



ASSEMBLY — 41ST SESSION

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Agenda Item 14: Aviation Security – Policy

STRENGTHENING THE RESPONSE TO THE INSIDER THREAT IN CIVIL AVIATION

(Presented by Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and supported by Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Panama and Uruguay)²

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Measures aimed at preventing acts of unlawful interference in civil aviation include those that help mitigate the risk associated with insider threat. The ICAO Global Aviation Security Plan (GASeP) recognizes the need to review personnel measures in the context of actions to enhance risk awareness and response. In addition to the technical guidance provided by ICAO in this area, it would be most helpful for States to have different means of assistance at their disposal, enabling them to develop and implement prevention policies and mechanisms to address insider threats.

Action: The Assembly is invited to:

- a) take note of the information set out in this working paper; and
- b) request the Council to design and develop activities of assistance to Member States (e.g., workshops, courses, seminars, implementation packages (iPacks) or any other technical assistance mechanism) for the identification, assessment and implementation of measures to mitigate insider threats in civil aviation.

<i>Strategic Objectives:</i>	This working paper relates to the <i>Security and Facilitation</i> Strategic Objective
<i>Financial implications:</i>	It is proposed that the activities referred to in this paper be funded from the Regular Programme Budget for the current triennium and/or from extrabudgetary resources.
<i>References:</i>	Annex 17 – <i>Aviation Security</i> Doc 10118, <i>Global Aviation Security Plan (GASeP)</i> Doc 10108, <i>Aviation Security Global Risk Context Statement (RCS)</i>

¹ Spanish version provided by Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of).

² Member States of the South American Region (SAM) and the Latin American Civil Aviation Commission (LACAC) (Argentina, Aruba (Kingdom of the Netherlands), Belize, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)).

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Traditional aviation security methods place emphasis on the risks to passengers and other aviation clients, such as cargo or mail consignees, etc. However, little emphasis is placed on the supervision and mitigation of security risks posed by aviation personnel. After being vetted, aviation employees are usually deemed “reliable” and are thus given almost unlimited access to aviation infrastructures, aircraft, information and critical systems.

1.2 Over time, various cases have shown that the staff of airports, government offices and airlines have used their access to and knowledge of aviation security procedures to commit offences and even acts of unlawful interference. Such incidents may include petty crime, organized crime, terrorism, smuggling, workplace violence, human trafficking, cyber threats, etc.

1.3 Under the standards and recommended practices of Annex 17, Contracting States are required to develop and implement security measures to prevent acts of unlawful interference in civil aviation and resolve possible vulnerabilities. These may include measures serving to mitigate the risk associated with insider threat, such as background checks, selection procedures, security awareness training, training of staff who carry out security screening, etc.

2. ANALYSIS

2.1 Under the activities geared to delivering priority outcomes, the Global Aviation Security Plan (GASeP) recognizes the need to review security measures relating to staff, taking into account risk advice and guidance on insider threat, in the context of actions to enhance risk awareness and response.

2.2 The GASeP also recommends that States review the adequacy of current measures to address insider threat, including background checks, physical measures, training and reporting mechanisms, and that these reviews be incorporated into States’ relevant aviation security programmes.

2.3 The protocols proposed by ICAO for risk assessments (*Aviation Security Global Risk Context Statement*, Doc 10108 – Restricted) considers the type of vulnerability from insiders, and States are recommended to make their own assessments of security risks.

2.4 It is important that vulnerabilities from insiders be considered as more serious, since insiders have access to security systems and have more opportunities than passengers or other personnel to successfully disrupt such systems in some way.

2.5 An appendix to Doc 10108 – Restricted sets out guidance on insider threats, including a proposal for insider threat assessment and measures to mitigate the threats identified.

3. CONCLUSION

3.1 One important element of aviation security is that States develop and implement adequate mechanisms for the effective identification, assessment and mitigation of possible insider threats. ICAO should support States by designing and making available a set of activities or a technical assistance mechanism, thus enabling them to build capacity to address insider threats to civil aviation activities.