



WORKING PAPER

ASSEMBLY — 39TH SESSION

TECHNICAL COMMISSION

Agenda Item 33: Aviation safety and air navigation monitoring and analysis

**STATE SAFETY OVERSIGHT SYSTEM AND THE UNIVERSAL SAFETY OVERSIGHT
AUDIT PROGRAMME (USOAP) – INSPECTOR QUALIFICATIONS**

(Presented by South Africa)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper highlights the challenges posed by provisions of Doc 8335, *Manual of Procedures for Operations Inspection, Certification and Continued Surveillance* in the implementation of the Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme Continuous Monitoring Approach (USOAP CMA). Protocol Question (PQ) 4.025 and PQ4.033 read together with PQ 2.053 requires a Member States to demonstrate that it has sufficient and qualified resources to implement effective safety oversight. Doc 8335 states that an inspector for flight operations inspector, for example, should have extensive operational experience — generally not less than 5 000 hours as a pilot-in-command of civil or military air transport aircraft. As it can be seen in the Report on the Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme Continuous Monitoring Approach (USOAP CMA) Results 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2015, Global EI on Critical Element (CE) 5 and audit Area operations (OPS) and personnel licensing (PEL) is low and is of a concern.

Action: The Assembly is invited to:

- a) review and note the contents of the Report on the Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme Continuous Monitoring Approach with emphasis on the effective implementation of safety oversight on Critical Element CE-4 and Audit Area Aircraft Operations;
- b) support action by the ICAO Secretariat to form a Working Group or to refer the matter to the Flight Operations Panel with intent to amend the number of hours required as a minimum experience for the flight operation’s inspector in Doc 8335; and
- c) instruct ICAO not to utilize the 5 000 minimum hours experience as a yardstick to determine the suitability of an Aviation Safety Inspector (ASI) and therefore the effectiveness of the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA).

<i>Strategic Objectives:</i>	This working paper relates to the Safety Strategic Objectives.
<i>Financial implications:</i>	N/A
<i>References:</i>	Doc 7300, <i>Convention on International Civil Aviation</i> Doc 9734, <i>Safety Oversight Manual</i> ; Parts A and B (2) Doc 8335, <i>Manual of Procedures for Operations Inspection, Certification and continued Surveillance</i> Doc 9735, <i>Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme Continuous Monitoring Manual</i> Doc 9859, <i>Safety Management Manual</i> Report on the Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme Continuous Monitoring Approach (USOAP CMA) Results 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2015.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Critical Elements (CEs) are deemed to be the key fundamental and essentially safety defence tools of a State's safety oversight system required for the effective implementation of safety-related international Standards and associated procedures. Each Member State is required to address all eight CEs in its effort to establish and implement an effective safety oversight system that reflects the shared responsibility of the State and the aviation community.

1.2 To evaluate the effectiveness of a State's safety oversight system, ICAO through the Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme Continuous Monitoring Approach (USOAP CMA), conducts audits on all the Member States.

1.3 The CEs cover the whole spectrum of civil aviation activities, including personnel licensing, aircraft operations, airworthiness of aircraft, aircraft accident and incident investigation, air navigation services and aerodromes. The level of effective implementation of the CEs is an indication of a State's capability for safety oversight.

2. DISCUSSION

2.1 The 32nd Session of the Assembly (22 September – 2 October 1998) reviewed the recommendations of the Council and adopted Assembly Resolution A32-11 — Establishment of an ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP).

2.2 Accordingly, the 35th Session of the Assembly adopted Resolution A35-6, which requested that the USOAP be expanded to include the safety-related provisions contained in all safety-related Annexes to the Chicago Convention as of 2005. This Resolution, which superseded Assembly Resolution A33-8, further requested the Secretary General to restructure the USOAP to implement the CSA and to restructure the safety oversight audit reports to reflect the CEs of a safety oversight system, as presented in the *Safety Oversight Manual (Doc 9734)*, Part A — *The Establishment and Management of a State's Safety Oversight System*. Under the CSA, all Member States would be audited at least once during a six-year period.

2.3 CE-4 relates to technical personnel qualifications and training. This entails the establishment of minimum knowledge and experience requirements for the technical personnel performing safety oversight functions and the provision of appropriate training to maintain and enhance their competence at the desired level. The training should include initial and recurrent (periodic) training.

2.4 Each audit protocol questionnaire comprises a set of comprehensive Protocol Questions (PQs) which are, at the same time, sufficiently flexible to allow the appropriate evaluation of the scope and complexity of the aviation activity in each State. PQs are the main tool used during the conduct of an audit for the assessment of the State's safety oversight capability.

2.5 The PQs are based on the Chicago Convention, safety-related Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) established in the Annexes to the Convention and associated guidance material. Each PQ is linked to a CE and when considered "not satisfactory", this is reflected in the related CE in the audit results. Every audit finding must be based on at least one not satisfactory PQ. A PQ marked as not satisfactory may also be referred to as a deficiency.

2.6 PQ 4.025 and PQ4.033 read together with PQ 2.053 require a Member State to demonstrate that it has sufficient and qualified resources to implement effective safety oversight. The material giving guidance in the Aircraft Operation Audit Area (*Manual of Procedures for Operations Inspection, Certification and Continued Surveillance*, Doc 8335) states that an inspector for flight operations inspector, for example, should have extensive operational experience — generally not less than 5 000 hours as a pilot-in-command of civil or military air transport aircraft. As it can be seen in the Report on the Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme Continuous Monitoring Approach (USOAP CMA) Results 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2015, Global EI on CE-5 and audit Area OPS and PEL is low and is of a concern.

2.7 The same document (Doc 8335) states that the CAA inspector conducting line or flight crew licensing checks should be required to hold a current airline transport pilot licence (ATPL). Persons seeking a position as a flight operations inspector should have held previous appointments either in operational management, as an airline pilot and designated examiner, or training instructor, or as a military pilot where equivalent experience in air transport operations would have been acquired. This statement is in harmony with the highest qualification a pilot can attain being ATPL.

2.8 In terms of ICAO Annex 1 – *Personnel Licensing* (PEL), a pilot requires 1 500 flight hours to be issued with ATPL. The function of an Aviation Safety Inspector (ASI) is of a special nature. One must have been in an authority to perform these functions. The training required to execute these duties as an ASI are of a specialized nature e.g. Government Safety Inspector. The initial training of CAA inspectorate staff consist of a competency-based instruction with respect to CAA regulations and procedures.

2.9 To ensure that CAA inspectorate personnel maintain proficiency and keep current on aircraft and equipment, techniques, procedures and new developments in their respective areas of expertise, it is essential that they receive periodic technical training. Inspectors should therefore be required to demonstrate a high degree of training in conducting oversight functions.

2.10 There is currently no evidence to indicate that an ASI who is having less than 5 000 hours as pilot-in-command cannot be in a position to effectively perform his/her duties. It is a well-known fact that CAA's of developing countries, particularly in the AFI Region, are having serious challenges in attracting, maintaining and retaining suitably qualified personnel. Hence a number of interventions have been initiated by African Civil Aviation Commission (AFCAC), ICAO and Development Partners.

2.11 This high number (5 000) of flight hours, which has no correlation to the effectiveness of the CAA, is viewed as a hindrance to the ability of Member States to recruit adequate resources required to execute their mandate. This requirement is therefore, compromising safety and has a high potential of creating a Significant Safety Concern (SSC) to a Member State.

3. CONCLUSION

3.1 The “No Country Left behind” (NCLB) campaign, the Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP) and Global Navigation Plan (GANP) can only be effectively implemented based on Member States having suitable resources. Raising the bar unnecessarily has adverse effects and therefore leaves a lot of countries behind.

3.2 South Africa, therefore, calls for the review of the decision to use the 5 000 hours as pilot-in- command for the purposes of determining the suitability of ASI. In the spirit of the ‘No Country

Left Behind', ICAO is requested to establish a Working Group to analyse the Report of the Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme Continuous Monitoring Approach with emphasis on the effective implementation of safety oversight on Critical Element CE-4 and Audit Area Aircraft Operations. The Working Group should ultimately recommend a suitable number of hours required as a minimum experience for the flight operation's inspector in Document 8335 and refer the matter to the Flight Operations Panel for finalization through the ICAO system.

3.3 As an interim measure, the 5 000 minimum hours experience should not be utilized as a yardstick to determine the suitability of an ASI and therefore the effectiveness of the CAA.

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