



NOTA DE ESTUDIO

ASAMBLEA — 41º PERÍODO DE SESIONES

COMISIÓN TÉCNICA

Cuestión 30: Seguridad operacional de la aviación y navegación aérea – Políticas

**RESULTADOS DEL PROYECTO MUNDIAL
DE EVALUACIÓN DE LA SEGURIDAD OPERACIONAL**

(Nota presentada por la Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Panamá, la República Dominicana, Singapur y la Fundación para la Seguridad Operacional de los Vuelos)

RESUMEN

En esta nota de estudio se presenta información sobre el trabajo realizado por la Fundación para la Seguridad Operacional de los Vuelos (FSF) en colaboración con asociaciones de líneas aéreas en un Proyecto Mundial de Evaluación de la Seguridad Operacional destinado a ayudar a la Fundación y sus miembros a entender las necesidades actuales de seguridad operacional a escala global y regional, identificando las sinergias y las brechas en el tratamiento de los riesgos existentes y los problemas emergentes en el ámbito de la seguridad operacional derivados de la pandemia de COVID-19. La información recopilada contribuyó a determinar las repercusiones que ha tenido la pandemia en la capacidad de los Gobiernos para apoyar a su industria, así como en la capacidad de la industria para cumplir sus obligaciones en el plano internacional y nacional.

Decisión de la Asamblea: Se invita a la Asamblea a:

- a) pedir a la OACI que examine el resumen de los resultados que figuran en el apéndice A y que elabore más textos de orientación dirigidos a los Estados sobre la implementación de un marco para el programa estatal de seguridad operacional (SSP) y que considere los niveles reales de madurez del SSP en los Estados cuando revise el objetivo y las metas del Plan Global para la Seguridad Operacional de la Aviación (GASP) relacionados con la implementación del SSP en el GASP 2026-2029;
- b) alentar a los Estados a que examinen el resumen de resultados que figuran en el apéndice A de esta nota y a que consideren la posibilidad de elaborar más textos de orientación para apoyar a su industria, basándose en el aprendizaje extraído y en las mejores prácticas para establecer sistemas de gestión de la seguridad operacional (SMS) con un enfoque más simplificado o ajustable para atender a los explotadores más pequeños; y
- c) alentar a los Estados y a la OACI a que sigan haciendo mayor hincapié en la promoción, la educación y la concienciación sobre la salud mental del personal de la aviación.

<i>Objetivos estratégicos:</i>	Esta nota de estudio se relaciona con el objetivo estratégico de Seguridad operacional.
<i>Repercusiones financieras:</i>	No se aplica.
<i>Referencias:</i>	HLCC 2021-WP/208, Proyecto Regional de Evaluación de la Seguridad Operacional de la Aviación, Región de Oriente Medio ; Proyecto Regional de Evaluación de la Seguridad Operacional de la Aviación, Región de Asia y el Pacífico ; Proyecto Regional de Evaluación de la Seguridad Operacional de la Aviación, Regiones de África Occidental y Central y de África Oriental y Meridional ; Proyecto Regional de Evaluación de la Seguridad Operacional de la Aviación, Regiones de Sudamérica, Norteamérica, Centroamérica y el Caribe .

1. INTRODUCCIÓN

1.1 En 2021, la Fundación para la Seguridad Operacional de los Vuelos (FSF) puso en marcha un Proyecto de Mundial de Evaluación de la Seguridad Operacional destinado a ayudar a la Fundación y sus miembros a entender las necesidades actuales de seguridad operacional a escala global y regional, identificando las sinergias y las brechas en el tratamiento de los riesgos existentes y los problemas emergentes en el ámbito de la seguridad operacional derivados de la pandemia. La evaluación se centró en el transporte comercial regular por vía aérea, la aviación de negocios y las operaciones especiales.

1.2 La evaluación, elaborada en colaboración con organismos reguladores, grupos regionales y asociaciones de la industria, se centró en seis regiones de la OACI: Sudamérica (SAM); Norteamérica, Centroamérica y el Caribe (NACC); Asia y el Pacífico (APAC); Oriente Medio (MID); África Oriental y Meridional (ESAF); y África Occidental y Central (WACAF). En los primeros meses se recopiló la información habitual de seguridad operacional, como datos sobre accidentes, incidentes y sucesos graves, y datos sobre el número de dispensas y prórrogas expedidas y de medidas de alivio tomadas. Se realizó un análisis más detallado sobre la capacidad de los organismos reguladores para expedir dispensas y de los proveedores de servicios para realizar evaluaciones de riesgo exhaustivas a fin de tomar decisiones informadas. La información recopilada contribuyó a determinar las repercusiones que ha tenido la pandemia en la capacidad de los Gobiernos para apoyar a su industria, así como en la capacidad de la industria para cumplir sus obligaciones en el plano internacional y nacional.

2. EL PROYECTO DE MUNDIAL DE EVALUACIÓN DE LA SEGURIDAD OPERACIONAL

2.1 En colaboración con asociaciones de líneas aéreas de todo el mundo, concretamente la Asociación Latinoamericana y del Caribe de Transporte Aéreo (ALTA), la Asociación de Líneas Aéreas Africanas (AFRAA), la Asociación de Líneas Aéreas de Asia y el Pacífico (AAPA) y la Organización de Transportistas Aéreos Árabes (AACO), se envió una encuesta exhaustiva a sus miembros, así como a los miembros del Programa de Norma Básica de Riesgo de Aviación (BARS) de la FSF, con el fin de recopilar información sobre el nivel de las evaluaciones de riesgo realizadas y las estrategias de mitigación que se han puesto en marcha durante la pandemia. En la encuesta participaron más de 185 líneas aéreas/explotadores aéreos de todo el mundo. La información se recabó mediante encuestas y los resultados cualitativos se examinaron a través de grupos de discusión y talleres. A continuación, se celebraron talleres virtuales en cada una de las regiones, con el apoyo de las asociaciones de líneas aéreas, a fin de llevar a cabo un análisis más profundo de los resultados de la encuesta y poner en común las mejores prácticas y el aprendizaje extraído. A los talleres asistieron 307 participantes de líneas aéreas, fabricantes, organismos reguladores y organizaciones internacionales.

2.2 Las respuestas a la encuesta, junto con otros datos recopilados, proporcionaron a la Fundación información sobre el nivel de las evaluaciones de riesgo realizadas por las líneas aéreas, incluidas las estrategias de mitigación puestas en marcha y una muestra de la implementación de los sistemas de gestión de la seguridad operacional (SMS) a escala regional. La información recopilada también aportó —desde una perspectiva regional— una idea del nivel de implementación del programa estatal de seguridad operacional (SSP) por parte del organismo regulador.

2.3 Los resultados de la encuesta, junto con el análisis de la FSF, se refieren a las siguientes áreas:

- a) planes de continuidad de las operaciones (BCP) y planes de respuesta ante emergencias (ERP);
- b) SMS y procesos de evaluación del riesgo;

- c) capacidad para vigilar y detectar peligros y realizar análisis de riesgos;
- d) proceso de gestión del cambio;
- e) cooperación entre la administración de aviación civil (CAA) y la industria; y
- f) factores humanos y gestión de recursos de la tripulación y salud mental.

3. RESUMEN DE LOS RESULTADOS

3.1 Los resultados detallados por región se compartieron con cada asociación de líneas aéreas que colaboró con la Fundación y pueden encontrarse en los enlaces siguientes. ([Regiones de África](#); [Región de Asia y el Pacífico](#); [Región de Oriente Medio](#); [Regiones de América](#)). En el apéndice de este documento se presenta un resumen de los resultados en formato de resultados clave y conclusiones principales de cada una de las áreas mencionadas en el párrafo 2.3 de esta nota.

4. CONCLUSIÓN

4.1 Se alienta a los Estados a que examinen el resumen de resultados y a que consideren la posibilidad de elaborar más textos de orientación para apoyar a su industria, basándose en el aprendizaje extraído y en las mejores prácticas, en especial para establecer SMS con un enfoque más simplificado o ajustable para atender a los explotadores más pequeños.

4.2 Se alienta a la OACI a que examine el resumen de los resultados que figuran en el apéndice A, en especial las conclusiones principales, y que elabore más textos de orientación dirigidos a los Estados sobre la implementación de un marco para el SSP y que considere los niveles reales de madurez del SSP en los Estados cuando revise el objetivo y las metas del Plan Global para la Seguridad Operacional de la Aviación (GASP) relacionados con la implementación del SSP en el GASP 2026-2029.

4.3 A reserva de este trabajo, la FSF alienta a la OACI, a través, por ejemplo, del Grupo Experto en Gestión de la Seguridad Operacional, a elaborar textos de orientación y material didáctico específicos para los Estados con sistemas de aviación más pequeños que desean implementar un SSP, con la valiosa intención de mejorar las normas de seguridad operacional mundiales, regionales y nacionales.

4.4 La industria de la aviación, junto con los Gobiernos y la OACI, deben invertir continuamente en el bienestar, la concienciación y la identificación de los problemas de salud mental en sus respectivas fuerzas laborales a fin de velar por que la seguridad de la aviación no se vea comprometida y por que se inculque una sólida cultura de la notificación en materia de seguridad operacional en cada organización.

APPENDIX

GLOBAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT SUMMARY OF RESULTS

1.0 The responses to the survey, together with other information collected, provided the Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) with information on the level of risk assessments performed by airlines, including mitigation strategies put in place and an indication of the degree of safety management systems (SMS) implementation worldwide. The information collected also provided — from a regional perspective — an indication of a regulator’s level of implementation (maturity) of a state safety program (SSP).

2.0 **Business Continuity and Emergency Response Plans** — Ninety-one per cent of the operators indicated that they had in place an emergency response plan (ERP). This comes as no surprise, considering that there is a requirement for operators to have this in place. Fifty-nine percent of the operators surveyed also had a business continuity plan (BCP), which included, to various degrees, disaster risk management and cybersecurity. Only 65 per cent of the operators indicated that change management and reduction in workforce were included as part of a risk assessment. Thirty-four per cent of the operators that had an ERP as well as a BCP did not have an established link between their ERP decision-making and the BCP. In other words, some decisions may have been made at the top level on reduction of workforce without necessarily involving the necessary safety leadership to provide input on the impact (safety risks) of these decisions.

2.1 **Key Outcomes:**

- Airlines recognized the importance of tying together business continuity and emergency response planning and the need for this to be more formalized.
- Airlines were forced to make sure a proper BCP and framework were functioning throughout an organization. The larger the airline, the more complex it is to ensure the proper functioning of business continuity throughout all departments. Primary focus was placed on how to determine the minimum workforce that would be required during the pandemic. Also examined were the logistics of how different functions of the organization would work with the minimum workforce size and whether they would be sustainable. This confirmed that emergency response work alone must have a BCP in place.
- The pandemic required airlines that had both an ERP and BCP to decide where to address the disruption caused by the pandemic, and in most cases, it was placed under the BCP because the disruption impacted the entire business.
- Some airlines had the advantage of having a BCP established prior to the pandemic, and thus were able to activate it during the pandemic. Relationships between risk managers and safety managers, including their working methods, were strengthened.
- Many airlines have disruption management and ERPs that are based on aircraft accident and incident outcomes. Processes, checklists and work instructions had to be quickly revised to support pandemic and endemic containment intervention actions.
- Restart operations required operators to consider organizational centralized restructuring; consolidated project identification of tasks, functions, timelines, skills and cost in resuming operations; air operator certification, and continuing airworthiness matters; commercial plans (new schedules and marketing plans); training (critical skills gap); an effort not to lose training capability (factoring a staff reduction by 75 percent) and a return-to-work policy (which departments needed to develop for both workers on site and those working remotely).

- At the BCP level, airlines had to address drastic workforce reduction and decide how to determine the minimization of the workforce, coupled with the logistics of how different functions of the organization would work with a minimal workforce and how sustainable this would be.
- Generally, a high percentage of the airlines did not link their ERP decision-making and the BCP.

2.2 Key Takeaways:

- It is critical for aviation executives to demonstrate safety leadership and their commitment to a positive safety culture within the organization in order to maintain the fragile balance between safety, operational priorities and financial pressures, and to enable sustainable operations.
- Strong safety leadership in an organization is a prerequisite for a positive safety culture, leading not only to a safer operation, but also to a more efficient and resilient business.
- Any plan in place is only effective if an activation plan is also in place. Once activated, clarity is required to identify who gets involved, as well as the pivotal roles that would go beyond safety and security personnel and constitute a network of entities and personnel that report to the emergency and crisis center.
- Organizations that coped better than others had an ERP or a BCP with a consolidated committee of people focusing on how the business should operate during a crisis. A consolidated committee can take many forms, but it essentially comprises a technical team and a strategic team working hand in hand, ensuring all staff at the appropriate levels are heard and able to speak freely and objectively to ensure effective and safe operations.

3.0 **Safety Management Systems and Risk Assessment Processes** — Ninety-seven per cent of all operators that responded to the survey indicated that they have established an SMS and a hazard identification and safety risk assessment process, and 92 per cent updated their risk assessment due to the pandemic. Sixty per cent of the operators surveyed indicated that they reviewed their risk assessment as required, weekly or monthly. However, 40 per cent did not perform a review or only did so infrequently during the pandemic.

3.1 Key Outcomes:

- Evidence-based risk assessments were limited in some of the decision-making processes.
- There was a need for quick implementation of mitigation measures in existing procedures or rapid integration of new procedures.
- There was a need to continually assess risks associated with exposure and delays.
- Operators were challenged with the myriad of changes to national requirements from one state to the next.
- Some operators were required to establish the strictest standards to ensure they would satisfy the requirements in the majority of states in which they operated.
- Medevac flights were forced to review standard operating procedures (SOPs) and risks every two days, due to the rapidly changing landscape.
- Flight crews of all sizes of operations risked exposure to infection.
- Many jurisdictions' health requirements were not available to flight crew until they were on site.
- With respect to SMS implementation, generally, large operators have implemented SMS, but small operators experienced challenges.
- Operators of all sizes had to function with SMS during the pandemic, and small operators found it challenging to implement SMS.

- Many operators have further matured their SMSs and adjusted them to account for pandemic-driven changes, thus helping to ensure safe operations.
- Evidence from the assessment has confirmed that smaller operators in many cases saw their level of activity increase during the pandemic, not only for cargo operations, but also for specialty operations, including offshore and medevac flights. Those operators faced challenges similar to those of large operators, including similar risks, and they were required to perform risk assessments on a regular basis.
- The return to normal operations resulted in an increase of events seen in flight data analysis such as unstabilized approaches. This was mitigated by earlier simulator training (prior to the scheduled recurrent training). Some of the earlier flights had an extra trainer or instructor in the cockpit.
- New SOPs were established by many air operators based on risk assessments, including recommendations from their respective CAAs, ICAO and the World Health Organization (WHO). Many airlines also arranged to create travel bubbles (agreements between countries, especially those with low numbers of COVID-19 cases, to open their borders to each other) to facilitate restart operations. /
- Special operations/flights had to be performed at the beginning of the pandemic to evacuate nationals all over the world, which required special SOPs, evacuation plans, hotel coordination and foreign government coordination. The special SOPs were updated almost monthly during the peak of the pandemic.
- While SOPs were being revisited or updated, operators had to be cognizant that changes should only be introduced when necessary, as significant changes required further training and also created additional fatigue for all staff.
- Changes in work processes (such as changing configurations from passenger to cargo or expanding to include freight) required prompt and clear communication, increased surveillance and spot-checks, due to new risks arising from the change in processes, as well as residual risks.
- Early efforts on risk assessments became overwhelming and required new SOPs to be defined on a frequent basis to gather information throughout the pandemic.

3.2

Key Takeaways:

- An SMS is the cornerstone of an effective strategy to prevent hazards from becoming unrecoverable risks. The myriad changes introduced at all organizational levels — dramatically reduced schedules, parked aircraft, layoffs, loss of experienced personnel, recruiting new employees to keep pace with recovery and developing COVID-19–related safety and wellness procedures, to name a few — have tested all operators and States’ abilities to identify and manage risk resulting from pandemic-related changes.
- The enhancement of the sharing and exchange of safety information will facilitate the development of safety intelligence for management of safety risks at all levels. Exploring and analyzing lessons learned from existing risk management strategies in all sectors and at all levels helps to build aviation safety intelligence and add to safety data collection to support the identification of hazards and safety data analysis.

- While the level of SMS maturity varied by operator, the industry has benefited from the fact that most operators have been implementing SMS for more than a decade. Over the past two years, many operators have further matured their SMS and adjusted them to account for pandemic-driven changes, thus helping to ensure safe operations. However, the assessment has revealed the benefits of and the need for a review of operational safety risk assessment processes on a routine (frequent) basis, to identify new risks, hazards and mitigations related to flight operations during the pandemic.
- States should consider establishing SMS in a more simplified or scalable approach for smaller operators. Additionally, operators of smaller aircraft should be encouraged to engage with their airline associations and the International Air Transport Association (IATA) to benefit from programs such as the IATA Standard Safety Assessment (ISSA).
- Operators of smaller aircraft are encouraged to receive enhanced training in SMS to augment the safety level capacity.
- There is a need to develop and train more service provider staff in high uncertainty scenario risk assessments. This type of training has proved essential for effective decision-making.

4.0 **Change Management** — Thirty-eight percent of the operators indicated that a change management process was applied across their entire company, without exception. Fifty-one percent managed to mitigate the risk arising from workforce changes during the pandemic well or exceptionally well. Hazard identification, risk assessments and safety culture promotion are fundamentals for a strong SMS. However, 29 percent of operators surveyed indicated that their organizations' handling of this issue was average to poor.

4.1 **Key Takeaways:**

- Organizations/operators need to review internal controls and processes for change management in light of the transition to the post-COVID-19 environment. Any changes to operations should not unintentionally reduce the effectiveness of deployed mitigations. If changes are required, a plan should be provided and special surveillance programs implemented to monitor, identify and mitigate potential undesired impacts.
- Organizations should continuously promote change management through their safety committee or other forums, with the aim of maintaining a culture of change, with information being exchanged at all levels.
- Organizations should create multi-disciplinary groups, when necessary, to assess risks from different perspectives. This would ensure a better performance in the implementation of mitigation or control measures.
- The main challenges encountered with change management were the timeline in which to implement the change, train all the personnel involved, sign contracts, and develop and authorize procedures or manuals.
- Most of the changes encountered by airlines were due to the pandemic, which resulted in an increase in change management processes. Finding new routes and new markets was crucial for operators.

- During the pandemic, most airlines changed their strategic plan and outlook model to move from transporting only passengers to moving passengers and cargo. In many cases, cargo-only flights were conducted, including charter for cargo. This change in type of operations required extensive coordination and approvals from regulators.

4.2 **Key Takeaways:**

- Organizations need to address the management of change effectively and regulators need to engage with their organizations to ensure that the results are safe and effective. The cooperation and relationship with the regulator are extremely important to ensure a smooth and relatively quick approval process.
- Organizations /operators need to review internal controls and processes for change management in light of the transition to the post-COVID-19 environment. They should ensure any changes to operations do not unintentionally reduce the effectiveness of deployed mitigations. If changes are required, organizations/operators should provide a plan and special surveillance programs to monitor, identify and mitigate potential undesired impacts.
- It takes visionary thinking to practice good change management and think through everything that could happen, including the ability to forecast effectively everything related to risk for flight safety and to conduct operational safety risk assessments, as appropriate.

5.0 **CAA and Industry Cooperation** — Survey respondents were asked a series of questions to determine the level of interaction and cooperation between the industry and CAAs based on what was called for in the CART recommendations. The top exemptions, alleviations and extensions issued by CAAs for adapting flight operations in the new normal during the pandemic were related to pilot proficiency checks, pilot recent experience, pilot license validity and pilot medical certificates. Sixty-eight percent of the operators received targeted exemptions, exceptions or alleviations. Forty percent of operators requested extensions from their CAAs to flight duty periods, of which all were processed. Sixty-eight percent of operators requested and received exemptions to address in cargo in cabin solutions.

5.1 **Key Outcomes:**

- A collaborative decision-making process between regulator and operator was proved successful. Some States established industry committees comprised of airlines, airline associations and airport operators to devise strategies to cope with the impact of the pandemic. That helped to serve as a coordination mechanism among the civil aviation industry and health authorities to support the prompt identification of a fast recovery once demands started to return to normal levels. The committee focused on identifying alleviation measures and coordinating communication strategies to gain passenger confidence in air transport.
- The establishment of a collaborative safety team (CST), in particular within the SAM and NACC regions, enhanced the information-sharing needed during the pandemic between the regulator and service provider.

- We witnessed examples of good safety management practices among regulators and industry that facilitated the ability to make risk-informed decisions by assessing the situation and devising strategies to alleviate some overly prescriptive requirements while at the same time ensuring risks were maintained at acceptable levels.
- Extensive coordination and cooperation were triggered among industry, States, international organizations and original equipment manufacturers (OEMs).
- Some regulators issued safety bulletins in line with IATA guidelines, which significantly helped the industry.
- In the majority of cases, communications with the regulator were enhanced during the pandemic. Regulators provided additional guidance on mitigating measures, particularly when exemptions were requested.
- Regulators were required to publish the temporary exemptions as differences as promoted by ICAO to facilitate air operators' routes across borders. However, the number of published differences were far fewer than the temporary exemptions that were issued.
- The regulator and industry (service provider) have been severely impacted in the past couple of years due to the pandemic. With this, we have to recognize that risks were introduced at all levels.
- Fewer on-site visits were performed. However, an increase in virtual monitoring activities was introduced. While virtual monitoring has been beneficial, it does not replace the benefits of on-site visits; however, it is complementary.
- There is a need to harmonize world health requirements between States and within States. A more harmonized approach is needed to ensure a standardized approach to dealing with health requirements versus the requirements directed by aviation ministries and the World Health Organization.

5.2 **Key Takeaways:**

- CAA and industry cooperation was enhanced. However, we must recognize that everyone (regulator and industry) has been severely impacted these past couple of years, and with this, we have to recognize the introduction of new risks at all levels.
- CAA oversight has been reduced, with fewer on-site visits or in many cases, an increased time interval between checks. This was compensated for by the performance of virtual visits, increased communications (in some cases), and the issuance of temporary exemptions. We have to recognize that occurrence data collection has been reduced in proportion with traffic. Furthermore, data analysis may have been impacted with the loss of expertise (temporary or permanent) in this area by both the regulator and industry. This creates a risk that we must consider.
- Managing the many waivers and exemptions issued to enable the industry to survive the pandemic and begin recovery should be an area of extra focus as SSPs mature over the next several years.
- The level of maturity of safety management processes varied considerably between operators as well as regulators. The industry lacks guidance on a pathway to mature safety management processes. The industry could benefit from a road map on building a mature SMS process.

6.0 **Human Factors/Crew Resource Management and Mental Health** — Fifty-seven percent of the operators surveyed indicated that staff reported increased fatigue associated with returning to work following a long period of inactivity, constant alertness to ongoing fears and concerns around

employment, infection and protection. Fifty-four percent reported an increase in stress due to nonstandard operations. Forty-nine percent reported reduced knowledge and skills, and 44 percent reported a breakdown in crew communication and alignment. Thirty-eight percent of respondents were concerned by reduced reporting of non-conformities, 21 percent reported an increase in risk-taking, and 37 percent of the operators indicated that there was an increase in the level of reports on mental health during the pandemic. It is worth noting that while there is no ICAO provision for States to require air operators to establish mental health programs, almost 54 percent of operators had put in place a program to deal with mental health.

6.1 **Key Outcomes:**

- We need to strongly encourage a robust safety reporting culture with special emphasis on safety-related issues in the COVID-19 and post-COVID-19 pandemic environment.
- Organizations should pay close attention to fatigue reporting and actively support reporting of fatigue and other occurrences via a strong just culture.
- Operators should be aware that personnel returning to the workforce and those who continued working through the pandemic may be under higher-than-normal levels of psychological stress.
- Organizations and regulators need to understand the sources of aviation professionals' fear, increased stress and distraction, all of which can potentially reduce staff performance levels and impact safety.
- Smaller carriers that do not necessarily have a stress and mental health program should at least have an open communication channel with all staff at all levels.
- Reporting on mental health still carries a bit of social stigma, and more effort is needed to encourage a robust safety reporting culture. Some operators, particularly in the MID and APAC regions, expressed the challenges in allowing an open discussion on mental health.
- The long-term effect of working from home without human interaction has had an impact on staff mentally.
- Fatigue was an issue when returning to the office, as people have become unaccustomed to the physical working environment.
- The impact of the pandemic has increased stress levels on pilots as they fly less frequently and in a changed environment.
- The launching of confidential peer support programs that act as a support system for pilot crewmembers and their families, while not mandatory, has provided significant benefits. Such programs help detect potential issues with a pilot's state of mental health before it becomes problematic.
- Increased communication with all staff was an important factor in helping staff members and crewmembers feel connected with the organization.
- Operators should monitor crew experience to avoid pairing less experienced crewmembers. Match an experienced crewmember with a less-experienced crewmember to provide enhanced training and mentoring and reduce potential errors.
- One beneficial tactic was the establishment of peer-to-peer groups to provide technical support to staff, just to keep everyone aware of operations, particularly during down time during the pandemic.

6.2 **Key Takeaways:**

- The pandemic has had an extensive impact on the well-being of aviation professionals across the industry. The Foundation urges all stakeholders to assess these impacts and mitigate them in their safety programs, and to make the appropriate resources and support available to all personnel.
- Human factors and issues of mental health have impacted all organizations. This requires not only effective mental health programs for staff, but also for measures to be put in place to reduce the possibility of these issues arising.
- Risks can be introduced when staff resources are disrupted, especially when highly specialized staff are impacted. Crew resource management, in particular, would be impacted by disruptions.

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