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Report on the Evaluation  
of  
The Global Aviation Security Plan (GASeP)

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Office of Internal Oversight



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## ACRONYMS

ACI	Airport Council International
ANB	Air Navigation Bureau
ASC	Aviation Security Committee
ASF	Aviation Security and Facilitation
ATAG	Air Transport Action Group
ATB	Air Transport Bureau
ATC	Air Transport Committee
ASC	Aviation Security Committee
ASP	Aviation Security Policy
CAA	Civil Aviation Authority
CAD	Canadian Dollars
CMA	Continuous Monitoring Approach
CANSO	Civil Air Navigation Services Organisation
C-DEC	Council Decision
CMRT	Corporate Management and Reporting Tool
C-WP	Council Work Programme
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
EI	Effective Implementation
ERG	Evaluation Reference Group
EC	European Commission
FAL	Facilitation
GANP	Global Air Navigation Plan
GASep	Global Aviation Security Plan
GASP	Global Aviation Safety Plan
IATA	International Air Transport Association
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICASS	ICAO Comprehensive Aviation Security Strategy
ISD-SEC	Implementation Support and Development Section
OECD – DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's - Development Assistance Committee
OIO	Office of Internal Oversight
SARPs	Standards and Recommended Practices
SPCP	Strategic Planning, Coordination and Partnerships
SSeCs	Significant Security Concern

TCB	Technical Cooperation Bureau
TIACA	The International Air Cargo Association
UIC	Committee on Unlawful Interference (currently Aviation Security Committee – ASC)
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
USAP-CMA	Universal Security Audit Programme – Continuous Monitoring Approach

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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1. The Office of Internal Oversight (OIO) has evaluated the Global Aviation Security Plan (GASeP) between April and November 2021. The purpose of the evaluation is twofold: accountability and learning. On the one hand, the evaluation seeks to provide evidence of institutional performance; it also contains recommendations for improvements. The principal intended users of the evaluation are the ICAO Council, Secretariat, Member States and other relevant stakeholders. The evaluation covered the evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, coherence, efficiency and sustainability and used both qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection and analysis.

### Key Findings and Conclusions

2. GASeP has been a useful and relevant framework at varying degrees to many Member States and some regional organizations for priority setting and a tool to advance aviation security. It has been used to help design and adjust national AVSEC plans, inspire regional Roadmaps and frameworks and used as an advocacy tool. However, it has limited use for some industry stakeholders.
3. GASeP is strategically aligned with the ICAO Strategic Objective on Security and Facilitation and the Business Plan. However, there is a need to incorporate the priority actions of the Roadmap in the Secretariat Operating Plans for implementation and monitoring. The relation between GASeP, Annex 17 and the manual should also be clarified in the document and better communication about the role of GASeP to all relevant stakeholders is needed.
4. COVID-19 has brought many challenges and delays as well as opportunities in implementing the priority actions of the GASeP. There is an overall call to adapt GASeP to a new time frame given the challenges COVID-19 has presented to Member States.
5. The establishment of an aspirational target for GASeP was an important step to encourage Member States. However, the aspirational targets are seen by many Member States as too ambitious and the mechanisms available to capture progress against the EIs as inadequate.
6. GASeP's target of achieving EI of at least 65 per cent in 80 per cent of Member States by 2020 has not been achieved. – only 63.04 percent (out of the target 80 percent) of States have achieved the 2020 target of a minimum 65 per cent EI. If the current trend continues, it is highly unlikely that the global target of 2023, (90 per cent of Member States to reach above 80 per cent EI) and 2030 (100 per cent of Member States to reach above 90 per cent EI) will be met.
7. There is no clarity in the results chain of GASeP's framework (activities leading to outputs and outputs leading to outcomes). In addition, the number of Priority Actions of the Roadmap are found to be too many. There is an overall demand from member States, Regional Offices and the industry to review GASeP's Roadmap and introduce focused priority actions or outputs, clear indicators and responsibilities.
8. There is progress in implementing the priority actions of the GASeP by ICAO, Member States and some stakeholders. The overall assessment of the quality of the technical assistance provided by ICAO to Member States in the area of security is also considered satisfactory. However, the absence of coherent monitoring and reporting of the priority actions of the GASeP makes it difficult to assess the level of achievements at the outcome level.
9. In general, GASeP has helped to raise the profile of aviation security at the political level, and this in turn improved the awareness of aviation security among senior officials. Since the inception of GASeP, some Member States have also reported an increase in budgetary allocation to AVSEC. However, absence of human resource and budgetary allocation for GASeP limited monitoring, implementation and reporting by the Secretariat.

## Recommendations

10. Based on the findings and conclusions, the evaluation forwarded three recommendations focusing on:
  - Revising GASeP by considering the issues identified in this evaluation report. These include but not limited to: a) adjusting EI targets to making them ambitious but realistic; b) making the GASeP revision more participatory drawing input from States, regional offices, regional groups and other relevant stakeholders as appropriate; c) clarifying adequately the links between GASeP, Annex 17, Doc 8973, and the USAP CMA; d) reducing the number of priority actions in the GASeP; and e) explaining the role of stakeholders in monitoring and reporting of GASeP and on how monitoring information will be used to improve performance.
  - Developing and using a clear monitoring and reporting mechanisms for GASeP results.
  - Identifying and allocating resources needed for effective and efficient implementation and management of GASeP at Secretariat level.

## INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT

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### Introduction

11. The evaluation of the Global Aviation Security Plan (GASeP) was conducted in accordance with the Office of Internal Oversight (OIO) Charter (C-WP/15115), the ICAO Evaluation Policy, approved by the Council in 2014 (C-DEC 203/3) and the Norms and Standards of the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG). The evaluation was conducted between April-November 2021.
12. Among the first tasks of the evaluation team was to obtain an understanding of the objectives of GASeP and to identify the main evaluation stakeholders. Information generated from this process informed the evaluation methodology, and was used as a point of reference during data analysis.
13. The draft evaluation report was reviewed by ATB and Evaluation Reference Group (ERG) members, and all evaluation processes followed United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) and ICAO confidentiality standards.

### Context

14. In 2002, after the events of September 11, an Aviation Security Plan of Action was adopted by the High-level Conference on Aviation Security in 2002, which included regular, mandatory, systematic audits to evaluate the aviation security arrangements in place in all ICAO Member States. It was later followed by the ICAO Comprehensive Aviation Security Strategy 2011-2016 (ICASS) and replaced by the current Global Aviation Security Plan 2017-2030 (GASeP).
15. GASeP was developed in 2017 with the objective of helping ICAO, Member States and other stakeholders enhance the effectiveness of global aviation security through a set of priority outcomes, priority actions and aspirational targets. GASeP seeks to unite the international aviation security community and inspire action in this direction, considering the threats and risks faced by the global civil aviation community which continue to evolve. It is also intended to achieve the shared and common goal of enhancing aviation security worldwide and to help Member States come together to fulfil the commitments set out in the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2309 (2016) and relevant ICAO Assembly Resolutions.
16. GASeP provides the foundation for States, industry, stakeholders and ICAO to work together with the common goal of enhancing aviation security worldwide and achieving five key priority outcomes, namely: a) enhance risk awareness and response; b) develop security culture and human capability; c) improve technological resources and foster innovation; d) improve oversight and quality assurance; and e) increase cooperation and support. GASeP does not contain specific aviation security policies or measures, prescriptive or otherwise. The specific aviation Standard and Recommended Practices (SARPS) are detailed in Annex 17 to the *Convention on International Civil Aviation* (Chicago Convention), which sets the security objectives and outcomes to be met. The ICAO Aviation Security Manual (Doc 8973) provides guidance on measures that Member States may take to meet the Annex 17 SARPs.
17. GASeP sets aspirational global targets, and includes a Global Aviation Security Plan Roadmap (Global Roadmap) that is supported by 32 actions and 87 tasks. The global Roadmap also sets out the following aspirational global targets:

- By 2020, 80 per cent of Member States reach above 65 per cent Effective Implementation (EI).<sup>1</sup>
  - By 2023, 90 per cent of Member States reach above 80 per cent EI.
  - By 2030, 100 per cent of Member States reach above 90 per cent EI.
18. ICAO has a plan to update the GASep global Roadmap by the end of 2021. This evaluation aims to contribute to this process by giving inputs to the improvement of GASep as a tool to help raise aviation security practices globally.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Effective Implementation refers to the average of 8 critical elements of an effective aviation security oversight system, assessed by the Global Universal Security Audit Programme (USAP-CMA) carried out by ICAO Secretariat in Member States.

<sup>2</sup>AVSECP/31-WP/6

## EVALUATION PURPOSE, SCOPE AND STAKEHOLDERS

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### Evaluation Purpose

19. The evaluation has two purposes: enhancing accountability and improving organizational learning. In terms of accountability, the evaluation independently assessed the relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of GASeP in enhancing global aviation security. In relation to organizational learning, the evaluation provides strategic and operational recommendations to improve the delivery of results and management of the GASeP.

### Evaluation Scope

20. The evaluation carried out was global with consideration of the five key priority outcomes of GASeP. It explored the global Roadmap and looked at the contributions of the Secretariat, Member States and the industry whenever possible. It covered the period between 2017 when GASeP was launched to April 2021 (at the time when the evaluation process started).
21. The evaluation does not include detailed analysis of each and every project and activity implemented by ICAO to contribute to GASeP. It also has not included detailed analysis of projects implemented in partnership with other stakeholders.

### Evaluation Stakeholders

22. The principal intended users of the evaluation are the ICAO Council, Secretariat, Member States and other stakeholders such as regional aviation organizations and the industry.

## EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

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### Evaluation Methodology

23. The evaluation was guided by 12 evaluation questions based on the Organization of Economic Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) evaluation criteria. For each evaluation question, indicators were identified to address the questions along with data sources and methods for data collection which are presented in the Evaluation Matrix in Annex 3.
24. The evaluation used a mixed-method approach and consulted various sources of data to ensure appropriate triangulation of findings. It looked at the achievement of GASeP's outcomes from a macro perspective, giving the opportunity for Member States, the Council, the Secretariat, regional organizations, and the industry to feed into the evaluation.
25. The evaluation used both qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection and analysis. An overview of the evaluation methodology is presented in this Section. A detailed description of the methodology used during the evaluation is provided in Annex 1.

### Data Collection

#### 26. Data sources included:

- Document review: The evaluation carried out a desk review of relevant documents, including Assembly resolutions, Council Working Papers, Manuals, Regional Roadmaps; Reports on GASeP's progress from various stakeholders; Summary of Universal Security Audit Programme – Continuous Monitoring Approach (USAP-CMA) Results, and Relevant evaluation reports.
- Online survey: The evaluation undertook an online survey of Member States to get their perspective on the planning, implementation and monitoring of the GASeP and any recommendations for improvements. The survey enabled the evaluation to collect information on the implementation of the priority actions of the Roadmap at Member States level and reach a broader base of States than can be consulted via individual interviews. All Member States, were targeted by the evaluation and 56 per cent responded to the survey.<sup>3</sup> The high response rate shows the level of engagement and interest in GASeP from Member States. About 84 per cent of respondents indicated they had either high (49 per cent) or moderate (35 per cent) levels of engagement with GASeP.
- Key informant interviews: The evaluation carried out individual interviews to collect in-depth qualitative information using semi-structured interview guides. The Team consulted stakeholders including ICAO senior management, Council Members, Director Generals, staff of Civil Aviation Authorities of Member States, and Secretariat staff. A total of 102 stakeholders were consulted including 43 from Member States. Table 1 shows the number of interviews by type of stakeholder.
- Data Collection through secondary data collection: Secondary data collection sheets were prepared and shared with ATB to get update on the implementation of the Priority Actions listed in the GASeP Road Map.

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<sup>3</sup> Please, see methodology section in Annex 1 for detailed information on number of Member States and contracting states who have answered the survey

Information collected was triangulated among the various data sources: desk review, semi-structured interviews, secondary data and the survey.

Table 1. Stakeholder Consultations

#	STAKEHOLDERS	RESPONDENTS CONSULTED	
		THROUGH INTERVIEW	ONLINE SURVEY
1	Member States	43	108 (56 per cent Response rate)
2	ICAO Staff (HQ and Regional Office)	28	
3	Industry	4	
4	Regional Organizations	12	
5	Council	4	
	Total	102	

#### Data analysis

27. Data analysis was carried out using: 1) Descriptive analysis for the survey; 2) Content analysis, where the major contributions of each interview were highlighted; 3) Coding of open questions of the survey, where answers were categorized and grouped according to their frequency.

#### Ethics

28. Participation in the evaluation was voluntary. Stakeholders were assured of the confidentiality of their responses, and data was stored in a secure location that was accessible only to the evaluation team. The evaluation does not associate names with specific comments in the report.
29. All evaluation activities adhered to the international standards and norms developed by UNEG and UNEG Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation. There was no conflict of interest from any evaluation team member in this exercise.

#### Limitations

30. This evaluation faced the following limitations:
- ICAO does not have a comprehensive database or monitoring system that would allow tracking of the implementation of the Priority Actions by all stakeholders. It was very difficult to ascertain which of the activities have been implemented, in particular by Member States, and how they contributed in achieving the 5 priority outcomes.

## FINDINGS

31. This section presents the main evaluation findings, focusing on the evaluation criteria of relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. Detailed survey findings (Figures and Tables) are presented in Annex 8.


### Relevance

32. Relevance has been assessed by examining the usefulness and alignment of GASep with ICAO Strategic Objectives, Regional/Member State priorities, the ICAO Business Plan, as well as priorities of other aviation stakeholders.

**Finding 1:** GASep is found to be very relevant to Member States with low and medium level of maturity in the aviation sector. However, the relevance of GASep for some Member States with mature aviation sector is found to be lower. Overall, Member States appreciate the existence and role of GASep. Some industry stakeholders see limited relevance in GASep for their own work.

33. The evaluation found that the GASep is relevant to achieve Member States needs and priorities, regional aviation security priorities, and ICAO Strategic Objectives overall. While a high proportion of stakeholders indicate high/moderate relevance of GASep to Member States needs and priorities (87 per cent) (Figure 1), regional aviation security priorities (85 per cent) and ICAO Strategic Objective (88 per cent), some Member States (13%) believe that the GASep has low relevance to other aviation stakeholders such as the industry and service providers. Thirty-Nine percent also believe it has moderate relevance to other stakeholders. The primary audience of ICAO are Member States. However, GASep also included responsibilities for the industry and it aimed at being a common platform of dialogue among different stakeholders.

Figure 1. Member States Perception of the Relevance and Usefulness of GASep



Source: GASep's Evaluation Survey for Member States.

34. When it comes to the usefulness and relevance of GASep to Member States, many States reported in the survey and during interviews that GASep helps them:

- to focus and provide clarity and direction;
- To enhance cooperation, raise awareness and increase alignment for the improvement of aviation security domestically and internationally;
- by providing guidance and a framework to improve aviation security and choose priorities.

*"GASeP sets the foundation for any State, and in particular States that lack experience and resources in establishing an AVSEC system. GASeP helps regulators justify AVSEC related initiatives to senior management and other stakeholders. GASeP gives global priorities which most States need when it comes to AVSEC."*

*Member state, Asia Pacific Region*

35. Approximately 68 per cent of survey respondents reported they referred to GASeP in preparing the country's national aviation security plan or programme. However, the relevance of GASeP may be limited for some Member States with high level of resources and maturity in the aviation sector. One Member State with this profile reported, "GASeP is not for us – it is not something we need or we use. That is not the fault of the GASeP; It is a reflection of our own maturity." Other Member States with advanced aviation security had similar perspectives, noting GASeP may not be central for them, but they believe GASeP to be relevant to other Member States. In other cases, Member States with mature aviation security found GASeP relevant and influential for them. The perspectives varied significantly. The, EU, who have many Member States with a mature aviation security regime, has incorporated GASeP principles into their own regulation.
36. While GASeP is seen as a harmonization document for standardization globally, discussions revealed that GASeP has to be localized and regionalized to be more relevant at the State level. This was stated by various Members States interviewed and indeed GASeP's priorities do not apply to all Member States equally (see further discussion on Outcome 4 on Technology Development). However, while regional plans are considered as tools to adapt the GASeP's agenda to different realities, they are not enough to establish the necessary commitment and ownership at the State level (see further on regional plans in Paragraph 82 and also on Sustainability).
37. Interviews indicated that the relevance of GASeP to regional priorities varied greatly among regions. The evaluation team was able to interview six regional organizations and identified a large spectrum; from no or very limited relevance and engagement, to very high relevance where GASeP was a model to define regional strategies and priorities. In the case of the European Commission (EC), GASeP was incorporated into their regulatory structure, and a working paper was presented to Aviation Security Panel (AVSECP/30-WP/10) to report on the progress in implementing GASeP. According to this Working Paper, the updated legislation revises the background check regime that the EU considers essential to address insider threat and promote security culture.
38. The African Civil Aviation Committee (AFCAC) used GASeP as a reference to review the Windhoek Declaration on Aviation Security for the region<sup>4</sup>. This review examined the Windhoek targets on aviation security and facilitation to ensure that they are aligned with the GASeP. In addition, three new targets were introduced, taking into account the untapped Key Priority Actions of the GASeP. AFCAC Member State's achievements against the Windhoek

*"We conduct surveys with Member States to ask their needs (every six months). (...) We are discussing about courses...We are collecting data and help our states to reach the Windhoek Declaration – if so, they will reach GASeP."*

*AFCAC*

<sup>4</sup> AFI SECFAL Plan – SC/9/2019 WP/05

Declaration are being updated through regular surveys with Member States. At the other end of the spectrum, there are regional organizations with limited resources, or cases in which regional groups operate with different agendas and priorities.

39. Though GASeP is specifically focused on Member States (and largely regulators), it also provides guidance to the industry. However, many industry stakeholders interviewed indicated that the relevance of GASeP for the industry is limited, and this was also reflected by some Member States. However, the evaluation found that even if not widely used, GASeP has been a tool used by some industry stakeholders to help advocate for new investment, or to bolster investment and reinforce the case for further work.
40. From the perspective of all Member States interviewed, GASeP is still relevant in the face of COVID-19, and Member States and stakeholders including ICAO have adapted the work on aviation security to the existing COVID-19 environment. Many field-based support and oversight activities had to be suspended as activities migrated to virtual courses and meetings<sup>5</sup>. Even though many activities were cancelled, the new virtual way of working actually allowed for the participation of people who would not otherwise have been able to attend in-person sessions.
41. Although threat and risk assessments are already an obligation under Annex 17 Standard 3.1.3, Member States reported that in the face of COVID-19, States undertook an increased level of risk analysis, and reviewed and revised their risk assessments, and indicated that the GASeP assisted in this process. As one West African Member State reported, "GASeP urged us to undertake a risk evaluation. When the pandemic came, we had to assess the [COVID-19] risk and the way passengers had to be screened, [and look at ways to limit] the possibility to touch the passengers. We adapted [our screening strategy as a result] ...".
42. Recognizing the need for harmonized aviation security contingency measures, ICAO has issued a guidance document entitled "Guidance for Aviation Security Contingency Measures during the COVID-19 Pandemic"<sup>6</sup>, with the aim to help States ensure that aviation security objectives continue to be met while applying appropriate health and sanitary measures to protect screeners, passengers and staff from cross contamination. A common concern expressed among Member States and industry was the number of people who have been laid-off and the increasing demands on those who have stayed in the context of the pandemic.

*"In the current context of the pandemic, we need to keep the profile of the security high. The last thing we need is a security crisis on top of the health crisis. GASeP does provide an instrument that gives the continuity of profile to security, and we use that as tool."*

Member of a regional organization

<sup>5</sup> AVSECP/32-WP/3, Report of ICAO AVSEC Assistance and Capacity Building Activities

<sup>6</sup> C-WP/15072

**Finding 2:** COVID-19 has brought challenges and also opportunities for aviation security. For example, the new virtual activities are increasing participation of Member States in training and other aviation security related activities. Many stakeholders suggest updating GASep’s implementation timeframe due to the challenges posed by COVID-19.

43. To further adapt to the current COVID-19 environment, many Member States have made the following suggestions which may be applicable for the AVSEC global community (Member States, secretariat and other stakeholders)
- a. Increase training and other capacity building activities, virtual activities, online tools, and review training materials to ensure they stay relevant;
  - b. Leverage technology and implement new ways of achieving results – as some States have demonstrated by using technology to conduct remote inspection activities – during COVID;
  - c. Consider COVID and health related issues in risk assessments in a new version of GASep;
  - d. Adjust GASep’s implementation timeframes and consider delays due to COVID;
  - e. Increase information sharing and cooperation amongst and within states; and
  - f. Strengthen support to aviation security oversight.
44. The Secretariat has been implementing some of these suggestions. However, the suggestions have value beyond the current pandemic, not just because learning from the COVID pandemic can be adapted to future global health threats, but also because many of the suggestions have value regardless of the context of a health crisis.

**Finding 3:** GASep has helped raise the profile of aviation security at the political level and improve awareness of aviation security of senior officials.

45. Member States were asked about the major strengths of GASep. A clear message that was consistently made across the course of interviews was that GASep has helped raise the profile of aviation security at the political level, and that this in turn improved the awareness of aviation security among senior officials. It was noted that in many cases GASep made aviation security concepts and priorities more accessible to senior officials who are not security experts with a deep knowledge of Annex 17 and related SARPS. This increased awareness has helped some Member States make the argument for more resources, or at the very least has increased the focus on aviation security as a priority.

*‘We follow GASep. When we had to develop our framework, we started to adopt towards that direction. It helped us in convincing top senior management. I think GASep helped us achieve those objectives faster – it added credibility to our initiatives. It is different when you bring ICAO’s document and show all states are going in this direction.’*

*Member State, Mideast Region*

46. The other major strengths of GASep highlighted by Member States include that it:
- a. Provided a framework and Roadmap to focus resources and raise the profile of aviation security;
  - b. Increased cooperation and information sharing;

- c. Helped to develop security culture;
- d. Improved risk awareness and response;
- e. Helped improve aviation security oversight;
- f. Helped increase Effective Implementation rate, compliance, and overall levels of security; and
- g. Has led to some improvements in security technology.

## Coherence

47. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has established Coherence as an evaluation criterion to establish whether plans and strategies at global, national and local levels are well aligned and complementary, leading to functional guidance, operations and achievements. This new criterion has been widely taken adopted in the practice of evaluation within the United Nations. In this context, this section examines the coherence and complementarity of GASeP to other ICAO Plans, regional/Member State priorities, including the measures being taken to improve alignment and coherence of GASeP with other Plans and frameworks.

**Finding 4:** The ICAO Business Plan is strategically linked to address GASeP priorities. However, many of the Priority Actions of the Road Map that are planned to be implemented by ICAO are not included in the Operating Plans. Many stakeholders found the link between the GASeP, Annex 17, and Doc 8973 to be weak.

48. ICAO has developed the Aviation Security Manual (Doc 8973) to assist Member States implement Annex 17. Doc 8973 provides guidance on how states may meet the Annex 17 SARPs. Annex 17 and Doc 8973 are constantly being reviewed and amended in light of new threats and technological developments. GASeP aims to help enhance effective implementation and compliance efforts of Annex 17 by Member States and stakeholders. GASeP's core objective of enhancing the effectiveness of global aviation security and improving the practical and sustainable implementation of aviation security measures is in line with ICAO's strategic objective of security and facilitation and linked with its Business Plan (2017-2019). However, there is differing perspectives on GASeP's relationship with Annex 17 and other ICAO aviation security documents. Many Member States do not clearly understand the relationship between GASeP, Annex 17 and Doc 8973, and believe that this relationship should be made clearer (see more in the Effectiveness section).
49. The other area examined by the evaluation was the alignment of the ICAO Business Plan with GASeP in particular and with the GASeP Roadmap and priority actions. The evaluation found that GASeP is included in the ICAO Business Plan 2017-2019 and 2020-2022 as a priority in terms of guiding security work at a strategic level. Providing support for GASeP implementation is also included across the Business Plan.<sup>7</sup> However, the priority actions of the GASeP Roadmap that are planned to be implemented by ICAO are not adequately reflected in the Business Plan or Regional Operating plans as concrete deliverables, indicating inadequate alignment of the GASeP with the Operating Plans that are guiding day-to-day works of ICAO. Interviews with some ATB staff indicated that this is still work in progress.

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<sup>7</sup> ICAO Business Plan 2017-2019 and 2020-2022

50. Some regional partners have aligned GASeP with their plans. As previously noted in this report, the African Civil Aviation Commission (AFCAC) used GASeP as a reference to review the Windhoek Declaration on Aviation Security for the region. Similarly, GASeP was incorporated into the regulatory structure of the European Commission (EC)<sup>8</sup>. The ICAO European and North Atlantic Aviation Security Group (ENAVSECG) has also strongly incorporated GASeP in their work and agenda guided by the Lisbon Declaration. However, other regions made less use of GASeP. Even though they have developed Regional Roadmaps and set targets, the evaluation found that the regional Roadmaps are not adequately used as a guide for work in the area.

**Finding 5:** Important efforts are underway to improve coordination between ATB and ANB to align the Global Plans, to further strengthen coordination among safety, air navigation and aviation security teams in ICAO Secretariat.

51. Though the three Global Plans (GASeP, GASP and GANP) deal with different issues and use different approaches, there are common areas, such as remotely-piloted aircraft systems and cyber security, that require a more integrated approach by the Global Plans. For example, the GANP through operational improvements detailed in the technical frameworks/ASBUs, supports the GASP and GASeP by enhancing the safety and security aspects of the air navigation system, as reflected in the performance ambitions.
52. However, there is little interaction between the two Bureaus (ATB and ANB) both in the planning process and the implementation of the Global Plans. The involvement of relevant ANB staff in the GASeP planning, monitoring and implementation process is limited. Similarly, the involvement of relevant ATB staff in the planning, monitoring and implementation of GASP and GANP is limited. The evaluation team learned that there are focal points from Operational Safety Section (OSS) working with security section at the ICAO Secretariat, and presence of OSS focal points in the AVSEC panel<sup>9</sup>. Efforts are also underway to improve coordination between the Bureaus during planning and implementation.

#### GASeP and Partnership

53. One of the mechanisms to improve coherence and alignment within GASeP is through improved partnerships with relevant stakeholders. A partnership is meant to complement work to achieve higher level results. Stakeholders were asked if there was an increase in the number of partnerships and collaborations among stakeholders as a result of GASeP and if they had specific examples.
54. Forty-five percent of Member States responding to the survey indicated that there was an improvement in partnerships in the context of GASeP (Figure 2 below). These Member States reported that GASeP has contributed for the improvement of partnerships as it provided a point of reference and a starting point for discussions how to partner on aviation security matters. For example, a Member State established a technical collaborative group with the authorities and airport/aircraft operators for the development of civil aviation security, using the GASeP as a method for managing and planning the work (actions and projects)<sup>10</sup>. However, many interview participants also noted that it was difficult to ascribe the increase in partnerships and cooperation

<sup>8</sup> AVSECP/30-WP/10


<sup>9</sup> Evaluation of the Global Safety Plan (Page 26) and Interview.

<sup>10</sup> HLCAS/2-WP/12, 17/10/18, A40-WP/285

specifically to the existence of GASeP, noting that it was likely most activities would have taken place with or without GASeP.

**Finding 6:** GASeP has been used by many partners as a common ‘thematic’ platform of collaboration which helped to identify areas of training and opportunities to collaborate for mutual benefit.

Figure 2. Increased Number of Partnerships and collaboration among stakeholders in the context of GASeP reported by Member States



Source: GASeP’s Evaluation Survey for Member States.

55. The value added by GASeP, as reported by stakeholders, was to provide a common ‘thematic’ platform of collaboration, which helped to identify areas of training and opportunities to collaborate for mutual benefit. Member States reported increased bilateral cooperation and information sharing, and indicated GASeP helped to develop security culture, and improve risk awareness security oversight (see data from the Survey in the annex). In addition, an important part of GASeP’s design was the establishment of the Effective Implementation Rate target that countries aspired towards, which also helped encourage collaboration.

*‘ GASeP has encouraged the promotion of a national security Group. When GASeP was developed, we started meetings with the industry to present GASeP and see what could be implemented in our country. The group grew in quality and deliverables. We have formalized it. (...) We have authorities in it and the industry. There are actions for the regulatory agency and actions for the industry. Member State, South American Region*

56. There is evidence from interviews that GASeP has helped to define training agendas, elaborate regional security plans, and foster effective engagement with stakeholders.

## Effectiveness

57. This section examines the effectiveness of GASeP in achieving its aspirational goals and delivering on the five priority outcomes. The section also examines the effectiveness of the management of GASeP.
58. GASeP was launched with a global Roadmap of priority actions, specific measures, tasks, indicators, and targets for ICAO, Member States and industry. GASeP also has aspirational goals to be achieved in 2020, 2023 and 2030. The launch of the global Roadmap attributed tasks and responsibilities not only to ICAO, but also to Member States and industry. Interviewees from within the Secretariat stated that involving a larger group of stakeholders was an evolution from the previous security strategy.
59. One of the main pillars of the plan are the aspirational goals. A variety of stakeholders including from the Secretariat, Member States, and Council Members, reported there was a significant debate during the establishment of the Effective Implementation (EI) targets, with some believing they were not ambitious enough, and others arguing they were far too ambitious. The EI targets were criticised by evaluation participants across the board as being unrealistic and potentially demotivating.

**Finding 7:** Establishing global aspirational goals and targets was considered important to focus the attention of, and get commitment from, senior managers and political leaders. However, the aspirational goals were found to be unrealistic by many stakeholders.

60. Setting ambitious targets and the choices of the target years (2020, 2023 and 2030) was at the request from the ICAO Council President, who was looking to align GASeP with other plan principles, and incentivize the plan<sup>11</sup>. Once the target year is completed, a review of the plan is normally expected to assess the progress in achieving the target and the factors contributing/affecting achievements. Three years were allotted to achieve the first two targets (2017/18-2020 and 2021-23). However, seven years (2024-2030) were allocated for the last target 2030. The reason for such difference in targeting is also not clear.
61. Apart from the overall EI target, a number of respondents highlighted that two “established Critical Elements” (CE 4 and CE 5) and the three “implementation CEs” (CE 6, CE 7 and CE 8) are contributing to the very low EI rate at global levels, but the rest of the CEs have higher implementation rates. While almost all stakeholders agreed that establishing a target was a necessity for GASeP for Member States to focus on, and an evolution from the previous plan, there was a suggestion that a more differentiated set of EIs, that considered the differing CE implementation, would be useful.

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<sup>11</sup> Discussion with ATB staff

**Finding 8:** ICAO does not have a monitoring and recording system to document GASeP's priority actions implemented by Member States, the various Secretariat Offices and units as well as other stakeholders. Absence of such system compromises the ability to properly identify contribution of various stakeholders to realize the outcomes as well as affected the assessment of the effectiveness of GASeP priority outcomes.

62. Most stakeholders agreed on the relevance of the five priority outcomes in contributing to the achievements of the overall objective of the GASeP. However, a general theme heard in interviews with stakeholders in the Secretariat, Member States and industry was that the global Roadmap does not have clear outcome and output level indicators to properly monitor the progress of GASeP. A review of the global Roadmap, undertaken as part of the evaluation to consider whether the global Roadmap indicators are SMART (Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant and Time bound) confirmed this stakeholder assertion. Indicators are identified largely for the priority actions (not outcomes). Most indicators for activities track the time when the tasks will be completed and not whether the quantity or quality of results is adequate. The formulation of targets for some of the indicators is also problematic. Targets set as 'on going' or 'as necessary' do not provide a clear description of the extent of changes (targets) expected.
63. According to GASeP, ICAO has an important global leadership and monitoring role in the implementation and coordination of the GASeP. Respondents consistently indicated during interviews that except for the USAP CMA, ICAO does not have a systematic mechanism to monitor Member State improvements in aviation security driven, or assisted, by GASeP. While reporting is undertaken by the Secretariat to the Council, and individual stakeholders, including Member States, regional organisations and industry, at their own initiative, provide reports to ICAO, the absence of a comprehensive monitoring and reporting system created challenges for the evaluation in analysing the effectiveness of each priority outcome of the GASeP. The need for a monitoring mechanism for GASeP is also raised in a number of Working Papers<sup>12 13</sup>.
- "The absence of a system for monitoring implementation discourages engagement and interest in the GASeP".*  
Member State, EUR/NAT Region
64. The evaluation team noted the view of some ICAO staff that monitoring GASeP is not the role of ICAO for a lack of mandate and that it is rather the responsibility of Member States to improve their effective implementation of Annex 17 SARPs. In addition, it was highlighted that the Secretariat has limited resources available to undertake such monitoring tasks. There was also a concern expressed by a number of Member States and industry that GASeP may have become a 'bureaucratic exercise', with reporting being undertaken, but with no learning to help shape future strategies.
65. Member States and industry also expressed a consistent desire to hear more about GASeP, including its results, its successes, and its shortcoming in order to learn from the experience. There was a call from various stakeholders to review and refine the global Roadmap to include fewer and more focused tasks, clearer indicators, clear responsibilities attributed to each actor, and clear monitoring mechanisms<sup>14</sup>. There was a concern expressed of inadequate clarity in the

<sup>12</sup> A40-WP/315 EX/128 2/8/19

<sup>13</sup> A40-WP/357, 2/8/19

<sup>14</sup> AVSECP/29-WP/25

results chain of GASep where activities/tasks must lead to outputs, which should lead to improved aviation security outcomes.

66. The evaluation has reviewed the progress of ICAO in achieving its Aspirational Global Targets (Table 2).

Table 2. Level of Effective Implementation (as at 31 December 2020)

ICAO Region	APAC	ESAF	EUR/NAT	MID	NACC	SAM	WACAF	Total No of States
# States	39	24	56	15	22	13	24	193
# States audited	37	22	54	13	22	13	23	183
# Member States above 65% EI	20	13	49	10	8	8	8	116
% Member States above 65% EI	54.05	59.09	90.74	76.92	36.36	61.54	34.78	63.04

Source: USAP – CMA: Analysis of Audit Results, Reporting period ending: 31 December 2020.

67. As can be seen in Table 2, 63 per cent of Member States were above the target 65 per cent EI rate (17% short of the target) as of 31 December 2020, only one region was above the target; EUR/NAT with 90.74 per cent of Member States achieving over 65 per cent EI. MID was close to the global target where 77 per cent of Member States were achieving over 65 per cent EI, while WACAF and NACC were the regions with the smallest percentage of Member States with above 65 per cent EI, 35 per cent and 36 per cent respectively.

**Finding 9:** GASep’s target of achieving EI of at least 65 per cent in 80 per cent of Member States by 2020 has not been achieved. – only 63.04 per cent (out of the target 80 per cent) of States have achieved the 2020 target of a minimum 65 per cent EI. If the current trend continues, it is highly unlikely that the global target of 2023, (90 per cent of Member States to reach above 80 per cent EI) and 2030 (100 per cent of Member States to reach above 90 per cent EI) will be met.

68. Table 3 shows trends in the level of EI from 2015 to 2020. There has been almost no change in the global EI Rate of Aviation Security in the last five years. The change in the audit programme approach in 2018 and the significant revisions of the annexes in 2018 and 2019 have partly contributed to the lack of improvement in the EI rate across the globe<sup>15</sup>. However, this data needs to be taken with caution as the EI alone may not be the best tool to measure the success of GASep. In addition, the information included in the tables is based on a mix of recent and old EI USAP-CMA’s audits reports which may not reflect the current status of EI in the countries/regions.
69. Member States provided feedback that there are limited mechanisms in place to update an EI score after a Member State makes changes to improve performance. This means EI scores are not adequately reflective of where States currently stand. As EI scores are not able to be updated in ‘real time’, there was frustration reported by Member States in not being able to see their progress reflected in their audit grade after they have made changes in order to comply with

<sup>15</sup> Interview with ATB staff

Annex 17 SARPs. Considering this challenge, Member States suggested for ICAO to consider the State's evidence, as provided in the Corrective Action Plan (CAP), to update the status of the EI in a continuous approach.<sup>16</sup>

70. It is noted that the purpose of a USAP-CMA audit is not to provide a mechanism for 'real time' status updates, but to be an independent snapshot of where a State's aviation security system stands at a particular moment in time. Accordingly, a changed USAP-CMA is unlikely to be the solution Member States are seeking. Nevertheless, the desire from States for some form of feedback mechanism was strongly expressed.

Table 3. Trends in Level of Effective Implementation 2015-2020 (Global and regional averages)

Level/Year	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Global	71.27	72.02	72.62	72.71	71.70	70.90
APAC	69.43	70.47	69.95	68.33	65.91	65.79
ESAF	57.41	58.93	58.84	63.98	64.98	64.35
EUR/NAT	87.37	87.83	88.79	88.55	88.25	87.98
MID	68.91	68.92	69.64	71.30	74.75	74.60
NACC	65.96	66.37	67.18	69.60	63.23	59.61
SAM	67.13	69.45	71.05	70.52	69.12	68.33
WACAF	55.25	55.30	58.10	55.39	56.04	55.46

Source: USAP – CMA: Analysis of Audit Results, reporting period ending: 31 Dec 2020

71. Based on the information collected from the survey and the secondary data collection matrix, the evaluation assessed the progress of ICAO and Member States in implementing the tasks proposed by the Roadmap. There were responsibilities for ICAO, Member States and the industry in the global Roadmap. There is limited information on what the industry has implemented.

**Finding 10:** Member States, the Secretariat and other partners have reported implementing various activities to achieve the priority outcomes of the GASeP. However, the Global Roadmap does not outline clear tasks and indicators, nor does it have a clear rationale linking activities to outputs and then to outcomes which limits accountability for results.

Outcome 1: Enhance Risk Awareness and Response

<sup>16</sup>A40-WP/285

72. Under this outcome ICAO reported implementing the following major activities:
- The endorsement of the Cybersecurity Strategy by the 40th Session of the ICAO Assembly;
  - The update of the Global Risk Context Statement (Doc 10108);
  - The updated overview of threats and risk published;
  - New guidance on protection of aviation infrastructure against UAS introduced in 12th Edition of ICAO Aviation Security Manual (Doc 8973);
  - New SARPs on RPAS security developed as part of new Part IV to Annex 6 on RPAS operations; and
  - Numerous training activities promoted including Risk Management Workshops and Security Culture Workshops, and implementation supported provided<sup>17 18</sup>.
73. In terms of progress of Outcome 1 for Member States, they were asked to what extent they had progressed (See Annex 7 Figure 10) in the following tasks:
- a. Implement and review secure, systematic mechanisms to share threat and risk information (States reporting high progress; 45%, and moderate progress 38%);
  - b. States' appropriate security authorities periodically review physical screening and access control methods, based on risk assessments (States reporting high progress; 53%, and moderate progress 32%); and
  - c. Review adequacy of current measures to address insider threat, including background checks, physical measures, training and awareness and reporting mechanisms to incorporate into the State's relevant aviation security programmes (States reporting high progress; 65%, and moderate progress 25%).
74. The progress reported by Member States is high. However, the tasks are not specific, and data is limited in showing how much progress has actually been made. Nevertheless, for Outcome 1, with the open-ended questions, States have consistently reported to be working and achieving progress on the following activities:
- Elaboration of risk management manuals and
  - Developing Risk Management frameworks.
75. An activity that was also reported by one Member State was the creation of models for integrating threat assessment into aviation security risk management frameworks by ICAO. However, ICAO indicated that the Global Risk Context Statement, Doc 8973 and Risk Management workshops are helpful guidance to address such issues. GASeP was very successful in selecting the key security areas one country should be working on as reported by stakeholders. The area of risk assessment was the one in which Member States have more consistently reported on and mentioned, and appears to be increasingly incorporated into global security culture. However, it is important to note that some people tend to overstate their achievements in self-assessment and reporting.

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<sup>17</sup> AVSECP/30-WP/12

<sup>18</sup> AVSECP/32-WP/3

## Outcome 2: Develop Security Culture and Human Capability

76. The ICAO Assembly designated 2020 as the Year of Security Culture (YOSC). With the COVID-19 pandemic severely impacting the aviation sector in 2020, the ICAO Council decided to extend the YOSC to 2021<sup>19</sup>. Under outcome 2 and as part of the ICAO Year of Security Culture (YOSC) 2020 and 2021, ICAO implemented many activities including the annual virtual ICAO Global Aviation Security Symposium, communications campaigns on YOSC and the development of an ICAO Security Culture website; and developed an ICAO Security Culture Workshop and associated Train-the-Trainer materials. In addition, ICAO has implemented the following major activities:
- Developed ICAO Toolkit on Enhancing Security Culture and ICAO Security Culture Campaign 'Starter Pack' published on ICAO's Security Culture website to raise security awareness<sup>20</sup>;
  - Developed and launched a Security Culture Workshop and associated Train-the-Trainer materials and a Security Culture training course;
  - Developed an ICAO capacity-building mapping tool;
  - Regional conferences on mechanisms to analyse USAP audit results and identify regional training needs;
  - Launching the Framework for Professionalization of the Workforce;
  - Launching the AVSEC Functions Mapping Table;
  - Updating ICAO existing aviation security training to reflect the most recent editions of Annex 17; and
  - Launching the ICAO Aviation Security Training Policy document and continuing to provide Regional/sub-regional trainings and assistance activities through the ISD-SEC Training Programme.
77. The majority of Member States acknowledged the work ICAO has been doing to produce guidance materials, and the importance of this work was recognized. However, there is no adequate mechanism to assess how much these materials are being used and their impact on the ground. There are a lot of materials available, but the evaluation cannot report to what extent Member States are aware of these materials and know how to access them. This was not explored in the scope of this evaluation and may be worth further exploring by ATB, noting the plan already in place to identify the use and impact of ICAO aviation security guidance materials.
78. As for the progress reported by Member States in Outcome 2, they were asked about their performance (See annex 8 Figure 11) under the following tasks:
- a. Develop communication strategies (States reporting high progress; 34%, and moderate progress 49%);
  - b. Increase management oversight and leading by example (States reporting high progress; 42%, and moderate progress 39%); and
  - c. Include provisions in quality control programmes to monitor the effective implementation of security culture (States reporting high progress; 36%, and moderate progress 43%).

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<sup>19</sup> AVSECP/32-WP/15, 1/4/ 2021

<sup>20</sup> AVSECP/32-WP/3

79. While Member States reported progress against the above tasks, less feedback was received on developing communication strategies, and more for increased management oversight and leading by example. Although in surveys such as the one sent to Member States on GASeP, there is a tendency by respondents to over-report results, the different rates among each task help to provide a picture of what is likely to have been a priority.
80. Most stakeholders interviewed mentioned 2021 and the Year of Security Culture, and the work they have done in support of it. This shows a high awareness from Member States of the initiative. Some highlights also in the support of Security Culture mentioned by stakeholders were:
- The production of security information materials;
  - The hosting of seminars and trainings;
  - Amendments to EU aviation security legislation, adopted on 23 January 2019, that address GASeP priority actions in developing security culture and human capability; and
  - The use of the ECAC Aviation Security Handbook regarding best practices on security culture.

### Outcome 3: Improve technological resources and foster innovation

81. Under this outcome, ICAO has reported progress in the following key tasks:

- progress on AVSECPaedia platform, with the new enhanced version expected in 2022;
- Revision of the Aviation Security Manual;
- Promotion of AVSEC Industry Engagement Day during AVSEC2018 and AVSEC2019; and
- The WGIAS Innovation Workshop held in February 2019. (For more details, see Annex 6.)

*"ICAO does not provide technical specifications. There we had some difficulties. We are planning to buy equipment, but we don't have specifications."*

*Member State, Small Island State,*

82. Several Member States reported the need to have more guidance regarding technology use. This is noted as a sensitive issue because it involves the industry. However, it may be a topic to further explore in a new version of GASeP given the demand for guidance from non-technology producing countries. Although this issue has been discussed by the Aviation Security Panel, it remains an issue for some Member States. One possible solution could be encouraging bilateral and multilateral cooperation between States who have developed guidance with those who have not. The secure ICAO Portal AVSECPaedia also provides information on this, but this not known by some Member States.

83. When Member States were asked about their progress against Outcome 3, there was a distinct difference in answers between the Member States who develop and use security technology and those that only use the technology produced by others. The consumers reported almost no activity in this area and in some cases, it was suggested that this is an area in GASeP to be reviewed as it does not apply to everyone.

*'Perpetual vetting is a ground-breaking approach in aviation security: it capitalizes on existing resources and connects them in an innovative way, promoting a much more robust security culture (...) For each type of screening equipment, we have developed detailed threat identification, minimum detection requirements and a qualified equipment list; screening authorities have operational specifications; and we have technical specifications. The Known Traveller Digital Identity (KDTI) pilot project allows travellers to share their information via mobile device with government agencies. This pilot project is a public-private partnership in cooperation with the Dutch Government, the World Economic Forum, and industry stakeholders.'*

*Member States, EUR/NAT Region*

84. Countries were asked about their progress in the following tasks (See Annex 7 Figure 12):

- a. Encourage and support trials and tests of new processes and equipment (States reporting high progress; 36%, and moderate progress 31%);
- b. Organize and support innovation events and challenges and encourage participation of start-up and entrepreneurial companies (States reporting high progress; 17%, and moderate progress 29%); and
- c. Assess available technologies for each type of security equipment (States reporting high progress; 33%, and moderate progress 33%).

85. Member states have reported the following additional activities:

- Leveraging EU and ICAO training assistance;
- Expanding cooperation with the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC);
- Amendments to European Union aviation security legislation of 23/1/2019 to address GASeP priority action in developing new detection standards (shoe scanner equipment, explosive vapour detection) and updating of existing standards.

Outcome 4: Improve oversight and quality assurance

86. Regarding progress against Outcome 4, ICAO reported the following key achievements:

- Establishment of region-specific targets through regional Roadmaps;
- Revision of USAP-CMA objectives, methodology and protocol questions;
- The development of a recurrent online course for USAP-CMA auditors;
- Communication with auditors through newsletters on a biannual basis; and
- The launch of a new CAP template.

87. The progress of Member States under Outcome 4 was reported on the basis of the following task: Analyse national quality control data to identify implementation issues that are systemic and require attention at a foundational level. In this case, 53% of Member States reported to be high

and 35% moderate (Annex 7 Figure 13). Member States have reported the key highlight activities in this context are:

- Implementation of annual Audit Plans;
- Implementation of USAP-CMA rectification Corrective Action Plan;
- Statistical database to analyse quality control trends
- Revision of guidance for quality control;
- ECAC Security Forum coordination on oversight and quality control activities in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic;
- Introduction of robust vetting process for staff requesting access to SRA.

Outcome 5: Increase cooperation and support,

88. Under this outcome ICAO has reported the following progress:

- Comprehensive and targeted AVSEC assistance and trainings through the AVSEC voluntary fund ISD-SEC programme;
- Development of needs assessments;
- Support the implementation of Aviation Security Improvement Plans (ASIPs) with States in-need;
- Development of security culture products; and
- Updating the ICAO Aviation Security Assistance and Capacity Building Strategy with enhanced focus on GASeP.

89. These tasks, which have required staff time and dedication, have been delivered. However, additional follow up and study is required to verify to what extent the trainings have developed the capacity of targeted Member States and the documents produced have been used. Some of the priority actions such as mapping of donor capabilities, the development of needs assessment manual, and the risk-based priority setting framework were postponed for 2022.

90. Member States reported their progress in Outcome 5 with the following task: Publicize UNSC Resolution 2309 (2016) and GASeP's objectives and Roadmap to local entities involved in aviation security. In this case, progress has been limited, with 28% reporting high, 39% reporting moderate, and 20% reporting low progress.

91. Regarding industry, little information was available about the implementation of Priority Actions as there was limited engagement by industry. Airport Council International (ACI) presented a Working Paper to the Aviation Security Panel in March 2018 that included a GASeP progress report<sup>21</sup>. ACI World and its Security Committee have endorsed a comprehensive Strategy where the components of the Strategy are in line with the Global Aviation Security Plan. ACI reported also the publication of ACI's Landside Security Handbook, the joint development of a training


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<sup>21</sup> HLCAS/2-WP/21, 24/10.18

course for airport security managers with ICAO, the inclusion of materials in AVSECPaedia, and the encouragement of ACI members to join the ICAO PoC Network<sup>22</sup>.

92. Overall many activities are implemented by ICAO and Member States to realize the five GASeP outcomes. However, there is limited reporting on the progress towards achieving the outcomes. High level reporting is done to the Council, at least once a year, and on some points at each session. However, there are no clear linkages between implemented activities and results with the planned outcomes of the GASeP (activities should lead to products and then to higher level results - outcomes). In addition, the use of the regional Roadmaps in some of the regions is very limited. A review of the regional Roadmaps showed that most of them contain similar text and vague targets. The interviews also showed that in some cases the Roadmaps, once developed, were not followed or incorporated into Member State work plans.
93. About 80 per cent of Member States reported that the influence of GASeP was moderate to high in changing national or sectoral plans for security, and 74 per cent indicated that GASeP had a moderate to high influence in changing behaviour and practice of aviation security (Figure 3). This level of influence and engagement can be further encouraged where Member States and ICAO’s aviation security experts both at HQ and Regional Office use GASeP as a point of reference when undertaking projects and technical support activities for Member States.

Figure 3. Level of GASeP’s influence in various areas as reported by Member States



Source: GASeP’s survey to Member States.


**Finding 11:** Regarding the implementation of the GASeP by Member States, ICAO’s overall support to Member States and the effectiveness of the support is appreciated by Member States. However, there is still a need for additional capacity building support by Member States to implement GASeP priority actions.

94. Interview and survey responses from Member States indicate they are generally comfortable with the support provided by ICAO in implementing the GASeP. Member States have reported that they found ICAO’s support to be at least moderately effective and found the guidance materials and manuals to be useful. (Figure 4).

<sup>22</sup> AVSECP/29-WP/31, 7/3/18

95. However, many Member States reported the need to have ICAO’s materials updated and translated into their languages in a timely manner. They also noted they would like to receive more targeted assistance, and made various suggestions (see Sustainability section).

Figure 4. Effectiveness of ICAO’s support to Member States to implement GASep’s Priority Actions



Source: GASep’s Evaluation Survey for Member States.

96. One Member State had a divergent opinion about ICAO’s technical assistance and stated that, *“With its limited AVSEC resources, ICAO should prioritize delivery of assistance to States who still struggle to meet their obligations to fully implement the standards of Annex 17 and the security provisions of Annex 9. ICAO should be developing and delivering innovative methods and clearer strategies for technical assistance to states that are falling and/or have historically continued to fall short in meeting their international obligations for civil aviation security. ICAO should also be conducting monitoring and evaluation of these assistance activities to measure their effectiveness and sustainability over time.”* Along with this statement came a call for ICAO to enhance its work on measuring the impact of the technical assistance it provides and being more targeted in its efforts. ICAO has indicated that technical assistance is being provided by prioritizing Member States in need and has a plan to work on measuring the impact of the technical assistance activities in 2022.
97. Many Member States noted the following as the major challenges to achieving the priority outcomes of GASep:
- i. Inadequate financial resources;
  - ii. Human resources shortages - recruiting and retaining;
  - iii. Lack of political will and political culture;
  - iv. Implementation of innovative technology;
  - v. Cooperation within the country and other stakeholders globally; and
98. Triangulation of data confirms the validity of many of the above challenges, and provides a possible insight into future priorities of GASep.
99. Based on interviews with stakeholders from various organizations, the evaluation team noted there may be an opportunity to enhance public relations through better communication with Regional Offices, Member States and the industry in the area of security. Member States were

also requesting an improvement in reporting and communication on GASeP.<sup>23</sup> It is understood that a legitimate culture of confidentiality exists within aviation security. However, at times this can create difficulties in building links and working with other organizations. As reported by the Secretariat, the industry may have access to the GASeP secure website, but not all relevant stakeholders know about the existence of such access. An enhanced open dialogue and a more permeable culture may help to fine tune what is produced to ensure it meets and addresses the needs of Member States and it is accessed by all relevant stakeholders.

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<sup>23</sup> A40-WP/285

## Efficiency


100. This section looks at the overall efficiency of GASeP. Efficiency is examined in terms of adequacy of available resources, timely availability of support by ICAO to Member States, clarity of processes, roles and responsibilities, and systems to implement and monitor GASeP priority outcomes, including the avoidance of duplication.

**Finding 12:** No additional human and/or financial resources was allocated for GASeP implementation and management for ICAO and this limits the efforts directed towards its implementation and monitoring.

101. The GASeP Roadmap identified Priority Actions to be implemented by ICAO, Member States and the industry. However, the Roadmap does not provide guidance on the resources needed, and the source of funding to be provided to implement the Priority Actions. It may be the case that given it is the Member States and industry that are expected to implement GASeP, no provision was made for additional resources within ICAO.

102. Though many of the Priority Actions in the Roadmap are also part of ICAO's day to day activities, delivering them in a timely manner would require the allocation of additional human and financial resources. There was a call to increase budget support for GASeP by the High-level Conference on Aviation Security.<sup>24</sup> No additional budget was allocated for implementation of GASeP Priority Actions, except for an EU secondment as reported by ATB.

103. Regional offices have also received no additional resources to implement GASeP specific priority actions or support Member States to implement GASeP. There was feedback received from regional offices expressing concerns about a shortage of staff for aviation security, and insufficient travel budget to provide technical assistance to Member States. It has been noted in previous evaluations that ICAO's financial and human resource position has remained almost the same for the past 10 years, and this places constraints on ICAO and how much it can support Member States in the implementation of the Global Plans<sup>25</sup> Figure 5. Contracting States who report increase in budget for Aviation Security since 2017



Source: GASeP's Evaluation Survey for Member States.

104. During Member States interviews many confirmed that their AVSEC budgets had increased from 2017, but decreased since the start of the COVID pandemic. Some Member States noted GASeP is being used as an advocacy tool to request the required human and financial resources for aviation security. Stakeholders also noted that GASeP is elevating the status of aviation security. However, it is difficult to identify the net contribution of the GASeP in relation to the increased


<sup>24</sup> HLCAS/2-WP/3 19/8/18

<sup>25</sup> Evaluation of GASP and GANP, 2019

CAAs aviation security budgets. See Figure 17 (annex 8) for the influence of GASeP in increasing number of staff and financial resources as reported by Member States.


105. Many Member States (Figures 6 and 7), reported they have adequate financial (38%) and staff (45%) resources for the implementation of the GASeP. However, these figures have an important nuance. Interview participants from Member States with mature aviation sector reported they do not have challenges of getting both human and financial resources while resources may be a serious problem in many developing countries, especially in terms of staff members as reported by many of them in the interviews.

Figure 6. Adequacy of Financial Resources for GASeP reported by Member States



Source: GASeP's survey to Member States.

Figure 7. Adequacy of Staff for the implementation of GASeP



Source: GASeP's survey to Member States.

106. Member States perception on timely availability of technical support, manuals and tools required for GASeP implementation is moderate (40 percent) and high (41 per cent) (Figure 3 page 33). Interview participants mentioned that timely support to Member States to implement GASeP is affected by resource limitations.

107. One of the major factors that contribute to the efficient delivery of results of any plan is clarity and understanding of roles and responsibilities. The Roadmap identified the priority actions to be taken into consideration when implemented by stakeholders. It also highlighted the role of ICAO in monitoring and reviewing GASeP. However, details on roles and responsibilities, whether

there will be regular reporting by Member States, the industry and ICAO on the implementation of the priority actions are not highlighted in the GASeP or in other documents. The flow and the use of such information is not clear, and the role of regional aviation security groups and regional offices have not been clearly indicated. Overall, there is inadequate clarity of roles and responsibilities in the management of the GASeP and inadequate clarity by Secretariat staff on their role in monitoring the implementation of the plan.

## Sustainability

108. This section presents issues related to ensuring the sustainability of the GASeP. As implementation of GASeP started a few years ago and slowed down due to the COVID pandemic, the evaluation concentrated more on the factors that will help to ensure sustainability of GASeP results. Accordingly, the evaluation examined sustainability in terms of the influence of GASeP in changing national or sectoral plans. The evaluation also examined the effectiveness of the alignment of GASeP with Member State and regional plans and programmes, and the effectiveness of ICAO's support in building the capacity of stakeholders to implement aviation security measures as important factors for sustainability.

109. Important factors that will contribute to the sustainability of a global plan is the relevance and alignment of GASeP with other development plans at various levels and a clear strategy as to how to integrate GASeP into regional and national aviation security plans and providing necessary human and financial support both at regional and Member State levels. As mentioned in the relevance section of the report, most Member States (over 85%) have found GASeP to be relevant to address Member States and regional priorities and needs. Many Member States also referred to GASeP in preparing national aviation security plans and programmes, and made efforts to align their plans with GASeP.

*"The GASeP is a common reference point as we set short and long term national and organizational strategies."*

*Member State, Southeast*

**Finding 13:** Alignment of GASeP with national aviation security plans and programmes as well as the effort made by some regional bodies to incorporate GASeP in their aviation security frameworks will enhance the uptake and sustainability of GASeP results. However, there is a need to expand such practice by all Member States, regional partners and other stakeholders.

110. In addition, linking aviation security plans of Member States with the National Civil Aviation Master Plans (CAMP) and through them with National Development Plans (NDPs) should be considered. Integration of GASeP priorities actions at State level with the CAMP and National Development Plans could ensure funding to GASeP activities at Member States levels. While regulators can create regulations, at Member States level investment will happen only if there is alignment with national priorities in the National Development Plan.

111. Though the actual implementation of regional Roadmaps is limited in some regions, the preparation and implementation of Regional GASeP Roadmaps is also another important factor for sustainability. Alignment of GASeP with the Windhoek Declaration on Aviation Security in Africa and incorporating GASeP into the regulatory structure of European Union (EU) are encouraging signs that leads to sustainability. However, ICAO should make further effort to encourage other regions to align with GASeP and implement their regional plans to ensure sustainability.

112. The other factor that will significantly improve GASeP sustainability is Member State capacity building. ICAO and stakeholders are making efforts to build the capacity of Member State aviation security experts. A key challenge at the developing Member State level can be turnover of staff at the CAA due to lower pay.

113. Technical assistance activities and projects ICAO is delivering to Member States aim to address issues identified through the ICAO USAP-CMA. A number of capacity building activities/trainings are organized by ICAO through the Implementation Support and Development Section – Security (ISD-SEC) unit of ATB and the Regional Offices. The following are some capacity building efforts that will contribute towards sustainability:

- ICAO Toolkit on Enhancing Security Culture and ICAO Security Culture Campaign 'Starter Pack' along with various training tips and guidance material that promote a positive security culture.
- Security Culture Workshop and a Security Culture training course.
- The regular Risk Management Workshops for Member States that benefitted 511 AVSEC specialists from 96 Member States so far.
- The various aviation security capacity building activities to Member States through the ICAO Aviation Security Training Centres (ASTCs) network including the trainings for the development of aviation security professionals.
- The provision of aviation security technical expertise and guidance to States in need through its assistance and capacity-building programme to address priority deficiencies in State aviation security and oversight regimes, as well as ensuring States enhance their capacity to address evolving threats and new security requirements.

114. The renewed focus of the revised ICAO Aviation Security Assistance and Capacity Building Strategy on strengthening, enhancing, and more strategically targeting and coordinating ICAO's assistance and capacity building efforts in line with the GASeP could also further contribute for the sustainability of GASeP's results. As indicated in Figure 4 (page 36) above the effectiveness of training organized by ICAO to the implementation of GASeP is rated as moderate or high by 75% the Member States. However, many developing countries have very limited aviation security expertise and the high turnover of CAA staff affects the sustainability of AVSEC in general, where GASeP is included.

*"GASeP is a valuable tool to foster continuous improvement for the State. In our case, it has allowed us to determine the priority result which was weaker, and guide resources to cover the gap. In our opinion, GASeP should be kept and improved, because it allows the countries in the region to count with a guiding tool for its development of the security system in civil aviation and its surveillance system which is associated."*

*Member state, South American Region*

115. Under the pillar of sustainability, it is important to note the following recommendations suggested by Member States for the future of GASeP.

- i. Provide more training and guidance materials and increase online collaboration (30 mentions);
- ii. Clarify and make clear the link between USAP-CMA, Annex 17, DOC 8973 and GASeP and improve monitoring tools (23 mentions);
- iii. Increase information exchange (webpage etc.) on best practices and improve collaboration (20 mentions);

- iv. Increase activities to promote GASep, engage Member States, and inform Member States of GASep results (16 mentions);
- v. Expand technical assistance programs (12 mentions).

## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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### Conclusions

116. Conclusion 1: GASeP has been a useful and relevant framework at varying degrees to Many Member States and some regional organizations for priority setting and a tool to advance aviation security. It has been used to help design and adjust national AVSEC plans, inspire regional Roadmaps and frameworks and used as an advocacy tool. However, it has limited use for some industry stakeholders. (Linked to Findings 1, and 3).
117. Conclusion 2: GASeP is strategically aligned with the ICAO Strategic Objective on Security and Facilitation and the Business Plan. However, there is a need to incorporate the priority actions of the Roadmap in the Secretariat Operating Plans for implementation and monitoring. The relation between GASeP, Annex 17 and the manual should also be clarified in the document and better communication about the role of GASeP to all relevant stakeholders is needed. (Linked to Finding 4).
118. Conclusion 3: COVID-19 has brought many challenges and delays in implementing the priority actions and at the same time various opportunities. There is an overall call to adapt GASeP to a new time frame given the challenges COVID-19 has presented to Member States. (Linked to Findings 2 and 7).
119. Conclusion 4: Member States agreed that establishing aspirational targets for GASeP was important, but most respondent States indicated the targets were too ambitious. In addition, according to a significant number of Member States, the mechanisms available to capture progress against the EIs were imperfect. (Linked to Findings 7, 8 and 10).
120. *Conclusion 5:* There is no clarity in the results chain of GASeP's framework (activities leading to outputs and outputs leading to outcomes). In addition, the number of Priority Actions of the Roadmap are found to be too many. There is an overall demand from member States, Regional Offices and the industry to review GASeP's Roadmap with limited and focused priority actions or outputs, clear indicators and responsibilities. (Linked to Findings 8, 9 and 10).
121. Conclusion 6: There is progress in implementing the priority actions of the GASeP by ICAO, Member States and some stakeholders. The overall assessment of the quality of the technical assistance provided by ICAO to Member States in the area of security is also considered satisfactory. However, the absence of coherent monitoring and reporting of the priority actions of the GASeP makes difficult to assess the level of achievements at the outcome level. (Linked to Findings 8, 11 and 12).
122. Conclusion 7: In general, GASeP has helped to raise the profile of aviation security at the political level, and this in turn improved the awareness of aviation security among senior officials. Since the inception of GASeP, some Member States have also reported an increase in budgetary allocation to AVSEC. However, the absence of specific human resource and budgetary allocation for GASeP limited the attention it required for monitoring, implementation and reporting by the Secretariat. (Linked to Findings 3, 11 and 12).

## Recommendations

[Recommendation 1](#): Revise GASeP considering the issues identified in this evaluation report. These include:

- a. adjusting EI targets to making them ambitious but realistic;
  - b. making the GASeP revision more participatory drawing input from States, regional offices, regional groups and other relevant stakeholders as appropriate;
  - c. clarifying adequately the links between GASeP, Annex 17, Doc 8973, and the USAP CMA, as well as other monitoring tools and that GASeP is not an additional set of requirements, but a tool/mechanism/framework to support the effective implementation of Annex 17;
  - d. reducing the number of priority actions in the GASeP and link them to the achievements of the priority outcomes;
  - e. clarifying the role of stakeholders in monitoring and reporting of GASeP and on how monitoring information will be used to improve performance; and
  - f. identifying resources gaps and their sources to implement and monitor GASeP.
- (Linked to all findings and conclusions – please see also annex 2)

Priority	Time Implication	Resource Implication
High	June 2023	Low

Closing criteria:

- Revised GASeP considering the above issues adopted by the ICAO Council

[Recommendation 2](#): The Secretariat should develop and use a clear monitoring and reporting mechanisms for GASeP results. The Secretariat could consider the following in designing the monitoring and reporting mechanism:

- a. Assess and use options for Member States to provide updates on their GASeP targets and achievements using a secure on-line platform.
- b. Ensure any monitoring tools developed are focused on outputs and outcomes, but also considering activities.

*Linked to findings 8 and 10 and conclusions 4, 5 and 6*

Priority	Time Implication	Resource Implication
Medium	June 2024	Medium

Closing Criteria:

- Monitoring and reporting mechanism for the revised GASeP in place

[Recommendation 3](#): The Secretariat should identify and allocate resources needed for effective and efficient implementation and management of GASeP at the Secretariat level including for priority actions that are not resourced. The Secretariat could also, inter alia, consider assigning a GASeP Coordinator or single point of contact responsible for GASeP's coordination and overseeing the work on monitoring, reporting and communication with relevant stakeholders. (linked to *findings 4 and 8, 11, 12 and conclusions*

Priority	Time Implication	Resource Implication
High	June 2023	High

Closing Criteria:

- Resource for the implementation of GASeP priority actions, monitoring and reporting identified and allocated/agreed to mobilize.

## ANNEX. SUMMARY ISSUES IDENTIFIED TO CONSIDER FOR GASEP REVISION AND IMPLEMENTATION

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- i. Undertake a review of the EI targets with a view to making them ambitious but realistic
- ii. Consider establishing region specific targets that feed into an overall global target and noting that regions are at differing levels of effective implementation.
- iii. Make the revision of GASeP participatory involving better relevant stakeholders including regional offices and regional groups
- iv. Clarify adequately the links between GASeP, Annex 17, Doc 8973, and the USAP CMA, as well as any other developed monitoring tools.
- v. Clarify that GASeP is not an additional set of requirements, but a tool to enhance effective implementation of Annex 17. This message was not clearly received by all Member States.
- vi. Reduce the number of priority actions in GASeP, but include clear tasks and clear rationales linking priority actions to results.
- vii. Clarify the role of stakeholders in monitoring and reporting on GASeP achievements including the major indicators, the frequency of reporting, the flow of information and on how monitoring information will be used.
- viii. Identifying resources gaps and their sources to implement and monitor GASeP.
- ix. Encourage alignment of GASeP with Member States national aviation security plans and regional stakeholders and the industry in their aviation security frameworks or programmes

### Other areas for consideration for the implementation of GASeP

- a. Monitoring
  - i. Assess different options for self-reporting of GASeP goals and priority actions/results using a dedicated secure on-line platform. In addition to giving Member States a way to provide updates to ICAO about progress in close to real time, such a mechanism could allow ICAO to prioritise audit and capacity development activities.
  - ii. Regional Roadmaps and targets should be reviewed inline with the overall global target, noting regions are at differing levels of effective implementation.
  - iii. Ensure any monitoring tools developed are able to capture not just activities but also outputs and outcomes.
  - iv. Consider additional remote oversight and monitoring options using the lessons learned from the experience of implementation and management during the COVID period.
- b. Communication
  - i. Make clear the single point of contact/responsibility for GASeP within ATB.
  - ii. Establish a formal mechanism to provide Member States with ongoing information regarding GASeP in terms of EI status and successes.
  - iii. Improve online collaboration and information exchange.
- c. To improve capacity development
  - i. Link technical support with GASeP when applicable
  - ii. Emphasise that GASeP is a way to speak a common language on aviation security when undertaking capacity development activities on a bilateral or multilateral basis.
  - iii. Build remote learning and engagement capabilities, as these online activities allow more Member States to participate in events and forums they would otherwise have been excluded from due to cost, travel, or staff limitations. This has already started during the pandemic.
  - iv. Establish effective mechanisms to track the effectiveness of training, focusing on the outcomes as well as outputs.

- v. Ensure capacity development is focused on the countries of most need, and in their areas of most need.
- d. Funding
- i. More funding is required for the Secretariat to support and monitor and evaluate GASeP, and in the regional offices to support Member State to implement GASeP priority actions.
  - ii. Link the Priority Actions of the GASeP Road Map that are planned to be implemented by ICAO in the Secretariat Operating Plans
  - iii. Vacant positions should be filled in a timely manner, the number of regional aviation security positions should be appropriate for the size and complexity of the region, and funding should be available to undertake the travel, training and capacity development activities required to support Member States.