



ASSEMBLY — 39TH SESSION

TECHNICAL COMMISSION

Agenda Item 37: Other issues to be considered by the Technical Commission

IMPROVING THE MONITORING AND RECORDING OF ACTIONS RELATING TO SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

(Presented by Slovakia on behalf of the European Union and its Member States¹,
the other Member States of the European Civil Aviation Conference²; and by
EUROCONTROL)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The issuance of safety recommendations (SRs), notably in the context of a Final Report following an accident or serious incident, is essential for enhancing aviation safety and to the prevention of similar occurrences in the future. The implementation by an addressee of a SR it receives remains the decision of that addressee. Nevertheless it is a fact that SRs are not always appropriately followed-up and addressed, and that the actions proposed or taken are not always adequately monitored by relevant parties. This is valid in various cases, including when relating to SRs addressed to ICAO and those of global concern (SRGC). Furthermore, it is recognised at a global level that exchanging safety information, including SRs, is fundamental to ensure aviation safety.

Action: The Assembly is invited to:

- a) recall that issuing SRs, notably in the context of a Final Report following an accident or serious incident, is crucial to the prevention of similar occurrences in the future and to the overall enhancement of aviation safety;
- b) call upon the Council to identify possibilities to ensure more efficient, and closer monitoring and recording of actions taken or proposed by addressees to address the safety issue identified by the SR, with a view to encouraging addressees to take adequate action when receiving Safety Recommendations; and to take actions accordingly, including, where relevant, to propose amendments to Annex 13;
- c) endorse the 2015 High-level Safety Conference Recommendation calling for the establishment by ICAO of a database for Safety Recommendations of Global Concern (SRGC) and expedite appropriate actions and its availability on an appropriate ICAO website; and
- d) invite ICAO to adopt a process with a view to identifying, amongst the SRs it receives or is informed of, SRGC and to inform its Member States through the aforementioned database.

¹ Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom

² Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Iceland, Republic of Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Norway, San Marino, Serbia, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey and Ukraine

<i>Strategic Objectives:</i>	This working paper relates to all Strategic Objective of Safety.
<i>Financial implications:</i>	The activities referred to in this paper will be undertaken subject to the resources available in the 2017-2019 Regular Programme Budget and/or from extra budgetary contributions. The European Union is ready to make available, free of charge, the tool that is used for the European SR database and that could be used for the ICAO SRGC database.
<i>References:</i>	Annex 13 — <i>Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation</i> Doc 9756, <i>Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation</i> Doc 9962, <i>Manual on Accident and Incident Investigation Policies and Procedures</i> Doc 10046, <i>Report of the Second High-Level Safety Conference (2015)</i>

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The issuance of Safety Recommendations (SRs), notably in the context of a Final Report following an accident or serious incident, is essential to the enhancement of aviation safety and to the prevention of similar occurrences in the future. In effect, SRs identify the actions which, resulting from the accident or serious incident investigation process, are deemed necessary to prevent the re-occurrence of the event. SRs can also result from safety studies, on the understanding that such safety studies were based on investigations carried out by Accident Investigation Authorities (AIAs).

2. DISCUSSION

2.1 It is acknowledged that the action taken as a result of a SR is and will remain the ultimate decision of the addressee that receives the SR. At the same time it is also recognised that, in some cases, SRs are not adequately acted upon, or even not addressed at all, so the identified safety issue remains.

2.2 The SR system should consider the flexible duration of recommended action for SRs, which could potentially impact the monitoring and follow-up effectiveness. Indeed, attention should be drawn to some inherent characteristics of SRs. The corrective action required technical/operational or regulatory issues may vary greatly, and so the nature of the action advocated by the AIA will vary. Thus short, medium or long term follow-up by the stakeholders should be considered. By experience, a technical response in the area of operations, design, training or maintenance could fall within a short/medium term process. On the other hand, an SR requesting a regulatory change addressed to a contracting State or a Regional Primary certification and regulatory authority for example, can involve a long-term regulatory process response. Currently there is no provision within Annex 13 — *Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation* on the implementation of the traceability, monitoring and follow-up of SRs. In effect, Annex 13 provisions relating to the responsibility of a State receiving or issuing SRs (Recommendations 6.10 to 6.12) only calls for a reply within ninety days, procedures to record the responses and procedures to monitor the progress of action taken.

2.3 In this context, particular attention should be paid by the Contracting States, ICAO and any SR addressee to SRs and consider them as an important issue for which a specific and unified monitoring and follow-up process should be implemented.

2.4 An improved monitoring of SR follow-up can contribute to improve the adequacy and level of SR implementation. It can ultimately support the prevention of similar events re-occurrence. Such enhanced monitoring should be assured by the Contracting State that has issued the SR and by the Contracting State responsible for the oversight of the addressee that received the SR. This can contribute to the overall oversight framework exercised by a State over the entities it is responsible for. In order to achieve these objectives, relevant Contracting States should be able to ensure effective traceability, monitoring and follow-up of SRs with the support of harmonized, efficient and more effective processes and procedures.

2.5 In certain cases, a SR can be addressed to ICAO. Those SRs should be addressed and followed-up in a timely and transparent manner by ICAO, with a view to ensure that, where relevant, necessary actions are taken to the benefit of global aviation safety. Furthermore, Contracting States should be informed on actions, or non-actions, taken by ICAO following a SR it has received and of the reasons supporting such action or non-action.

2.6 The setting up of SRGC by ICAO in 2011, highlighted the fact that SRs are of strategic importance for aviation safety and this effective resource should make it possible to identify safety issues of global priority. A process should be adopted to make the SRGC concept a reality. This should notably allow ICAO to adopt a process with a view to identify SRGCs, among SRs it receives or is informed of.

2.7 Furthermore those SRGCs should be shared with the States as aggregation of information should provide major safety benefits. Such a platform should help to better identify safety concerns and trends, and prevent duplication of effort among regional safety organizations or States. This has notably been recognised at the ICAO High-level Safety Conference (HLSC) that was held in 2015. At a regional level, the European Union (EU) has set up in 2013 a SR database to facilitate the exchange of related SRs information and the identification of SR of EU-wide relevance. To make such a SR system achievable, this requires a database, guidance and procedures, mainly to ensure SR traceability, through monitoring and follow-up status of responses and actions undertaken or not by the addressees. These actions should guarantee a quality of data and traceability relating to SRs and responses provided by the addressees..

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