be dealt with have at a regional level, inaugurating the meeting/Workshop.

ii-3 SCHEDULE, ORGANIZATION, WORKING METHODS, OFFICERS AND SECRETARIAT

The Meeting agreed to hold its sessions from 0900 to 1500 hours, with appropriate breaks. The work was done with the Meeting as a Single Committee.

Mr. Madison Walton, delegate from United States, served as Chairman of the Meeting and Rapporteur of the Scrutiny Working Group.

Mr. Jorge Fernández Demarco, RO/ATM/SAR Regional Office, Lima, acted as Secretary. He was assisted by Messrs. Ricardo Dantas and Reinaldo Taveira from CARSAMMA, Ms. Stephanie Beritsky, Ms. Theresa Brewer Dougherty and Mr. José Pérez, from the FAA, USA.

ii-4 WORKING LANGUAGES

The working languages of the Meeting were Spanish and English, and its relevant documentation was presented in both languages.

ii-5 AGENDA

The following agenda was adopted:

Agenda Item 1: History of RVSM, Regional Monitoring Agencies and Scrutiny Groups

- a) Roles and responsibilities
- b) Overview of Target Levels of Safety

Agenda Item 2: GTE Overview – CARSAMMA & Rapporteur

- a) Terms of Reference
- b) Background
- c) Composition
- d) Objectives
- e) Methodology
- f) Reporting

Agenda Item 3: Large Height Deviation (LHD) Analysis – CARSAMMA

- a) Application of GTE methodology to LHD events
- b) Summarize parameter values
- c) Identify operational trends from data base

Agenda Item 4: Other business

ii-6 ATTENDANCE

The meeting was attended by a total of 42 participants, from one State of the NACC Region (United States) and 5 States of the SAM Region (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Paraguay). The list of participants is shown in pages iii-1 to iii-6.

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Agenda Item 1: History of RVSM, Regional Monitoring Agencies and Scrutiny Groups

- a) Roles and responsibilities
- b) Overview of Target Levels of Safety

1.1 The Meeting took note of the roles and responsibilities of the Scrutiny Group, among which the task of reviewing occurrences of large-height deviations is emphasized, including the lack of transferences among ATC units. It also noted that in an effort to facilitate the determination as to whether an event of this type qualifies as large height deviation, a methodology was approved. This methodology is known as CAR/SAM RVSM Reference Guide. A summary of the Reference Guide was made by the USA Delegation, highlighting some of the most important aspects of such GTE working policy.

1.2 The meeting recalled the role and responsibilities of the Regional Monitoring Agency (RMA) and its relationship with ICAO Doc 9574, where the process of implementation of five steps for RVSM introduction is described, and among them the establishment of a regional monitoring agency (RMA) is required, to act as a supervisory body of safety monitoring.

1.3 The establishment of a Scrutiny Group on Reduced Vertical Separation Minima, having the aim to assist the RMA to analyse LHD, was explained. The GTE was established as a decision of GREPECAS. This group of experts in operations, ATC, flight crews and safety is called Scrutiny Working Group (GTE). The Terms of Reference of the GTE and its composition are shown in Appendix B to the CAR/SAM RVSM Reference Guide that is included as **Appendix A** to this part of the report.

1.4 The meeting took note of the objectives pursued by the GTE, which directly contributes to the compliance of the requirement of providing a continuous assessment of the factors affecting the calculation of RVSM airspace collision risk.

1.5 Another aspect analysed was the methodology used by the GTE for the revision and assessment of data, which consists in reviewing the existing reports, as well as other sources, and analyse the events that generate 3000 ft or more large-height deviations in FL290-FL410.

1.6 As identified by the GTE, through the approved methodology, any variation in 90 m (300 ft) or more altitude with respect to the altitude assigned or planned. In case of identifying a qualified deviation, the event is categorized as a large-height deviation.

1.7 In reviewing the parameter values, the meeting noted that one of the aspects to be taken into account is the difference of flight level in which the pilot is authorized to fly in respect of the one he is actually flying. In most of the cases, the parameter shall require the opinion and operational experience of an expert for the assignment of a value. The most important value assigned to the large height deviation is the duration of the aircraft at the incorrect or unplanned flight level.

1.8 The meeting noted the error code table used by the GTE for the analysis of LHD. It also received information on the trends as per LHD, as well as the identification of adverse trends. In case of identifying adverse trends, the Scrutiny Group formulates recommendations of corrective actions to try to ensure that operational errors are kept to the minimum and that the airspace under study continues to meet the requirements of the accepted target level of safety.

1.9 The work of the GTE is necessary to support continuity of RVSM operations.

1.10 The GTE has recognised that altitude deviations generated by operational errors and in-flight contingencies occur in all airspace, regardless of minimum separation. The goal of the monitoring activity is to ensure that RVSM airspace operations do not generate an increase in collision risk due to such events, and that total vertical risk does not exceed target levels of safety. However, actions and proposed measures to reduce the risk should not be exclusive for RVSM airspace.

APPENDIX A



International Civil Aviation Organization

**CARIBBEAN AND SOUTH AMERICAN RVSM GRUPO DE TRABAJO DE ESCRUTINIO
(CAR/SAM RVSM GTE)**

REFERENCE GUIDE

MARCH 2009

1. Introduction

1.1. This reference guide is a consolidation of materials describing the construction, purpose and methodology of the CAR/SAM RVSM *Grupo de Trabajo de Escrutinio* (GTE). It is intended to be used as a basic reference for anyone interested in Scrutiny Group activity.

1.2. It is essential that regional authorities take into account all possible means of ascertaining and reducing the level of risk of collision resulting from operational errors that cause large height deviations (LHD). The CAR/SAM RVSM GTE is the primary group to evaluate and assess the operational aspects of large height deviations.

2. Background

2.1. System Performance Monitoring

2.1.1. Experience has shown that large height deviations, a deviation in the vertical dimension from the cleared flight level whereby established margins of separation may be eroded, of 90 m (300 ft) or greater in magnitude have a significant impact on operational and technical risk in RVSM airspace. The causes of such deviations have been found to be, but are not limited to:

- a) an error in the altimetry or automatic altitude control system of an aircraft;
- b) turbulence and other weather-related phenomena;
- c) an emergency descent by an aircraft without the crew following established contingency procedures;
- d) response to airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS) resolution advisories;
- e) not following an ATC clearance, resulting in flight at an incorrect flight level;
- f) an error in issuing an ATC clearance, resulting in flight at an incorrect flight level; and
- g) errors in coordination of the transfer of control responsibility for an aircraft between adjacent ATC units, resulting in flight at an incorrect flight level.

The additional risk associated with operational errors and in-flight contingencies influence the outcome of RVSM safety assessments. A diagram illustrating the LHD contribution to the overall risk assessment is included in Appendix A.

2.1.2. System performance monitoring, as outlined in ICAO doc 9574, is necessary to ensure the continued safe use of reduced vertical separation minimum (RVSM) and that established safety goals are met. This activity includes monitoring the minimum risk of collision associated with operational errors and in-flight contingencies. The monitoring process is divided into two main categories:

- a) Risk associated with the aircraft technical height-keeping performance (technical risk), and
- b) The overall risk, i.e. risk due to all causes.

2.1.3. The monitoring process involves the collection and evaluation of operational data. Appropriate methodologies will need to be in place to process this data in order to enable comparison with regionally agreed overall safety objectives.

2.2. Regional Monitoring Agency (RMA) Roles and Responsibilities

2.2.1. ICAO Doc 9574 describes a five-step implementation process for introduction of the RVSM. Among other actions required, the implementation process calls for establishment of a regional monitoring agency (RMA) to act as the safety oversight body. The RMA is required to conduct regular comprehensive safety assessments in order to ensure that the Target Level of Safety (TLS) is met. That is, that the risk associated with the RVSM as estimated by ICAO risk modeling is less than the TLS value. In other words, the RMA determines if the estimated risk of collision, calculated in accordance with ICAO collision risk methodology, is less than the agreed TLS.

2.2.2. A critical component of RVSM safety assessment, as well as a system performance monitoring requirement, is the analysis of large height deviations.

2.2.3. It is the responsibility of the cognizant RMA to establish a program for identifying large height deviations and a mechanism for collecting and analyzing reports of such deviations. It is also the responsibility of the RMA to provide periodic reports of observed height deviations to the appropriate PIRG and/or its subsidiary bodies, in accordance with procedures prescribed by the PIRG.

2.2.4. The Caribbean-South American Monitoring Agency (CARSAMMA) is the regional monitoring agency (RMA) established by GREPECAS to conduct this work for the Caribbean and South American regions.

2.2.5. While the RMA will be the recipient and archivist for reports of large height deviations, it is important to note that the RMA alone cannot be expected to conduct all activities associated with a comprehensive program to detect and assess large height deviations.

2.3. Establishment of a Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum Scrutiny Group

2.3.1. To assist the RMA in analyzing LHDs, a body of experts has been established by GREPECAS. This group of operational, ATC, flight crew and safety experts is called a Scrutiny Group, Grupo de Trabajo de Escrutinio (GTE). The GTE Terms of Reference is included in Appendix B.

3. Composition

3.1. The Scrutiny Group requires a diverse set of subject-matter experts. The Group is composed of subject matter experts in air traffic control, aircraft operations and maintenance, regulation and certification, data analysis, and risk modeling from the involved regions.

3.2. In the CAR/SAM regions, the following organizations are represented in the Scrutiny Group:

- a) The Caribbean and South American Monitoring Agency (CARSAMMA)
- b) The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
- c) Dirección Générale de l'Aviation Civile (DGAC)
- d) International Federation of Air Line Pilots' Associations (IFALPA)
- e) Corporación Centroamericana de Servicios de Navegación Aérea (COCESNA)
- f) Corporación Peruana de Aeropuertos y Aviación Comercial S.A. (CORPAC S.A.)

3.3. Scrutiny Groups in other regions have recommended the formation of a Scrutiny Sub-Group. Participation in the Sub-Group is by subject matter experts and specialists. The Sub-Group is responsible for executing the preparatory work for the Scrutiny Group including the analysis and categorization of selected large height events. The Scrutiny Group shall govern the decisions proposed by the Sub-Group. Sub-Group members are drawn from the Scrutiny Group.

4. Objectives

4.1.1. The Scrutiny Group's work contributes directly to the requirement to provide on-going assessment of factors which affect the estimate of collision risk in RVSM airspaces.

4.1.2. The initial result of the Group's effort is to examine the "event" reports and produce an estimate of time spent at a flight level other than cleared. This estimate is used as a primary input used in the preparation of an estimate of the operational risk for the implementation of Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum (Appendix A). The Group

examines both technical risk (affected by reliability and accuracy of the avionics within the aircraft) and operational risk (affected by the human element) in the development of the safety assessment.

4.1.3. Once the Group has made its initial determination, the data are reviewed to look for performance trends. If any adverse trends exist, the Group may make recommendations for reducing or mitigating the effect of those trends as a part of the RVSM implementation. Subsequently, the Group will meet to examine the post-implementation record of performance and to assure that operational errors are kept to a minimum. This information is used to assure that the airspace being examined continues to satisfy the requirements of the target level of safety, which is necessary to support continued RVSM operations. New procedures or other mitigation strategies to reduce occurrences of large height deviations may evolve out of this process.

5. Data Collection

5.1.1. It is the responsibility of the relevant RMA, CARSAMMA, to establish procedures for the collection of information concerning large height deviations of 90m (300ft) or greater in magnitude

5.1.2. The primary source for reports of LHDs is the ATC units. Surveillance data collected by ATC units provides the basis for identifying large height deviations. ATC units should be required to submit monthly reports of large height deviations to the cognizant RMA.

5.1.3. CARSAMMA, with the advisement of the GTE, created a LHD reporting form designed to capture the information necessary to accurately assess large height deviations. The form is available in three different languages, Portuguese, Spanish, and English and is accessible on CARSAMMA's web site at the following location: <http://www.cgna.gov.br/CARSAMMA/siteUSA/inicial.htm> . A sample of this form is included in Appendix C.

5.1.4. Accessibility of LHD reporting materials is essential to encourage the reporting of events by all parties involved in the provision of air traffic services.

5.1.5. The GTE will explore all sources for reports of large height deviations such as State databases of air safety incident reports and voluntary reporting safety databases.

5.1.6. When analyzing reports of large height deviations, the primary concern of the GTE is the impact of such events on the collision risk and on the overall safety of the system. Data collected by the GTE is used for analysis purposes only and all LHD events reviewed by the GTE are de-identified. Confidentiality will be maintained.

6. Data Review and Evaluation

6.1.1. The methodology employed by the GTE is to examine existing databases as well as other sources and analyze events resulting in a large height deviation of 300ft or greater within FL290-FL410. These events are usually the result of Air Traffic Control (ATC) loop errors (the undiscovered misunderstanding of a clearance), instances wherein a controller fails to capture an inaccurate read-back, an altitude over or undershoot, turbulence situations, emergencies, errors in coordination, weather complications or response to an ACAS resolution advisory. The largest source of reports useful for these purposes comes from the established regional safety reporting systems. However, in many instances these reports are designed for other purposes so they may lack the clarity on information that would be desirable to the GTE. Thus, the experience of the members of the Scrutiny Group is essential in order to infer the effect, if any; the events have on risk in the airspace. All data sources undergo an initial review using key RVSM parameters and all reports of interest are extracted for further evaluation.

7. Methodology

7.1.1. The GTE is tasked with the responsibility of analyzing all reports of interest and assigning parameter values, as defined in the GTE LHD White Paper (Appendix D), that consist of cleared flight level, event flight level, levels crossed, final flight level, duration at unplanned flight level and total vertical deviation. Since the reports are not tailored for the needs of the Scrutiny Group, these values are not typically clearly defined. The GTE must rely on the expert judgment and operational experience of its members to assign these values.

7.2. Identifying Large Height Deviations

7.2.1. The GTE will evaluate all reports of interest and, based upon established GTE methodology, identify any altitude variation of 90m (300ft) or greater from the assigned or planned altitude. If a qualified deviation is identified, the event is categorized as a large height deviation.

7.2.2. When evaluating altitude variation events of 90m (300ft) or greater, it is not always clear that the event qualifies as a large height deviation. Appendix E provides examples of events that qualify as LHDs and events that do not.

7.2.3. Additional values are considered when evaluating events involving a negative transfer where the pilot provides a boundary crossing estimate several minutes prior to entering the adjacent FIR. Typically this type of event would not be included in the LHD analysis. Further analysis revealed that one can not assume that even though the incoming aircraft data are displayed on the radar, that the controller identified the potential coordination error. Some group members have noted that although the accepting FIR received notification prior to the aircraft crossing the boundary, there is a period of time where the controller is unable to remediate the event prior to the error occurring; an agreed “buffer” duration value is considered to account for controller reaction time. In other words, if the boundary crossing estimate is provided before the

agreed “buffer” duration or distance, then the event is not considered to be an LHD; if the estimate is received equal to or less than the established buffer value than the event is an LHD. The agreed “buffer” value is 3 minutes or 20nm and is termed the Inter-facility Buffer Zone. The buffer value should be used as a guideline and each event should be evaluated individually. Figure 1 included in Appendix D illustrates the buffer concept.

7.3. Parameter Values

7.3.1. Cleared Flight Level

7.3.1.1. The flight level at which the pilot was cleared or currently operating. For example, aircrew accepts a clearance intended for another aircraft and ATC fails to capture the read back error or aircrew conforms to a flawed clearance delivered by ATC.

7.3.1.2. This parameter, in some cases, will require expert judgment and operational experience to assign a value. The Scrutiny Group must take into consideration the controller’s plan versus the cleared flight level.

7.3.2. Event Flight Level

7.3.2.1. The event flight level is the flight level of error or the incorrect altitude of operation for an identifiable period of time without having received an ATC clearance

7.3.3. Duration at Unplanned Flight Level

7.3.3.1. The greatest exposure to risk is the time spent level at a flight level other than the cleared level. This parameter value contributes significantly to the calculation of operational risk.

7.3.3.2. The duration at unplanned flight level is the length of time that an aircraft was level at an altitude (flight level) that was not cleared, or planned, by air traffic control. Duration is recorded in one second increments.

7.3.3.3. The calculation of duration begins once the aircraft is level at a flight level other than the cleared level or planned level by ATC, and terminates once ATC initiates remedial action.

Figure 1 illustrates a large height deviation that has a duration value larger than zero. The duration calculation begins and point A and terminates and point B.




Figure 1.

7.3.3.4. It is important to note that not all large height deviations result in the aircraft being level at a flight level other than that cleared or planned by ATC; therefore, some events are assigned a duration value of zero.

7.3.3.5. It is also important to note the duration value determined or assigned by the GTE of LHDs that occur in a radar environment will vary significantly from that of a non-radar environment.

7.3.3.6. In most cases, LHD reports reviewed by the GTE lack the information necessary to calculate the time spent at incorrect flight level. Thus, the experience of the members of the Scrutiny Group is essential to provide in-depth analysis of each event

7.3.3.7. If the Scrutiny Group is unable to determine the time spent at incorrect flight level, a default value is assigned.

7.3.3.8. The GTE identified the need to establish a default duration value to assign to those events where there is not enough information included in the report to determine the time spent at incorrect flight level. Two default values were established, one for a radar environment and one for a non-radar environment. The default values are included in the GTE LHD White Paper, Appendix D.

7.3.4. Total Vertical Deviation

7.3.4.1. Total vertical deviation is the distance in feet between the altitude of current operation prior to the deviation and the point at which the aircraft is once again under ATC supervision. A deviation that resulted in an increase of altitude will be recorded as a positive number and a deviation that resulted in a decrease of altitude will be recorded as a negative number.

7.3.4.2. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate two large height deviations of different magnitudes. The first example, Figure 2, illustrates a large height deviation with a magnitude of 1000ft. The second example, Figure 3, illustrates a large height deviation with a magnitude of 1300 ft.




Figure 2.




Figure 3.

7.3.5. Levels Crossed

7.3.5.1. The total number of flight levels between the point that the aircraft exits the cleared flight level and is once again under ATC supervision is calculated to determine the number of levels crossed. For example, in the examples provided in figures 2 and 3 in section 7.2.4.2, one level was crossed.

7.3.5.2. The Scrutiny Group must consider the hazard zone when calculating the number levels crossed. The hazard zone is also referred to as the buffer zone.

7.3.5.3. The hazard zone is the minimum physical distance of defined dimensions to accommodate:

- a) Variations in an aircraft's flight path due to air movements, etc.;
- b) The size of the aircraft;
- c) An additional "miss" distance

7.3.5.4. The value of the hazard zone was determined to be ± 90 m (300ft). A brief explanation of the considerations underlying this value is included in paragraph 2.3.6.7 in the *Air Traffic Services Planning Manual (Doc 9426)*. The explanation is also included in Appendix F

7.3.5.5. This buffer zone criterion shall be used to determine that a specific level is occupied by an aircraft. In the LHD illustrated in figure 4, the aircraft penetrates the buffer zone but does not reach the next flight level. Applying the criterion described in paragraph 7.2.5.4, the total number of levels crossed in this example is 1.




Figure 4

7.3.6. Levels Final

7.3.6.1. The final flight level is the cleared flight level after the error/deviation.

7.3.6.2. Some reports of large height deviations do not contain the final flight level. When this information is not available in the LHD report, the Scrutiny Group relies on operational expert judgment to determine the final flight level. The final flight level of the large height deviation illustrated in figure 5 is 370.




Figure 5.

7.3.7. Rate of Climb or Descent

7.3.7.1. The rate of climb or descent of an aircraft crossing through an uncleared level also contributes to the estimate of operational risk. In most cases, this parameter value is not included in reports of large height deviations. The GTE must rely on operational expert judgment to determine the rate of climb or descent.

7.3.7.2. The GTE established climb and descent rate default values. The default values are included in the GTE LHD White Paper (Appendix D)

7.3.8. Event Category

7.3.8.1. Classification of each LHD event is necessary for risk assessment purposes and for the identification of adverse trends. Each LHD event is assigned an error type code that identifies the type of event that caused the deviation. The error codes are categorized as operational or technical for consideration in the Collision Risk Model (CRM). A complete list of the error codes is included in table 1.

Table 1. Error Codes

A	Failure to climb/descend as cleared
B	Climb/descend without ATC clearance
C	Entry into airspace at an incorrect flight level
D	Deviation due to turbulence or other weather related cause
E	Deviation due to equipment failure
F	Deviation due to collision avoidance system (TCAS) advisory
G	Deviation due to contingency event
H	Aircraft not approved for operation in RVSM restricted airspace
I	ATC system loop error; (e.g. pilot misunderstands clearance message or ATC issues incorrect clearance)
J	Equipment control error encompassing incorrect operation of fully
K	Incorrect transcription of ATC clearance or re-clearance into the FMS
L	Wrong information faithfully transcribed into the FMS (e.g. flight plan followed rather than ATC clearance or original clearance followed instead of re-clearance)
M	Error in ATC-unit-to-ATC-unit transition message
N	Negative transfer received from transitioning ATC-unit

O	Other
P	Unknown

7.4. Analysis

7.4.1. It is the responsibility of the GTE to summarize their findings and analyze the data with the goal of identifying adverse trends and assess the overall risk.

7.4.2. The benefits of analyzing LHD data over time

7.4.2.1. Maintaining a cumulative summary of analyzed LHD events will allow the GTE to determine the following:

- a) The frequency of occurrence
- b) Whether errors appear to occur systematically or randomly in time
- c) Time between each event
- d) Effect of airspace changes, if any, since RVSM implementation

7.4.3. Identify trends

7.4.3.1. The cumulative LHD summary is also used to identify adverse trends. The Scrutiny Group will evaluate grouped event categories and determine whether one particular event type occurs more often than another. This particular analysis can also be applied to geographic regions.

7.4.3.2. The Scrutiny Group will also identify operational trends that may be revealed in the data. If any exist, the Group may make recommendations for reducing the effect of those trends.

7.5. Remedial Recommendations

7.5.1. If adverse trends are identified, the Scrutiny Group will submit recommendations for remedial actions to ensure that operational errors are kept to a minimum and that the airspace being examined continues to satisfy the requirements of the target level of safety, which is necessary to support continued RVSM operations.

7.5.2. It is important to bear in mind that height deviations, as a consequence of operational errors and in-flight contingencies, occur in all airspace irrespective of the separation minimum. The purpose of this monitoring activity is to ensure that operations in RVSM airspace do not induce an increase in the risk of collision from these events and that the total vertical risk does not exceed the agreed overall safety objectives. The actions and measures proposed to reduce risk should not be exclusive to RVSM airspace.

7.6. Reporting


7.6.1. The Scrutiny Group reports annually to the RMA the results of its operational analysis including the identification of performance trends, summary of categories and estimation of duration at incorrect flight level, and recommended measures to reduce the risk in RVSM airspace. The RMA will incorporate the analysis of the Scrutiny Group in its report to the ICAO Regional Planning Group (GREPECAS) for the CAR/SAM regions.

7.7. Meeting Frequency

7.7.1. The Scrutiny Group should meet regularly so that adverse trends due to operational errors that cause large height deviations can be identified quickly and remedial actions can be taken.

APPENDIX A

RVSM Dataflow and Decision-Making Process Highlighting Scrutiny Activities



APPENDIX B**Terms of Reference of the CAR/SAM RVSM Grupo de Trabajo de Escrutinio
(RVSM/GTE)**

- a. To assemble subject matter experts, as needed, in air traffic control, aircraft operations and maintenance, regulation and certification, data analysis and risk modeling;
- b. To analyze and evaluate large height deviations of 300 ft or greater as defined by ICAO Doc 9574;
- c. To coordinate the assembly and review of large height deviation data with the Regional Monitoring Agency;
- d. To produce an estimate of flight time away from the cleared flying level to be used a primary input in the preparation of an estimate of risk by the Regional Monitoring Agency;
- e. To identify large height deviation trends and to recommend remedial actions in order to improve safety;
- f. To report results to GREPECAS through the ATM/CNS subgroup;
- g. To accomplish other tasks as directed by GREPECAS;
- h. Participate in the Regional Aviation Safety Group – Pan American (RASG-PA) to harmonize regional safety initiatives.

Composition: 1 State/Organization from the CAR Region, 1 State/Organization from the SAM Region, United States, CARSAMMA, COCESNA, IATA, IFALPA, IFATCA.

APPENDIX C

CARSAMMA Caribbean and South American Monitoring Agency		The information contained in this form is confidential and will be used for safety analysis purposes only.	
ALTITUDE DEVIATION FORM			
Report to the CARSAMMA of an altitude deviation of 300ft or more, including those due to TCAS, Turbulence and Contingency Events			
Today's date:	Reporting Unit:		
INCIDENT DETAILS			
Operator Name:	Call Sign:	Aircraft Type:	Mode C Displayed:
Date of Occurrence:	Time UTC:	Occurrence Position (lat/long or Fix):	
Cleared Route of Flight:			
Cleared Flight Level:	Estimated Duration at Incorrect Flight Level (seconds):	Observed Deviation (+/- ft):	
Other Traffic Involved:			
Cause of Deviation (<i>brief title</i>): (Examples: ATC Loop Error, Turbulence, Weather, Equipment Failure)			
AFTER SEPARATION RESTORED:			
Observed/Reported Final Flight Level*:	Mark the appropriate box	Did this FL comply with the ICAO Annex 2 Tables of Cruising Levels?	
*Please indicate the source of information – ModeC/Pilot	Is the FL above the cleared level: <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	
	Is the FL below the cleared level: <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> No	
NARRATIVE			
Detailed Description of Incident (Please give your assessment of the actual track flown by the aircraft and the cause of the deviation.)			
CREW COMMENTS (IF ANY)			
When complete please forward the report(s) to:			
Management Center Of Air Navigation Caribbean and South American Monitoring Agency (CARSAMMA) Av. Brig. Faria Lima, 1941 São José dos Campos, SP Cep: 12227-000 Brazil Telephone: (55-12) 3904-5004 or 3904-5010 Fax: (55-12) 3941-7055 E-Mail: carsamma@cqna.gov.br			

APPENDIX D

Grupo de Trabajo de Scrutinio (GTE) Large Height Deviation (LHD) White Paper

Description of Criteria

Note: The following terms, expressions and definitions are not approved by the ICAO's Council and should be used for analysis of Large Height Deviation purpose only.

Cleared Flight Level – the flight level at which the pilot was cleared or currently operating (eg, Aircrew accepts a clearance intended for another aircraft and ATC fails to capture the read back error or aircrew conforms to a flawed clearance delivered by ATC)

Reference Flight Level – The altitude that would have provided at least the minimum separation (vertical or horizontal) required

That flight level from which the Height Deviation is calculated; this level may be different from the Cleared Flight Level and must often be determined by the Scrutiny Group operational experts from the data in the Large Height Deviation report

Event Flight Level – the flight level of error, the incorrect altitude of operation for an identifiable period of time without having received an ATC clearance

Height Deviation – any altitude variation of 300ft or greater from the assigned altitude, these variations can be the result of turbulence, equipment malfunction, ATC loop errors, etc.

ATC Loop Errors – any incident where there is a misunderstanding between the pilot and the controller, failure to properly coordinate altitude information or unable to maintain situational awareness

Total Deviation – the total amount of feet between the altitudes of current operation prior to the deviation and the point at which the aircraft is once again under ATC supervision, a deviation that resulted in an increase of altitude will be recorded as a positive number, a deviation that resulted in a decrease of altitude will be recorded as a negative number

Hazard Zone – 300ft buffer zone above and below each flight level (Diagram 1-A)

Inter-facility Buffer Zone - A period of time used to determine whether a facility-to-facility coordination error should be considered a large height deviation. The current value established by the GTE is 3 minutes or 20nm. In other words, if the boundary crossing estimate is provided before the agreed “buffer” duration/distance then the event is not considered to be an LHD; if the estimate is received equal to or less than the established buffer value than the event is an LHD. The buffer value should be used as a

guideline and each event should be evaluated individually. Figure 1 illustrates the “buffer” concept.




Figure 1 Inter-facility Buffer Zone Illustration

Duration - length of time that an aircraft was level at an altitude that was not cleared by air traffic control, duration will be recorded in one second increments (Diagram 1-A), if the Scrutiny Group is unable to determine the time spent at incorrect flight level, a default value is assigned. The default values are included in Table 1.

Table 1. Duration Default Values

Radar	Non-Radar
90 s	90 s

Levels Crossed – the total number of flight levels between the point that the aircraft exits the cleared flight level and is once again under ATC supervision (Diagram 1-A)

Levels Final – the cleared flight level after the error/deviation

Code – a category and a subcategory assigned to each event (Diagram 1-B)

Rate of Climb or Descent – the climb and descent values are included in Table 2.

Table 2 Climb and Descent Values

Rate of Descent		Rate of Climb	
Drift	1000 ft per minute	Minimum	500
Normal	1500+ ft per minute	Normal	750
Rapid	2500+ ft per minute	Expedite	1250

Diagram 1-A

RVSM Flight Levels




Diagram 1-B**Error Codes**

Code	Cause of Large Height Deviation
A	Failure to climb/descend as cleared
B	Climb/descend without ATC clearance
C	Entry into airspace at an incorrect flight level
D	Deviation due to turbulence or other weather related cause
E	Deviation due to equipment failure
F	Deviation due to collision avoidance system (TCAS) advisory
G	Deviation due to contingency event
H	Aircraft not approved for operation in RVSM restricted airspace
I	ATC system loop error ; (e.g. pilot misunderstands clearance message or ATC issues incorrect clearance)
J	Equipment control error encompassing incorrect operations of fully functional FMS or navigation system (e.g. by mistake the pilot incorrectly operates INS equipment)
K	Incorrect transcription of ATC clearance or re-clearance into the FMS
L	Wrong information faithfully transcribed into the FMS (e.g. flight plan followed rather than ATC clearance or original clearance followed instead of re-clearance)
M	Error in ATC-unit-to-ATC-unit transition message
N	Negative transfer received from transitioning ATC-unit
O	Other
P	Unknown

APPENDIX E

EXAMPLES OF EVENTS THAT QUALIFY AS LHDS AND EVENTS THAT DO NOT

NON-LHD

1.- RADAR COVERAGE IN THE ADJACENT AREA

When the receiving FIR has a radar coverage **over 20 NM** in the airspace of the transferring FIR and it is observed that the aircraft has a flight level different to the one previously coordinated, which was not revised, it is not considered LHD, since the same is acknowledged before entering its airspace, it should be kept in mind that it is a risk for safety, but an investigation should be made as a coordination incident but not as an LHD.

2.- WITHOUT A RADAR COVERAGE IN THE ADJACENT AREA

When the receiving FIR has contact with the aircraft **5 minutes** before it enters its airspace, and it is made aware of the aircraft's change of flight level with respect to a level previously coordinated, we do not consider there is a LHD, because the FIR is made aware of this before it enters its airspace. We do have to bear in mind that there is a risk in safety, but an investigation must be conducted as a coordination incident and not as a LHD.

3.- LATERAL DEVIATION

When an aircraft reports a laterally deviated position of the original point of transfer, either through another route or because of a deviation requested by the crew for operational convenience, we do not consider there is a LHD given that the initial philosophy of the reports of large height deviations exclusively corresponds to vertical deviations and not to lateral ones. In this case, we must investigate this situation as a coordination incident between adjacent ACC.

4.- TRANSFER TIME ERROR

When an aircraft ~~reports a longitudinal deviated position in time due to coordination error or to lack of review of the transfer time,~~ **crosses or notifies the transfer point 4 or more minutes after ETO to the point** this is not considered an LHD. In light of the initial philosophy of large height deviations reports, this would only cover vertical deviations and not to horizontal ones. In this case, we must investigate this situation as a coordination incident between adjacent ACC.

5.- LATERAL DEVIATION WITH RADAR COVERAGE IN THE ADJACENT AREA

When an aircraft flies into an airspace that was not included in its route due to an operational deviation, this is not considered an LHD. Since this is an operation error made by the ACC that is aware of the deviation and that failed to report it to the affected ACC, this event should be considered a coordination incident between adjacent FIRs.

LHD

6. -WITHOUT RADAR COVERAGE

When an aircraft flies into a receiving FIR and reports a flight level different from the one previously coordinated, this is considered an LHD. We must take into account the time when the aircraft passes the FIR border and the corresponding ACC becomes aware of the traffic and takes an action regarding the deviation whether this action means leaving the aircraft at the level it is reporting or move the aircraft to a level at which it does not conflict with the FIR's traffic plan.

7.- WITH RADAR COVERAGE BEFORE THE FIR BORDER

If communications failed, an aircraft is transferred to a certain flight level and then it goes into the accepting ACC's radar coverage at a different flight level **without contact with the ACC**, this is considered an LHD. We must take into account the time when the aircraft passes the transfer point border and the corresponding ACC becomes aware of the traffic and takes an action regarding the deviation and its traffic plan.

8 .- ERRORS IN THE TIME OF TRANSFER WITHOUT RADAR COVERAGE

When an aircraft crosses or notifies the transfer point 4 or more minutes before the ETO at once, without review by the transferor and there are not conditions described in 1 and 2 is considered as a LHD, given that the ACC is not accepting expected the aircraft before its airspace.

9 .- LATERAL DEVIATION

When an aircraft notifies be established on a route different from the initially coordinated and there are no conditions described in 1 and 2, is considered a LHD in mind that the ACC has planned accepting traffic on the new route.

Note: it should be noted that all LHDs are also treated as incidents of coordination.

APPENDIX F

2.3.6.7 Accuracy of SSR Mode C data

2.3.6.7.1 The use of SSR Mode C data must take account of the following errors affecting accuracy:

- a. Correspondence error, reflecting discrepancies between level information used and the level information encoded for automatic transmission. The maximum value of this error has been accepted to be $f \pm 38$ m (125 ft) (95 per cent probability) (cf. ICAO Annex 10, Volume I, Part I, 3.8.7.12.2.5);
- b. Flight technical error, reflecting inevitable deviations by aircraft from intended levels as a reaction to flight control operations, turbulence, etc. This error, when related to manually flown aircraft, tends to be larger than that for aircraft controlled by automatic pilots. The maximum value of this error used so far, based on a 95 per cent probability, is ± 60 m (200 ft) (cf. *Report of COM/OPS Divisional Meeting (1966)*, Item 9, page 9-35, 4.2). However, it should be noted that a number of factors contributing to this value have been improved since.

2.3.6.7.2 The mathematical combination of the non-related errors in a) and b) above results in a value of ± 72 m (235 ft) (based on a 95 per cent probability) and it is therefore believed that a value of $f \pm 90$ m (300 ft) constitutes a valid decision criterion to be applied in practice when:

- a. Verifying the accuracy of SSR Mode C data;
- b. Determining the occupancy of levels.

Agenda Item 2: GTE Overview – CARSAMMA & Rapporteur

- a) Terms of Reference
- b) Background
- c) Composition
- d) Objectives
- e) Methodology
- f) Reporting

2.1 Under this agenda item, the CARSAMMA delegates explained to the meeting the criteria to be used by the GTE and CARSAMMA to assess events qualifying and LHDs and events which do not qualify as such. Examples of each one of the cases were presented, and this was used by the meeting to ask questions and clarify doubts on the qualification and criteria used.

2.2 This criterion is based on aspects related with the scope of the radar surveillance coverage in the adjacent area, lateral deviations, with or without surveillance, errors in the estimated time in the transference of responsibilities point from one ACC to the other. The criterion used, as approved by the Meeting, is included as Appendix E to the CAR/SAM Reference Guide shown as Appendix A to the report on agenda item 1. The presentation made by CARSAMMA is shown in **Appendix A** to this part of the report.


2.3 CARSAMMA also showed examples to fill-in LHD forms and Error Code Table. This presentation is shown in **Appendix B** to this part of the report.

2.4 The Terms of Reference of the Scrutiny Group is shown Appendix B of the CAR/SAM RVSM Guide, the LHD form is shown in Appendix C, while the error code tables is shown in Appendix D of the aforementioned document (Diagram 1B).

APPENDIX A

**CARSAMMA PRESENTATION – HISTORY OF RVSM AND ESTABLISHMENT OF
REGIONAL MONITORING AGENCIES AND SCRUTINY GROUPS**

Caribbean and South American RVSM Grupo de Trabajo de Escrutinio (CAR/SAM RVSM GTE)



CARSAMMA



History of the Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum (RVSM) and Establishment of Regional Monitoring Agencies (RMAs) and Scrutiny Groups



Independent Monitoring Authority

- The concept of an independent monitoring authority that would act as a clearing house for safety related materials in a given ICAO region dates back to the North Atlantic (NAT) System Planning Group and the development of the Minimum Navigation Performance Specification (MNPS).
- MNPS is required by each State authority in accordance with regional agreements.
- MNPS requires that the navigation performance of the aircraft be certified or approved by a State authority.

3



NAT CMA

- A need was recognized to maintain regional records and quality control information for the region and conduct analysis to assure the system providers and operators alike that the performance was within established limits.
- In 1981 the North Atlantic Systems Planning Group (NAT SPG) commissioned one of the first organizations to conduct Scrutiny Group-type activities, the Central Monitoring Agency (CMA).

4



Lateral Separation Monitoring

- The responsibility of collecting reports of gross navigational errors (GNEs) was assigned to the CMA.
- The NAT SPG assembled operational experts to comment on unusual GNEs, to interpret the circumstances around them and to recommend changes to policies, practices and procedures to minimize the occurrence of infrequent but risk generating events.

5



Connection To ICAO SARPs

- ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) provides the basis for this work.
 - A feedback mechanism wherein one detects and then corrects risk generating events is part of ICAO endorsed collision risk methodology.
 - Hazard monitoring is also a fundamental component of the ICAO Safety Management System (SMS).

6



Vertical Separation - RVSM

- Prior to the establishment of the CMA in the North Atlantic, the NAT SPG decided to implement RVSM in its airspace.
- The RVSM implementation process was defined in the ICAO RVSM Manual, Doc 9574.
- Doc 9574 was developed by the ICAO Review of the General Concept of Separation Panel (RGCSP) which later became the Separation and Airspace Safety Panel (SASP).

7



System Performance Monitoring

- System performance monitoring, as outlined in ICAO Doc 9574, is necessary to ensure the continued safe use of reduced vertical separation minimum (RVSM) and that established safety goals are met.
- This activity includes monitoring the minimum risk of collision associated with operational errors and in-flight contingencies. The monitoring process is divided into two main categories:
 - Risk associated with the aircraft technical height-keeping performance (technical risk)
 - The overall risk, i.e. risk due to all causes

8



RVSM Manual - RMA

- The ICAO RVSM Manual, Doc 9574, established the roles and responsibilities of the Regional Monitoring Agency (RMA).
- The RVSM Manual was also developed using collision risk modeling (CRM) methodology, therefore, a similar set of processes for recording, analyzing and acting on information gathered in the system was established.

9



RVSM Initial Implementation

- In 1997, when RVSM was implemented in the NAT, the CMA's role was expanded to include vertical events.
- The process of evaluating vertical events and developing remedial action is ongoing in the NAT.
- In 1999 RVSM was implemented in Pacific airspace in accordance with Doc 9574.
- A Pacific RMA, the Pacific Approvals Registry and Monitoring Agency (PARMO), was established and operated by the Federal Aviation Administration.

10



RVSM Expansion

- The ICAO RVSM implementation process and RMA establishment was repeated as RVSM was implemented in other regions for example:
 - Europe
 - Asia
 - Caribbean and South America
 - North America
 - Canada
 - Mexico
 - United States

11



Regional Monitoring Agency (RMA) Roles and Responsibilities

12



Establishment of a Regional Monitoring Agency (RMA)

- Among other actions required in the 5-step RVSM implementation process identified in ICAO doc 9574, the process calls for establishment of a regional monitoring agency (RMA) to act as the safety oversight body.
- RMAs are established by regional planning groups.
- The draft ICAO RMA Handbook lists all flight information regions (FIRs) where RVSM has been implemented and the cognizant RMA for each FIR.

13



RMA Roles and Responsibilities

- It is the responsibility of the relevant RMA to establish a program for identifying large height deviations and a mechanism for collecting and analyzing reports of such deviations.
- The Caribbean-South American Monitoring Agency (CARSAMMA) is the regional monitoring agency (RMA) established by GREPECAS to conduct this work for the Caribbean and South American regions.

14



Data Collection

- It is the responsibility of the relevant RMA, CARSAMMA, to establish procedures for the collection of reports of LHDs
- CARSAMMA, with the advisement of the GTE, created a LHD reporting form designed to capture the information necessary to accurately assess large height deviations.

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LHD Reporting Form

Incident Details

The GTE relies on the narrative

Accessibility plays a key role in reporting

The LHD reporting form is available on CARSAMMA's website and is available in three different languages

16



GTE Overview

17



Need for a Scrutiny Group

- Why have a Scrutiny Group?
 - When you establish a change in separation it is impossible to predict all conditions
 - The airspace is dynamic, requires continuous monitoring
- One good example:
 - Review panels have noted that the expanded use of highly accurate global navigation satellite systems, while decreasing lateral risk, has contributed to an increase in vertical risk.

18



Establishment of the GTE

- To assist the RMA in analyzing LHDs, a body of experts has been established by GREPECAS. This group of operational, ATC, flight crew and safety experts is called a Scrutiny Group, Grupo de Trabajo de Escrutinio (GTE).
- The GTE Terms of Reference as follows:

19



GTE Terms of Reference

- To assemble subject matter experts, as needed, in air traffic control, aircraft operations and maintenance, regulation and certification, data analysis and risk modeling;
- To analyze and evaluate large height deviations of 300 ft or greater as defined by ICAO Doc 9574;
- To coordinate the assembly and review of large height deviation data with the Regional Monitoring Agency;
- To produce an estimate of flight time away from the cleared flying level to be used a primary input in the preparation of an estimate of risk by the Regional Monitoring Agency;
- To identify large height deviation trends and to recommend remedial actions in order to improve safety;
- To report results to GREPECAS through the ATM/CNS subgroup;
- To accomplish other tasks as directed by GREPECAS.

20



GTE Composition

- The Scrutiny Group requires a diverse set of subject-matter experts. The Group is composed of subject matter experts in air traffic control, aircraft operations and maintenance, regulation and certification, data analysis, and risk modeling from the involved regions.
- In the CAR/SAM regions, the following organizations are represented in the Scrutiny Group:
 - CARSAMMA
 - FAA
 - DGAC
 - IFALPA
 - COCESNA
 - CORPAC (S.A.)

21



Objectives

- Provide on-going assessment of factors which affect the estimate of collision risk in RVSM airspaces
- Prepare periodic estimates of the risk of collision due to the loss of planned vertical separation in RVSM airspaces
- Analyze available data and, under expert guidance, make recommendations to procedures and practices that will maintain the operation of the airspace below agreed thresholds or to improve the operational safety in the airspaces

22



What is a Large Height Deviation?

- A deviation in the vertical dimension from the cleared or planned flight level of 90 m (300 ft) or greater in magnitude
- The causes of large height deviations have been found to be, but are not limited to:
 - Altimetry error
 - Turbulence
 - Emergency descent
 - Response to airborne collision avoidance system
 - Not correctly following an ATC clearance
 - An error in issuing an ATC clearance
 - Coordination errors between adjacent ATC units

23



Why Evaluate and Analyze LHDs?

- Experience has shown that large height deviations have a significant impact on operational and technical risk in RVSM airspace.
- The additional risk associated with operational errors and in-flight contingencies influence the outcome of RVSM safety assessments.

24



Parameter Values Assessed by GTE

- One of the main objectives of the GTE is to identify the following parameter values for each reported LHD:
 - Cleared flight level
 - Event flight level
 - Duration at unplanned flight level
 - Total vertical deviation
 - Level crossed
 - Level final
 - Rate of climb or descent
 - Event category

25




Methodology and Parameter Values

26



Collision Risk Model Overview

- The CRM established key parameters
 - Rate of LHD occurrences
 - Growth in traffic and congestion (reflected in passing frequency and occupancy)
 - Lateral navigation performance




27



Cleared Flight Level

- The flight level at which the pilot was cleared or currently operating.
- For example, aircrew accepts a clearance intended for another aircraft and ATC fails to capture the read back error.




28



Event Flight Level

- The flight level of error or the incorrect altitude of operation for an identifiable period of time without having received an ATC clearance




29



Duration at Unplanned Flight Level

- The length of time that an aircraft was level at an altitude (flight level) that was not cleared, or planned, by air traffic control.
- Duration is recorded in one second increments.



* The calculation of duration begins once the aircraft is level at a flight level other than the cleared level or planned level by ATC, and terminates once ATC initiates remedial action.


30



Default Value for Duration

- The GTE identified the need to establish a default duration value to assign to those events where there is not enough information included in the report to determine the time spent at incorrect flight level.
- Two default values were established, one for a radar environment and one for a non-radar environment

Radar Environment	Non-Radar Environment
90 seconds	90 seconds




31



Total Vertical Deviation

- The distance in feet between the altitude of current operation prior to the deviation and the point at which the aircraft is once again under ATC supervision.




32



Total Vertical Deviation

- Resumption of ATC supervision may occur at a point other than a flight level




33



Levels Crossed

- The total number of flight levels between the point that the aircraft exits the cleared flight level and is once again under ATC supervision.




34



Levels Crossed

- The Scrutiny Group must consider the hazard zone when calculating the number of levels crossed.
- The value of the hazard zone is ± 90 m (300ft)
- This criterion shall be used to determine that a specific level is occupied by an aircraft




35



Levels Final

- The cleared flight level after the error/deviation
- Some reports of LHDs do not contain the final flight level. When this information is not available, the Scrutiny Group relies on operational expert judgment to determine the final flight level



36



Rate of Climb or Descent

- The rate of climb or descent of an aircraft crossing through an uncleared level also contributes to the estimate of operational risk.
- In most cases, this parameter value is not included in reports of large height deviations.
- The GTE established climb and descent rate default values.

37



Event Category

- Classification of each LHD event is necessary for risk assessment purposes and for the identification of adverse trends
- Each LHD event is assigned an error type code that identifies the type of event that caused the deviation

38



Error Classification Scheme


A	Failure to climb/descend as cleared
B	Climb/descend without ATC clearance
C	Entry into airspace at an incorrect flight level
D	Deviation due to turbulence or other weather related cause
E	Deviation due to equipment failure
F	Deviation due to collision avoidance system (TCAS) advisory
G	Deviation due to contingency event
H	Aircraft not approved for operation in RVSM restricted airspace
I	ATC system loop error; (e.g. pilot misunderstands clearance message or ATC issues incorrect clearance)
J	Equipment control error encompassing incorrect operation of fully
K	Incorrect transcription of ATC clearance or re-clearance into the FMS
L	Wrong information faithfully transcribed into the FMS (e.g. flight plan followed rather than ATC clearance or original clearance followed instead of re-clearance)
M	Error in ATC-unit-to-ATC-unit transition message
N	Negative transfer received from transitioning ATC-unit
O	Other
P	Unknown

39



Analysis

- It is the responsibility of the GTE to summarize their findings and analyze the data with the goal of identifying adverse trends and assess the overall risk



40



Analyzing LHD Data Over Time

- Maintaining a cumulative summary of analyzed LHD events will allow the GTE to determine the following:
 - The frequency of occurrence
 - Whether errors appear to occur systematically or randomly in time
 - Time between each event
 - Effect of airspace changes, if any, since RVSM implementation

41



Identify trends

- One important function of the GTE is to identify adverse trends
- The GTE will evaluate grouped event categories and determine whether one particular event type occurs more often than another.
- The GTE will also identify operational trends that may be revealed in the data. If any exist, the Group may make recommendations for reducing the effect of those trends

42



Remedial Recommendations

- If adverse trends are identified, the GTE will submit recommendations for remedial actions to ensure that operational errors are kept to a minimum and that the airspace being examined continues to satisfy the requirements of the target level of safety
- The actions and measures proposed to reduce risk should not be exclusive to RVSM airspace

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Reporting

- The GTE reports annually to the RMA the results of its operational analysis including the identification of performance trends, summary of categories and estimation of duration at incorrect flight level, and recommended measures to reduce the risk in RVSM airspace.
- The RMA will incorporate the analysis of the Scrutiny Group in its report to the ICAO Regional Planning Group (GREPECAS) for the CAR/SAM regions.

44



Meeting Frequency

- The Scrutiny Group should meet regularly so that adverse trends due to operational errors that cause large height deviations can be identified quickly and remedial actions can be taken.

APPENDIX B

CARSAMMA PRESENTATION – LHD CODES

CARSAMMA

Agencia de Monitoreo del Caribe y Sudamérica









CODIGOS LHD

EJEMPLOS

A

FALLA EN EL ASCENSO / DESCENSO SEGÚN AUTORIZACIÓN.



CODIGOS LHD

EJEMPLOS Y DUDAS

CARSAMMA
Agencia de Monitoreo para el Caribe y Sudamérica

La información contenida en este formulario es confidencial y solo será usada con el propósito estadístico de analizar la seguridad operacional.

FORMULARIO DE DESVIACIÓN DE ALTITUD

Informe a la CARSAMMA de una desviación de altitud de 300 pies o más, incluyendo aquellos debido a sucesos TCAS, de Turbulencia y Contingencia.

1. Fecha de hoy: **22 FEB 08** 2. Agencia de Notificación: **FIR SANTIAGO (SCEZ) - CENTRO DE CONTROL DE AREA DE SANTIAGO**

DETALLES DE LA DESVIACIÓN

3. Nombre del Operador: **LAN** 4. Distribución de llamada: **LAN841** 5. Tipo de Avión: **B743** 6. Modo C Visualizado: **F320**

7. Fecha de la ocurrencia: **22 FEB 2008** 8. Hora UTC: **12:56** 9. Ubicación de la Ocurrencia (lat/long o punto de referencia): **MORSA**

10. Ruta Autorizada de vuelo: **UL348**

11. Nivel de vuelo Autorizado: **F300** 12. Tiempo estimado transcurrido en el nivel de vuelo incorrecto (segundos): **30** 13. Desviación Observada (+/-) (ft): **+ 2,000**

14. Otro tránsito si hubiera: **NO**

15. Causa de la desviación (libro breve): **ASCENSO SIN AUTORIZACIÓN DEL ÓRGANO ATC**
(Ejemplo: Error operacional en el ciclo de coordinaciones ATC, Turbulencia, Clima, Falla en el Equipo)

DESPUÉS DE RESTAURADA LA DESVIACIÓN

16. Nivel de Vuelo Final (Operado/Reportado): **F320** 17. ¿Cumplió esta FL con las Tablas de Niveles de Cruce del Anexo 2 de la OACI? SI

18. ¿Fue el FL arriba del nivel autorizado? NO

19. ¿Fue el FL debajo del nivel autorizado? SI

RELATO



(Por favor de su evaluación de la desviación solicitada por el avión y la causa de la desviación)

TRANSITO AUTORIZADO PARA FL300 CONTINUA ASCENSO PARA FL320

21. COMENTARIOS DE LA TRIPULACIÓN (DE HABERLOS)

B

ASCENSO / DESCENSO SIN AUTORIZACIÓN DEL ÓRGANO ATC.


CARSAMMA
Informe de Incidencias para el Caribe y Subcontinente

La información contenida en este formulario es confidencial y solo será usada con el propósito estadístico de analizar la seguridad operacional.

FORMULARIO DE DESVIACIÓN DE ALTITUD

Informe a la CARSAMMA de una desviación de altitud de 300 pies o más, incluyendo aquellos debidos sucesos TCAS, de Turbulencia y Contingencia:

1. Fecha de hoy: 13 NOV 07	2. Agencia de Notificación: FER SANTIAGO (SCEZ) - CENTRO DE CONTROL DE AREA DE SANTIAGO		
DETALLES DE LA DESVIACIÓN			
3. Nombre del Operador: LAN EXPRESS	4. Descripción de Evento: LXP338	5. Tipo de Avión: B732	6. Modo C Visualizado: 340, AREA EN COBERTURA RADAR
7. Fecha de la incidencia: 13 NOV 2007	8. Hora UTC: 23:39	9. Ubicación de la Ocurrencia (lat/long o punto de referencia): 50 NM NORTH FROM VIN VOR	
10. Ruta Autorizada de Vuelo: VTN UN238 FAG	11. Nivel de Vuelo Autorizado: FL 330	12. Tiempo estimado transcurrido en el nivel de vuelo incorrecto (segundos): 30	13. Desviación Observada (+/- Ft): -1,000
14. Otro tráfico involucrado: NO			
15. Causa de la desviación (Bajo Anexo): PILOTO ASCENSO SIN AUTORIZACION ATC (Ejemplos: Error operacional en el ciclo de coordinaciones ATC, Turbulencia, Clima, Pello en el Equipo)			
DESPUES DE RESTAURADA LA DESVIACIÓN			
16. Nivel de Vuelo "Final Observado/Reportado": FL350	17. Marque el cuadro apropiado		18. ¿Cumplió este FL con los Tablas de Niveles de Cruce del Anexo 2 de la OACI? X SI
*Puede indicar la fuente de la información - Pinta/Modo C MODO C	19. Este es el FL, arriba del nivel autorizado: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	20. Este es el FL, debajo del nivel autorizado: <input type="checkbox"/>	21. No: <input type="checkbox"/>
RELATO			
(Por favor de su evaluación de la desviación hecha por la tripulación y la causa de la desviación)			
PILOTO ASCENSO SIN AUTORIZACION ATC			
21. COMENTARIOS DE LA TRIPULACIÓN (DE HABERLOS)			





CODIGOS LHD

EJEMPLOS Y DUDAS

C


ENTRADA EN EL ESPACIO AÉREO EN NIVEL DE VUELO INCORRECTO.

ALTITUDE DEVIATION FORM

Report to the CARSAMMA of an altitude deviation of 300ft or more, including those due to TCAS, Turbulence and Contingency Events

1. Today's date: 15/02/2008	2. Reporting Unit: PIRACO ACC		
DEVIATION DETAILS			
3. Operator Name: Unknown	4. Call Sign: RHINO 25	5. Aircraft Type: B742	6. Mode C Displayed: N/A
7. Date of Occurrence: 15/02/2008	8. Time UTC: 0330	9. Occurrence Position (lat/long or Fix): ELOPO	
10. Cleared Route of Flight: ELOPO 8520 ANU KSGAP AROFU ASALI BESUK			
11. Cleared Flight Level: F330	12. Estimated Duration at Incorrect Flight Level (seconds): 15	13. Observed Deviation (+/- Ft): 3000	
14. Other Traffic Involved: NIL			
15. Cause of Deviation (Briefly): ATC LOOP ERROR (Examples: ATC Loop Error, Turbulence, Weather, Equipment Failure)			
AFTER DEVIATION IS RESTORED			
16. Observed/Reported Final Flight Level*: F350 PILOT	17. Mark the appropriate box		18. Did this FL comply with the ICAO Annex 2 Tables of Crossing Levels? <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
*Please indicate the source of information - Mode C/FIS	19. Is the FL above the cleared level: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		20. Is the FL below the cleared level: <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
NARRATIVE			
(Please give your assessment of the actual track flown by the aircraft and the cause of the deviation)			
RHINO25 was coordinated by T352 ACC at ELOPO at 0330 F300			
RHINO25 8742 routing ELOPO 8520 ANU KSGAP AROFU ASALI BESUK: reported at ELOPO at 0330 F300 proceeding 8520 ANU KSGAP.			
THE aircraft was subsequently re-cleared to maintain F310 within the Piraco FIR.			
CREW COMMENTS (IF ANY)			





CODIGOS LHD

EJEMPLOS Y DUDAS

D

DESVIACIÓN DEBIDO A LA TURBULENCIA O OTRAS CAUSAS METEOROLÓGICAS.

CARSAMMA
Agencia de Manejo para el Centro y Sudamérica

La información contenida en este formulario es confidencial y solo será usada con el propósito estadístico de analizar la seguridad operacional.

FORMULARIO DE DESVIACIÓN DE ALTITUD

1. Fecha de hoy: 10/05/2007 2. Agencia de Notificación: Departamento de Estadísticas y Control-GNA-CINAC-PARAQUAY

DETALLES DE LA DESVIACIÓN

3. Nombre del Operador: AMERICAN AIRLINES	4. Distintivo de Llamada: AAL 955	5. Tipo de Aeronave: B 772	6. Modo C Visualizado: ---
7. Fecha de la ocurrencia: 07/05/2007	8. Hora UTC: 11:07	9. Ubicación de la Ocurrencia (M/Ring o punto de referencia): MADRID	
10. Ruta Autorizada de Vuelo: UL 793		13. Desviación Observada (+/- Ft): 2000 FT	
11. Nivel de vuelo Autorizado: 790	12. Tiempo estimado transcurrido en el nivel de vuelo incorrecto (segundos): ---		14. Otro tránsito si hubiere: ---

15. Causa de la desviación (abreviatura):
METEOROLÓGICAS


DESPUES DE RESTAURADA LA DESVIACIÓN

16. Nivel de Vuelo Final Observado/Reportado*: 410	17. Esta el FL arriba del nivel autorizado: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SI	18. Cumple este FL con las Tablas de Niveles de Crecer del Anexo 2 de la OACI? <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SI
*Para indicar la fuente de la información - Piloto/Modo C: PILOTO	19. Esta el FL debajo del nivel autorizado: <input type="checkbox"/> SI <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	

RELATO

20. Descripción Detallada de la Desviación

21. COMENTARIOS DE LA TRIPULACIÓN (DE HABERLOS)




CODIGOS LHD

EJEMPLOS Y DUDAS

E

DESVIACIÓN DEBIDO A FALLA DEL EQUIPO.




CARSAMMA
Agencia de Manejo para el Centro y Sudamérica

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FORMULARIO DE DESVIACIÓN DE ALTITUD

Informe a la CARSAMMA de una desviación de altitud de 300 pies o más, incluyendo aquellos debido a causas TCAS, de Turbulencia y Contingencia.

1. Fecha de hoy: 23-10-06 2. Agencia de Notificación: GUAYAQUIL ACC

DETALLES DE LA DESVIACIÓN

3. Nombre del Operador: LAN CHILE	4. Distintivo de Llamada: LAN 561	5. Tipo de Aeronave: B-763	6. Modo C Visualizado: SE
7. Fecha de la ocurrencia: 14-10-2006	8. Hora UTC: 06:29	9. Ubicación de la Ocurrencia (M/Ring o punto de referencia): LUGRE - VARUO	
10. Ruta Autorizada de Vuelo: UL 749		13. Desviación Observada (+/- Ft): 100 PIES	
11. Nivel de vuelo Autorizado: 330	12. Tiempo estimado transcurrido en el nivel de vuelo incorrecto (segundos): 40 MINUTOS		14. Otro tránsito si hubiere: NO

15. Causa de la desviación (abreviatura):
FALLA EN EL EQUIPO DE ABORDO
(Ejemplo: Error operacional en el uso de coordinaciones ATIS, Turbulencia, Olmo, fallo en el Ecuipaje)

DESPUES DE RESTAURADA LA DESVIACIÓN


16. Nivel de Vuelo Final Observado/Reportado: 329	17. Esta el FL arriba del nivel autorizado: <input type="checkbox"/> SI <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	18. Cumple este FL con las Tablas de Niveles de Crecer del Anexo 2 de la OACI? <input type="checkbox"/> SI <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO
*Para indicar la fuente de la información - Piloto/Modo C: PILOTO Y MODO C	19. Esta el FL debajo del nivel autorizado: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SI <input type="checkbox"/> NO	

RELATO

20. Descripción Detallada de la Desviación
(Por favor dar un desarrollo de la desviación reportada por la aeronave y la causa de la desviación)

DURANTE TODO EL SOBREVUELO DE LA UIR GUAYAQUIL ESTUVO VARIANDO ALTITUD ENTRE 330 Y 329

21. COMENTARIOS DE LA TRIPULACIÓN (DE HABERLOS)





CODIGOS LHD

EJEMPLOS Y DUDAS

F

DESVIACIÓN DEBIDO A AVISO DEL SISTEMA ANTICOLISIÓN (ACAS/TCAS).


CARSAMMA
Agencia de Monitoreo para el Caribe y Sudamérica

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FORMULARIO DE DESVIACIÓN DE ALTITUD

Informe a la CARSAMMA de una desviación de altitud de 10 000 ft. o más, cualquier altura distinta a la de la Tabla de Niveles de Cruce del Anexo 2 de la OACI.

1. Fecha de hoy: 24-04-2008	3. Agencia de Notificación: LIMA	DETALLES DE LA DESVIACIÓN	
5. Nombre del Operador: SAN ESTEBAN	4. Distributivo de Llamado: LNE 1447	5. Tipo de Avión: B-737	6. Modo C Visualizado: TCAS
7. Fecha de la ocurrencia: 17.01.08	8. Hora UTC: 0558	9. Ubicación de la Ocurrencia (lat/long o punto de referencia): VOR DE LIM	
10. Nivel de vuelo autorizado: LNE 1447 /0437/06302	11. Nivel de vuelo observado: 350	12. Tiempo estimado transcurrido en el nivel de vuelo incorrecto (segundos): 08 minutos	13. Desviación Observada (+/- ft.): 2000 ft
14. Otro trámite a haberse si: <input type="checkbox"/>			
15. Causa de la desviación (abreviada): ERRORES OPERACIONALES EN EL COLEO DE COORDINACIONES ATC (Ejemplo: Error operacional en el ciclo de coordinaciones ATC, Turbulencia, Ocho, Falsa en el espacio)			
16. Nivel de vuelo Final Observado/Reportado*: 350		DESPUES DE RESTAURADA LA DESVIACIÓN	
17. Esta es la causa de la información: <input type="checkbox"/>		18. Cumplió este FL con las Tablas de Niveles de Cruce del Anexo 2 de la OACI? <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
19. Modo C: EL PILOTO		20. Descripción Detallada de la Desviación <i>(Por favor dar la evaluación de la altura reportada por el piloto y la causa de la desviación)</i>	
LIMA ACC AUTORIZO A MXA 1694 A SAEZ/MMHX DE NIVEL 340 A NIVEL 350 SIN PERCATARSE QUE EL LNE 1447 CON NIVEL DE VUELO 350, A LAS 0556. AMBOS ESTIMABAN EL VOR DE LIMA 0558.			
21. COMENTARIOS DE LA TRIPULACIÓN (DE HABERLOS)			



CODIGOS LHD

EJEMPLOS Y DUDAS

G

DESVIACIÓN DEBIDO A EVENTO INESPERADO / CONTINGENCIA (FALLA DEL MOTOR, DE PRESURIZACIÓN).





CARSAMMA
Agencia de Monitoreo para el Caribe y Sudamérica

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FORMULARIO DE DESVIACIÓN DE ALTITUD

Informe a la CARSAMMA de una desviación de altitud de 10 000 ft. o más, cualquier altura distinta a la de la Tabla de Niveles de Cruce del Anexo 2 de la OACI.

1. Fecha de hoy: 09/10/2007	3. Agencia de Notificación: Departamento de Estadísticas y Control-GND/ENAC-PARAQUAY	DETALLES DE LA DESVIACIÓN	
2. Nombre del Operador: VARELO	4. Distributivo de Llamado: VLD 7411	5. Tipo de Avión: B 752	6. Modo C Visualizado: ---
7. Fecha de la ocurrencia: 11/06/07	8. Hora UTC: 10:33	9. Ubicación de la Ocurrencia (lat/long o punto de referencia): POS - POS	
10. Ruta Autorizada de Vuelo: ---	11. Nivel de vuelo autorizado: 410	12. Tiempo estimado transcurrido en el nivel de vuelo incorrecto (segundos): ---	13. Desviación Observada (+/- ft.): 2000 FT
14. Otro trámite a haberse si: <input type="checkbox"/>			
15. Causa de la desviación (abreviada): SOLICITUD DEL PILOTO			
16. Nivel de vuelo Final Observado/Reportado*: 390		DESPUES DE RESTAURADA LA DESVIACIÓN	
17. Esta es la causa de la información: <input type="checkbox"/>		18. Cumplió este FL con las Tablas de Niveles de Cruce del Anexo 2 de la OACI? <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
19. Modo C: PILOTO		20. Descripción Detallada de la Desviación <i>(Por favor dar la evaluación de la altura reportada por el piloto y la causa de la desviación)</i>	
21. COMENTARIOS DE LA TRIPULACIÓN (DE HABERLOS)			



CODIGOS LHD

EJEMPLOS Y DUDAS

H

AERONAVE NO APROBADA PARA OPERACIÓN EN ESPACIO AÉREO RVSM.








CODIGOS LHD
EJEMPLOS Y DUDAS

I

ERROR DE ENTENDIMIENTO ATC (PILOTO INTERPRETA AUTORIZACIÓN DE FORMA INCORRECTA O EL ÓRGANO ATC EMITE AUTORIZACIÓN INCORRECTA).



CARSAMMA
Agencia de Monitoreo para el Control y Supervisión

FORMULARIO DE DESVIACIÓN DE ALTITUD
Informe a la CARSAAMA de una desviación de nivel de vuelo de 300 pies o más, incluyendo número de vuelo TCAL, de Turkuquia y Cartagena.

1. Fecha de hoy: **24-04-2008** 2. Agencia de Notificación: **LIMA**

DETALLES DE LA DESVIACIÓN

3. Nombre del Operador: **MEXICANA DE AVIACIÓN** 4. Etiqueta de Operador: **MXA 1694** 5. Tipo de Avión: **R330** 6. Modo C Instalado:
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

7. Fecha de la operación: **17.01.08** 8. Hora UTC: **0558** 9. Ubicación de la Desviación (en el punto de referencia): **VOR DE LIMA**

10. Nivel autorizado de vuelo: **MXA 1694 EL 350/06 436** 11. Nivel de vuelo autorizado: **JL 550** 12. Tiempo estimado de vuelo: **08 minutos** 13. Desviación Observada (en FT): **2000 ft**

14. Cita de la notificación: **18** 15. Causa de la desviación (Código breve): **ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC**
(Ejemplo: Error operacional en el ciclo de coordinaciones ATC, Turkuquia, China, Faltó en el Equipo)

DESPUES DE RESTAURADA LA DESVIACION
 1. Después de restaurar la desviación: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

16. Nivel de vuelo autorizado: **360** 17. Fecha de la operación: **17.01.08** 18. Hora UTC: **0558** 19. Ubicación de la Desviación (en el punto de referencia): **VOR DE LIMA**

20. Tiempo estimado de vuelo: **08 minutos** 21. Desviación Observada (en FT): **2000 ft**

22. Cita de la notificación: **18** 23. Causa de la desviación (Código breve): **ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC**
(Ejemplo: Error operacional en el ciclo de coordinaciones ATC, Turkuquia, China, Faltó en el Equipo)

RELATO
 1. Después de restaurar la desviación: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

LIMA ACC AUTORIZO A MXA 1694 A SAEZ/MMMX A NIVEL 360 SIN PERCATARSE QUE EL LNE 1447 CON NIVEL DE VUELO 350, A LAS 0556. AMBOS ESTIMABAN EL VOR DE LIMA 0558.

21. COMENTARIOS DE LA TRIPULACION (DE HABERLOS)







CODIGOS LHD
EJEMPLOS Y DUDAS

J

ERROR DE CONTROL DEL EQUIPO, INCLUYENDO LA OPERACIÓN INCORRECTA DEL FMS O LO SISTEMA DE NAVEGACIÓN.

formulÁRIO DE DESVIO DE ALTITUDE

Informe à CARSAMMA os desvios de altitude de 300 pés ou mais, no Espaço Aéreo RVSM, incluindo aqueles ocorridos devido a TCAS, Turbulência e Contingência.

1. Data de Higi: 07/03/2008 2. Agência de Notificação: ACC SBRE

Detalhes do desvio

3. Nome do Operador: OCEANAIR 4. Indicativo de Chamada: ONE 6141 5. Tipo de Aeronave: FK100 6. Modo C Visualizado: SIM (FL337)

7. Data da Ocorrência: 25/02/2008 8. Hora UTC: 00:13Z 9. Local da Ocorrência (lat/long, ou ponto de referência): **RDL 081/110NM DE LAPA**

10. Rota: UW10

11. Nível de Voo Autorizado: **FL 330** 12. Tempo Estimado no Nível de Voo Incorreto (segundos): **60 SEGUNDOS** 13. Desvio Observado (+/- Ft): + 700 Ft

14. Outro Tráfego (se houver): NIL

15. Causa do Desvio: **FALHA DO EQUIPAMENTO**
(Exemplos: Falha de Coordenação ATC, Turbulência, Clima, Falha de Equipamento, etc.)
Depois de corrigido o desvio -> ATCA CORRECTING THE DEVIATION

16. Nível de Voo Final Observado/Reportado: FL337 (Modo C) Marque o quadro apropriado: 19. Fl. de acordo com a Tabela de Níveis de Cruzeiro conforme o Anexo 2 da OACI? Sim


* Favor indicar a fonte da informação: Piloto/Modo C 17. Fl. acima do nível autorizado: Sim 18. Fl. abaixo do nível autorizado: Não

relato

20. Descrição Detalhada do Desvio (For favor, dê sua opinião sobre esta violação pela aeronave e a causa do desvio)

Indicação de FL diferente do autorizado (FL330)-Observado MODO C FL337
THIS APPROX OF A FL DIFFERENT FROM THE ONE THAT WAS CLEARED (FL 330) - MODE C OBSERVED AT FL 337
 Obs: INFORMO QUE NA OCASIÃO NÃO HOUVE A COLETA DO REGISTRO DA AERONAVE PELO ATCO.
I INFORM THAT, ON THAT OCCASION, ATCO DID NOT SEARCH FOR THE AIRCRAFT REGISTRATION NUMBER. Página 2 de 2

21. comentários da tripulação (se houver)
 Após interrogatório pelo órgão ATCO piloto informou que havia um problema no piloto automático e que já estava corrigido.



CODIGOS LHD
EJEMPLOS Y DUDAS

K

TRANSCRIPCIÓN INCORRECTA PARA EL FMS DE LA AUTORIZACIÓN O REAUTORIZACIÓN DEL ÓRGANO ATC.




formulário de desvio de altitude

Informe à CARSAMMA os desvios de altitude de 300 pés ou mais, no Espaço Aéreo RVSM, incluindo aqueles ocorridos devido a TCAS, Turbulência e Contingência.

1. Data de Higi: 07/03/2008 2. Agência de Notificação: ACC SBRE

Detalhes do desvio

3. Nome do Operador: OCEANAIR 4. Indicativo de Chamada: ONE 6141 5. Tipo de Aeronave: FK100 6. Modo C Visualizado: SIM (FL337)

7. Data da Ocorrência: 25/02/2008 8. Hora UTC: 00:13Z 9. Local da Ocorrência (lat/long, ou ponto de referência): **RDL 081/110NM DE LAPA**

10. Rota: UW10

11. Nível de Voo Autorizado: **FL 330** 12. Tempo Estimado no Nível de Voo Incorreto (segundos): **60 SEGUNDOS** 13. Desvio Observado (+/- Ft): + 700 Ft

14. Outro Tráfego (se houver): NIL

15. Causa do Desvio: **FALHA DO EQUIPAMENTO**
(Exemplos: Falha de Coordenação ATC, Turbulência, Clima, Falha de Equipamento, etc.)
Depois de corrigido o desvio -> ATCA CORRECTING THE DEVIATION

16. Nível de Voo Final Observado/Reportado: FL337 (Modo C) Marque o quadro apropriado: 19. Fl. de acordo com a Tabela de Níveis de Cruzeiro conforme o Anexo 2 da OACI? Sim

* Favor indicar a fonte da informação: Piloto/Modo C 17. Fl. acima do nível autorizado: Sim 18. Fl. abaixo do nível autorizado: Não

relato

20. Descrição Detalhada do Desvio (For favor, dê sua opinião sobre esta violação pela aeronave e a causa do desvio)

Indicação de FL diferente do autorizado (FL330)-Observado MODO C FL337
THIS APPROX OF A FL DIFFERENT FROM THE ONE THAT WAS CLEARED (FL 330) - MODE C OBSERVED AT FL 337
 Obs: INFORMO QUE NA OCASIÃO NÃO HOUVE A COLETA DO REGISTRO DA AERONAVE PELO ATCO.
I INFORM THAT, ON THAT OCCASION, ATCO DID NOT SEARCH FOR THE AIRCRAFT REGISTRATION NUMBER. Página 2 de 2

21. comentários da tripulação (se houver)
 Após interrogatório pelo órgão ATCO piloto informou que havia um problema no piloto automático e que já estava corrigido.



CODIGOS LHD
EJEMPLOS Y DUDAS

L

INFORMACIÓN INCORRECTA TRANSCRIBIDA PARA EL FMS (PLAN DE VUELO SEGUIDO EN VEZ DE LA AUTORIZACIÓN ATC).







CODIGOS LHD
EJEMPLOS Y DUDAS

M

ERROR EN LA MENSAJE DE TRANSICIÓN ENTRE ÓRGANOS ATC ADYACENTES (ERROR DE COORDINACIÓN).



CARSAMMA
Agencia de Monitoreo para el Control y Sustentabilidad

La información contenida en este formulario es confidencial y será usada únicamente para el propósito de analizar la seguridad operacional.

FORMULARIO DE DESVIACIÓN DE ALTITUD

Informe a la CARSAMMA de una desviación de altitud de 300 pies o más, incluyendo aquellos incidentes sucesos TCAS, de Turbulencia y Choque.

1. Fecha de hoy: 12 ENERO 2007	2. Agencia de Notificación: PANAMA	DETALLES DEL DESVÍO	
3. Nombre del Operador: COPA AERÍAS	4. Identivo de Llamada: COP409	5. Tipo de Avioneta: B737	6. Modo C Visualizado: FLASD
7. Fecha de la ocurrencia: 12 DE ENERO 2007	8. Viento VTC: 1337Z	9. Ubicación de la Ocurrencia (Miles y punto de referencia): OASD	
10. Sube Autoridad de Vuelo: UL789	11. Nivel de vuelo Autorizado: FL390	12. Tiempo estimado transcurrido en el nivel de vuelo incorrecto (segundos): 0	13. Desviación Observada (+/-) Ft: 2,000 FEET
14. Otro idioma si hubiera: NO			

15. Causa de la desviación (Ejemplo: MAL ENTENIMIENTO EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC)

Ejemplo: Error operacional en el ciclo de coordinaciones ATC, Turbulencia, Clima, Falta en el Equipo

16. Nivel de Vuelo Final Observado/Reportado*	17. Etapa del FL, arriba del nivel autorizado: C3	18. Etapa del FL, debajo del nivel autorizado: X2	19. Descripción Detallada del Evento (Por favor dar un resumen de lo ocurrido, incluya el momento y la causa de la desviación)
20. Marque el cuadro apropiado	21. Complete este FL con los Tablos de Niveles de Altura del Anexo 2 de la OACI	X2 SI	
*Por favor indicar la fuente de la información --	22. Etapa del FL, debajo del nivel autorizado: X2	23. No	


REPORTE DEL PULPO

RELATO

24. Descripción Detallada del Evento (Por favor dar un resumen de lo ocurrido, incluya el momento y la causa de la desviación)

ERROR DE COORDINACION POR PARTE DE KINGSTON CONTROL, LA TRANSFERENCIA INICIAL FUE A FL450, LUEGO LLAMARON PARA REVISAR EL NIVEL A FL390 Y LA AERONAVE LLAMO A FL450, ACEPTAR EL ERROR.

25. COMENTARIOS DE LA TRIPULACIÓN (DE HABERLOS)



CODIGOS LHD
EJEMPLOS Y DUDAS

N

AUSENCIA DE COORDINACIÓN POR PARTE DEL ÓRGANO ATC TRANSFERIDOR (FALTA DE COORDINACIÓN).



CARSAMMA
Agencia de Monitoreo para el Caribe y Sudamérica

La información contenida en este formulario es confidencial y será usada solamente con el propósito de analizar la seguridad operacional.

FORMULARIO DE DESVIACIÓN DE ALTITUD

Informe a la CARSAMMA de una desviación de altitud de 300 pies o más, incluyendo aquellos debido a causas TCAS, de Turbulencia y Castigreja.

1. Fecha de hoy: 4 FEBRERO 2007		2. Agencia de Notificación: PANAMA	
DETALLES DEL DESVÍO			
3. Nombre del Operador: COPA AIRLINES	4. Distribivo de Llamada: COPASA	5. Tipo de Avioneta: E175	6. Modo C Visualizado: FL300
7. Fecha de la ocurrencia: 4 DE FEBRERO 2007	8. Hora UTC: 2238Z	9. Ubicación de la Ocurrencia (Si/Según a punto de referencia): BOGAL	
10. Ruta Autorizada de Vuelo: USRTA	11. Nivel de vuelo Autorizado: N/A	12. Tiempo estimado transcurrido en el nivel de vuelo incorrecto (segundos): 8 SEGUNDOS	13. Desviación Observada (+/- Ft): N/A
14. Otro tránsito si hubiera: NO			
15. Causa de la desviación (libro breve): NO ERROR DE COORDINACION EN EL CICLO DE COMUNICACIONES ATC			

(Ejemplo: Error operacional en el ciclo de comunicaciones ATC, Turbulencia, Chirra, Falsa en el Espiral)

16. Nivel de Vuelo Final Observado/Reportado*:	17. Marque el cuadro apropiado	18. Cumplió este FL con los Tablas de Niveles de Cruce del Anexo 2 de la OACI?
*Por favor indicar la fuente de la información - Piloto/Modo C	17. Este el FL arriba del nivel autorizado: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SI <input type="checkbox"/> NO	18. SI <input type="checkbox"/> SI <input type="checkbox"/> NO

RELATO

20. Descripción Detallada del Desvío
(Por favor de su evaluación de la desviación válida por la aeronave y la causa de la desviación)

ERROR DE COORDINACIÓN POR PARTE DE BARRANQUILLA CONTROL, NO PASARON LA TRANSFERENCIA. ACEPTAN EL ERROR.


21. COMENTARIOS DE LA TRIPULACIÓN (DE HABERLOS)



CODIGOS LHD
EJEMPLOS Y DUDAS

O

OTROS.



CARSAMMA
Agencia de Monitoreo para el Caribe y Sudamérica

La información contenida en este formulario es confidencial y será usada solamente con el propósito estadístico de analizar la seguridad operacional.

FORMULARIO DE DESVIACIÓN DE ALTITUD

Informe a la CARSAMMA de una desviación de altitud de 300 pies o más, incluyendo aquellos debido a causas TCAS, de Turbulencia y Castigreja.

1. Fecha de hoy: 30/05/2007		2. Agencia de Notificación: Departamento de Estadísticas y Control del CONAC-PRAGUAY	
DETALLES DE LA DESVIACIÓN			
3. Nombre del Operador: COPAS AIRLINES	4. Distribivo de Llamada: COP 782	5. Tipo de Avioneta: B 737	6. Modo C Visualizado: ---
7. Fecha de la ocurrencia: 22/04/07	8. Hora UTC: 18:00	9. Ubicación de la Ocurrencia (Si/Según a punto de referencia): EGGQ / GEGNA	
10. Ruta Autorizada de Vuelo: ---	11. Nivel de vuelo Autorizado: 380	12. Tiempo estimado transcurrido en el nivel de vuelo incorrecto (segundos): ---	13. Desviación Observada (+/- Ft): 2000 FT
14. Otro tránsito si hubiera: OTROS			
15. Causa de la desviación (libro breve): OTROS			


DESPUÉS DE RESTAURADA LA DESVIACIÓN

16. Nivel de Vuelo Final Observado/Reportado*:	17. Marque el cuadro apropiado	18. Cumplió este FL con los Tablas de Niveles de Cruce del Anexo 2 de la OACI?
*Por favor indicar la fuente de la información - Piloto/Modo C	17. Este el FL arriba del nivel autorizado: <input type="checkbox"/> SI <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	18. SI <input type="checkbox"/> SI <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO


RELATO

20. Descripción Detallada de la Desviación



21. COMENTARIOS DE LA TRIPULACIÓN (DE HABERLOS)



CODIGOS LHD
EJEMPLOS Y DUDAS



DESCONOCIDA.

CARSAMMA
Agencia de Monitoreo para el Cambio y Sustentabilidad

La información contenida en este formulario es confidencial y solo será usada con el propósito estadístico de analizar la seguridad operacional.

FORMULARIO DE DESVIACIÓN DE ALTITUD

1. Fecha de hoy: 13/04/2007 2. Agencia de Notificación: Departamento de Estadísticas y Control-GNA-CDNAC-PARAGUAY

DETALLES DE LA DESVIACIÓN

3. Nombre del Operador: LAN CHILE	4. Identivo de Llamado: LAN 759	5. Tipo de Avionet: B 763	6. Modo C Visualizado: ---
7. Fecha de la ocurrencia: 07/03/2007	8. Hora UTC: 14:42	9. Ubicación de la Ocurrencia (lat/long o punto de referencia): FOZ / BOBCK	
10. Ruta Autorizada de Vuelo: UA 207			
11. Nivel de vuelo Autorizado: 300	12. Tiempo estimado transcurrido en el nivel de vuelo incorrecto (segundos): ---	13. Desviación Observada (+/- Ft): 2000 FT	
14. Otro tránsito si hubiere: ---			
15. Causa de la desviación (dibujó breve): ---			

DESPUÉS DE RESTAURADA LA DESVIACIÓN

16. Nivel de Vuelo Final Observado/Reportado*:
300 Marque el cuadro apropiado 18. Cumplió esta FL con las Tablas de Niveles de Cruce del Anexo 2 de la OACI? X Si


*Favor indicar la fuente de la información -
Piloto/Modo C: PILOTO 17. Esta el FL arriba del nivel autorizado: Si No

18. Esta el FL debajo del nivel autorizado: Si No

RELATO

20. Descripción Detallada de la Desviación:

21. COMENTARIOS DE LA TRIPULACIÓN (DE HABERLOS):



CODIGOS LHD
EJEMPLOS Y DUDAS

Agenda Item 3: Large Height Deviation (LHD) Analysis – CARSAMMA

- a) Application of GTE methodology to LHD events
- b) Summarize parameter values
- c) Identify operational trends from data base

3.1 CARSAMMA presented LHD events reported, from the period 1 July to 31 December 2009. A total of 422 LHD reported in the CAR and SAM Regions were submitted to analysis by the meeting. For this analysis, the methodology approved by the GTE and the necessary values of parameters, were used to carry out the referred airspace risk assessment. The Meeting analysed each event and, with expert judgment, determined parameter values necessary for collision risk estimation. A summary of reported events and GTE analysis is included in **Appendix A** to this part of the report.

3.2 In doing this task, the meeting, among other data, reviewed flight estimated hour in incorrect levels, large height deviations (LHD) in each one of the reports, flight levels crossed in these deviations, and reviewed the causes of each one of them. These values will be used to estimate the operational risk of operations carried out in the RVSM airspace in charge of CARSAMMA.

3.3 Figure 1 provides a summary of the error codes assigned for all events that were analysed. As it may noted, categories M and N continue to be the main errors identified, which represent 94% of LHD reported.




Figure 1 Summary of Error Codes

3.4 Figure 2 shows occurrences percentage in the reporting points mostly affected by these events. As you may note in figure 2 the addition of the most affected reporting points is 42% from the total.




Figure 2 Rate of LHD Occurrence by Position - Top 25 Positions

Error prevention programme in the communication cycle between adjacent ACCs

3.5 In reviewing this matter the meeting again recalled GREPECAS Conclusion 15/36 encouraging States, among other matters, to implement the error prevention programme in the communication cycle between adjacent ACCs.

3.6 Also, the delegate of Colombia presented a working paper, recognising that the main objective of the meeting is to evaluate the operational risk in RVSM airspace, and indicating that outside this airspace the same errors are surely presented, keeping in mind the negative impact for safety in the region.

3.7 The following actions were analysed in the proposal presented:

- a) To develop a training programme in each one of the States to all ATCOs and in basic courses make emphasis in the importance of traffic coordination and its revisions, when applicable.
- b) That each State make a revision on the letters of agreement between different ATS units, keeping in mind the development of mechanisms for exchange of information of coordination incidents among ATC units, either delegating in one office of each one of the ATC offices or through the heads of each one of the ACC, APP or FIC involved, in order to know which failures have been presented in the provision of the service.

- c) That each State make a special effort to comply with the obligations agreed in the existing letters of operational agreement regarding air traffic coordination and establish procedures to periodically meet with adjacent ATS providers in bilateral or multilateral meetings to consider reports on operational errors produced and develop mitigating measures to prevent future errors and improve safety in the Region.
- d) To project within the development plan of each State, implementation of technology that enables automatic coordination among ATS units, i.e. ATS Inter-Facility Data Communication, (AIDC), in order to minimise the workload of ATCOs in their job positions, and at the same time reduce the possibility of errors in the coordination cycle.

3.8 The Meeting felt that the actions proposed reinforce the communications cycle error prevention programme between adjacent ACCs and that the same should be adopted by the Meeting. In view of the above, the following conclusion was adopted:

Conclusion GTE/9-1 Actions to be adopted to reduce coordination errors between adjacent ACCs

That CAR/SAM International Organizations, in addition to the error programme in the communication cycle between adjacent ACCs, take into account the following matters:

- a) Develop training programmes for air traffic controllers, and to include the importance of air traffic coordination between ATC units within the curricula of basic courses;
- b) Carry out a revision of letters of agreement between ACCs, so as to contemplate the inclusion of procedures and mechanisms for information exchange of coordination incidents among ATC units; and
- c) Include the implementation technology that permits automatic coordination between ATS units within the development plans.

3.9 For a better illustration, GREPECAS/15 Conclusion 15/36 - *Measures to reduce operational errors in the ATC coordination loop between adjacent ACCs* is shown in **Appendix B** to this part of the report.

3.10 Within the measures that might reduce LHD events, the meeting recalled that a procedure for pilots to communicate 5 minutes in advance before reaching the transference point of the accepting ACC, had been analysed within the GTE environment. This procedure, which in general terms is already available in the letters of operational agreement (LOA) among several ACCs of the CAR/SAM Regions, should enable to obtain flight data before entering the FIR, in case of a transference omission. This procedure does not imply a transfer of responsibilities from the ATC over the aircraft, but only communications transference. Its application would increase safety reducing at the same time LHD reports.

3.11 The meeting considered that, in order to effectively implement such procedure, ACCs should instruct pilots so that they communicate 5 minutes before the transference point. Those ACCs that do not have this procedure in their LOAs should analyse its inclusion in coordination with adjacent ACCs.

Submission of LHD reports to CARSAMMA

3.12 An aspect highlighted by CARSAMMA has been the difficulty for the Monitoring Agency to carry out the LHD analysis if States do not send the information, as established by GREPECAS in Conclusion 15/36, where it is established that administrations must send reports before the 10th day of each month.

Non-RVSM approval aircraft

3.13 Another matter that CARSAMMA submitted for consideration of the meeting is the amount of aircraft flying within RVSM airspace and is not in the CARSAMMA or other data bases. The Secretariat informed that a state letter was sent to CAR/SAM States requesting information on aircraft that are not in the data base as approved, but no reply had been received so far. The Meeting requested the Secretariat to insist with States to receive such information.

Increase of LHD in the South Atlantic oceanic area

3.14 The Meeting noted that there was an increase in LHD reports in the South Atlantic oceanic airspace, known as AORRA (Atlantic Ocean Random Routing Area) in flights between Ascension Island (Ascension Auxiliary Airfield) and Falkland Island (Mt. Pleasant Airport), involving Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. These LHD have the peculiarity that commercial aircraft fly during several hours without communication with the control centres involved, which considerably increases the total risk in the Region. The agreements reached among the three States were informed to the meeting. The Meeting also requested that this situation be thoroughly analysed among States involved, in order to reach a definitive solution to these events and, in order to coordinate procedures that would mitigate the occurrence of large height deviations as have been reported to CARSAMMA and that are causing a significant increase in risk at the South Atlantic airspace.

3.15 In addition, the Meeting concluded that LHD reported in the sector of the airspace, should be taken into account for the total risk analysis, but that CARSAMMA should made an additional assessment without considering these LHD, so as to avoid distorted information on safety in the Region due to these reports.

3.16 The Meeting requested the Secretariat to send a communication to IATA so that the latter inform the commercial airlines flying within this airspace on the need to contact ATC units involved in the referred airspace, emphasizing on the operational risk that would involve not doing so.

Filling-in of LHD forms

3.17 The meeting noted that several LHD reports completed by the ACCs are not clear enough to make an accurate assessment and felt that ATCOs should be instructed in the filling of forms, as well as on the recognition as to how an event is an ATS incident and at the same time an LHD.

3.18 The delegate from Paraguay proposed the analysis of the possibility to prepare a particular code system to take into account the most common events, and that the same is useful for ATCOs to complete in a clearer and accurate manner column NARRATIVE from the LHD form. If this codification is feasible, the proposal would be submitted for consideration of GTE/10 Meeting. In view of the above, the following was agreed:

Conclusion GTE/9-2

Feasibility study to prepare a code system of the most common causes reported in LHD

That the delegates of Colombia, Ecuador and Paraguay:

- a) Analyse the possibility of a particular code system that takes into account the most common errors for ATCOs to complete in a more accurate and clear manner the column NARRATIVE of LHD form; and
- b) Submit the result of this task for the consideration of GTE/10 Meeting.

APPENDIX A

CARSAMMA GTE ANALYSIS

Secuencia	EVENT DATE	OPR ACFT	FLIGHT IDENT	ACFT REGISTER NUMBER	ACFT TYPE	EVENT HOUR	POSITION	ROUTE	MODE C DISPLAY	CLRD FL	EVENT FL	HT LHD	DURATI ON	DURATI ON GTE	CODE	CODE GTE	FIR	CAUSE	SUMMARY 1	SUMMARY 2	SUMMARY 3	2nd ACFT	2nd ACFT FL	2nd ACFT POSITION	SOURCE	Time (S)	Time (Op)	n (S)	n (Op)
318	01/07/09	COA	COA419		B767	13:13	VUDAL	UL337	340	340	340	0	90		N	N	MAIQUETIA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	El control de PIARCO NO efectuó la coordinacion de nivel de vuelo NI de estimado por lo que la aeronave reporto en la posicion	VUDAL SIN autorizacion de vuelo SIN estimado.				PILOT / MODE C	90		0		
319	01/07/09	AAL	AAL1668		B763	20:19	ARMUR	TTPP ARMUR UL337 NEGON UL337 DODLO DCT ZIN DCT FORST DCT FOWEE FLIPRI MKIA	340	340	340	0	90		N	N	SAN JUAN	ATC LOOP ERROR - NO PRIOR COORDINATION	AAL1668 entered TIJZ CTA/FIR at FL340 over ARMUR intersection without prior coordination by SVMIL. There was	NO loss of separation. The TIJZ supervisor contacted SVMIL supervisor, Mr. Muñoz, to report the incident.				PILOT / MODE C	90		0		
320	02/07/09	LNE	LNE1447	CCCOF	A320	4:56	VAKUD	UL780	NO	310	330	2000	90		M	M	LIMA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	A las 04:53 ATCO SEGU realiza revision tardia del Fidel LNE1447 A320 SEGU / SCEL.	Consideramos que la fuente de la revision fue el ATCO de SEGU.				ATCO de SEGU	90		1		
321	02/07/09	AAL	AAL964		B772	19:08	ILKIT	UL304	YES	360	380	2000	90		M	M	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	AAL964 SBGR / KMIA B772 UL304 ILKIT 19:08 FL360. Estimated was passed with FL360. Aircraft checked ILKIT at 19:08 FL380.	NO level revision from BARRANQUILLA.				PILOT	90		1		
322	03/07/09	TPU	TPU051	N471TA	A319	13:09	LIXAS	UG436	SI	350	370	2000	90		M	M	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	CENAMER ACC NO realizo la revisión de FL pues lo habia transferido a FL350.					PILOT / MODE C	90		1		
323	03/07/09	MPH	MPH073	PHMCW	MD11	13:07	VAMOS	UL318 / UG439	SI	390	390	0	90		M	M	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	SBKO ACC NO realizo la revisión de estimado, pues lo habia transferido a las 13:56 por VAMOS.					PILOT / MODE C	90		0		
324	03/07/09		N26WJ	N26WJ	FA50	18:37	MOXAS	UG439	SI	390	410	2000	90		M	M	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	SBKO ACC NO realizo la revisión de FL, pues lo habia transferido a FL390.					PILOT / MODE C	90		1		
325	04/07/09	LAN	LAN584	CCCXG	B763	16:48	VAKUD	UL780	SI	320	320	0	90		N	N	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	SPIM ACC NO realizo la transferencia.					PILOT / MODE C	90		0		
326	04/07/09	LAN	LAN584	CCCXG	B763	16:48	VAKUD	UL780	NO	320	320	0	60		N	N	LIMA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	La FIR SPIM omite la transferencia a la FIR SEGU, del LA584 B763 SCEL / MUHA sobre la posicion VAKUD consideramos	que el tiempo transcurrido es resultado de la diferencia de tiempo entre la hora de cambio de frecuencia y la hora de paso	efectivo, mas no se considera si la aeronave llama inmediatamente a SEGU o si esta ya se encontraba en cobertura radar.				PILOT	60		0	

327	05/07/09	AAL	AAL945	N358AA	B763	9:18	IREMI	UL302	NO	370	350	-2000	120		M	M	LIMA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	AAL945 B763 KDFW / SCEL pasa la posición IREMI con FL350 cuando la transferencia realizada a FL370. Consideramos	que el tiempo transcurrido es resultado de la diferencia de tiempo entre la hora de cambio de frecuencia y la hora de paso	efectivo, mas no se considera si la aeronave llama inmediatamente a SEGU o si esta ya se encontraba en cobertura radar.						PILOT	120	1	1
328	05/07/09	AAL	AAL945	N358AA	B763	9:18	IREMI	UL302	NO	370	350	-2000	90		M	M	ANTOFAGASTA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	AAL945 ingresa via IREMI a FL diferente al transferido.							PILOT	90	1	1	
329	05/07/09	GLO	GLO7470		B738	15:31	FOZ	UM548		340	360	2000	60		M	M	ASUNCIÓN	FALTA DE COORDINACIÓN POR PARTE DE LA DEPENDENCIA TRANSFERIDORA	GLO7470 - SBCT / SGAS con FL360 chequeo posición FOZ a las 15:30, estimando posición KEVUR 15:48.	Esta aeronave fue coordinada por el control de CURITIBA en la posición FOZ para las 15:30, con el FL340, fue autorizado el FL340 hasta el VAS. Dicha aeronave reporta posición FOZ a las 15:31 con el FL360.	El control de CURITIBA alego que el cambio de nivel fue hecho pocos minutos antes de la posición FOZ, olvidandose de la coordinación.						PILOT	60	1	1
330	06/07/09	INC	INC707		MD82	1:00	MEGIR	TNCC UA563 POS UG449 KORTO UG449 SMJP		290	310	2000	90		M	M	PIARCO	ATC LOOP ERROR	At 00:28, MAIQUETIA ACC coordinated INC707 with PIARCO ACC at position MEGIR at 01:00 FL290. PIARCO ACC approved FL290 for INC707.	INC707 contacted PIARCO ACC at 01:01 estimating MEGIR at 01:03 maintaining FL310. NO other traffic was affected. MAIQUETIA ACC apologized for the error.						PILOT	90	1	1	
331	06/07/09	AEA	AEA072	ECJQG	A332	1:53	ITEGO	SVMI UA550 PPR 18N060W random route LEMD		350	370	2000	90		M	M	PIARCO	ATC LOOP ERROR	At 01:18, MAIQUETIA ACC coordinated AEA072 with PIARCO ACC at position PELMA at 01:58 FL370. PIARCO ACC advised UNABLE FL370. FL350 approved on AEA072.	MAIQUETIA ACC read back the cleared approved FL350 for AEA072. AEA072 contacted PIARCO ACC at 01:57	estimating PELMA at 02:00 FL370. Conflicting traffic was BWA611 CYYZ UG449 TTPP estimating PELMA at 02:08 FL370. When contacted MAIQUETIA apologized for the error.						PILOT	90	1	1
332	07/07/09	IBE	IBE6740	ECIDF	A343	0:55	DAREK	SKBO MTA UA561 BGI 18N050W random route LEMD		330	350	2000	90		M	M	PIARCO	ATC LOOP ERROR	At 00:30, MAIQUETIA ACC coordinated IBE6740 with PIARCO ACC at position PERGA at 01:02 FL330. PIARCO ACC approved FL330 for IBE6740. IBE6740	contacted PIARCO ACC at 00:30 estimating PERGA at 00:39 maintaining FL350. NO other traffic was affected.						PILOT	90	1	1	
333	09/07/09	AVA	AVA014		A332	1:33	MILOK	UA516		390	390	390	0	90		N	N	SAN JUAN	ATC LOOP ERROR - NO PRIOR COORDINATION	AVA014 entered TJZS CTA/FIR at FL390 over MILOK intersection without prior coordination by SVMI. There was NO loss of separation. Attempts by TJZS supervisor	to contact SVMI to report the event were unsuccessful.						PILOT / MODE C	90	0	0

334	09/07/09	CMP	CMP357	HP1564	E190	18:23	PULTU	UL305	SI	350	340	-1000	90		M	M	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	SBKO ACC NO realizo la revisión de FL. Lo había transferido a FL340.							PILOT / MODE C		90	0		1
335	09/07/09	LXJ	LXJ341	N341FX	CL60	21:23	SISEL	UG437	SI	390	410	2000	90		N	N	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	SBKO ACC NO realizo la transferencia.							PILOT / MODE C	90		1		
336	10/07/09	TPU	TPU131	N480TA	A319	12:18	PLG (PUERTO LEGUIZAMO)	UG431	NO	360	360	0	98		N	N	LIMA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	A las 12:19 SBKO realiza la transferencia del TPU131 SBKO / SPIM momento en el cual la aeronave se encontraba reportando su paso efectivo por PLG a las 12:18.						PILOT	98	0		0		
337	11/07/09	TAM	TAM8095	PTMVO	A332	16:35	DIBOK	UL795	YES	350	370	2000	90		M	M	KINGSTON	ATC LOOP ERROR	TAM8095 was transferred to KINGSTON from HAVANA at FL350, however the aircraft entered KINGSTON FIR at FL370.	was transferred to CURACAO at FL350 and entered CURACAO FIR maintaining FL370.					PILOT	90		1			
338	11/07/09	AFR	AFR3959		A320	17:06	MELLA	MTPP UM525 MELLA DCT PSE DCT COY R888 MODUX/N0 444F230 R888 GORET DCT TFFR 01:39		370	370	370	0	90		N	N	SAN JUAN	ATC LOOP ERROR - NO PRIOR COORDINATION	AFR3959 entered TIZS CTA/FIR at FL370 over MELLA intersection without prior coordination by MDSO. There was NO loss of separation.	The TIZS supervisor contacted THE MDSO supervisor, Mr. Casilio, and report the incident.				PILOT / MODE C	90		0			
339	13/07/09	TPA	TPA606	N768QT	B762	19:46	MIRLO	UG426	SI	340	340	0	90		N	N	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	SPIM ACC NO realizo la transferencia.						PILOT / MODE C	90		0			
340	13/07/09	AAL	AAL1738		B738	20:20	ARMUR	UG432		340	340	340	0	90		N	N	SAN JUAN	ATC LOOP ERROR - NO PRIOR COORDINATION	AAL1738 entered TIZS CTA/FIR at FL340 over ARMUR intersection without prior coordination by MVMI.	There was NO loss of separation. The TIZS supervisor notified SVMI supervisor, Mr. Gabriel Medina.				PILOT / MODE C	90		0			
341	14/07/09	LAN	LAN601	CCCXE	B763	2:46	OSELO	UL401	NO	350	350	0	90		N	N	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	CENAMER ACC NO realizo la transferencia.						PILOT / MODE C	90		0			
342	14/07/09	LAN	LAN621	CCCXG	B763	7:25	ARTOM	UL344	NO	350	330	-2000	90		M	M	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	CENAMER ACC NO realizo la revisión de FL. Lo había transferido a FL350.						PILOT / MODE C	90		1			

343	15/07/09	RPN	RPN501	N836RA	MD83	14:58	NALDA	KDAL NALDA UA770 AUR MGGT	310	350	310	-4000	90		M	M	CENTRAL AMERICA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	El centro de control de MÉRIDA coordinó el RPN501 a FL350 y la aeronave penetró a la FIR CENTROAMÉRICA a FL310. La aeronave fue autorizada a mantener FL310 en la FIR CENTROAMÉRICA.							MODE C	90		2		
344	16/07/09	UPS	UPS382	N453UP	B752	14:50	ARNAL	UL465	NO	350	350	0	90		N	N	PANAMA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	KINGSTON control NO efectuo la coordinación de transferencia del UPS382.							PILOT	90		0		
345	16/07/09	AAL	AAL935		A306	18:20	REPIS	UG446	330	330	330	0	90		N	N	MAIQUETIA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	El centro de control de CURACAO NO coordino la aeronave antes citada con nivel de vuelo 330. Reporto al control MAIQUETIA SIN previa coordinacion.							PILOT / MODE C	90		0		
346	16/07/09	CMP	CMP751	HP1369	B737	20:48	SORTA	UL780	NO	350	390	4000	90		M	M	ANTOFAGASTA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	CMP751 ingresa via SORTA a FL diferente al transferido.							PILOT	90		2		
347	20/07/09	UAL	UAL0842		B763	6:44	NEKOB	UL776	YES	340	350	1000	1620	90	M	M	GEORGETOWN	ATC LOOP ERROR	UAL0842 reported NEKOB at 06:44 FL350 instead of FL340 as was cleared and coordinated by PARAMARIBO Control.	Enquiries from the PIC revealed before he was cleared to FL350 and transfer by AMAZONICA Control at TIR (TIRIOS) to PARAMARIBO Control.	PIC reported that he made reports at TIR VOR and NEKOB to PARAMARIBO Control on freq. 123,9 at FL350 and no re-clearance was issued. Aircraft was flying SBGR to KORD.						PILOT	90		0	
348	20/07/09	ACA	ACA983		B763	19:38	UCA (VOR) - 27 NM SE	UG430	377	380	380	-300	39	0	D	D	HAVANA	TURBULENCIA SEVERA	Ambas aeronaves (ACA983 y NKS461) recibieron autorización del ATC para desviarse hacia el ESTE debido a mal tiempo en la ruta, aunque no habían reportado previamente turbulencia en la zona	donde estaban volando. Cuando el ATC se percató de la desviación de nivel de vuelo del ACA983 se lo comunica al NKS641, en ese mismo	momento la tripulación del NKS641 informa que está descendiendo siguiendo un RA del TCAS.Tránsito en trayectoria opuesta NKS641 A319 FL370 reportó RA en TCAS y descendió hasta FL360.						PILOT / MODE C	0		0	
349	20/07/09	LAN	LAN834	CCCWY	B763	21:21	MORSA	UL348	NO	330	310	-2000	90		A	A	SANTIAGO	ASCENSO/DESCEN SO SIN AUTORIZACIÓN ATC	LAN834 en AWY UL348 fue autorizado a volar MORSA FL330 / FL390, y notificó volando en MORSA FL310 / FL390.	TRIPULACIÓN SEÑALA QUE FUE "ERROR DEL PILOT"						PILOT	90		1		

358	24/07/09	NKS	NKS978	N514NK	A319	5:32	VAKUD	UL780	SI	330	330	0	90		N	N	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	SPIM ACC NO realizo la transferencia.						PILOT / MODE C	90	0	0
359	25/07/09	AFR	AFR461	FJITJ	B744	1:07	ITEGO	SVMI UA550 PPR 18N060W random route LFPG		330	330	0	90		N	N	PIARCO	ATC LOOP ERROR	MAIQUETIA ACC neglected to pass an estimate on AFR461 SVMI UA550 PPR 18N060W random route LFPG. At 01:07, AFR461 contacted PIARCO ACC and reported an estimate for PELMA of 01:12 FL330.	When contacted MAIQUETIA ACC apologized for the error.					PILOT	90	0	0
360	25/07/09	ACA	ACA076		A319	3:56	POKAK	UA554	YES	370	370	0	90		M	NO LHD	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	ACA076 CYYZ / SVMI A319 UA554 POKAK 03:56 FL370. Aircraft checked POKAK at 04:52 FL370. NO TIME revision from SANTO DOMINGOS.	*** NO LHD *** - ATT: GTE7				PILOT	90	0	0	
361	25/07/09	MPH	MPH061	PHMCR	MD11	5:17	ENSOL	UG426	SI	310	330	2000	90		M	M	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	SBKO ACC NO realizo la revision de FL. Lo habia transferido a FL310.					PILOT / MODE C	90	1	1	
362	25/07/09	LCR	LRC611	N497TA	A320	18:32	ARNEL	UG436	NO	350	350	0	30		N	N	LIMA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	Siendo las 18:33 LRC611 A320 MROC / SPIM llama sobre la posicion ARNEL. SEGU info omitio transferencia.					PILOT	30	0	0	
363	25/07/09	LCR	LCR611	N497TA	A320	18:34	ARNEL	UG436	SI	330	330	0	90		N	NO LHD	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	SEGU ACC NO realizo la transferencia a SPIM ACC.	*** REPORTE REPETIDO ***				PILOT / MODE C	90	0	0	
364	25/07/09	LNE	LNE538	CCCWN	B763	19:33	UGUPI	UL780	SI	320	320	0	90		N	NO LHD	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	SEGU ACC NO realizo la transferencia a SKBO	*** NO LHD - GTE 9 ***				PILOT / MODE C	90	0	0	
365	25/07/09	KLM	KLM714	PHKCB	MD11	20:45	0730N 05400W	SMJP DCT 0730N0540 0W DCT 0927N0530 0W DCT EHAM	NO	350	350	0	10		M	NO LHD	ROCHAMBEAU	ATC LOOP ERROR	PARAMARIBO ACC coordinates KLM714 to CAYENNE ACC ETO 0730N05400W at 20:30 FL350. at 20:45, without contact with KLM714, CAYENNE	controller contacts PARAMARIBO controller whe states that KLM714 is still on the ground.	*** NO LHD - GTE 9 ***			CAYENNE Controller	10	0	0	
366	26/07/09	CMP	CMP489	HP1565	E190	1:53	PADOX	UG437	NO	350	350	0	28		N	N	LIMA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	A las 01:53 llama SEGU para dar transferencia del CMP489 E190 MPTO / SPIM sobre la posicion PADOX ETO 01:53 al mismo tiempo llama el PILOT del CMP489 reportando la posicion PADOX.	Omision de transferencia				PILOT	28	0	0	
367	26/07/09	NKS	NKS977	N527NK	A319	1:55	VAKUD	UL780 / UG436	NO	310	310	0	90		N	N	LIMA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	A las 01:52 llama NKS977 A319 KLL / SPIM FL310 ETO VAKUD 01:55. SEGU omite transferencia.				PILOT	90	0	0		

368	26/07/09	LPE	LPE2565	CCCWY	B763	1:55	VAKUD	UL780	NO	330	330	0	90	60	N	N	LIMA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	A las 01:53 CTA SEGU llama para realizar transferencia del LPE2565 B763 KMIA / SPIM sobre la posición VAKUD eto 01:55.	Transferencia tardía. Consideramos que la fuente de la información fue el ATCO de SEGU.						ATCO de SEGU	60	0	0
369	29/07/09	AAL	AAL1047	N605AA	B752	17:05	PIGBI	PIGBI UA315 VESKA	350	370	350	-2000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC PUERTO PRÍNCIPE sobre la posición PIGBI a FL370 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL350.						MODE C	90	1	1	
370	30/07/09	LAN	LAN967	CCCYL	A319	16:28	ILPEM	UL797	NO	360	320	-4000	20		M	M	ANTOFAGASTA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	LAN967 fue transferido en ILPEM a FL360 e ingreso a FL320.						PILOT	20	2	2	
371	30/07/09	AFR	AFR401		B772	21:24	AKNEL	UM799		310	330	2000	120		M	M	ASUNCIÓN	FALTA DE COORDINACIÓN POR PARTE DE LA DEPENDENCIA TRANSFERIDORA	AFR401 B772 FPL SCEL / LFPG transferido por ACC RESISTENCIA en la posición AKNEL a las 21:22 con FL310, AFR401 llama a ACC asunción en la posición AKNEL a las 21:24 con FL330.	ACC asunción NO recibio ningun cambio de nivel por parte del ACC RESISTENCIA.					PILOT	120	1	1	
372	31/07/09	ARG	ARG1368	LVBH	B735	16:54	MIBAS	UB560	NO	360	340	-2000	15		M	M	SANTIAGO	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	ARG1368 fue transferido en MIBAS a FL360 e ingreso a FL340.						PILOT	15	1	1	
373	01/08/09	TPU	TPU051	N480TA	A319	17:50	ARNEL	UG436	SI	370	370	0	90		N	NO LHD	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	SEGU ACC NO realizo la transferencia a SPIM.	*** NO LHD - GTE 9 ***					PILOT / MODE C	90	0	0	
374	01/08/09	TPU	TPU051	N480TA	A319	17:50	ARNEL	UG436	NO	370	370	0	82		N	N	LIMA	FALTA DE COORDINACIÓN POR PARTE DE LA DEPENDENCIA TRANSFERIDORA	A las 17:50 TPU051 A319 MSLP / SPIM reporta sobre la posicion ARNEL FL370. No se tenia transferencia de dicho vuelo.					PILOT	82	0	0		
375	01/08/09	TAM	TAM8086	PTMVE	A332	19:02	VUMPI	UL795	380	360	380	2000	90		M	M	MAIQUETIA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	El control de AMAZONICO NO efectuo la coordinacion de cambio de nivel de vuelo en la posicion VUMPI.						MODE C	90	1	1	
376	01/08/09	TPU	TPU136	N521TA	A319	22:16	BOKAN	UA550	SI	360	380	2000	90		M	M	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	SBKO ACC NO realizo la revision de FL. Lo habia transferido a FL360.	*** NO LHD - GTE 9 ***					PILOT / MODE C	90	1	1	
377	01/08/09	CMP	CMP4711		B737	22:32	VESKA	UM525 - TJSJ / MPTO		340	340	0	90		N	N	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Aircraft checked VESKA at 22:32 FL340. NO estimate received from SANTO DOMINGO.						PILOT	90	0	0	

378	02/08/09	AMX	AMX018	XAJJOY	B738	1:44	ISERU	UL308		370	370	-8000	720	0	G	G	CENTRAL AMERICA	FALLA EN EL EQUIPO	01:44:50, AMX018 informa que estaba descendiendo a FL270, 88 NM al NW de ISERU. 01:46:35, AMX018 informa estar a FL260 y que había sufrido un DESPLOME.	01:49:41, AMX018 fue autorizado para subir a FL370. NOTA: La aeronave no proporcionó detalles sobre el tipo de problema que había ocasionado el desplome.	Debido a su posición geográfica hubo dificultad de comunicación con la aeronave ya que casi no había cobertura de comunicaciones en la frecuencia AMS 123.9 MHz.						PILOT	0		4	
379	03/08/09	LAN	LAN601	CCCXF	A343	3:16	OSAKI	UL312	SI	350	370	2000	90		M	NO LHD	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	LIMA control indica NO haber recibido revision de nivel de vuelo de 350 para nivel de vuelo 370. GUAYAQUIL afirma que SI, realizo la revision de nivel de vuelo.	*** NO LHD - GTE 9 ***						PILOT / MODE C	90		1		
380	03/08/09	LAN	LAN601	CCCQF	A343	3:22	OSAKI	UL312	NO	330	370	4000	61		M	M	LIMA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	A las 03:22 LAN601 A343 KLAX / SPIM reporta sobre la posicion OSAKI con FL370 cuando la transferencia fue realizada con FL330.						PILOT	61		2			
381	03/08/09	LPE	LPE2514	CCCXF	B767	9:16	ARNAL	UL465 GCM UG448 ATUVI	YES	340	360	2000	90		M	M	KINGSTON	ATC LOOP ERROR	LPE2514 B767 from SPIM / KMIA checked ARNAL at 09:18 FL360 and not FL340 as coordinated by PANAMA ACC which later reported that training was in progress.						MODE C	90		1			
382	03/08/09	AAL	AAL2107		B752	13:43	VESKA	UA315 - KMIA / SVMI		370	370	0	90		M	M	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Estimated time 13:52. Aircraft checked VESKA at 13:43 FL370. NO time revision from SANTO DOMINGO.						PILOT	90		0			
383	03/08/09	AAL	AAL939		B738	23:57	VESKA	UA315 - KMIA / TNCC		370	370	0	90		M	M	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Estimated time 00:04. Aircraft checked VESKA at 23:57 FL370. NO time revision from SANTO DOMINGO.						PILOT	90		0			
384	04/08/09	RPB	RPB7542		E190	18:07	ARORO	UG447	NO	360	380	2000	10		M	M	PANAMA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	BOGOTA control NO efecto la coordinacion de revision del nivel de vuelo del RPB7542. En ese momento el sistema de radar estaba fuera de servicio por mantenimiento.						PILOT	10		1			
385	06/08/09	DAL	DAL239	N174DZ	B763	0:19	PIGBI	PIGBI UA315 VESKA	390	410	390	-2000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC PUERTO PRÍNCIPE sobre la posición PIGBI a FL410 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL390.						PILOT	90		1			

386	06/08/09	AAL	AAL1318	N683A	B752	1:20	PIGBI	PIGBI UA315 VESKA	390	350	390	4000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC PUERTO PRÍNCIPE sobre la posición PIGBI a FL350 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL390.							PILOT	90		2		
387	06/08/09	AAL	AAL1818		B752	12:40	ARMUR	TTPP UL337 NEGON UL337 BODLO ZIN FORST FOWEE FLIPRI KMIA	380	380	380	0	90		N	N	SAN JUAN	ATC LOOP ERROR - NO PRIOR COORDINATION	AAL1818 entered TIJZ FIR/CTA over ARMUR intersection at FL380 WITHOUT prior coordination from SVMIL. No loss of separation. TIJZ supervisor, Mr. Abiel Ortiz, notified SVMIL supervisor of the event.							PILOT / MODE C	90		0		2
388	07/08/09	AAL	AAL2107		B752	13:38	VESKA	UA315 - KMIA / SVMIL		370	370	0	90		M	NO LHD	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Estimated time 13:26. Aircraft checked VESKA at 13:38 FL370. NO time revision from SANTO DOMINGO.	*** NO LHD ***					PILOT	90		0		0	
389	07/08/09	JBU	JBU773		B763	17:42	BEROX	UA567 - KBOS / TNCA		300	300	0	90		M	N	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Aircraft checked BEROX at 17:42 FL300. NO estimated received from SANTO DOMINGO.						pilot	90		0		0	
390	07/08/09	AAL	AAL935		B763	17:51	VESKA	UA315 - KEWR / SVMIL		370	330	-4000	90		M	M	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Estimated time 17:51. Aircraft checked VESKA at 17:51 FL330. NO level revision from SANTO DOMINGO.						PILOT	90		2		2	
391	07/08/09	VEC	VEC201	N620DL	B752	17:52	PIGBI	PIGBI UA315 VESKA	390	370	390	2000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC PUERTO PRÍNCIPE sobre la posición PIGBI a FL370 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL390.						PILOT	90		1		1	
392	08/08/09	AAL	AAL935	N346AN	B763	17:57	VESKA	PIGBI UA315 VESKA	330	370	330	-4000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC SANTO DOMINGO sobre la posición VESKA a FL370 y penetró la FIR CURAZAO a FL330.						PILOT	90		2		2	
393	08/08/09	KLM	KLM754		MD11	20:49	SCAPA	TNCB UG431 JANMA NUBUS GECAL BALLO RESNO EHAM	310	310	310	0	90		N	N	SAN JUAN	ATC LOOP ERROR - NO PRIOR COORDINATION	KLM754 entered TIJZ FIR/CTA over SCAPA intersection at FL310 without prior coordination from TNCC. No loss of separation. TIJZ supervisor,	Mr. Jafeth Medina, notified TNCC supervisor, Mr. Stuart, of the event.					PILOT / MODE C	90		0		0	
394	08/08/09	TPU	TPU033	N681TA	A320	23:43	ARNEL	UG436	SI	350	350	0	90		N	N	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	GUAYAQUIL control acepta NO haber realizado la transferencia a LIMA control.						PILOT / MODE C	90		0		0	

395	09/08/09	TPU	TPU131	N480TA	A319	12:15	PLG (PUERTO LEGUIZAMO)	UG431	NO	360	380	2000	27		M	M	LIMA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	Siendo las 12:15 el TPU131 A319 SKBO / SPIM chequea la posición PLG (PUERTO LEGUIZAMO) con FL380 cuando la transferencia fue dada con FL360.						PILOT	27		1	
396	09/08/09	AAL	AAL936	N395AN	B763	21:28	VESKA	VESKA UA315 PIGBI	380	340	380	4000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC CURAZAO sobre la posición VESKA a FL340 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL380.						PILOT	90		2	
397	10/08/09	IBE	IBE6464		A343	3:46	ALCOT	UG431 - SEGU / LEMD		330	330	0	90		N	N	CURAZAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Aircraft checked ALCOT at 03:46 FL330. NO estimated received from MAIQUETIA.						PILOT	90		0	
398	10/08/09	ACA	ACA075		A319	6:19	KABON	UA554 - SVMI / CYYZ		360	360	0	90		N	N	CURAZAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Aircraft checked KABON at 06:19 FL360. NO estimated received from MAIQUETIA.						PILOT	90		0	
399	10/08/09	ARG	ARG1368	LVBDD	B735	16:28	MIBAS	UB560	340	320	340	2000	10		M	M	SANTIAGO	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	ARG1368 ingresa via MIBAS a FL diferente al transferido.						PILOT / MODE C	10		1	
400	11/08/09	LAN	LAN621	CCCZU	B763	10:35	JURAK	UL401	NO	350	370	2000	30		M	M	ANTOFAGASTA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	LAN621 notifica en JURAK a FL370. Habia sido transferido a FL350.						PILOT	30		1	
401	11/08/09	MPH	MPH665		B763	20:19	SCAPA	UG431 - EHAM / TNCA		340	340	0	90		N	N	CURAZAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Aircraft checked SCAPA at 20:19 FL340. NO estimated received from SAN JUAN.						PILOT	90		0	
402	11/08/09	CMP	CMP351		E190	22:37	PALAS	UA319 - MDPC / MPTO		340	360	2000	90		M	M	CURAZAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Estimate time 22:33. Aircraft checked PALAS at 22:37 FL360. NO time or level revision from SANTO DOMINGO.						PILOT	90		1	
403	12/08/09	AAC	AAC1318		B752	0:14	VESKA	UA315 - KMIA / TNCA		350	350	0	90		M	NO LHD	CURAZAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Estimate time 00:06. Aircraft checked VESKA at 00:14 FL350. SANTO DOMINGO was called and they gave us a revision .	*** NO LHD ***					PILOT	90		0	
404	13/08/09	CF	CF239		B763	10:35	PALAS	UA319 - MDSD / MROC		360	360	0	90		M	NO LHD	CURAZAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Estimate time 10:35. Aircraft checked PALAS at 10:39 FL360. NO time revision from SANTO DOMINGO.	*** NO LHD ***					PILOT	90		0	

405	13/08/09	MPD	MPD974	ECKXB	A332	19:28	ITEGO	SPIM NOL UA550 18N060W 23N050W random route LEMD		370	370	0	90		N	N	PIARCO	ATC LOOP ERROR	MPD974 reported at position ITEGO at time 19:28 FL370. There was NO prior coordination on the flight from MAIQUETIA ACC no was any departure message received via the AFTN.	At time 19:31 MAIQUETIA called PIARCO ACC to coordinate MPD974. MAIQUETIA ACC was informed that the aircraft was already in PIARCO's airspace.						PILOT	90		0		0
406	13/08/09	AFR	AFR423	FGLZS	A343	23:48	KIKAS	UA550		350	350	350	0	90		M	M	MAIQUETIA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	La aeronave fue autorizada al centro de control de BOGOTA por ruta UA550 y la misma la autorizo por la UG431 sin coordinacion con el centro de control de MAIQUETIA.						MODE C	90		0		0
407	14/08/09	LRC	LRC694		E190	13:19	PALAS	UA319 - MDSO / MROC		380	380	0	90		N	M	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Estimate time 13:28. Aircraft checked PALAS at 13:19 FL380. No time revision from SANTO DOMINGO.						PILOT	90		0		0	
408	14/08/09	TPA	TAP733		B762	15:01	VESKA	UA315 - KMIA / SVVA		390	390	0	90		M	NO LHD	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Aircraft checked VESKA at 15:01 FL390 with the wrong callsign. Callsign should be TPA723.	*** NO LHD - GTE 9 ***					PILOT	90		0		0	
409	14/08/09		N335RC	N335RC	LJ35	19:53	KARUM	KARUM UG446 CDO		390	350	390	4000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC CURAZAO sobre la posición KARUM a FL350 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL390.					PILOT	90		2		2	
410	15/08/09	BBR	BBR1518	YV304T	B752	2:15	PIGBI	PIGBI UA315 VESKA		410	390	410	2000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC PUERTO PRÍNCIPE sobre la posición PIGBI a FL390 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL410.					PILOT	90		1		1	
411	15/08/09		NOAA49	N49RF	GLF4	22:19	1900N 05330W	TBPB 1230N055W 1442N050W 10N05330 1630N0503 0W 1730N046W 1430N049W 10N04742W 1330N051W 1230N055W TBPB		410	410	0	90		M	NY ATC	PIARCO	ATC LOOP ERROR - NO COORDINATION	Two PLN were filed on NOAA49. The 1o FPL received by PIARCO ACC had the coordinates, 15N05230W followed by 1630N05330W while the 2o FPL received (disseminated 3 minutes after the flight's ATD) had the	coordinates 15N05230W, 19N05330W (outside of PIARCO) and then 1630N05330W. PIARCO ACC used the 1o FPL and did not verify the route of flight with NOAA49. The aircraft actually flew 1230N055W , 1442N050W, 19N05330W,	1630N05330W, flight plan route. Upon reporting at position 19N05330W, PIARCO ACC realized that the ACFT was operating in NY ARTCC's airspace. This aircraft spent 20 minutes in NY's airspace before re-entering PIARCO's airspace.	*** NO LHD - GTE 9 ***				PILOT	90		0		0

412	16/08/09	CMP	CMP437	HP1527	B737	3:31	VAKUD	UL780	NO	350	370	2000	60		M	M	LIMA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	CMP437 B737 MPTO / SCEL ETO VAKUD 03:31 FL350. Siendo las 03:30 llama el CTA SEGU e INFO cambio de FL a 370. Consideramos que la fuente fue el ATCO de SEGU.							ATCO de SEGU	60		1	
413	17/08/09	LPE	LPE2707	CCCXC	B763	5:15	0800N 03500W	LEMD DCT 08N035W DCT 05N04118W DCT SPIM	NO	340	340	0	10		N	N	ROCHAMBEAU	ATC LOOP ERROR	At 05:15, ATLANTICO ACC contacts CAYENNE control to inform that LPE2707 is crossing CAYENNE airspace, adding that this flight has entered through 08N035W at 04:41, flying to 05N04118W.	DAKAR ACC has not coordinated this flight to CAYENNE ACC. DAKAR controller said he has forgotten.						PILOT	10		0	
414	17/08/09	MXA	MXA1691	XAMXN	B763	6:28	UGADI	UL308	NO	370	370	0	90		N	N	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	CENAMER control NO realizo la transferencia del vuelo MXA1691 a GUAYAQUIL.						PILOT / MODE C	90		0		
415	17/08/09	AJT	AJT810	N495AJ	B727	12:39	BEROX	BEROX UA567 CDO UA554 KDK DCT SGO	350	370	350	-2000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC CURAZAO sobre la posición BEROX a FL370 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL350.						PILOT	90		1		
416	17/08/09	TPU	TPU051	N682TA	A320	16:50	LIXAS	UG436	NO	370	370	0	90		M	NO LHD	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	CENAMER control NO informo el desvio de aerovia del TPU051 a GUAYAQUIL control.	A las 17:03 es observado 19 NM al oeste de la posicion EKEDA	*** NO LHD ***				PILOT / MODE C	90		0		
417	17/08/09	MXA	MXA1695	XAMXO	B762	17:07	UGADI	UL308	NO	370	370	0	90		M	NO LHD	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	CENAMER control NO realiza la revision de la hora de la transferencia. Pues hubo seis (6) minutos de diferencia de lo indicado.	Cruzó UGADI 17:13 FL370	*** NO LHD ***				PILOT / MODE C	90		0		
418	17/08/09	CWC	CWC421		MD11	19:25	IRGUT	UL304 - KMIA / SBCB		290	310	2000	90		M	M	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Aircraft checked IRGUT at 19:25 FL310. NO level revision received from SANTO DOMINDO.						PILOT	90		1		
419	18/08/09	COA	COA1643	N17139	B752	19:03	BEROX	BEROX UW7 PTA UA554 SKR	370	390	370	-2000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC CURAZAO sobre la posición BEROX a FL390 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL370.					PILOT	90		1			
420	18/08/09		XAGNI	XAGNI	F2TH	20:55	ANPAL	UL308	SI	400	400	0	90		M	M	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	LIMA control NO realiza la revision de la hora de transferencia. Hay una diferencia de cuatro (4) minutos.	Estimado en ANPAL 20:55. Se reporta 20:51					PILOT / MODE C	90		0		

421	19/08/09	UEA	UEA261	A6EWA	B77L	16:46	0500S 01800W	UIR	NO	360	360	0	90		N	N	ATLANTICO	ATC LOOP ERROR- NO COORDINATION BY ABIDJAN ACC (DIII)	ROBERTS ACC (ACRA) had coordinated the aircraft with ABIDJAN ACC . However, ABIDJAN ACC (DIII) did not coordinate it.							PILOT	90		0	
422	20/08/09	UAL	UAL0842	N660UA	B763	4:48	ISANI	UL304	340	320	340	2000	90		M	M	MAIQUETIA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	La aeronave fue autorizada al centro de control de AMAZONICO con FL320 por la ruta UL304 y la misma reportó con FL340 sin coordinacion con el centro de control de MAIQUETIA.							MODE C	90		1	
423	20/08/09	AAL	AAL992	N361AA	B763	4:49	ISANI	UL304	360	340	360	2000	90		M	M	MAIQUETIA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	La aeronave fue autorizada al centro de control de AMAZONICO por la ruta UL304 y la AERONAVE reportó con el centro de control de MAIQUETIA con nivel de vuelo 360.							MODE C	90		1	
424	23/08/09	IBE	IBE6742	ECGQK	A343	2:36	DAREK	SKBO UA561 BGI 18N050W (FPL) LEMD		350	350	0	90		N	NO LHD	PIARCO	ATC LOOP ERROR	At time 02:21 PIARCO ACC received a transmission from IBE6742 estimating position DAREK at 02:36 (position PERGA at 02:41) maintaining FL350. This flight had not been previously coordinated by	MAIQUETIA ACC and PIARCO ACC did not receive a departure message for the flight via the AFTN. PIARCO ACC descended BWA611 to FL340 due to the conflict at position PERGA (BWA611 B738	CYYZ UG449 TTPP was estimating position PERGA at 02:41 FL350).MAIQUET IA ACC was contacted, informed of the situation and they apologized for not passing an estimate on IBE6742.	BWA6 11	350	PERGA	PILOT	90		0		
425	24/08/09	PUA	PUA222	CXCRF	CRJ9	15:30	AKPOD	UM540	370	390	370	-2000	60		M	M	CURITIBA	COORDINATION FAILURE	The aircraft had been coordinated at FL390 by MONTEVIDEO ACC, but it entered CURITIBA FIR at FL370.							MODE C	60		1	
426	24/08/09	BAW	BAW249	GYMMD	B772	18:27	1700N 03730W	EGLL 25N034W 17N03730W 13N039W 05N042W SBGR		340	340	0	90		N	N	PIARCO	ATC LOOP ERROR	BAW249 contacted PIARCO Radio and reported at 17N03730W at time 18:27 FL340, estimating 13N039W at time 18:57. There was NO prior coordination on this flight by SANTA MARIA Radio.	PIARCO ACC contacted SANTA MARIA 's supervisor and there was an indication that the situation would be investigated.					PILOT	90		0		
427	24/08/09	ROI	ROI1220		B732	18:50	VESKA	VESKA UA315 PIGBI	300	320	300	-2000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC CURAZAO sobre la posición VESKA a FL320 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL300.							PILOT	90		1	

428	25/08/09	AFR	AFR423	FGNII	A343	0:47	ACORA	UA516	350	330	350	2000	90		M	M	MAIQUETIA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	El control de CURACAO efectuó la coordinación al AFR423 con FL330. Cuando dicha aeronave llama al centro de control de MAIQUETIA en la posición ACORA UA516 con FL350 sin coordinación de	cambio de nivel por parte del control CURACAO por lo que dicha aeronave se tuvo que descender a FL330 motivado a un tráfico convergente en la posición ILMET con FL350 (AAL1819 B757).	Convergente al mismo nivel el AAL1819 B752 KMIA TTPP UL337 con FL350.	AAL1819	350	ILMET	MODE C	90			1		1
429	25/08/09	LAN	LAN601	CCCXF	B763	2:38	ARTOM	UL344	NO	330	350	2000	90		M	M	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	LAN601 se reporta en posición ARTOM a nivel de vuelo 350. CENAMER control NO realizo la revision de nivel de vuelo.					PILOT / MOD	90			1		1	
430	25/08/09	ACA	ACA076	CGITR	A319	2:53	SEKAR	SEKAR UA554 POKAK	390	370	390	2000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC MIAMI sobre la posición SEKAR a FL370 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL390.					PILOT	90			1		1	
431	25/08/09	COA	COA1666	N37437	B739	8:31	PIGBI	PIGBI UA315 VESKA	350	330	350	2000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC PUERTO PRÍNCIPE sobre la posición PIGBI a FL330 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL350.					PILOT	90			1		1	
432	25/08/09	TPU	TPU139	N980TA	A319	22:40	BOKAN	UA550	SI	380	380	0	90		N	N	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	BOGOTA control NO realiza la transferencia del TPU139. BOGOTA control acepta la omision.	*** NO LHD - GTE 9 ***				PILOT / MODE C	90			1		1	
433	26/08/09	AAL	AAL991	N384AN	B763	5:20	ESIPO	UL795	370	350	370	2000	90		M	M	MAIQUETIA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	El centro de control de CURACAO transmitió el estimado de dicha aeronave en la posición ESIPO con FL350 y la aeronave reporto con el centro de control de MAIQUETIA con FL370.					PILOT	90			1		1	
434	27/08/09	DAL	DAL201	N703DN	B77L	0:15	1000S 01000W	1000S01000W DCT FHAW UL695 DIGOR UL375 EGIMI	NO	320	320	0	90		N	N	ATLANTICO	ATC LOOP ERROR - COORDINATION FAILURE	ABIDJAN ACC (DIII) LUANDA (FNAN) did not coordinate it. During its first contact, the aircraft informed that it was maintaining FL320.					PILOT	90			0		0	
435	27/08/09	CMP	CMP307	HP1557	E190	2:54	UGUPI	UL780	SI	350	370	2000	90		M	M	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	BOGOTA control NO realiza la revision del nivel de vuelo.						PILOT / MODE C	90			1		1
436	27/08/09	LNE	LNE539	CCCRV	B763	20:50	BOKAN	UA550	SI	350	350	0	90		N	NO LHD	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	BOGOTA control NO realiza la revision de hora. Se reporta seis (6) minutos mas tarde.	*** NO LHD - GTE 9 ***				PILOT / MODE C	90			0		0	

437	28/08/09		XASKA	XASKA	LJ25	3:40	CAT (51 NM al SE del VOR)	UA317	405	410	410	-500	3		D	D	CENTRAL AMERICA	TURBULENCIA SEVERA	Se observó a la aeronave descendiendo, interrumpiendo el mismo a FL405. 03 segundos después inició ascenso hasta volver a nivelarse a FL410.	Se le consultó a la tripulación el motivo de su descenso, informando que tuvieron una turbulencia severa que los obligó a descender.							MODE C	3		0	
438	28/08/09	DAL	DAL238	N186DN	B763	13:46	VESKA	VESKA UA315 PIGBI	360	340	360	2000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC CURAZAO sobre la posición VESKA a FL340 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL360.							PILOT	90	1	0		
439	28/08/09	DAL	DAL238	N186DN	B763	13:57	PIGBI	VESKA UA315 PIGBI	360	340	360	2000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC SANTO DOMINGO sobre la posición PIGBI a FL340 y penetró la FIR PUERTO PRÍNCIPE a FL360.							PILOT	90	1	0		
440	28/08/09	GSM	GSM8511	GCEFG	B763	15:38	3400S 03000W	EGYP DCT FHAW	NO	370	370	0	90		N	N	ATLANTICO	ATC LOOP ERROR - COORDINATION FAILURE	MONTEVIDEO ACC did not coordinate the aircraft. The first contact was at the coordinates 3400S03000W FL370.						PILOT	90	0	0			
441	28/08/09	AAL	AAL936	N696AN	B752	21:58	IRGUT	IRGUT UL304 ETBOD	360	380	360	-2000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC CURAZAO sobre la posición IRGUT a FL380 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL360.							PILOT	90	1	0		
442	29/08/09	CMP	CMP307	HP1557	E190	3:35	UGUPI	UL780	SI	350	350	0	90		N	N	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	BOGOTA control NO realiza la transferencia a GUAYAQUIL Y BOGOTA control acepta la omision.						PILOT / MODE C	90	0	0			
443	29/08/09	WOA	WOA1001	N278WA	MD11	3:37	ASDOK	ASDOK (UL572) DCT BUTAP UL695	NO	320	320	0	90	1920	N	N	ATLANTICO	ATC LOOP ERROR - COORDINATION FAILURE	ABIDJAN ACC (DIII) DAKAR (GOOO) did not coordinate the aircraft. During the first contact, at 03:37, the aircraft informed that had passed ASDOK position at 03:05, estimating BUTAP position at 03:38.						PILOT	1920	0	0			
444	29/08/09	CMP	CMP211	HP1370	B772	3:41	ENSOL	UG426	SI	410	410	0	90		M	NO LHD	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	BOGOTA pasa la transferencia CUATRO (4) minutos antes que la aeronave en mención cruze la posición ENSOL.	*** NO LHD ***					PILOT / MODE C	90	0	0			

445	29/08/09	FWA	FWI241		E190	14:12	GABUN	DEPSI UA890 GABUN UA890 PAP UG633 ETBOD		370	360	-1000	60		F	F	PORT AU PRINCE	ATC LOOP ERROR - TCAS	Aircraft was flying at FL370 duly cleared by ATC but has been involved in TCAS resolution where he had to maintain FL360 temporarily.			N411P A - H25B - KFXE UB882 MKJP	FL370	GABUN	PILOT		60	0		1
446	29/08/09	BWA	BWA1483		B738	14:40	GEKOS	UG449	YES	390	350	-4000	90		M	M	GEORGETOWN	ATC LOOP ERROR	PIARCO ACC was issued with a clearance for BWA1483 by GEORGETOWN ACC cleared FL390. PIARCO ACC released the aircraft FL350.	GEORGETOWN ACC agreed to clear the aircraft to FL390 after passing conflicting traffic. BWA1483 was subsequently transferred to PARAMARIBO ACC at position GEKOS FL350.			FL390 was coordinated to PARAMARIBO ACC by GEORGETOWN ACC prior to transfer.		MODE C	90		2	2	
447	29/08/09		N10UC	N10UC	HS25	20:27	VESKA	VESKA UA315 PIGBI		360	320	360	4000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC CURAZAO sobre la posición VESKA a FL320 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL360.				PILOT	90		2	2		
448	30/08/09	AAL	AAL997	N782AN	B772	5:29	VAMOS	UL318	SI	370	370	0	90		N	N	GUAYAQUIL	EN EL CICLO DE C	BOGOTA control NO realiza la transferencia del vuelo. BOGOTA acepta la omision.					PILOT / MODE C	90		0	0		
449	31/08/09	MXA	MXA1695	XAMXO	B762	17:26	ANPAL	UL308	NO	290	390	10000	54		M	M	LIMA	EN EL CICLO DE C	Control de transito aereo de SEGU en la transferencia del MXA1695 B762 MMMX / SAEZ informó FL390.	Control de transito aereo de LIMA colaciona FL290 a lo cual lo CTA SEGU informa colacion correcta.			La aeronave ingresa a la FIR LIMA con FL390.		PILOT	54		5	5	
450	31/08/09	CMP	CMP275	HP1526	B738	18:14	SIDOS	UA553 / UA552		370	370	370	0	90		N	N	MAIQUETIA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	La aeronave reporto en la posición SIDOS sin coordinación de tiempo y nivel por parte del centro de control de BARRANQUILLA.				PILOT	90		0	0		
451	01/09/09	AVA	AVA030		B752	17:00	SIA.	UG430	YES	360	290	-7000	90	0	G	G	KINGSTON	EQUIPMENT FAILURE	AVA030 B752 filed via UG430 SKRG / KMIA descended from FL360 to FL230 at 17:00 and continued its flight to destination.					MODE C	0		3	4		
452	02/09/09	JAV	JAV7318	JYJAI	B764	2:57	DAGAM	FZAA DCT DAGAM (UL695) DCT VADAD DCT FLUTE DCT RECIFE		360	360	0	90	240	N	N	ATLANTICO	ATC LOOP ERROR - COORDINATION FAILURE OF DAKAR ACC	DAKAR ACC did not coordinate the aircraft. During the first contact, the aircraft informed that was maintaining FL 360 over DAGAM position.	Besides, the aircraft was using the call sign JAV7318 instead of the one foreseen on the AVOEM (Special Flight Authorization) number 821/09 .				PILOT	240		0	0		

453	02/09/09	UAE	UAE261	A6EWI	B77L	16:05	1000S 01000W	10S010S DCT 13S015W DCT 16S020W DCT 18S025W DCT 20S030W DCT EKALO		360	360	0	90		N	N	ATLANTICO	ATC LOOP ERROR - COORDINATION FAILURE OF ABDJAN ACC	ABIDJAN ACC did not coordinate the aircraft.							PILOT	90		0	
454	03/09/09	AAL	AAL1078	N672AA	B752	20:35	VESKA	VESKA UA315 PIGBI	380	360	380	2000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC CURAZAO sobre la posición VESKA a FL360 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL380.						MODE C	90		1		
455	04/09/09	IBE	IBE6314	ECJNQ	A346	2:03	PALAS	PALAS UA319 BETIR	370	330	370	4000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC CURAZAO sobre la posición PALAS a FL330 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL370.					MODE C	90		2			
456	04/09/09	AAL	AAL2133	N636AM	B752	2:32	PIGBI	PIGBI UA315 VESKA	350	390	350	-4000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC PUERTO PRÍNCIPE sobre la posición PIGBI a FL390 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL350.					MODE C	90		2			
457	04/09/09	ACA	ACA092	CFCAE	B763	10:47	PADOX	UG437	NO	330	350	2000	53		M	M	LIMA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	A las 10:47 llama el ACA092 B763 CYYZ / SCEL sobre la posición PADOX con FL350 cuando la transferencia fue dada con FL330.					PILOT	53		1			
458	04/09/09	AAL	AAL935		B752	18:45	VESKA	UA315 - K Mia / SVMI		370	370	0	90		M	NO LHD	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Estimate time 18:34. Aircraft checked VESKA at 18:45 FL370. No time revision from SANTO DOMINGO.	*** NO LHD - GTE 9 ***					PILOT	90		0		
459	04/09/09	AWE	AWE871		B752	18:52	BEROX	UA567 - KCLT / TNCA		360	360	0	90		M	NO LHD	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Estimate time 18:47. Aircraft checked BEROX at 18:52 FL360. No time revision from SANTO DOMINGO.	*** NO LHD - GTE 9 ***					PILOT	90		0		
460	04/09/09	CJT	CJT1893		B762	23:50	ARMUR	TTPP - ARMUR UL337 NEGON UL337 CDO - MDS	360	360	360	0	90		N	N	SAN JUAN	ATC LOOP ERROR	CJT1893 entered the TJZS CTA/FIR over the ARMUR intersection at FL360 without prior coordination from SVMI (MAIQUETIA). SVMI supervisor Mr. Munoz was notified. There was NO loss of separation.					PILOT / MODE C	90		0			
461	05/09/09	DAL	DAL663		B752	16:53	VESKA	UA315 - KATL / TNCB		330	350	2000	90		M	M	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Aircraft checked VESKA at 16:53 FL350. No level revision from SANTO DOMINGO.						PILOT	90		1		

462	06/09/09	LNE	LNE1447	CCCQO	A320	7:05	SORTA	UL780 - SEGU / SCEL	NO	330	350	2000	90		M	NO LHD	LIMA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	LIMA omite el cambio de nivel de vuelo del LNE1447 SEGU / SCEL, el cual fue transferido "ETO" SORTA 07:05 FL330 en vez de FL350.	*** NO LHD - GTE 9 ***						PILOT	90		1	
463	06/09/09	LNE	LNE1447	CCCQO	A320	7:07	SORTA	UL780 - SEGU / SCEL	NO	330	350	2000	90		M	M	ANTOFAGASTA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	LNE1447 transferido en SORTA a FL330, ingresa a FL350.							PILOT	90		1	1
464	07/09/09	LCO	LCO1408	CCCZZ	B763	23:19	PADOX	UG437	SI	320	320	0	90		N	M	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	SPIM control hizo la transferencia por PADOX 23:29. No realizo revision de estimado.						PILOT / MODE C	90		0	0	
465	08/09/09	MPH	MPH069	PHMCT	MD11	1:41	1111N 03630W	EHAM DCT 15N035W DCT 1111N03630W DCT 05N040W DCT SBKP	NO	340	340	0	10		N	N	ROCHAMBEAU	NEGATIVE TRANSFER RECEIVED FROM TRANSITIONING ATC UNIT	The previous ATC unit (DAKAR ACC) has not coordinated this flight. DAKAR controller stated he didn't managed to connect CAYENNE by phone.						PILOT	10		0	0	
466	08/09/09	LAN	LAN704	CCCQE	A343	5:06	0500N 04000W	SCEL UM799 NADIR DCT 05N040W DCT 14N035W DCT LEMD	NO	350	350	0	10		N	N	ROCHAMBEAU	NEGATIVE TRANSFER RECEIVED FROM TRANSITIONING ATC UNIT	The previous ATC unit (ATLANTICO ACC) has not coordinated this flight. The pilot has crossed ROCHAMBEAU FIR boundary (05N040W) at 05:06 FL350.						PILOT	10		0	0	
467	08/09/09	CIU	CIU341	N609GC	DC10	15:55	UGUPI	UL780	SI	350	350	0	90		M	NO LHD	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	SKBO CONTROL transfiro en UGUPI 1547 y NO realizo revision de estimado.	*** NO LHD ***					PILOT / MODE C	90		0	0	
468	08/09/09	KLM	KLM743	PHBQF	B772	16:59	PELMA	UA550	360	360	360	0	90		N	M	MAIQUETIA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	El control de PIARCO NO efectuo la revision de tiempo sobre la posicion PELMA. La variacion de tiempo fue de 10 minutos.					MODE C	90		0	0		
469	08/09/09	LAN	LAN756		A320	23:38	ARPAS	UR554		330	350	2000	90	0	M	M	ASUNCIÓN	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	El ACC de RESISTENCIA realiza la transferencia del LAN756 (SCEL / SBGR) a las 23:38 con FL330 en la posicion ARPAS. La aeronave entro en contacto con ACC de ASUNCIÓN a la hora y posicion mencionada	pero con FL350. ACC RESISTENCIA NO coordino el cambio de nivel y al ser requerido sobre este punto, el control de RESISTENCIA adujo que se les paso informar el	cambio de nivel del LAN756 debido a que tenian mucho trafico.				PILOT	0		1	1	
470	09/09/09		N245TT	N245TT	G550	23:35	ARMUR	UG432	470	410	470	0	90		M	NO LHD	MAIQUETIA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	El centro de control de SAN JUAN NO efectuo la coordinacion de correccion de nivel al centro de control de MAIQUETIA.	*** NO LHD - GTE 9 ***				MODE C	90		0	0		

471	10/09/09	AVA	AVA018	N968AV	A332	2:51	DAREK	SKBO UA561 GND UA561 BGI 18N050W Random route LEBL	N/A	370	390	2000	90		M	M	PIARCO	ATC LOOP ERROR	MAIQUETIA ACC coordinated AVA018 at PERGA at 03:12 FL370. PIARCO ACC approved FL370 for AVA018. AVA018 contacted PIARCO ACC at 02:58, estimating DAREK at 03:06, PERGA at 03:11	maintaining FL390. Conflicting traffic for AVA018 was TAM8079 estimating PERGA at 03:08 FL390. PIARCO ACC contacted MAIQUETIA ACC and advised that AVA018 was descending to	FL380 due traffic. MAIQUETIA ACC advised that he intended to descend AVA018 to cross PERGA at FL370. AVA018 advised that no such clearance was issued to him.	TAM8 079	FL390	PERGA 03:08	PILOT	90			1	
472	10/09/09	FDX	FDX55	N718FD	A306	14:30	PIGBI	PIGBI UA315 VESKA	350	330	350	2000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC PUERTO PRINCIPLE sobre la posición PIGBI a FL330 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL350.					MODE C	90			1		
473	10/09/09	LPE	LPE2585	CCCPM	A319	14:45	PULTU	UL305	NO	360	380	2000	90		M	NO LHD	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	SEGU (GUAYAQUIL) control no tuvo contacto TERAS y la aeronave se reporto en PULTU con SPIM control con FL380.	SEGU lo recibio de SKBO (BOGOTA) a FL360. SKBO indica que hizo la revision a FL380.	*** NO LHD - GTE 9 ***			PILOT / MODE C	90			1		
474	11/09/09	WOA	WOA1001	N278WA	MD11	4:15	ARUSI	FNLU UL695 ARUSI BISUK DCT KIAH	NO	360	360	0	10		N	N	ROCHAMBEAU	NEGATIVE TRANSFER RECEIVED FROM TRANSITIONING ATC UNIT	The previous ATC unit (ATLANTICO ACC) has not coordinated this flight. After climbing up WOA1001 from FL300 to FL360, Cayenne controller is aware of LPE2707 FL340 on crossing route over	DETOM without any prior coordination. WOA1001 has crossed DETOM 04:51 FL360 and LPE2707 has crossed DETOM 05:08 FL340.			LPE27 07 - B763 - LEMD / SPIM DCT 10N03 6W DCT UDOK A DCT CYR	FL340	DETOM 05:08	PILOT	10		0	
475	11/09/09	LPE	LPE2707	CCCWG	B763	4:21	1000N 03600W	LEMD DCT 10N036W DCT UDOKA DCT CYR UL306 DIMAS DCT SPIM	NO	340	340	0	10		N	N	ROCHAMBEAU	NEGATIVE TRANSFER RECEIVED FROM TRANSITIONING ATC UNIT	The previous ATC unit (DAKAR ACC) has not coordinated this flight. The pilot has contacted FL340 at 04:31 ETO UDOKA 04:52 and DETOM 05:08.				WOA1 001 - MD11 - FNLU / KIAH - UL695 ARUSI BISUK DCT	FL360	DETOM 04:51	PILOT	10		0	
476	11/09/09	LAN	LAN841	CCCEB	B763	13:24	MORSA	UL348	NO	320	360	4000	90		B	B	ANTOFAGASTA	ASCENSO/DESCENSO SIN AUTORIZACIÓN ATC	LAN841 autorizado a FL320, sobre MORSA notifica volando bloque de niveles FL320 / FL360.					PILOT	90		2			
477	12/09/09	BBR	BBR1526	YV304T	B752	3:44	PIGBI	PIGBI UA315 VESKA	390	350	390	4000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC PUERTO PRINCIPLE sobre la posición PIGBI a FL350 y penetro la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL390.					MODE C	90			2		
478	14/09/09	LAN	LAN601	CCCQG	A343	2:20	LOGAL	UL312	NO	350	350	0	90		N	N	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	CENAMER control NO realizo la transferencia.					PILOT / MODE C	90			0		

479	14/09/09		N178SD	N178SD	GLF4	15:07	PIGBI	PIGBI UA315 VESKA	410	370	410	4000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC PUERTO PRINCIPE sobre la posición PIGBI a FL370 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL410.						MODE C	90		2	
480	14/09/09	CJA	CJA992		B738	17:42	SEKAR	SEKAR UA554 PTA UA567 BEROX	370	350	370	2000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC MIAMI sobre la posición SEKAR a FL350 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL370.						MODE C	90		1	
481	15/09/09		PRGLH	PRGLH	B733	12:27	ISANI	UL304	360	360	360	0	90		M	NO LHD	MAIQUETIA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	La aeronave fue coordinada en la posición ISANI a las 12:17 por el ACC AMAZONICO con FL340 por la ruta UL304 y la misma chequeo la posición ISANI 12:27 es decir diez minutos mas tarde revision	omitida por el ACC AMAZONICO.	*** NO LHD *** - ATT: GTE 7				MODE C	0		0	
482	15/09/09	LPE	LPE2589	CCCOU	A319	12:47	BOKAN	UA550	SI	300	300	0	90		N	N	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	SKBO ACC (BOGOTA)NO realizo la transferencia.					PILOT / MODE C	90		0		
483	15/09/09	LAN	LAN571		B763	16:43	ROLUS	UL300	NO	330	350	2000	90		M	M	LIMA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	Siendo las 16:44 el LAN571 B763 SBKO / SCEL info haber chequeado la posición ROLUS a las 16:43 con FL350 cuando la transferencia se recibio con FL330.					PILOT	90		1		
484	19/09/09	CMP	CMP270	HP1558	E190	2:54	PALAS	PALAS UA319 CDO	350	370	350	-2000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC CURAZAO sobre la posición PALAS a FL370 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL350.					MODE C	90		1		
485	19/09/09	LPE	LPE627	CCCEB	B763	8:01	UGADI	UL308	NO	370	370	0	90	2640	N	N	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	CENAMER control NO realizo la transferencia por UGADI a SEGU CONTROL.					PILOT / MODE C	2640		0		
486	19/09/09	LPE	LPE627	CCCZT	B763	8:45	ANPAL	UL308	NO	370	370	0	90		N	N	LIMA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	Siendo las 08:53 llama el LPE627 B763 MMMX / SPIM e info haber chequeado la posición ANPAL a las 08:45 con FL370.					PILOT	90		0		
487	21/09/09	DAL	DAL239	N177DN	B763	0:05	PIGBI	PIGBI UA315 VESKA	370	390	370	-2000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC PUERTO PRINCIPE sobre la posición PIGBI a FL390 y penetró la FIR SANTO ANTONIO a FL370.					MODE C	90		1		

488	21/09/09		C5GAF	C5GAF	B721	15:45	1603N 03730W	GBYO 1603N0373 0W 16N040W 15N050W AROPU TBPB	N/A	340	340	0	90		N	NO LHD	PIARCO	ATC LOOP ERROR	DAKAR ACC failed to coordinate C5GAF with the PIARCO ACC. The first information that PIARCO had on the flight was when DAKAR ACC called PIARCO ACC for progress at 16N040W.	DAKAR ACC advised that the unit had NO contact with C5GAF so no estimate was passed. DAKAR then gave PIARCO an estimate for 16N040W at 16:00 FL340. The flight checked 16N040W at 15:56 FL340.	No other traffic was involved. *** NO LHD ***						PILOT	0		0
489	23/09/09	LAN	LAN601	CCCRV	B763	0:23	NOTOS	NOTOS UL344 ARTOM	NO	350	350	0	90		N	N	CENTRAL AMERICA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	MERIDA ACC NO coordinó el estimado y cuando se le consultó dijo haber olvidado coordinarlo con CENAMER ACC.							PILOT	90		0	
490	23/09/09		N212T	N212T	ASTR	17:40	PIGBI	PIGBI UA315 VESKA	390	370	390	2000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC PUERTO PRÍNCIPE sobre la posición PIGBI a FL370 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL390.							MODE C	90		1	
491	23/09/09	TPU	TPU074	N491TA	A320	19:13	BEROX	BEROX UA567 CDO	370	350	370	2000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC CURAZAO sobre la posición BEROX a FL350 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL370.							MODE C	90		1	
492	23/09/09	LPE	LPE2564	N361AA	N361AA	20:23	OPRUS	UM414 / UG427	370	350	370	2000	90		M	M	MAIQUETIA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	La aeronave fue autorizada por el ACC de BOGOTA con FL350. La misma reporto en la posición OPRUS con el ACC de MAIQUETIA con FL370.	El ACC de BOGOTA NO efectuo la coordinacion de cambio de nivel.						MODE C	90		1	
493	23/09/09	VEC	VEC202	N620DL	B722	20:50	VESKA	VESKA UA315 PIGBI	340	400	340	-6000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC CURAZAO sobre la posición VESKA a FL400 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL340.							MODE C	90		3	
494	24/09/09	COA	COA653	N24736	B737	3:29	MOXAS	UG439 / UL318	SI	370	390	2000	90		M	M	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	BOGOTA ACC NO realizo la revisión de FL, pues lo había transferido a FL370 por MOXAS.							PILOT / MODE C	90		1	
495	24/09/09	GSM	GSM8510		B763	3:59	0622S 01000W	EGVN / FHAW - 0622S01000 W DCT FHAW		360	360	0	1200		N	N	ATLANTICO	ATC LOOP ERROR - COORDINATION FAILURE OF DAKAR ACC	At 06:59, FHAW TWR (Ascension Island) informed ATLANTICO ACC that the mentioned aircraft was requesting descent. That's when ATLANTICO ACC became aware of the aircraft.	DAKAR ACC did not coordinate the aircraft.						PILOT	1200		0	

496	25/09/09	INC	INC707	PJMDC	MD82	1:40	MEGIR	TNCC UA563 POS UG449 SMJP	N/A	330	310	-2000	90		M	M	PIARCO	ATC LOOP ERROR	At 01:09 MAIQUETIA ACC coordinated INC707 MD82 TNCC UA563 POS UG449 SMJP, with PIARCO ACC at MEGIR at 01:40 FL330. INC707 checked over MEGIR at 01:41 maintaining FL310.	Conflicting traffic was BWA1415 B738 TTPP UA324 SYCJ. DEP PIARCO at 01:33 climbing to FL310. The situation was resolved by climbing INC707 to FL330. When contacted MAIQUETIA ACC seen	unaware that the aircraft was at FL310 MAIQUETIA ACC apologized for the situation.	BWA1415 - B738 - TTPP / SYCJ - UA324	FL310	MEGR	PILOT	90			1
497	25/09/09	GSM	GSM8511	GCEFG	B763	17:30	3400S 03400W	3400S03400 W DCT FHAW		350	350	0	90		N	N	ATLANTICO	ATC LOOP ERROR - COORDINATION FAILURE OF MONTEVIDEO ACC	MONTEVIDEO ACC and EZEIZA ACC did not coordinate the aircraft. We only became aware of the aircraft because the pilot contacted us by telephone.					PILOT	90		0		
498	26/09/09	COA	COA1638		B753	16:03	BEROX	UA567 - KEWR / TNCA		340	340	0	90		M	M	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Estimate time 16:08. Aircraft checked BEROX at 16:03 FL340. No time revision from SANTO DOMINGO.					PILOT	90		0		
499	27/09/09	WOA	WOA1001	N278WA	MD11	5:07	ARUSI	FNLU UL695 ARUSI BISUK DCT KIAH	NO	360	360	0	10		N	NO LHD	ROCHAMBEAU	ATC LOOP ERROR	At 05:02 ATLANTICO ACC coordinates WOA1001 to CAYENNE ACC ETO ARUSI 05:06. CAYENNE don't manage to contact WOA1001 at 05:06 so the controller phone ATLANTICO ACC to get some explanations.	ATLANTICO controller state that the flight will be at the boundary at 05:16 due to weather conditions. At the end, WOA1001 contacts CAYENNE control at 05:08 indicating to have cross ARUSI at 05:07 FL360.	*** NO LHD ***			PILOT	0		0		
500	27/09/09	FAG	FAG01	T01	B752	5:15	PAKON	PAKON UA300 BVI	350	350	350	0	90		O	H	AMAZONICA	ATC LOOP ERROR	MAIQUETIA ACC informed that FAG01 was RVSM approved and it confirmed that had checked this information with SVMG (MARGARITA) TWR. MAIQUETIA ACC had coordinated FAG01 as being	RVSM approved at FL350, but when the aircraft contacted AZ ACC informed that it was not RVSM approved. FAG01 crossed with UAL860 on the opposite way at FL360.		UAL860 - B772 - SBGR / KIAH	FL360		PILOT	90		0	
501	27/09/09	LCO	LCO1408	CCCZZ	B763	12:42	ELAKO	UA320	NO	400	400	0	90		N	N	LIMA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	A las 12:42 ATCO SLLP (LA PAZ) da la transferencia del LCO1408 B763 SCAS / SPIM ETO ELAKO 12:42. Paralelamente llama el PILOT informando paso por ELAKO a las 12:42.					PILOT	90		0		
502	27/09/09		N226CP	N226CP	E150	17:40	ARMUR	TTPP UL337 NEGON CDO MBPV	400	400	400	0	90		N	N	SAN JUAN	ATC LOOP ERROR	N226CP entered the TJZS CTA/FIR over the ARMUR intersection at FL400 without prior coordination from SVMI (MAIQUETIA).	SVMi supervisor Mr. Cesar Landaeta was notified. He advises controller tried to call TJZS (SAN JUAN) with NO response and sent the estimate via AFTN. There was NO loss of separation.	We have advised SVMi that AFTN messages do not constitute coordination.			PILOT	90		0		

503	28/09/09		N800KS	N800KS	B733	22:05	TAP (TAPACH ULA)	UA317	370	350	370	2000	90		M	M	CENTRAL AMERICA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	MERIDA ACC coordinó la aeronave a FL350 y esta llamó a CENAMER ACC a FL370. MERIDA ACC NO coordinó el cambio de nivel de vuelo.						PILOT/ MODE C	90		1	
504	28/09/09		KLM	KLM736	B744	22:30	MILOK	TNCC MILOK UA516 RKADIA 2600N 05500W EHAM	350	370	350	-2000	300		M	M	SAN JUAN	ATC LOOP ERROR	KLM736 entered TJSZ (SAN JUAN) FIR/CTA over MILOK intersection at FL350 when FL370 was the coordinated altitude from SVMI (MAIQUETIA). SVMI supervisor, Mr. Leonardo Rodriguez was notified.	There was NO loss of separation.					PILOT	300		1	
505	30/09/09	AAL	AAL996	N754AN	B772	5:01	ARUXA	UL417	375	360	360	1500	5	0	E	NO LHD	AMAZONICA	DEVIATION DUE TO EQUIPMENT FAILURE	The altitude deviation was observed during approximately 5 seconds when the aircraft reached FL375 near to ARUXA position. AWY UL417. The aircraft was flying from SAEZ to KDFW.	Because of the brevity of the occurrence and since there was not any turbulence report...	*** NO LHD - GTE 9 ***			MODE C		5	0		
506	01/10/09	CMP	CMP382	HP1562	E190	21:03	BETIR	BETIR UA319 PALAS	380	340	380	4000	90		B - 1 - M	B - 1 - M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por SANTO DOMINGO a FL340 pero penetró la FIR de CURAZAO con FL380.				MODE C	90		2			
507	03/10/09	AAL	AAL1668	N382AN	B763	20:29	VESKA	UA315	360	340	360	2000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por CURAZAO a FL340 pero penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO con FL360				MODE C	90		1			
508	03/10/09	MST	MST9840	PRMTC	DC10	21:15	ACENA (091350S 0460448W)	UIR - SBSV DCT SBEG	320	320	320	0	90		N	N	AMAZONICA	ATC COORDINATION FAILURE	RECIFE ACC did not coordinate the estimated time with AMAZONICO ACC.					MODE C	90		0		
509	04/10/09	IBE	IBE6843	ECJCY	A346	1:30	ERETU	UN857	NO	340	340	0	90		N	N	ATLANTICO	ATC COORDINATION FAILURE	IBE6843 contacted this center via ADS/CPDLC. The mentioned traffic had not been coordinated by DAKAR ACC when it entered the area of ATLANTICO and RECIFE ACCs.	Whe questioned, DAKAR's air traffic controller confirmed that he had not coordinated the traffic.			PILOT	90		0			
510	04/10/09	SAA	SAA227		B747	1:35	3000S 02500W	UIR - SAEZ DCT FAJS (30S025W 30S020W 30S015W 30S010W)	NO	350	350	0	5400		N	N	ATLANTICO	ATC COORDINATION FAILURE	The mentioned aircraft entered ATLANTICO FIR without coordination which should have been done by MONTEVIDEO ACC. At 01:35, JOHANNESBURG ACC informed us by telephone that the	mentioned traffic was going to enter that area around 02:45.			PILOT	5400		0			

511	05/10/09	UAE	UAE261	A6EWC	B77L	15:45	0900S 01000W	09S010W 11S010W 13S020W 16S025W 18S030W 21S035W EKALO	NO	340	340	0	90		N	N	ATLANTICO	ATC COORDINATION FAILURE	ABIDJAN ACC did not coordinate UAE261.							PILOT	90		0	
512	05/10/09	ACA	ACA076	CFYJH	A319	2:46	SEKAR	SEKAR UA554 POKAK	370	350	370	2000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por MIAMI a FL370 pero penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO con FL350. MIAMI hizo um "HANDOFF" radar pero nunca se mencionó en el mismo algún cambio en el nivel	que había sido inicialmente autorizado; de hecho, no se dio ninguna información de nivel.						MODE C	90		1	
513	06/10/09	CMP	CMP270	HP1376	B737	1:48	PALAS	PALAS UA319 CDO	370	360	370	1000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por CURAZAO a FL360 (incorrecto para la derrota a solicitud de SANTO DOMINGO y por tránsito) pero penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO con FL370.					MODE C	90		1			
514	06/10/09	APW	APW2457	N868AN	B752	19:16	PADOX	UG437	NO	370	370	0	33		N	N	LIMA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	Siendo las 19:16 llama el APW2457 B752 KMIA / SPIM FL370 sobre la posicion PADOX. NO se tenia transferencia dicho vuelo.					PILOT	33		0			
515	07/10/09	KLM	KLM785		B744	0:41	SCAPA (17 NM EAST)	TNCM SCAPA UG431 BEXER TNCC	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	90		M	NO LHD	SAN JUAN	ATC LOOP ERROR	KLM785 was coordinated with CURAZAO ACC (TNCC) over SCAPA intersection. Aircraft entered TNCC CTA/FIR 17 NM east of SCAPA intersection. KLM785 (captain Chris Kelkjens) advised that TNCC	cleared then direct to PIJG on initial contact. "JR" at TNCC states that KLM785 requested direct PIJG on initial contact. "JR" adds that KLM785 was cleared direct SCAPA direct PIJG and told to report SCAPA.	*** NO LHD- GTE 9 ***				PILOT/ MODE C	0		0		
516	07/10/09		N650CD	N650CD	C650	17:29	VESKA	VESKA UA315 PIGBI	400	380	400	2000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por CURAZAO a FL380 pero penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO con FL400.					MODE C	90		1			
517	08/10/09	CWC	CWC425	N986AR	MD11	0:21	UGUPI	UL780	SI	390	310	-8000	90		M	M	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	SKBO ACC (BOGOTA)(BOGOTA) NO realizo la revisión de nivel de vuelo, pues lo había transferido a 390.					PILOT/ MODE C	90		4	4		
518	08/10/09	CWC	CWC437	HP1370	B737	3:22	UGUPI	UL780	SI	370	350	-2000	90		M	M	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	SKBO ACC (BOGOTA)(BOGOTA) NO realizo la revisión de nivel de vuelo, pues lo había transferido a 370.					PILOT/ MODE C	90		1	1		

519	08/10/09	LCO	LCO1400	CCCZY	B763	13:07	PADOX	UG437	SI	340	320	-2000	90		M	M	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	SPIM ACC (LIMA) NO realizo la revisión de nivel de vuelo, pues lo había transferido a 340.	reportado VAMOS, o coreto é PADOX						PILOT / MODE C	90		1	1
520	08/10/09	FWI	FWI201	FOSUD	E190	13:49	MILUX	TFFF UA555 TRAPP UM786 MILUX DCT KALEP DCT SOCA	NO	390	390	0	10		M	NO LHD	ROCHAMBEAU	OTHER	The previous ATC unit SMPM ACC (Paramaribo) has coordinated this flight ETO MILUX 13:45 FL390. The pilot has contacted at 13:49 indicating crossing MILUX. SMPM ACC has not revise the coordination.	*** NO LHD *** - ATT: GTE 7					PILOT	0		0	0	
521	08/10/09	AFR	AFR3970	FGKXQ	A320	13:57	MILUX	TFFF UA555 TRAPP UM786 MILUX DCT KALEP DCT SOCA	NO	330	330	0	10		M	NO LHD	ROCHAMBEAU	OTHER	The previous ATC unit SMPM ACC (Paramaribo) has coordinated this flight ETO 0617N054W (MILUX) 13:50 FL330. The pilot has contacted at 13:57 indicating crossing 0617N054W (MILUX).	SMPM ACC has not revise the coordination.	*** NO LHD *** - ATT: GTE 8				PILOT	0		0	0	
522	08/10/09	IBE	IBE646P	ECGUP	A343	16:56	CUC (CUCUTA)	UG431	370	360	370	1000	90		M	M	MAIQUETIA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	El control de BOGOTA NO efectuo la revision de nivel sobre la posicion CUC (CUCUTA). La aeronave reporto con el centro de control MAIQUETIA con nivel de vuelo 370 el no fue coordinado.					MODE C	90		0	0		
523	08/10/09	CMP	CMP751	HP1531	B737	18:51	VAKUD	UL780	NO	350	370	2000	30		M	M	LIMA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	A las 18:51 llama el CMP751 B737 MPTO / SCEL sobre VAKUD FL370 cuando la transferencia fue realizada con FL350.					PILOT	30		1	1		
524	09/10/09	TAM	TAM8097	PTMVM	A332	4:45	0900N 03500W	LFPG DCT 09N035W DCT SBGR	NO	370	370	0	10		N	N	ROCHAMBEAU	ATC LOOP ERROR	The previous ATC unit (DAKAR ACC) has not coordinated this flight. ATLANTICO ACC has called CAYENNE ACC at 04:45 to inform that TAM8097 was crossing 09N035W On route to SOOO FIR.	The Brazilian controller has detected the aircraft on his ADS monitor.DAKAR ACC has never coordinated this flight which initially did not intend to cross SOOO FIR according to its FPL.				PILOT	10		0	0		
525	09/10/09	AAL	AAL996		B772	5:15	TEMID	UA321	345	360	360	1500	20		E	NO LHD	AMAZONICA	DEVIATION DUE TO EQUIPMENT FAILURE	Probably it was equipment failure because at the same moment COA52 also showed at FL345. The aircraft showed during some seconds at FL345.	*** NO LHD - GTE 9 ***				MODE C	20		0	0		

526	09/10/09	COA	COA52		B762	5:15	TEMID	UA321	345	340	340	500	20		E	NO LHD	AMAZONICA	DEVIATION DUE TO EQUIPMENT FAILURE	Probably it was equipment failure because at the same moment AAL996 also showed at FL345. The aircraft showed during some seconds at FL345.	*** NO LHD - GTE 9 ***						MODE C	20		0		0
527	10/10/09		N59FT	N59FT	C650	1:02	VESKA	VESKA UA315 PIGBI	340	360	340	-2000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por CURAZAO a FL360 pero penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO con FL340.						MODE C	90		1		1	
528	10/10/09	MPD	MPD974	ECKXB	A332	19:55	DIMAS	SPIM UL306 DIMAS CYR DCT BISUK DCT 17N040W DCT LEMD	NO	370	370	0	10		N	N	ROCHAMBEAU	NEGATIVE TRANSFER RECEIVED FROM TRANSITIONING ATC UNIT	The previous ATC unit SMPM ACC (Paramaribo) has forgotten to transfer this flight to CAYENNE ACC.	The pilot has contacted CAYENNE at 19:54 height minutes after the TCP and just after a call from CAYENNE to PARAMARIBO about this flight.				PILOT	10		0		0		
529	10/10/09	GLO	GLO1601	PRGOP	B738	22:45	BLESS	UZ14	347	340	340	700	20	0	A	A	RECIFE	FAILURE TO CLIMB	GLO1601 had been cleared to climb to FL340. However, when it passed FL340 continued climbing and it was alerted by the ATCO. It returned to FL340, the cleared one.					MODE C	20		0		1		
530	11/10/09		N88ZL	N88ZL	B703	21:54	TERAS	UL305	NO	380	400	2000	30		M	M	LIMA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	A las 21:54 llama el N88ZL B703 SKBO / SPIM con FL400 cuando la transferencia fue dada con FL380.				PILOT	30		1		1			
531	13/10/09	TFL	TFL362		B763	2:12	SCAPA	TNCC SCAPA UG431 DDP EHAM	310	310	310	0	90		N	N	SAN JUAN	ATC LOOP ERROR - NO PRIOR COORDINATION	TFL362 entered SAN JUAN CERAP (TIJS) CTA / FIR at FL310 without prior coordination from CURACAO ACC (TNCC). No loss of separation.	TIJS notified TNCC supervisor Mr. Enrique Koon who acknowledged that the flight entered TIJS airspace without prior coordination.				MODE C	90		0		0		
532	13/10/09	GLG	GLG601		B737	19:57	BOKAN	UA550	SI	340	320	-2000	90		M	M	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	SKBO ACC (BOGOTA)NO realizo la revision de nivel de vuelo, pues lo había transferido a FL340.	*** NO LHD - GTE 9 ***				PILOT / MODE C	90		1		1		
533	13/10/09	UPS	UPS414		B763	16:16	DIBOK	UL795-KMA / SBKP		330	330	0	90		N	N	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	NO estimate / coordination received					PILOT	90		0		0		
534	17/10/09		PROPP	PROPP	H25B	16:20	7 minutes to VILAS	SBRF UG449 OTONI VILAS DCT TTPP	NO	400	400	0	900		N	N	ROCHAMBEAU	NEGATIVE TRANSFER RECEIVED FROM TRANSITIONING ATC UNIT	The previous ATC unit SBZACC (AMAZONICO) has forgotten to transfer this flight to CAYENNE ACC on OTONI position at 16:20.	SMPM (Paramaribo) has established radio contact with this flight at 16:35, seven minutes before it left our FIR / UIR.				PILOT	900		0		0		

535	17/10/09	IBE	IBE6830	ECIHH	A346	23:45	1437N 03730W	SAL 1316N0381 6W 1437N0373 0W LEMD		370	370	0	90		N	N	PIARCO	ATC LOOP ERROR	PIARCO ACC coordinated the IBE6830 with GVSC (SAL OCEANIC) instead of GOOO (DAKAR OCEANIC).	This resulted in the receiving station, GOOO not having an estimate on the flight when IBE6830 established contact at 1437N03730W.						PILOT	90		0	
536	18/10/09	LNE	LNE1730	HCCGZ	B763	8:32	BOKAN	UA550	SI	360	360	0	90		N	N	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	SBKO ACC NO realizo la transferencia a SEGU ACC (GUAYAQUIL).	*** NO LHD - GTE 9 ***						PILOT / MODE C	90		0	
537	18/10/09	ACA	ACA092	CFAE	B763	12:40	SORTA	UL780	NO	330	370	4000	90		M	M	ANTOFAGASTA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	ACA092 transferido en SORTA a FL330, ingresa a FL370.						PILOT	90		2		
538	18/10/09	ACA	ACA092	CFAE	B763	12:40	SORTA	UL780	NO	330	370	4000	90		M	NO LHD	LIMA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	A las 12:06 LIMA DA transferió el ACA092 B763 CYZ / SCEL ETO SORTA 12:40 con FL370. SCFZ (ANTOFAGASTA) colecciona transferencia con FL330 a lo cual LIMA informó afirmativo	*** REPORTE REPETIDO ***					PILOT	90		0		
539	18/10/09	TPU	TPU020	N566TA	A320	13:11	IREMI	UL302	NO	320	340	2000	90		M	M	LIMA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	Siendo las 13:13 el TPU020 A321 SCEL / SPIM reporta haber chequeado la posicion IREMI a las 13:11 con FL340, cuando la transferencia se tenia con FL320.					PILOT	90		1			
540	18/10/09	TPU	TPU020	N566TA	A321	13:11	IREMI	UL302	NO	320	340	2000	90		M	NO LHD	ANTOFAGASTA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	TPU020 transferido en IREMI a FL320, ingresa a FIR LIMA a FL340.	*** REPORTE REPETIDO ***					PILOT	90		0		
541	18/10/09	COA	COA1638		B753	16:20	BEROX	UA567 - KEWR / TNCA		340	340	0	90		M	M	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Aircraft estimated BEROX at 16:29 and checked at 16:20.						PILOT	90		0		
542	18/10/09		PRLTC	PRLTC	E135	23:18	KIKER	SBBV KIKER UA300 DDP KTEB	400	400	400	0	90		N	N	SAN JUAN	ATC LOOP ERROR - NO PRIOR COORDINATION	TFL362 entered SAN JUAN CERAP (TJZS) CTA / FIR at FL400 without prior coordination from MAIQUETIA ACC (SVM I). No loss of separation.	TJZS notified SVM I supervisor, Mr. Juan Berbesi, who said they had an emergency and had forgotten to coordinate the flight with TJZS.					MODE C	90		0		
543	20/10/09	AZA	AZA686		B763	18:00	PERRY	UA551	360	360	360	0	90		N	NO LHD	MAIQUETIA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	El centro de control de PIARCO efectuo la coordinacion de nivel y tiempo por la posicion PELMA aerovia UA550 al centro de control MAIQUETIA y la aeronave reporto a MAIQUETIA	en la posicion PERRY UA551 con nivel 360.	*** NO LHD - GTE 9 ***				MODE C	90		0		
544	20/10/09	BAW	BAW246	GBNLT	B744	23:07	0500N 04200W	SBGR DCT 05N042W DCT 13N039W DCT EGLL	NO	330	330	0	10	120	N	N	ROCHAMBEAU	NEGATIVE TRANSFER RECEIVED FROM TRANSITIONING ATC UNIT	At 23:07, SBAO ACC (ATLANTICO) coordinates BAW246 ETO 05N042W 23:05 FL330. This flight is in our space for 2 minutes.					PILOT	120		0			

545	20/10/09	TAM	TAM3840		A320	13:26	TELMA	UZS	350	370	350	-2000	420		M	M	RECIFE	COORDINATION FAILURE	The aircraft was coordinated at FL370 by BRASILIA ACC.							MODE C	420		1	1
546	20/10/09	AFR	AFR6854	FGIUA	B744	13:41	JOBER - FIR RE	UN741	380	370	380	1000	540		M	M	RECIFE	COORDINATION FAILURE	ATLANTICO ACC coordinated the aircraft at FL370.							MODE C	540		1	0
547	21/10/09	UAL	UAL0842	N663UA	B763	4:10	OIA	SBRF UA555 BEL OIA BUXEX DCT KORD	NO	340	340	0	10	120	N	N	ROCHAMBEAU	NEGATIVE TRANSFER RECEIVED FROM TRANSITIONING ATC UNIT	The previous ATC unit SBZAZ ACC (AMAZONICO) has not coordinated this flight to CAYENNE ACC. The pilot has contacted over 041422N 0520129W 2 minutes after the boundary.						PILOT	120		0	0	
548	21/10/09		N575MA	N575MA	H25B	17:03	MILOK	MPMG MOLOK UA516 DANDE TNCM	410	390	410	2000	90		M	M	SAN JUAN	ATC LOOP ERROR	N575MA entered SAN JUAN CERAP (TJZS) CTA / FIR over the MILOK intersection at FL410 when MAIQUETIA ACC had coordinated FL390.	No loss of separation. TJZS notified SVMI supervisor, Mr. Cesar Landareta, who confirmed the incident.					MODE C	90		1	1	
549	23/10/09	AVA	AVA025	N411AV	A320	20:00	PULTU	UL305	NO	360	380	2000	90		M	M	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	SBKO ACC NO realizó la revisión de nivel de vuelo, pues lo había transferido a FL360.						PILOT / MODE C	90		1	1	
550	24/10/09	AAL	AAL903		B752	22:25	VESKA	UA315 - KMIA / SVMI		290	350	6000	90		M	M	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Aircraft estimated VESKA at 22:28 and checked at 22:25. NO FL revision.						PILOT	90		3	3	
551	26/10/09	LAN	LAN704	CCCQE	A343	5:38	0500N 04000W	SCEL UM799 NADIR DCT 05N040W DCT 1118N0363 4W DCT 14N035W DCT LEMD	NO	350	330	-2000	10		M	M	ROCHAMBEAU	ATC LOOP ERROR	The previous ATC unit SBAO ACC (ATLANTICO) has coordinated LAN704 to CAYENNE ACC ETO 05N040W 05:42 FL350. The pilot contacted CAYENNE at FL330.						PILOT	10		1	1	
552	26/10/09	AAL	AAL980	N176AA	B752	7:37	VILAS	KMIA UG449 VILAS OTONI UG449 BEL DCT SBSV	NO	370	370	0	10	180	N	N	ROCHAMBEAU	NEGATIVE TRANSFER RECEIVED FROM TRANSITIONING ATC UNIT	The previous ATC unit SMPM ACC (PARAMARIBO) has not transferred this flight to CAYENNE ACC. CAYENNE controller was forced to call SMPM for claiming the transfer of AAL980 in frequency.	At the end the pilot has contacted CAYENNE, 3 minutes after he entered the FIR UIR SOOO.					PILOT	180		0	0	
553	27/10/09	AAL	AAL907	N782AN	B772	1:50	ESIPO	UL795	310	350	310	-4000	90		M	M	MAIQUETIA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	La aeronave fue autorizada al ACC de CURACAO con FL350. La misma reporto en la posicion ESIPO con el ACC de MAIQUETIA con FL310.	El control de CURACAO no efectuó la coordinacion de cambio de nivel.					MODE C	90		2	2	

554	27/10/09	AVA	AVA078	N361AA	B752	3:16	KIKAS	UA550	390	370	390	2000	90		M	M	MAIQUETIA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	La aeronave fue autorizada al ACC de BOGOTA con FL370. La misma reporto en la posicion KIKAS con el ACC de MAIQUETIA con FL390. El control de BOGOTA no efectuo la coordinacion de cambio de nivel.							MODE C	90		1	
555	27/10/09	AAL	AAL906		B772	5:04	ISANI	UL304	380	380	380	0	90		N	N	MAIQUETIA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	La aeronave no fue coordinada por el centro de control AMAZONICO. L amisma reporto en la posicion ISANI sin estimado con nivel de vuelo 380.							MODE C	90		0	
556	28/10/09	MXA	MXA1691	XAMXE	B763	7:40	UGADI	UL308	NO	330	350	2000	90		M	M	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	CENAMER ACC NO realizo la revision de nivel de vuelo, pues lo había transferido a FL350.							MODE C	90		1	
557	28/10/09	AMX	AMX010	XAT0J	B762	21:36	OSELO	UL401	NO	370	350	-2000	90		M	M	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	CENAMER ACC NO realizo la revision de nivel de vuelo, pues lo había transferido a FL370.							MODE C	90		1	
558	29/10/09	AWE	AWE885	N711UW	A319	17:41	ILURI	KPHL ILURI UA555 BGI TBPB		370	390	2000	90		M	M	PIARCO	ATC LOOP ERROR	SAN JUAN ACC coordinated AWE885, KPHL ILURI UA555 BGI TBPB - ILURI at 17:41 FL370. N384JW, KRDG ILURI UA555 FOF DCT BNE, checked ILURI at 17:34 FL410.	Air Traffic Control at PIARCO was in the process of giving descent to the aircraft to FL380 when AWE855 contacted PIARCO ACC at ILURI at 17:41 FL390.	When contacted SAN JUAN ACC apologized for the error.	N384J W - LJ60 - KROG /	FL410	ILURI	PILOT	90		1		
559	29/10/09		N878QS	N878QS	H25B	19:31	GILGA	UA574	350	370	350	-2000	90		M	M	MAIQUETIA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	La aeronave fue autorizada por el ACC de BARRANQUILLA con FL370, la misma reporto en la posicion GILGA con el ACC de MAIQUETIA con FL350.	El Control de BARRANQUILLA no efectuo la coordinacion de cambio de nivel.						PILOT	90		1	
560	30/10/09	LAN	LAN635	CCCDM	B763	2:40	IREMI	UL302	NO	350	350	0	90		N	N	ANTOFAGASTA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	LAN635 NO fue transferido, ingresa en IREMI a FL350.							PILOT	90		0	
561	30/10/09	BSK	BSK222	N742MA	B738	23:36	LAMKN	TBPB UA632 ANU UL462 ILOGA KBWI		340	360	2000	90		M	M	PIARCO	ATC LOOP ERROR	PIARCO ACC inadvertently copied and assigned FL360 to BSK222, as the level approved by the adjacent unit - SAN JUAN ACC. On investigation it was found that SAN JUAN ACC approved FL340 for BSK222.	The error was discovered when the aircraft contacted SAN JUAN ACC and SAN JUAN queried the level given to the aircraft. PIARCO apologized for the error.						PILOT	90		1	
562	30/10/09	APW	APW503		DC10	20:31	SCAPA	UG431 - TJBQ / SKBO		360	360	0	0		M	NO LHD	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Aircraft estimated SCAPA at 20:27 and checked at 20:31.	*** NO LHD *** - ATT: GTE 7						PILOT	0		0	

563	31/10/09	DLH	DLH535	DAIHS	A346	0:20	WEST OF DUNTA	SVMI UA550 PPR 18N060W EDDF		370	370	0	90		N	NO LHD	PIARCO	ATC LOOP ERROR	At ITEGO, PIARCO ACC approved a request from DLH535 to deviate to his left due weather. This information was not communicated to SAN JUAN ACC. SAN JUAN ACC supervisor later called to advise	PIARCO that an unknown aircraft SQ3705 at FL370 west of DUNTA.	PIARCO investigated and found that the deviated aircraft DLH535 had clipped SAN JUAN airspace and apologized for not having passed the information.	*** NO LHD - GTE 9 ***			PILOT	90		0	
564	31/10/09	DLH	DLH535	DAIHS	A346	0:25	PELMA (EAST OF ANADA)	SVMI UA550 PPR 18N060W EDDF	YES	370	370	0	90		N	N	SAN JUAN	ATC LOOP ERROR	DLH535 entered the SAN JUAN CERAP (TJZS) CTA / FIR east of the ANADA intersection without prior coordination from PIARCO ACC (TTPP). NO loss of separation.	TJZS notified TTPP supervisor, "JT", who confirmed the incident and advised the aircraft was deviating for weather.				MODE C	0	0	0		
565	31/10/09	LPE	LPE2565	CCCDP	B763	2:08	ILMUX	UM414	NO	360	380	2000	90		M	M	LIMA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	A las 02:07 llama el LPE2565 B763 SVMI / SPIM ETO ILMUX 02:08 e informa mantener FL380, cuando la transferencia realizada fue con FL360.				PILOT	90	1	0			
566	31/10/09	IBE	IBE6464	ECHQH	A343	5:02	PERRY	SEGU MIQ UA551 FOF DCT 18N056W 21N050W LEMD		370	370	0	90		M	M	PIARCO	ATC LOOP ERROR	At 03:55 SVZM ACC coordinated IBE6464 at PERRY at 05:02 FL350 with TTZP ACC. Due to conflicting traffic, FL350 was not approved and FL370 was approved. SVZM ACC accepted the FL and advised that the ACFT would cross the boundary maintaining FL370.	At 04:14, 04:31 and again at 04:49, MAIQUETIA ACC called PIARCO ACC to confirm that they had the estimate on IBE6464 at PERRY at 05:02 FL370. At 04:54, 3 minutes before the aircraft checked the boundary MAIQUETIA called PIARCO to advise that contact	could not be established with IBE6464 and the aircraft was still at FL350. At 04:57, IBE6464 established contact with TTPP ACC and was climbed to FL360 to avoid traffic DAL61 B764 KATL UG449 IBERT UL776 SBGL, estimating PERRY at 05:01 FL350.	DAL61 - N845 MH - B764	FL350	PERRY	PILOT	90	0	0	0
567	01/11/09		N722FS	N722FS	FA50	18:22	TARBA	UA511	YES	340	360	2000	90		M	M	KINGSTON	ATC LOOP ERROR	N722FS checked TARBA at FL360. Aircraft was earlier transferred by CURACAO at FL340 and was later revised at FL360. KINGSTON failed to update flight progress strip.				MODE C	90	1	0			
568	01/11/09	AWE	AWE1686	N108UW	A320	19:18	BEROX	BEROX UA567 CDO UL793		350	330	350	2000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC CURAZAO a FL330 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL350.				MODE C	90	1	1		

569	02/11/09	SRU	SRU1116	OB1841P	B732	12:57	AND (ANDAHU AYLAS)	UV11	NO	320	340	2000	43		B	B	LIMA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	Queda pendiente por enviar informacion final ya que la investigacion se encuentra en curso	Piloto recibe autorizacion de CUZCO Aproximacion para ascender a FL320 y colaciona dicha autorizacion. Posteriormente ya en ascenso el piloto informa ascendiendo para FL340 (nivel NO autorizado)	a lo cual el ATCO informa recibido y posteriormente a ello el ATCO le solicita al piloto que notifique a traves de FL320.						PILOT	43		1	
570	02/11/09	COA	COA1667	N33266	B738	14:15	ELASO	UL674	380	340	380	4000	90		M	M	KINGSTON	ATC LOOP ERROR	COA1667 reported ELASO FL380 and not FL340 as was coordinated by CURACAO ACC.							MODE C	90		2		
571	02/11/09	CMP	CMP751	HP1525	B737	19:32	VAKUD	UL780	NO	370	370	0	25		N	N	LIMA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	A las 19:32 llama el CMP751 B737 MPTO/SCEL sobre VAKUD FL370. No se tenía transferencia.						PILOT	25		0			
572	02/11/09		N550GA	N550GA	GLE5	21:02	ANPAL	UL308	NO	340	340	0	90	720	N	N	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	CENAMER control OMITIO la transferencia y el PILOT se comunica 12 minutos despues de que cruzo el espacio aereo ECUATORIANO. lo que dio lugar a que tampoco se pase a tiempo la transferencia a LIMA control.	CARSAMMA: Tiempo de 720 segundos de ANPAL hasta la llamada.					NO	720		0			
573	03/11/09	TAM	TAM3420		A320M	13:00	LOVIS	UZ3	YES	350	350	0	90		N	NO LHD	AMAZONICA	COORDINATION FAILURE	There was no vertical or horizontal discrepancy observed. There was only a lack of coordination of the adjacent ACC.	This information serves the briefing of CGNA who was on mission in CINDACTA 4, in the month of september/09.	*** NO LHD - GTE 9 ***				MODE C	0		0			
574	03/11/09	AAL	AAL902	N697AN	B752	14:53	VESKA	VESKA UA315 PIGBI	360	380	360	-2000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC CURAZAO a FL380 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL360.					MODE C	90		1				
575	03/11/09	IBE	IBE6025	ECGJT	A343	17:13	TASIL	UN873	NO	340	360	2000	60		M	I - M	ATLANTICO	COORDINATION FAILURE	The IBE6025 (LEMD / SBGL) was coordinated by the DAKAR on FL340, but he reported the TASIL 17:13 in FL360.	We question what happened to the ACC DAKAR which ratified the said traffic was maintaining FL340.				PILOT	60		1				
576	03/11/09	GSM	GSM8511	GCEFG	B763	17:20	3400S 05000W	UIR - AORRA	NO	330	330	0	90		N	N	ATLANTICO	NEGATIVE TRANSFER RECEIVED FROM TRANSITIONING ATC UNIT	The GSM8511 (SUMU / FHAW) was not coordinated by the ACC MONTEVIDEO. The traffic made contact with the ACC ATLANTIC at 17:20 informing the data of the flight plan and	passed position 34S050W at 17:18 in FL330.				PILOT	0		0				

577	03/11/09	IBE	IBE6845	EIOB	A346	17:25	NANIK	UN741	NO	360	350	-1000	300		B - M	B - M	ATLANTICO	COORDINATION FAILURE	The IBE6845 (LEMD / SAEZ) was coordinated by the ACC DAKAR on FL360, but the traffic entered in the FIR ATLANTICO, NANIK position at 17:25 maintaining FL350							PILOT	300		1			
578	03/11/09		N458DA	N458DA	C560	19:40	PESTO	PESTO UB520 CISNE UR644 AUR	410	350	410	6000	90		M	M	CENTRAL AMERICA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	KINGSTON ACC coordinó los niveles de vuelo del N458DA y YV1469 en forma invertida. CENAMER autorizo al N458DA a mantener FL410 en la FIR CENTROAMERICA.				YV1496	FL350	PESTO	MODE C	90		3			0
579	03/11/09		YV1496	YV1496	FA50	19:40	PESTO	PESTO UB767 PZA UR878 MGA	350	410	350	-6000	120		M	M	CENTRAL AMERICA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	KINGSTON ACC coordinó los niveles de vuelo del YV1469 y N458DA en forma invertida. CENAMER autorizo al YV1469 a mantener FL350 en la FIR CENTROAMERICA.				N458DA	FL410	PESTO	MODE C	120		3			3
580	04/11/09	ADB	ADB2108	UR82073	A124	10:00	3406S 04707W	3406S04707 W / 30S046W / 2917S04549 W / DCT ETANO	NO	350	350	0	90		N	N	ATLANTICO	COORDINATION FAILURE	The traffic of ADB2108, EGYPT / SBGL, FL350 was not coordinated by EZEIZA ACC and too by MONTEVIDEO ACC.	The aircraft called this center just before entering the FIR ATLANTICO and gave us their positions and estimates.						PILOT	90		0			0
581	04/11/09		VPBEE	VPBEE	F900	11:20	1700S 01000W	AORRA (17S010W - 18S015W - 18S020W - 19S025W - 20S030W - 20S035W)	NO	380	380	0	90	4080	N	N	ATLANTICO	NEGATIVE TRANSFER RECEIVED FROM TRANSITIONING ATC UNIT	The traffic of the VPBEE P900, FNLU / SBCL, FL380 entered in the ATLANTICO FIR on position 17S010W at 10:12, and made contact with this ACC at 11:20, giving details and estimates.	of Luanda reported that h	*** CARSAMMA Tiempo 4080 segundos ***				PILOT	4080		0			0	
582	04/11/09	AAL	AAL955		B763	11:36	SIDAK	UM402	NO	380	360	-2000	90		N	N	ASUNCIÓN	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	AAL955 chequeo posicion SIDAK sin coordinacion del control de SLLP, en consulta con el control adyacente informa que olvidaron transferir por tener mucho trafico.						PILOT	90		1			1	
583	06/11/09	DAL	DAL61	N837MH	B764	5:25	ANADA	KATL ANADA UG449 KORTO SBGL	NO	370	310	-6000	90		M	M	PIARCO	ATC LOOP ERROR	SAN JUAN ACC coordinated DAL61 B764 - KTAL UG449 SBGL at ANADA at 06:23 FL370. At time 05:22 DAL 61 contacted PIARCO ACC and gave an estimate for position ANADA at 05:27 FL310.	PIARCO ACC contacted SAN JUAN supervisor who reported that the error originated on their end resulting in the aircraft being coordinated at FL370 instead of FL310. No other traffic was affected by this error						PILOT	90		3			3

584	06/11/09	LPE	LPE2589		A319	12:45	BOKAN	UA550	SI	300	300	0	90		N	N	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	BOGOTA control realiza la transferencia extemporaneamente cuando la aeronave cruzaba el ponto BOKAN	*** NO LHD - GTE 9 ***						PILOT / MODE C	90		0	
585	06/11/09	CMP	CMP224	HP1379	B737	16:21	SIDOS	UA553	390	N/A	390	6000	90		N	N	MAIQUETIA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	El centro de control de BARRANQUILLA no efectuó la coordinacion de cambio de nivel de vuelo ni estimado con el control MAIQUETIA en la posicion SIDOS por lo que la aeronave llamo sin estimado.						MODE C	90		3		
586	06/11/09	COA	COA1643	N75851	A320	19:50	BEROX	BEROX UA567 CDO UL793	330	350	330	-2000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC CURAZAO a FL350 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL330.						MODE C	90		1		
587	06/11/09	AWE	AWE874	N916UW	B752	22:12	BEROX	BEROX UW7 PTA UA554 SEKAR	370	360	370	1000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC CURAZAO a FL360 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL370.						MODE C	90		0		
588	07/11/09	UAL	UAL972	N588UA	B752	21:10	BEROX	BEROX UW7 PTA UA554 SEKAR	360	350	360	1000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC CURAZAO a FL350 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL360.						MODE C	90		0		
589	08/11/09	JBU	JBU821	N534JB	A320	14:08	ASIVO	ASIVO DCT CDO - UL793	290	350	290	-6000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC MIAMI a FL350 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL290						MODE C	90		3		
590	08/11/09	BWA	BWA424	9YBGI	B738	22:24	ANADA	TTPP UG449 KJFK	NO	320	320	0	90		M	M	PIARCO	ATC LOOP ERROR	At 21:39 PIARCO ACC coordinated BWA424 TTPP UG449 KJFK with TJSJ ACC at position ANADA at 22:24 FL320. After BWA424 checked ANADA at 22:24, TJSJ ACC queried the time of the estimate.	Tape investigations revealed that PIARCO ACC passed an estimate to TJSJ ACC on BWA424 ANADA at 22:24 FL320 but TJSJ ACC read back 23:24 FL320 to which PIARCO ACC replied ROGER. No air traffic conflict resulted from this situation.						PILOT	90		0	
591	09/11/09	TPA	TPA601	N768QT	B762	6:09	PLG (PUERTO LEGUIZA MO)	UG431	NO	360	360	0	90		N	M - O	LIMA	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	A las 06:07 llama TPA601 B762 SKRG / SPIM PLG 06:09 FL360. BOGOTA info trato de comunicarse via circuito oral ATS y telefono, sin tener respuesta, por lo tanto envia mensaje de transferencia via AFTN	el cual por falta de coordinacion en LIMA ACC no fue entregado al sector correspondiente.						PILOT	90		0	

592	11/11/09	AAL	AAL909	N788AN	B772	3:30	PIGBI	PIGBI UA315 VESKA	350	330	350	2000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC PUERTO PRINCIPE a FL330 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL350.						MODE C	90		1		
593	11/11/09	DAL	DAL120	N199DN	B763	3:41	NELOS	UZZ4	360	340	340	-2000	10		E	NO LHD	AMAZONICA	EQUIPMENT FAILURE	The two traffics were flying just above the other, UAL842 in FL360 and the DAL120 in FL340, keeping the axis of UZZ4 the same direction. There was a sudden change of flight level of FL360 for DAL120.	n for 10 seconds. Upon d					*** NO LHD - GTE 9 ***	MODE C	10		1	
594	12/11/09	CMP	CMP451		E190	11:40	MELLA	SJU DCT MELLA ILAMO UM525 VESKA	360	340	360	2000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC SAN JUAN a FL340 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO ascendiendo a FL360.						MODE C	90		1		
595	12/11/09	GTI	GTI63	N496MC	B744	19:23	ETBOD	ETBOD UL304 IRGUT	350	370	350	-2000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC PUERTO PRINCIPE a FL370 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL350.						MODE C	90		1		
596	12/11/09	GTI	GTI63	N496MC	B744	19:23	IRGUT	ETBOD UL304 IRGUT	350	370	350	-2000	90		M	NO LHD	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC SANTO DOMINGO a FL370 y penetró la FIR CURAZAO a FL350. ***Si auto reporta *** - Considerar el reporte de CURAZAO referente al mismo evento***						MODE C	90		1		
597	12/11/09	GTI	GTI63	N496MC	B744	19:43	IRGUT	UL304	YES	370	350	-2000	90		M	M	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	GTI63 KMIA / SBKB B744 UL304 IRGUT 19:43 FL370. Aircraft checked IRGUT with FL350. NO level revision.						MODE C	90		1		
598	12/11/09	LAN	LAN622	CCCXC	B763	22:17	KARAZ	UL401	NO	340	340	0	90		M	M	LIMA	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	A las 22:20 SPIM ACC revisa FL340 del LAN622 SCEL / MMMX con paso efectivo sobre la posición KARAZ 22:12. La transferencia fue realizada inicialmente con ETO KARAZ 22:13 y FL320.						PILOT	90		1		
599	13/11/09	AAL	AAL1013	N620AA	B752	18:49	SEKAR	SEKAR UA554 PTA W7 BEROX	390	370	390	2000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC MIAMI a FL370 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL390						MODE C	90		1		

600	14/11/09	CMP	CMP454	HP1533	B738	4:15	50 NM de LIMPO	UA321	370	350	350	2000	10		E	E - H	AMAZONICA	EQUIPMENT FAILURE	The flight CMP454 was maintaining FL350 when it was observed climbing and leveling at FL370, the Proximity Alert System bizzed due to the presence of flight CMP805 at FL370.			CMP805 - B738	FL350	50 NM de LIMPO	MODE C	10		1	
601	14/11/09	CMP	CMP805	HP1377	B738	4:15	50 NM de LIMPO	UA321	350	370	350	0	10		E	NO LHD	AMAZONICA	EQUIPMENT FAILURE	3000 feet below the flight	*** NO LHD - GTE 9 ***		CMP454 - B738	FL370	50 NM de LIMPO	MODE C	10		0	0
602	15/11/09	DLH	DLH511	DABVE	B744	6:31	0500N 04000W	SAEZ UZ2 SLI DCT 05N040W DCT 1111N0363 0W DCT 1600N0330 0W EDDF	NO	350	350	0	10		M	M	ROCHAMBEAU	ERROR IN ATC-UNIT TO ATC-UNIT TRANSITION MESSAGE	The previous ATC unit (ATLANTICO ACC) has coordinated this flight ETO 05N040W 06:36 FL350. The PILOT has crossed this point at 06:31 FL350. SBAO (ATLANTICO) ACC has not revised the coordination.					PILOT	10		0	0	
603	15/11/09	AAL	AAL980		B752	7:45	VILAS	KMIA UG449 VILAS OTONI SBSV	NO	350	350	0	10		M	M	ROCHAMBEAU	ERROR IN ATC-UNIT TO ATC-UNIT TRANSITION MESSAGE	The previous ATC unit (PARAMARIBO ACC) has coordinated this flight ETO VILAS 07:50 FL350. The pilot has crossed this point at 07:45 FL350. SMPM (PARAMARIBO) ACC has not revised the coordination.					PILOT	10		0	0	
604	15/11/09	NKS	NKS336	N502NK	A319	17:00	SELEK	SELEK UZ403 FIO DCT TIO	350	N/A	350	0	90		N	N	CENTRAL AMERICA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	HABANA ACC no coordino esta aeronave con CENAMER ACC.					MODE C	90		0	0	
605	17/11/09	LPE	LPE2428	CCCWF	B763	2:35	KONRI	UL550	NO	340	360	2000	90		M	M	ANTOFAGASTA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	LPE2428 transferido en KONRI a FL340, ingresa a FL360.					PILOT	90		1	1	
606	17/11/09	AAL	AAL971	N606AA	B752	16:38	SELEK	SELEK UZ403 FIO DCT TIO	370	370	370	0	90		N	N	CENTRAL AMERICA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	HABANA ACC no coordino el AAL971 con CENAMER ACC.			YV1496		PILOT / MODE C	90		0	0	
607	17/11/09	CMP	CMP408		B738	16:39	OROSA	UA319	YES	370	370	0	90		M	M	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Aircraft checked OROSA at 16:27. NO time revision.					MODE C	90		0	0	
608	17/11/09	LAN	LAN622		B763	22:28	ANPAL	UL308	NO	340	340	0	90		N	N	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	LIMA control NO pasa la transferencia y la aeronave se reporta sin transferencia con GUAYAQUIL.					PILOT / MODE C	90		0	0	
609	18/11/09		PPBIR	PPBIR	CL30	8:45	ASIVO	KARUM UG446 CDO UL793 ASIVO	430	410	430	0	0		M	NO LHD	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC SANTO DOMINGO a FL410 y penetró la FIR MIAMI a FL430.	***NO RVSM***				PILOT / MODE C	0		0	0	

610	19/11/09	AAL	AAL998	N789AN	B772	5:30	NELOS	UZ24	360	340	360	0	1800		B	B	AMAZONICA	CLIMB/DESCENT WITHOUT ATC CLEARANCE	The aircraft climbed to FL360 without asking the AMAZONICO ACC. There was a communication failure.							MODE C	1800		0	
611	19/11/09	TAM	TAM8057	PTMSR	B763	6:45	EGBAX	UR640	345	350	350	500	10		E	NO LHD	AMAZONICA	EQUIPMENT FAILURE	MODE C accused FL345	*** NO LHD - GTE 9 ***						MODE C	10		0	
612	19/11/09	DAL	DAL395		B752	8:31	LENOM	UG444	YES	380	400	2000	90		M	M	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	DAL395 KJFK / SKBO B752 UG444 LENOM 08:31 FL380. Aircraft checked LENOM at 08:21 with FL400. NO level revision.						MODE C	90		1		
613	19/11/09	JBU	JBU880	ECHQH	A320	21:41	LAMKN	TLPL VONID KOROL LAMKN MNOLO KJFK	NO	340	370	3000	90		M	NO LHD	PIARCO	ATC LOOP ERROR	PIARCO ACC failed to coordinate JBU880 A320 TLPL BONID KOROL LAMKN MNOLO KJFK at position LAMKN at 21:41 FL340 with SAN JUAN ACC. PIARCO ACC knew of the error when SAN JUAN ACC	reported having contact with the aircraft without having an estimate at LAMKN from the PIARCO ACC. PIARCO ACC apologized for the error.	***NOT IN CARSAMMA REGION***ATT: GTE8 - *** NO LHD - GTE 9 ***				PILOT		90		1	
614	19/11/09	VEC	VEC202	N620DL	B752	22:26	VESKA	VESKA UA315 PIGBI	400	340	400	6000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC CURAZAO a FL340 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL400.						MODE C	90		3		
615	19/11/09	TAM	TAM8098	PTMVH	A332	23:12	RUBIC	UN 866	350	350	350	0	960		N	NO LHD	RECIFE	COORDINATION FAILURE	not coordinated the traffic	*** NO LHD - GTE 9 ***						MODE C	960		0	
616	20/11/09	IBE	IBE6314		A343	2:05	OROSA	UA319	YES	330	350	2000	90		M	M	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	IBE6314 MROC / LEMD A319 UA319 OROSA 02:05 FL330. Aircraft checked OROSA with FL350. NO level revision.						MODE C	90		1		
617	20/11/09	POT	POT930		IL76	6:44	2300S 02500W	DCT	NO	330	330	0	600	6720	N	N	ATLANTICO	NEGATIVE TRANSFER RECEIVED FROM TRANSITIONING ATC UNIT	Traffic POT930 of EGYPT to FHAW was not coordinated by the center MONTEVIDÉO. The first contact was made at 06:44 on coordinated 23S025W.	*** CARSAMMA - Tiempo 6720 segundos ***					MODE C	6720		0		
618	20/11/09	AAL	AAL955		B772	11:36	SIDAK	UM402	NO	380	400	2000	90		M	M	ASUNCIÓN	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	El control de LA PAZ transfirió el tráfico AAL955 KJFK / SAEZ en la posición SIDAK a las 11:36 con FL380, cuando dicho tráfico tuvo contacto con el ACC de	El control de LA PAZ no realizó la coordinación del cambio de nivel de dicho tráfico.				PILOT	90		1			

619	20/11/09	UAL	UAL847		B763	14:12	OROMU	UL793	NO	N/A	350	0	90		N	N	ASUNCIÓN	FALTA DE COORDINACIÓN POR PARTE DE LA DEPENDENCIA TRANSFERIDORA	El control de LA PAZ no transfirió el tráfico UAL847 KIAD / SAEZ FL350 en la posición OROMU a las 14:12. El control de LA PAZ alego que se olvido de la coordinación del tráfico.							PILOT	90	0	0	
620	20/11/09	DNL	DNL2982		F100	21:56	MILOK	TNCC MILOK UA516 PJM TNCM	350	310	350	4000	90		M	M	SAN JUAN	ATC LOOP ERROR	DNL2982 entered SAN JUAN CERAP (TJZS) CTA/FIR over MILOK intersection at FL350 when coordinated altitude was FL310 with MAIQUETIA ACC (SVMI). SVMI controller called to coordinate FL350 but	the TJZS controller readback/approved FL310 and the SVMI controller did not catch the readback. No loss of separation. SVMI Supervisor, Mr. Gabriel Medina confirmed the information.							MODE C	90	2	0
621	21/11/09	LRC	LRC695		E190	2:57	OROSA	UA319	YES	350	350	0	90		M	M	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Aircraft checked OROSA at 02:16. NO time revision.							MODE C	90	0	2	
622	21/11/09	LAN	LAN621		B763	9:33	ESDIN	UL402	NO	330	330	0	90		N	N	LIMA	FALTA DE COORDINACIÓN POR PARTE DE LA DEPENDENCIA TRANSFERIDORA	A las 09:33 LAN621 reporta ESDIN FL330. Se omitio transferencia con SCEL.							PILOT	90	0	0	
623	22/11/09	UAL	UAL0842		B763	6:28	ILKIT	UL304	YES	380	320	-6000	90		M	M	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	UAL0842 SBGR / KORD B763 UL304 ILKIT 06:28 FL380. Aircraft checked ILKIT 06:32 FL320. NO level revision.						MODE C	90	3	3		
624	22/11/09	DAL	DAL200	N706DN	B77L	6:53	0700N 03500W	UKEDI UL375 EGIMI UL 695 DAGAM ASI (KATL/FAJ S)	NO	310	310	0	3360		M	M	ATLANTICO	COORDINATION FAILURE	CAYENNE ACC coordinated this traffic in such a position UKEDI on FL310 at 06:53 and the traffic effectively entered in the ATLANTICO FIR on position 07N035W FL310 at 06:53.	The pilot reported: "Our clearance from NEW YORK was EGIBO direct to FHAW which puts us about 95 NM north of UL375".						MODE C	3360	0	0	
625	23/11/09	LCO	LCO1503	N772LA	B772	5:17		UN741	NO	310	330	2000	360		M	M	ATLANTICO	COORDINATION FAILURE	The traffic LCO1503 was coordinated by DAKAR ACC at FL310, when it was passing the position NANIK, reported FL330.						PILOT	360	2	0		
626	23/11/09	DTA	DTA745		B743	14:52	2000S 02000W	17S010W / 19S015W / 20S020W / 21S025W / 22S030W / 22S035W / EKALO	NO	360	360	0	90	4440	M	N	ATLANTICO	COORDINATION FAILURE	The traffic DTA745 has not been coordinated by the LUANDA ACC and the PILOT made the first QSO (contact) at 14:52 near the coordinated 20S020W.	*** CARSAMMA - Tiempo 4440 segundos ***						PILOT	4440	0	0	

627	24/11/09	CMP	CMP463	HP1373	B737	1:33	PLG (PUERTO LEGUIZA MO)	UA321	NO	350	370	2000	90		M	M	LIMA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	A las 01:32 llama CMP436 B737 MIPTO / SACO ETO PLG 01:33 FL370. transferencia fue realizada por SKBO en PLG 01:33 FL350.							PILOT	90		1			
628	24/11/09		N21AX	N21AX	GLAX	11:50	FOZ	UB554	NO	350	350	0	90		N	N	ASUNCION	FALTA DE COORDINACION POR PARTE DE LA DEPENDENCIA TRANSFERIDORA	El control de RESISTENCIA no coordino el trafico N219AX SUMU / SYCJ, via UB554, dicho trafico llama a ASUNCION control a las 11:50, solicitando instruccion a lo que solicita notificar posicion.	este reporta haber chequeado posicion FOZ 11:45 estimando posicion TEDAS 11:58. Cuestionando RESISTENCIA la no transferencia de este vuelo la cual no recibio respuesta concreta.							MODE C	90		0		1
629	25/11/09	JBU	JBU757		A320	19:34	BEROX	UA567	YES	320	320	0	90		M	M	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Aircraft checked BEROX at 19:28. NO time revision.							MODE C	90		0			
630	26/11/09	CMP	CMP453		B738	10:45	TEMID	UA321	360	360	360	0	15		E	NO LHD	AMAZONICA	EQUIPMENT FAILURE	For two times, rapidly, the radar screen showed FL375 on MODE C.	*** NO LHD - GTE 9 ***		CMP8 06	FL380	TEMID	MODE C	15		0				
631	26/11/09	CMP	CMP409		B738	19:55	PALAS	UA319	YES	340	340	0	90		M	NO LHD	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Aircraft checked PALAS at 20:00. NO time revision.	*** NO LHD *** - ATT: GTE 7 / 8						MODE C	90		0			
632	26/11/09	SMJ	SMJ381F	SMJ381F	MD11	22:35	3400S 04000W	34S040W / 32S030W / 29S020W / 24S010W	NO	330	330	0	90		M	NO LHD	ATLANTICO	COORDINATION FAILURE	There was the coordination of traffic SMJ381F of SUMU to SBGL in 35S050W coordinated by CURITIBA ACC, but the destination of this traffic was HKJK.	*** NO LHD ***						MODE C	0		0			
633	27/11/09	LAN	LAN621	CCCWN	B763	6:40	OSELO	UL401	NO	330	330	0	2160	1980	N	N	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	CENAMER control transfiere extemporaneamente al LANCHILE 621, 9 minutos antes de la posicion KARAZ cuando se encontraba proximo a espacio aereo PERUANO.	Reportado KARAZ o correto é OSELO	*** CARSAMMA: Tiempo sin contacto con la aeronave - 2160 segundos ***						MODE C	1980		0		
634	27/11/09	COA	COA53	N67157	B762	8:00	PLG (PUERTO LEGUIZA MO)	UA321	NO	370	370	0	271	240	N	N	LIMA	FALTA DE COORDINACION POR PARTE DE LA DEPENDENCIA TRANSFERIDORA	Siendo las 08:04 llama SKBO (BOGOTA) e informa transferencia del COA53 B762 KIAH / SAEZ el cual habia chequeado PLG 08:00 FL370.						PILOT	240		0				

635	27/11/09	TPU	TPU040	N479TA	A319	13:22	DORKA	UL550	NO	340	360	2000	82		B - M	I	LIMA	ASCENSO/DESCENSO SIN AUTORIZACIÓN ATC / ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	Las 13:23, TPU040 SUMU/SPIM notifica haber chequeado DORKA 13:22 con FL360.La transferencia fue realizada por ACC SANTIAGO con FL340. Las 13:24 ACC LIMA llama a SCEZ y este confirma la transferencia con FL340. Al comunicarle que el transito se	encontraba con FL360 informo NO saber del cambio. Las 13:25 SPIM solicita informacion al PILOT de quien autorizo su ascenso, informando este que fue SCEZ. A su vez,SCEZ informo que ese transito solicito ascenso pero no fue autorizado y se le solicito	mantener FL hasta DORKA para luego solicitar cambio con SPIM. Se le informa eso al PILOT y el reafirma que lo autorizaron antes de la posicion LOA (CALAMA). SCEZ insiste que ese transito no fue autorizado a ascender. SCEZ informa revisar a grabacion.						PILOT	82		1	
636	27/11/09	TPU	TPU040	N479TA	A319	13:24	DORKA	UL550	NO	340	360	2000	90		M	NO LHD	ANTOFAGASTA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	TPU040 es transferido en DORKA a FL340, ingresa a FIR SPIM (LIMA) FL360.	*** CARSAMMA: Confirmacion del reporte de Lima ***						PILOT	90		1		
637	27/11/09	AAL	AAL903		B752	23:10	VESKA	UA315	YES	370	350	-2000	90		M	M	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	AAL903 KMIA / SVMI B752 UA315 VESKA 23:10 FL370. Aircraft checked VESKA with FL350. NO level revision.						MODE C	90		1			
638	28/11/09	DAL	DAL61	N841MH	B764	0:43	PIGBI	PIGBI UA315 VESKA		330	310	330	2000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC PUERTO PRINCIPE a FL310 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL330.						MODE C	90		1		
639	29/11/09	MPH	MPH665		B763	1:15	MILOK	TNCC MILOK DDP CAFEE EHAM		290	290	290	0	90		M	NO LHD	SAN JUAN	ATC LOOP ERROR - ACFT ENTERED AIRSPACE AT WRONG INTERSECTION	MPH665 entered the SAN JUAN CERAP (TJZS) CTA/FIR over the ANADA intersection when the coordinated intersection from MAIQUETIA ACC (SVM) was MILOK intersection.No loss of separation.	TJZS notified SVM I SUPERVISOR, Mr. Henry Rodriguez, who confirmed the aircraft was coordinated over MILOK intersection and advised he was going to address the issue with the controller.	*** NO LHD - GTE 9 ***					MODE C	90		0	
640	29/11/09	TAM	TAM3450		A320	1:20	FORTI	UW 13		390	390	390	0	60		M	NO LHD	RECIFE	COORDINATION FAILURE	ot coordinated the traffic	*** NO LHD - GTE 9 ***						MODE C	60		0	
641	29/11/09		N129QS	N129QS	B737	17:48	FOZ	UB554	NO	370	370	0	420		N	N	ASUNCIÓN	FALTA DE COORDINACIÓN POR PARTE DE LA DEPENDENCIA TRANSFERIDORA	El ACC de RESISTENCIA no realizo la transferencia al ACC ASUNCION, la aeronave N129QS B737 de SAEZ para TNCM, siendo esta ruta responsabilidad del ACC ASUNCION. Una vez reclamado este hecho a RESISTENCIA, alegaron que transfirieron a	CURITIBA y que ellos aceptaron el trafico, diciendo que CURITIBA debio transferir a ASUNCION. ASUNCION se percató del hecho, recibiendo una informacion de CURITIBA de que este trafico estaba haciendo un desvio a la izquierda	de la ruta que estaba en territorio Paraguayo, entonces el controlador solicita los datos de la hora que chequeo el VOR de FOZ a las 17:40 y la hora que etimaba liverar la FIR por posicion TEDAS fue de las 17:52.					ACC CURITIBA	420		0		
642	01/12/09		N53HJ	N53HJ	LJ55	0:20	VESKA	VESKA UA315 PIGBI		360	400	360	-4000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC CURAZAO a FL400 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL360.						MODE C	90		2		

643	01/12/09	AFR	AFR423	EFCEY	A343	0:49	KIKAS	UA550	350	330	350	2000	90		M	M	MAIQUETIA	ERROR OPERACIONAL	El Control de BOGOTA NO efectuó la coordinación de nivel de vuelo sobre la posición KIKAS y la aeronave reporto con el ACC MAIQUETIA con nivel de vuelo 350 el cual no fue coordinado.							MODE C	90		1	
644	01/12/09	AZS	AZS2109	RA76842	IL76	13:53	1051N 03622W	GVAC UW46 KENOX DCT POKSI DCT 1051N 03622W DCT UDOKA DCT SOCA	NO	300	280	-1000	10		B - P	NO LHD	ROCHAMBEAU	UNKNOWN	The previous ATC unit (GOOO - DAKAR ACC) coordinates this flight ETO 1051N03622W 13:53 FL300. The pilot contacts at 13:53 over this point FL280.	*** NO LHD - GTE 9 ***						PILOT	10	0		1
645	01/12/09	CMP	CMP382	HP1556	E190	21:16	PALAS	CDO UA319 PALAS	360	340	360	2000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC ST. DOMINGO a FL340 y penetró la FIR CURAZAO a FL360.						MODE C	90		1		
646	02/12/09	VEC	VEC8201	HP1310	B727	18:44	PIGBI	PIGBI UA315 VESKA	330	310	330	2000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC PUERTO PRÍNCIPE a FL310 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL330.						MODE C	90		1		
647	02/12/09	HPJ	HPJ88	N88V	LJ60	20:31	VESKA	VESKA UA315 PIGBI	380	400	380	-2000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC CURAZAO a FL400 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL380.						MODE C	90		1		
648	03/12/09	ABD	ABD2306	UR82027	A124	9:15	0623S 01300W	FHAW 0623S01300 W	NO	350	350	0	90	1080	N	N	ATLANTICO	COORDINATION FAILURE	s not coordinated by ASC	*** CARSAMMA: Voló 126 NM - 18 min = 1080 seg ***						PILOTO	1080	0		0
649	03/12/09	GSM	GSM8510	GCEFG	B763	10:30	1000S 01500W	FHAW 10S015W 15S018W	NO	340	340	0	90	1080	N	N	ATLANTICO	COORDINATION FAILURE	s not coordinated by ASC	*** CARSAMMA: Voló 126 NM - 18 min = 1080 seg ***						PILOTO	1080	0		0
650	04/12/09	AFR	AFR401	FGSPQ	B752	2:33	0500N 04000W	SCEL UM799 NADIR DCT 05N 040W DCT 1140N 03642W DCT LFPG	NO	350	350	0	10		N	N	ROCHAMBEAU	NEGATIVE TRANSFER RECEIVED FROM TRANSITIONING ATC UNIT	The pilot contact CAYENNE Control crossing 05N 040W FL350. The previous ATC unit (SBAO ACC) has not coordinated this flight.						PILOT	10	0			0
651	04/12/09	AZA	AZA674	ISE__	B772	6:14	BUGAT	UL206	335	360	360	-2500	30		E	NO LHD	RECIFE	RADAR FAILURE	anti-collision of traffic w	*** NO LHD - GTE 9 ***						MODE C	30		1	
652	04/12/09		N575G	N575G	LJ45	15:40	RETAK	CDO UA554 PTA UA636 RETAK	400	380	400	2000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC ST. DOMINGO a FL380 y penetró la FIR PUERTO PRÍNCIPE a FL400.						MODE C	90		1		1

653	04/12/09	GSM	GSM8511	GCEFG	B767	16:05	3400S 03500W	34S035W DCT FHAW	NO	350	350	0	90		N	N	ATLANTICO	COORDINATION FAILURE	At 16:05 the GSM8511 called this the ACC in FL350 and reported the position 34S035W. There was no coordination by MONTEVIDEO ACC or EZEIZA ACC.	After the initial call, the traffic was cleared to climb to FL370.						PILOTO	90		0	
654	04/12/09	LAN	LAN569	CCCWN	B763	21:39	SORTA	UL780	NO	370	350	-2000	90		M	M	LIMA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	Se da transferencia del LAN569 B763 SEGU / SCEL ETO SORTA 21:41 FL370. La aeronave ingresa a FIR ANTOFAGASTA con FL350. Omision de revision.						PILOT	90		1		
655	05/12/09	ACA	ACA092	CFIVR	B777	13:26	IREMI	UL302	NO	350	370	2000	30		M	M	ANTOFAGASTA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	ACA092 transferido en IREMI a FL350 ingresa a FL370.						PILOT	30		1		
656	05/12/09	ACA	ACA092	CFIVR	B777	13:26	IREMI	UL302	NO	350	370	2000	90		M	NO LHD	LIMA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	El ACA092 B777 CYYZ / SCEL reporta paso por IREMI 13:26 FL370, cuando la transferencia fue realizada con FL350.	*** LIMA confirma su error *** DESCARTAR					PILOT	0		0		
657	07/12/09	AAL	AAL2107	N639AA	B752	14:41	PIGBI	PIGBI UA315 VESKA	370	310	370	6000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC PUERTO PRÍNCIPE a FL310 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL370.					MODE C	90		3			
658	07/12/09		YV2073	YV2073	C550	18:23	POKAK	LRN UT4 POKAK	290	270	290	0	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC SANTO DOMINGO a FL270 y penetró la FIR CURAZAO a FL290.					MODE C	90		1			
659	07/12/09		N45VS	N45VS	LJ45	20:20	VESKA	PIGBI UA315 VESKA	410	390	410	2000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC SANTO DOMINGO a FL390 y penetró la FIR CURAZAO a FL410.					MODE C	90		1			
660	07/12/09	MPH	MPH661		B763	23:25	POKAK	POKAK UT8 PNA	330	350	330	-2000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC CURAZAO a FL350 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL330.					MODE C	90		1			
661	08/12/09	LPE	LPE2585	CCCQK	A319	14:19	PULTU	UL305	NO	360	380	2000	1080	900	M	M	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	El ACC SKBO (BOGOTA) NO realizo la revisión de FL380, pues fue transferido a FL360 y el PILOT no hizo contacto en toda la ruta con el ACC SEGU (GUAYAQUIL), reportandose con LIMA Control a FL380.	*** CARSAMMA: Tiempo de 1080 segundos de PULTU hasta TERAS - 125 NM sin contacto.				PILOT / MODE C	900		1			

662	08/12/09	LPE	LPE2585	CCCQK	A319	14:37	TERAS	UL305	NO	360	380	2000	228	120	M	M	LIMA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	Siendo las 14:39 el LPE2585 A319 SKBO / SPIM, notifica haber pasado la posición TERAS 14:37 con FL380 cuando la transferencia se recibió con FL360.							PILOT	120		1		
663	08/12/09	WEB	WEB6737	PRWJI	B733	14:47	RDL 228 150 NM de FLZ	UM654 / UN741	340	340	340	0	240		M	NO LHD	RECIFE	RADAR FAILURE	as lost to radar detection by	*** NO LHD *** NO hubo variación de altitud, solo falla de detección radar ***							MODO C	0		0	
664	08/12/09	TPU	TPU025	N568TA	A320	16:43	DORKA	UL550	NO	350	370	2000	60		M	M	ANTOFAGASTA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	TPU025 transferido en DORKA a FL350 ingresa a FL370.							PILOT	60		1		
665	08/12/09	GSM	GSM8511	GCEFG	B763	16:48	3500S 03100W	35S031W DCT FHAW	NO	350	350	0	90		N	N	ATLANTICO	COORDINATION FAILURE	The GSM8511 (EGYP / FHAW) was not coordinated by the responsible center. The pilot made self-coordination.							PILOTO	90		0		
666	08/12/09	BAW	BAW246		B744	23:29	0037N 04321W	37N04321W 05N042W	NO	330	350	2000	90		M	M	ATLANTICO	COORDINATION FAILURE	The traffic of the BAW246 was coordinated at FL330 and the aircraft entered in the area of the ATLANTICO ACC at FL350.							PILOTO	90		1		
667	09/12/09	DAL	DAL201	N706DN	B77L	0:47	091230S 0113960W	UL695 (10S010W ASI DAGAM ASANU EGUPA BUTAP DIGOR NOISE BODAK ORARO OBKUT DIKEB EGIMI ARUSI)	NO	320	320	0	960		N	N	ATLANTICO	COORDINATION FAILURE	ABIDJAN ACC did not effect the coordination of DAL201, FAJS / KATL, coming from the pilot to call the ATLANTICO ACC by frequency HF 6649 and by DATA LINK connection.							PILOTO	960		0		
668	09/12/09	CUB	CUB312		T204	13:56	AMBIN	UG442	YES	350	350	0	90		M	NO LHD	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Estimated time 13:56. Aircraft checked AMBIN at 14:00. NO time revision from MKJK.	*** NO LHD *** - ATT: GTE 7 / 8							PILOT / MODE C	0		0	
669	09/12/09		N52CT	N52CT	BE55	18:38	VESKA	VESKA UA315 PIGBI	400	430	400	-2000	90		M	NO LHD	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC SANTO DOMINGO a FL430 y penetró la FIR CURAZAO a FL400.	*** NO LHD - GTE 9 ***						MODE C	90		1		
670	09/12/09	ABX	ABX2232	N742AX	B762	21:56	VESKA	VESKA UA315 PIGBI	400	430	400	-2000	90		M	NO LHD	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC SANTO DOMINGO a FL430 y penetró la FIR CURAZAO a FL400.	*** NO LHD - GTE 9 ***						MODE C	90		1		

671	10/12/09	GSM	GSM8510	GCEFG	B763	7:24	0626S 01444W	0626S01444 W ASI (FHAW)	NO	360	360	0	90	840	N	N	ATLANTICO	COORDINATION FAILURE	ABIDIAN ACC not coordinated the GSM8510, EGVN / FHAW, point of entry into the ATLANTICO FIR, 0626S01444W as the flight plan.	GSM8510 through the TW	*** CARSAMMA: Aeronave voó 100 NM sin contacto = 14 min = 840 seg ***				ASCENCI ON ISLAND	840		0	
672	10/12/09	AMX	AMX028		B763	9:53	OSELO	UL401	NO	350	330	-2000	90		M	M	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	El ACC de CENAMER NO realizo la revisión de FL330, pues fue transferido a FL350 y el PILOT no hizo contacto en toda la ruta con el ACC SEGU (GUAYAQUIL) reportandose con Lima Control a FL330.	CARSAMMA: La transferencia deveria ser en OSELO y no en KARAZ. Porqué no preguntaron para CENAMER sobre el vuelo cuando el estimado en OSELO estaba vencido..	Reportado KARAZ o correto é OSELO				PILOT	90		1	
673	10/12/09		YV338T	YV338T	SBR1	13:47	POKAK	POKAK UA554 CDO	280	380	280	-9000	90		M	NO LHD	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC CURAZAO a FL380 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL280.	*** NO LHD - GTE 9 ***				MODE C	90		4		
674	11/12/09	AFR	AFR423	FGNII	A343	1:58	PELMA	SKBO UA550 PPR 18N 060W LFPG		330	350	2000	90		M	M	PIARCO	ATC LOOP ERROR	At 01:14 MAIQUETIA ACC coordinated an estimate on AFR423 at position PELMA at 02:04 FL330. PIARCO ACC approved FL330 for AFR423. At 01:51 AFR423 contacted PIARCO at the	PIARCO / MAIQUETIA boundary - ITEGO at FL350 estimating PELMA at 01:57. Conflicting traffic was BWA611 B738 REG: 9YGE0 - CYYZ ANADA UG449 POS TTPP estimating PELMA at 01:54 FL350.	To resolve the situation PIARCO ACC had to descend AFR423 to FL340 until crossing the traffic.	BWA6 11 - B738 - CYYZ /TTPP	FL350	PELMA	PILOT	90		0	
675	11/12/09	TAM	TAM8066	PRMAK	A320	14:01	ORALO	UA573	NO	340	360	2000	27		M	M	LIMA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	Siendo las 14:01 reporta el TAM8066 A320 SBGR / SPIM, ORALO FL360 cuando la transferencia fue realizada con FL340.					PILOT	27		1		
676	11/12/09	GSM	GSM8511	GCEFG	B763	16:45	3400S 03600W	AORRA	NO	330	330	0	90	4140	N	N	ATLANTICO	COORDINATION FAILURE	The GSM8511 of EGYP to FHAW, entered in the ATLANTICO FIR at 15:36 in coordinates 034S036W, and obtained the first contact at 16:45, informing the FL330 and destination FHAW.	*** CARSAMMA: Aeronave voló 69 min = 4.140 seg sin contacto ***				PILOT0	4140		0		
677	11/12/09	CMP	CMP710		E190	17:52	SELAN	UM525	YES	350	350	0	90		N	N	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Aircraft called on frequency without any transfer message from SKEC.						PILOT / MODE C	90		0	
678	13/12/09	AAL	AAL423		B752	4:40	RETAK	RETAK UA636 PTA UW9 RIBES UW4 CDO	370	390	370	-2000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC PUERTO PRÍNCIPE a FL390 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL370.					MODE C	90		1		

679	14/12/09		YV2477	YV2477	H25B	16:09	VESKA	VESKA UA315 PIGBI	280	380	280	-9000	90		M	NO LHD	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC CURAZAO a FL380 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL280.	*** NO LHD - GTE 9 ***						MODE C	90		4		
680	15/12/09	LPE	LPE2583		A319	2:19	PULTU	UL305	NO	380	360	-2000	90		M	M	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	EI ACC BOGOTA NO realizo la revisión del nivel de vuelo. Reportandose sobre la posición PULTU a FL 360.						PILOT	90		1	5		
681	15/12/09	IBE	IBE6348	ECGHX	A343	5:26	VESKA	VESKA UM525 MELLA	310	330	310	-2000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC CURAZAO a FL330 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL310.						MODE C	90		1			
682	15/12/09	GSM	GSM8511	GCEFG	B763	16:15	334716S 0373556W	3418S03811 W 30S034W 25S030W 20S026W 15S022W 10S017W ASI (FHAW)	NO	350	350	0	480		N	N	ATLANTICO	COORDINATION FAILURE	There was no coordination by MONTEVIDEO ACC, the GSM8511, EGPY / FHAW, B763, FL350. This traffic made the first contact of 16:15, via HF, and said it had crossed the coordinated 35S039W the 16:07.						PILOTO	90		0			
683	15/12/09	IBE	IBE6674	ECINO	A346	23:57	PERRY	SVMI UA551 FOF 18N 058W 23N 050W LEMD		370	370	0	90		N	N	PIARCO	ATC LOOP ERROR	MAIQUETIA ACC failed to coordinate IBE7764 with the PIARCO ACC at position PERRY. IBE6674 first contacted PIARCO ACC at position ONGAL at 23:54 FL350 PERRY at 23:57 FL370.	MAIQUETIA supervisor at 01:10 apologized for the error adding that the installation of a new piece of equipment contributed to the situation.						PILOT	90		0		
684	16/12/09	BWA	BWA522	9YGE0	B738	14:13	ANADA	TTPP POS UG449 KJFK		340	320	-2000	90		M	M	PIARCO	ATC LOOP ERROR	At 13:39 PIARCO ACC coordinated an estimate on BWA522 TTPP UG449 KJFK at position ANADA at 14:13 FL340. SAN JUAN ACC approved FL340 on BWA522. Due to traffic PIARCO ACC climbed	BWA522 to an initial FL320. Thereafter, PIARCO failed to climb the aircraft to the level approved FL340. At time 14:11 BWA522 checked over position ANADA and was sent over to SAN JUAN's frequency.	SAN JUAN subsequently called PIARCO and informed that he had a target approaching ANADA at FL320. PIARCO admitted the error was theirs.						PILOT	90		1	
685	16/12/09	LAN	LAN625		B763	17:15	OSELO	UL401	NO	330	330	0	2700	2520	N	M	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	EI ACC CENAMER realiza la transferencia por la ruta incorrecta y el PILOT no hace contacto en todo el espacio aereo con GUAYAQUIL Control, reportandose con LIMA Control en una ruta que no le esperaba.	CARSAMMA: Por qué GUAYAQUIL NO pregunto a CENAMER ACC sobre el vuelo? Por qué LIMA NO hice el LHD?						PILOT	2520		0		

686	16/12/09	CWC	CWC420	N985AR	MD11	18:59	KILER (40 NM SOUTH)	UG430	340	320	340	2000	90		M	NO LHD	KINGSTON	ATC LOOP ERROR	The flight was transferred by BARRANQUILLA ACC at FL320. However the flight reported at FL340 approximately 40 NM south KILER.	CARSAMMA: NO LHD							MODE C	90		1	
687	16/12/09	TPU	TPU075		A319	21:36	BEROX	UA567	YES	360	340	-2000	90		M	M	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Aircraft checked BEROX with FL340. NO level revision from MDCS.							PILOT / MODE C	90		1	1	
688	16/12/09		N1547B	N1547B	BE40	23:11	AMBIN	UG442	YES	370	370	0	90		M	M	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Estimated time 23:11. Aircraft checked AMBIN at 22:58. NO time revision from MKJK.							PILOT / MODE C	90		0	0	
689	17/12/09	AFR	AFR423	FGLZP	A343	2:02	PERRY	SVMI MIQ UA551 FOF 18N 058W 23N 050W LFPG		330	330	0	90		M	NO LHD	PIARCO	ATC LOOP ERROR	At 02:02 MAIQUETIA ACC coordinated an estimate on AFR423 at PERRY at time 02:07 FL350. Conflicting traffic was BWA523 B738 FL350 - REG: 9YGE0 - route of flight - KJFK UG449 POS TTPP estimating PERRY at 02:51.	PIARCO ACC advised MAIQUETIA ACC to descend AFR423 to FL330 to avoid a conflict and BWA523 was given traffic information. AFR423 contacted PIARCO ACC at time 02:03 and reported over position PERRY FL330.	*** NO LHD - GTE 9 ***	BWA523 - B738 - KJFK / TTPP	FL350	PERRY	PILOT	90		0	0		
690	17/12/09	KLM	KLM744		B772	5:03	PAGAK	UL793	YES	330	330	0	90		N	N	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Aircraft called on frequency without any transfer message from SVZM.							PILOT / MODE C	90		0	0	
691	17/12/09	CMP	CMP408		B737	16:58	OROSA	UA319	YES	390	390	0	90		M	M	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Estimated time 16:58. Aircraft checked OROSA at 16:53. NO level revision from SKEC.							PILOT / MODE C	90		0	0	
692	17/12/09	AAL	AAL1013		B752	19:19	BEROX	UA567	YES	380	390	1000	90		M	M	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Aircraft checked BEROX with FL390. NO level revision from MDCS.							PILOT / MODE C	90		0	1	
693	18/12/09	VEC	VEC202		B752	0:02	VESKA	VESKA UA315 PIGBI	380	360	380	2000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC CURAZAO a FL360 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL380.							MODE C	90		1	1	
694	18/12/09	AVA	AVA010	N968AV	A332	6:00	PELMA	SKBO UA550 PPR 18N 060W LEMD		370	370	0	90		N	N	PIARCO	ATC LOOP ERROR	At 05:15 MAIQUETIA ACC coordinated an estimate on AVA010 at PELMA at 06:10 FL370 with PIARCO ACC. PIARCO ACC approved FL370 on AVA010 SKBO UA550 PPR 18N 060W LEMD.	At time 05:55 AVA010 called PIARCO ACC at position ONGAL estimating PERRY at 06:29 FL370 SBKO UA551 FOF 18N 058W LEMD. MAIQUETIA ACC advised that it was an error on their end.						PILOT	90		0	0	
695	18/12/09	AEY	AEY19	IAIGH	B762	11:21	3410S 03410W	EGYP DCT FHAW	NO	370	370	0	90		N	N	ATLANTICO	COORDINATION FAILURE	O centro MONTEVIDEO não coordenou o referido tráfego.							PILOTO	90		0	0	

696	18/12/09	TAI	TAI561	N494TA	A320	13:09	ERBOR	UA552	370	370	370	0	90		N	N	CENTRAL AMERICA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	MERIDA ACC NO coordinó con CENAMER ACC el vuelo TAI561. o se recibió el mensaje de transferencia de la dependencia ATC que transfiere.	ACC CENAMER lo autorizó a mantener FL370 dentro de la FIR CENTROAMERICA.							MODE C	90		0		0
697	18/12/09	AFR	AFR456	FGZCH	A332	19:00	NANIK	UN741	NO	380	390	1000	600		M	M	ATLANTICO	COORDINATION FAILURE	The DAKAR ACC climbed the traffic in their area and forgot to inform the ATLANTICO ACC change level, a fact confirmed by phone. There was no coordination of traffic by the ASCENSION TWR.							PILOTO	600		1		0	
698	18/12/09	AFR	AFR444	FGZCE	A332	19:30	NANIK	UN741	NO	370	380	1000	660		M	M	ATLANTICO	COORDINATION FAILURE	The DAKAR ACC climbed the traffic in their area and forgot to inform the ATLANTICO ACC change level, a fact confirmed by phone. There was no coordination of traffic by the ASCENSION TWR.							PILOTO	660		1		0	
699	18/12/09	KLM	KLM736		B744	21:52	MILOK	TNCC MILOK UA516 RRDIA 26N 055W EHAM	330	330	330	0	90		N	N	SAN JUAN	ATC LOOP ERROR	KLM736 entered the TJZS (SAN JUAN) CTA / FIR over the MILOK intersection at FL330 with NO prior coordination from MAIQUETIA (SVM) ACC.	SVM) supervisor, Mr. Carlos Gonzalez, was notified of the event and confirmed the information.						PILOT / MODE C	90		0		0	
700	19/12/09	GLO	GLO9067		B738	0:39	POKAK	UA554	YES	400	400	0	90		N	N	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Aircraft called on frequency without any coordination and transfer message from MDCS.							PILOT / MODE C	90		0		0	
701	19/12/09	AFR	AFR461	FGITF	B744	2:00	PELMA	SVM) UA550 PPR 18N060W LFPG	NO	350	330	-2000	90		M	M	PIARCO	ATC LOOP ERROR	At time 01:33 MAIQUETIA ACC coordinated AFR461 at PELMA at 02:00 FL350. PIARCO ACC approved FL350. At time 01:58 AFR461 made first contact with PIARCO ACC estimating	PELMA at 02:00 maintaining FL330. The error was drawn to MAIQUETIA ACC attention.	**CREW COMMENTS: The PILOT of AFR461 advised that he had informed MAIQUETIA ACC that he was unable FL350.**					PILOT	90		1		1	
702	19/12/09	VCV	VCV6000		B733	3:20	KABON	UA554	YES	360	340	-2000	90		M	M	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Aircraft checked KABON with FL340. NO level revision from SVZM.							PILOT / MODE C	90		1		1	
703	19/12/09	CMP	CMP1610		B732	12:21	PALAS	UA319	YES	320	320	0	90		M	NO LHD	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Estimated time 12:21. Aircraft checked PALAS at 12:25. NO time revision from MDCS.	*** NO LHD *** - ATT: GTE 7 / 8						PILOT / MODE C	0		0		0	

704	19/12/09	CMP	CMP451		E190	12:23	VESKA	UM525	YES	340	340	0	90		M	M	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Estimated time 12:23. Aircraft checked VESKA at 12:13. NO time revision from MDCS.							PILOT / MODE C	90		0	
705	19/12/09	AWE	AWE875		A320	16:05	BEROX	UA567	YES	360	360	0	90		M	M	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Estimated time 16:05. Aircraft checked BEROX at 16:00. NO time revision from MDCS.							PILOT / MODE C	90		0	
706	21/12/09	TAM	TAM8091		A332	1:23	DIBOK	UL795	YES	370	350	-2000	90		M	M	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Aircraft checked DIBOK with FL350. NO level revision from MKJK.							PILOT / MODE C	90		1	
707	21/12/09		N578M	N578M	C550	2:27	AVELO	UA315	YES	380	380	0	90		N	NO LHD	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Aircraft checked abeam AVELO (off route), without prior coordination from SVZM.	*** NO LHD - GTE 9 ***						PILOT / MODE C	90		0	
708	21/12/09	AAL	AAL952	N39364	B763	18:06	ARNAL	UL465	YES	340	360	2000	90		M	M	KINGSTON	ATC LOOP ERROR	AAL952 from SEGU / KMIA checked ARNAL at 18:06 FL360. Aircraft was transferred at FL340.						MODE C	90		1		
709	21/12/09	AAL	AAL1934	N974AN	B738	20:25	DIBOK	UL795	YES	320	380	6000	90		M	M	KINGSTON	ATC LOOP ERROR	AAL1934 B738 checked DIBOK at FL380 and not at FL320 as understood by KINGSTON ACC.						MODE C	90		3		
710	21/12/09	AAL	AAL903		B752	23:14	VESKA	UA315	YES	370	370	0	90		M	NO LHD	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Estimated time 23:14. Aircraft checked VESKA at 23:18. NO time revision from MDCS.	*** NO LHD *** - ATT: GTE 7 / 8					PILOT / MODE C	0		0		
711	22/12/09	AWE	AWE853		B752	17:06	BEROX	UA567	YES	380	360	-2000	90		M	M	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Aircraft checked BEROX with FL360. NO level revision from MDCS.						PILOT / MODE C	90		1		
712	22/12/09	KLM	KLM785		B744	20:27	ACORA	UA516	YES	380	380	0	90		M	NO LHD	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Estimated time 20:27. Aircraft checked ACORA at 20:37. NO time revision from MDCS.	*** NO LHD *** - ATT: GTE 7 / 8					PILOT / MODE C	0		0		
713	22/12/09		N789XJ	N789XJ	C750M	23:07	SELEK	MRLB UG439 UCL UG448 TADPO MTH KTPA	400	400	400	0	90		M	M	HAVANA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	Ei ACC CENAMER informó al ACC HABANA estimado del N789XJ SELEK 23:15. La aeronave pasó realmente sobre SELEK 23:07, sin que CENAMER informara revisado.					MODE C	90		0			
714	23/12/09	LAN	LAN705	CCCQE	A343	16:45	1118N 03634W	LEMD DCT 14N035W DCT 1118N0363 4W DCT 05N040W DCT SCEL	NO	340	340	0	10		M	M	ROCHAMBEAU	ERROR IN ATC-UNIT TO ATC-UNIT TRANSITION MESSAGE	The previous ATC-unit (DAKAR ACC) coordinates LAN705 ETO 1118N03634W 17:22 F1340. At 16:45 DAKAR ACC contacts CAYENNE Control to inform that LAN705 was crossing 1118N03634W.	DAKAR ACC has not revised the coordination.					PILOT	10		0		
715	23/12/09	AAL	AAL1879	N970AN	B738	17:05	RETAK	RETAK UA636 PTA UA554 POKAK	270	310	270	-2000	90		B - M	NO LHD	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC PUERTO PRINCIPE a FL310 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL270.	*** NO RVSM ***				MODE C	0		1			

716	23/12/09	THT	THT702	FOLOV	A343	19:30	34125 03500W	AORRA	NO	370	370	0	90		N	N	ATLANTICO	COORDINATION FAILURE	The THT702 entered into ATLANTIC ACC without coordination.							PILOTO	90	0	0
717	23/12/09		N604LJ	N604LJ	C525	18:20	KABON	UA554	YES	360	380	2000	90	0	M	M	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Aircraft called through FL380 climbing to FL430. NO level revision from MDCS.							PILOT / MODE C	0	1	0
718	24/12/09	BBR	BBR1526		B752	4:45	VESKA	UA315	YES	410	410	0	90		M	NO LHD	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Estimated time 04:45. Aircraft checked VESKA at 04:49. NO time revision from MDCS.	*** NO LHD *** - ATT: GTE 7 / 8					PILOT / MODE C	0	0	0	
719	24/12/09	ACA	ACA075		A319	6:47	KABON	UA554	YES	340	340	0	90		N	N	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	NO prior coordination from SVZM.						PILOT / MODE C	90	0	0	
720	24/12/09	BBR	BBR1515		B752	11:12	AVELO	UA315	YES	360	360	0	90		N	N	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	NO prior coordination from SVZM.						PILOT / MODE C	90	0	0	
721	24/12/09	AAL	AAL939		B737	23:37	VESKA	UA315	YES	390	390	0	90		M	NO LHD	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Estimated time 23:37. Aircraft checked VESKA at 23:42. NO time revision from MDCS.	*** NO LHD *** - ATT: GTE 7 / 8					PILOT / MODE C	0	0	0	
722	25/12/09	GLO	GLO9067		B738	0:29	POKAK	UA554	YES	370	370	0	90		M	M	CURACAO	ATC LOOP ERROR	Estimated time 00:29. Aircraft checked POKAK at 00:22. NO time revision from MDCS.						PILOT / MODE C	90	0	0	
723	25/12/09	COA	COA1446	N33292	B738	19:31	PENSO	MID UB753 TNT UA502 TIO	370	370	370	0	90		N	N	CENTRAL AMERICA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	MERIDA ACC NO coordinó con CENAMER ACC el vuelo COA1446. CENAMER ACC lo instruyó para que ascendiera a FL380 debido a la presencia del vuelo AAL982.	NO se recibió el mensaje de transferencia de la dependencia ATC que transfiere.		AAL98 2 - MGGT UG765 CTM KMIA	370	PENSO	MODE C	90	0	0	
724	25/12/09	AAL	AAL939	N957AN	B738	23:39	PIGBI	PIGBI UA315 VESKA	390	370	390	2000	90		M	M	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACIÓN OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIÓN	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC PUERTO PRINCIPE a FL370 y penetró la FIR SANTO DOMINGO a FL390.					MODE C	90	1	1		
725	26/12/09		N835BA	N835BA	B737	8:51	OSORA	UL300	NO	350	370	2000	90		M	NO LHD	LIMA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	EI N835BA B737 KMIA/SAEZ notifica sobre la posición OSORA FL370 cuando la transferencia se dio a Centro AMAZONICO con FL350.					PILOT	90	1	1		

726	26/12/09		N835BA	N835BA	B737	8:53	PLG (PUERTO LEGUIZA MO)	UG430	NO	350	370	2000	90	3000	B - M	M	LIMA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	A las 08:51 el N835BA reporta OSORA con FL370 cuando para la FIR LIMA se encontraba en todo momento a FL350. Al consultarle al PILOTO este informa que fue autorizado por BOGOTA (SKBO) al ascenso y que reporto PLG (LEGUIZAMO) e IQT (QUITOS) a dicho FL.A las 08:53 se realiza coord.	con ACC AMAZONICO por el cambio de FL y este informa que lo tiene en visualizacion RADAR a 17NM con FL370. Al consultarle a BOGOTA (SKBO) con que nivel transfirió la aeronave sobre PLG y si lo tenía en visualizacion RADAR, este informa que con FL350 y que si lo tenía en presentacion.	Cabe indicar que al revisar las grabaciones, el reporte sobre la posicion PLG (LEGUIZAMO) es bastante ilegible por lo cual resulta imposible definir con que nivel reporta esta posicion. Al reportar sobre la posicion IQT (QUITOS) no informa el FL que mantiene. Por lo tanto es imposible determinar en que momento a aeronave cambia FL o si este ingreso a la FIR LIMA con FL370.						PILOT	3000			1
727	26/12/09	AWE	AWE880	N721UW	A319	22:42	ILURI	TBPB ILURI UA555 DDP UG431 ELMUC KPHL	350	360	350	-1000	90		M	M	SAN JUAN	ATC LOOP ERROR - ISSUED WRONG ALTITUDE	AWE880 entered the TIJZS CTA/FIR over the ILURI intersection at FL350 when FL360 was the coordinated altitude with PIARCO ACC.	MAIQUETIA supervisor, "RJ", was notified of the event and confirmed the information.						MODO C	90	0		1	
728	26/12/09	AWE	AWE880	N721UW	A319	22:44	ILURI	TBPB ILURI UA555 DDP UG431 KPHL		360	350	-1000	90		M	NO LHD	PIARCO	ATC LOOP ERROR	At 22:04 PIARCO ACC coordinated AWE880 with SAN JUAN ACC at position ILURI at 22:42 FL360. SAN JUAN ACC approved FL360. AWE880 was cleared initially to FL350 due to traffic in the PIARCO FIR.	PIARCO ACC failed to climb the aircraft to FL360 and the aircraft crossed position ILURI at FL350. PIARCO ACC admitted the error to SAN JUAN ACC.	*** La confirmacion del reporte de SAN JUAN ***					PILOT	0	0		0	
729	27/12/09	TAI	TAI380		A319	16:51	PABEL	MHRO UL471 TADPO MTH KMIA	360	360	360	0	90		M	M	HAVANA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	El ACC de CENAMER informó al ACC HABANA estimado del TAI380 PABEL 17:03. La aeronave pasó realmente sobre PABEL 16:51, sin que CENAMER informara revisado.						MODO C	90	0		0		
730	27/12/09		N380BA	N380BA	LJ60	19:24	SELEK	MNMG UG439 ULC UG448 TADPO MTH KFL	340	340	340	0	90		M	M	HAVANA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	El ACC de CENAMER informó al ACC HABANA estimado del N380BA SELEK 19:34. La aeronave pasó realmente sobre SELEK 19:24, sin que CENAMER informara revisado.						MODO C	90	0		0		
731	28/12/09	COA	COA1037	N18119	B752	2:39	VAKUD	UL780	NO	390	370	-2000	31		M	M	LIMA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	Siendo las 02:39 el COA1037 KEWR / SPIM chequea VAKUD con FL370 cuando la transferencia fue realizada con FL390.						PILOTO	31	1		1		

732	28/12/09	CMP	CMP4795	HP1561	E190	20:50	PALAS	CDO UA319 PALAS	280	340	280	-5000	90		M	NO LHD	ST. DOMINGO	DESVIACION OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACION	La aeronave fue coordinada por el ACC SANTO DOMINGO a FL340 y penetró la FIR CURAZAO a FL280.	*** NO RVSM ***						PILOTO	0		0	
733	29/12/09	TPU	TPU049	N493TA	A340	13:17	ILMUX	UM414	NO	340	360	2000	660	90	M	M	LIMA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	Siendo las 13:18 llama el TPU049 A340 SVMI / SPIM sobre la posicion ILMUX con FL360, cuando la transferencia se recibio con FL340.						PILOTO	90		1	0	
734	29/12/09	HFY	HFY621	CSTQM	A343	19:30	3411S 03408W	EGYP DCT FHAW	NO	370	370	0	90		N	N	ATLANTICO	COORDINATION FAILURE	There was no coordination of traffic HFY661 by MONTEVIDEO ACC or EZEIZA ACC. The traffic entered into the area of ATLANTICO ACC reporting the FL370.					PILOTO	90		0	1		
735	31/12/09	LPE	LPE2595	CCCXD	B763	0:16	PULTU	UL305	NO	360	380	2000	90	900	M	M	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	El ACC BOGOTA NO realizo la revisión del FL380, pues fue transferido a FL360 y el piloto no hizo contacto en toda la ruta (PULTU / TERAS) con el ACC GUAYAQUIL, reportandose con LIMA Control a FL380.	*** CARSAMMA: TIEMPO sin contacto con el ACC - 1070 segundos ***				PILOTO	900		1	0		
736	31/12/09	LPE	LPE2595	CCCXA	B763	0:30	TERAS	UL305	NO	360	380	2000	303	240	N	M	LIMA	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	Siendo las 00:34 el LPE2595 B763 MDPC / SPIM reporta haber chequeado TERAS 00:30 FL380. La transferencia fue recibida con FL360.				PILOTO	240		1	0			
737	31/12/09	ATN	ATN540	N721CX	DC87	3:00	ARUSI	UL695 (FHAW DCT TAPA VC BIRD)	NO	300	300	0	90	14142	N	N	ATLANTICO	COORDINATION FAILURE	There was no coordination of traffic by the ASCENSION TWR.	*** CARSAMMA: Tiempo sin contacto con el ACC - 1650 NM - 235 min - 14.142 seg ***	HACER VERIFICACION CON SBAO			PILOTO	14142		0	0		
738	31/12/09	AAL	AAL957	N345AN	B763	8:25	UGUPI	UL780	SI	350	370	2000	120	90	M	M	GUAYAQUIL	ERROR OPERACIONAL EN EL CICLO DE COORDINACIONES ATC	BOGOTA control realizo el FL370 del AAL957 con el que cruzo sobre la posicion UGUPI.				MODOS	90		1	0			
739	31/12/09	TAM	TAM8076	PTMSR	B763	22:03	DIBOK	UL795	YES	360	380	2000	90		M	M	KINGSTON	ATC LOOP ERROR	TAM8076 was coordinated DIBOK 21:58 FL360 by CURACAO ACC. The flight however reported at FL380. CURACAO acknowledged that they failed to revise the level.				MODOS	90		1	0			

APPENDIX B**“CONCLUSION 15/36 MEASURES TO REDUCE OPERATIONAL ERRORS IN THE ATC COORDINATION LOOP BETWEEN ADJACENT ACCs**

That taking into account the impact of operational errors in the ATC coordination loop between adjacent ACCs on air operations safety:

- a) CAR/SAM States/Territories/International Organizations apply, on an urgent basis among other measures, the programme for the prevention of errors in the coordination loop between adjacent ACCs described in **Appendix F** to this part of the Report in order to reduce LHDs caused by errors in traffic coordination messages between ATC units to achieve an acceptable target level of safety;
- b) CAR/SAM States/Territories/International Organizations gradually implement the interface for data exchange among ATC units (AIDC); and
- c) ICAO coordinate, provides assistance, and conduct follow-up on the implementation of these corrective measures.”

Agenda Item 4: Other business

4.1 No business was dealt with under agenda item 4.