



WORKING PAPER

ASSEMBLY — 40TH SESSION

EXECUTIVE COMMISSION

Agenda Item 12: Aviation Security — Policy

COLLABORATION BETWEEN SECURITY AGENCIES

(Presented by South Africa)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Threats to aviation continue to be complex and difficult to mitigate. It is for this reason that one agency or department cannot shoulder the responsibility for protection of the aviation system against these threats. Hence, a key factor to attaining success in the implementation of aviation security measures is collaboration amongst government agencies and aviation stakeholders with the key focus being on the protection of people and property.

To highlight this enigma, South Africa's experience in dealing with a number of crimes affecting air travellers through the establishment of a collaborative structure at OR Tambo international airport (ORTIA) will be reflected on.

Action: The Assembly is invited:

- a) to note the content of this working paper; and
- b) to encourage other States, that have not already done so, in establishing cooperation and collaboration Strategies and to build partnerships, in order to improve the effective implementation of Standards and Recommended Practices.

<i>Strategic Objectives:</i>	This working paper relates to the <i>Security and Facilitation</i> Strategic Objective.
<i>Financial implications:</i>	No Financial Implications.
<i>References:</i>	Annex 17 – <i>Security</i> <i>Global Aviation Security Plan</i> (Doc 10118) UN Security Council Resolution 2309 (2016)

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Threats to aviation continue to be complex and difficult to mitigate. It is for this reason the responsibility for protection of the aviation system against these threats cannot be shouldered by one agency or department. Hence, a key factor to the implementation of aviation security measures is through collaboration amongst government agencies and aviation stakeholders with the key emphasis being on the protection of people and property.

1.2 Annex 17, acknowledges this fact in the following standard, “Each Contracting State shall require the appropriate authority to define and allocate tasks and coordinate activities between the departments, agencies and other organizations of the State, airport and aircraft operators, air traffic service providers and other entities concerned with or responsible for the implementation of various aspects of the national civil aviation security programme.” Standard 4.8.3 further states that “Each Contracting State shall ensure coordination of landside security measures in accordance with Standards 3.1.6, 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 between relevant departments, agencies, other organizations of the State, and other entities, and identify appropriate responsibilities for landside security in its national civil aviation security programme.”

1.3 This fact is also acknowledged in the Global Aviation Security Plan (GASeP) in that one of its overarching principles is “cooperation and information sharing” The GASeP also lists as key priority number five: “**Increase cooperation and support.** Increasing collaboration between and within States will enable the key security objectives to be achieved more quickly and efficiently.” Under this priority the following priority action is stated, “Ensure all national entities concerned are actively involved in implementation of measures.”

1.4 The United Nations Resolution 2309 “*Urges* all States to ensure that all their relevant domestic departments, agencies and other entities work closely and effectively together on matters of aviation security;”

2. DISCUSSION

2.1 The above issues raised places a responsibility on all aviation security stakeholders to cooperate and collaborate in pursuit of safer and secure aviation security environment.

2.2 Over the past few years, South Africa saw an escalation in crimes against international and domestic travellers (including airport users), robbery of valuable cargo, as well as in the facilitation of contraband and illegal immigrants. This necessitated the implementation of actions to prevent, investigate and combat these crimes.

2.3 An investigation into the factors hampering effective combating of these crimes was found to be the lack of coordination between the various law enforcement agencies operating at and around the airport.

2.4 An Integrated Multi-Disciplinary Tactical Security Plan (IMDTSP) for airport and Surrounding Police Clusters was developed, approved and implemented by all the relevant aviation stakeholders. Fundamental to the success of this plan was the active support and leadership of the various South African government Ministers led by the then Minister of Police.

2.5 The IMDTSP is underpinned by embracing five pillars:

2.5.1 Pillar 1: Intelligence, which is provided through an Intelligence Coordinating Committee, including the counter-corruption strategies of vetting airport employees and undercover projects to infiltrate organized crime syndicates operating in and around the airport.

2.5.2 Pillar 2: Enhanced Landside Security, which provides traffic management on the immediate roadways of the airport and by-law enforcement within the airport landside.

2.5.3 Pillar 3: Proactive measures by Law Enforcement Agencies to prevent combat or respond to crime in progress within their areas of responsibility, integrating where possible to enhance this capability.

2.5.4 Pillar 4: Reactive measures to contribute to the successful prosecution of offenders by investigating, collating and analysing evidence.

2.5.5 Pillar 5: Route and Clusters Security around the airport to secure the feeding highways and combat crime, which transcends the airport jurisdiction into neighbouring precincts by means of criminal syndicates. Police Clusters and the Police Emergency Services (K9) are involved in the combatting of all crimes by providing a proactive and responsive policing service that will reduce the levels of priority crime in areas bordering the airport.

2.5.6 The Joint Operational Centre (JOC) Operations Room that runs 24/7 and is the coordination hub for any incidents, which need an immediate multi-disciplinary tactical level, approach to crime or other security related incidents.

2.6 The JOC Supervisor's meeting convenes daily to ensure coordination of resources at the airport to combat crime. The reviewing of the previous day's incidents/crimes are done, where after the planning and deployments for the next 24 hours is embraced. The deployment strategies to combatting crime is aligned to the Crime Pattern Analysis and an Intelligence Coordinating Committee (ICC) briefing from the Joint Operations Coordinating Committee (JOCCOM).

2.7 JOCCOM provides oversight for addressing security vulnerabilities, risks and threats at the airport. The JOCCOM is convened daily during the stabilisation period and the frequencies of meetings are subsequently reduced to weekly meetings whilst maintaining the stabilisation of the security at ORTIA. Senior level management forms part of these meetings at the airport to deal with issues, which require strategic decision making to provide direction for the operationalization and to receive feedback from the JOC, which informs on the five pillars of the IMDTSP.

2.8 An extended JOCCOM convenes once a month (previously weekly during the stabilisation period) where the JOCCOM representatives are joined by their senior managers and external role-players from the Clusters, Metros, the Appropriate Authority, and supporting Departments. These meetings allow for wider reaction from external role-players not based at the airport and for information sessions on issues which are dealt with by external role-players who indirectly are in support to the airport – National Prosecuting Authority and other relevant departments and agencies. This structure develops strategies and provides much needed strategic direction to facilitate and support the implementation of the Airport Security Programme.

2.9 Local Airport Security Committee (LASC) chaired by the designated Airport Operator also provides a platform for interaction on a strategic level of the Airport Operators Committee (AOC), Air Cargo Operators Committee (ACOC) and the Retail Operators Committee.

3. **CONCLUSION**

3.1 In summary, the model elaborated above as implemented at OR Tambo International Airport highlights the fact that successful application of aviation security measures can be achieved through intelligence driven operations, information sharing and cooperation inclusive of, but not limited to, collaboration among government agencies and the aviation stakeholders.

— END —