Japan
National Aviation Safety Plan
2026

Civil Aviation Bureau

Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism

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FOREWORD

Air transportation has become a well-established means of transportation that enables high-speed and long-distance travel, which is essential for revitalizing Japan's economy and society and enhancing its international competitiveness. We must not forget that aviation safety is the foundation for the sustainable function of this important means of transportation and the most important factor that supports public confidence.

The number of aircraft landings at Japan's airports and the volume of air traffic during the year 2025 has recovered to pre-COVID-19 pandemic levels and it will be necessary to respond appropriately to the changes in the number of aircraft landings at airports and the volume of air traffic in airspaces. Under these circumstances, Japan is required to take more comprehensive safety measures than ever before to prevent accidents and incidents.

One of the most recent major issues in related to civil aviation in Japan was the accident caused by a runway incursion at Tokyo International Airport (or Haneda Airport) in early 2024 and all possible efforts and measures to secure and enhance aviation safety are now being taken. In addition to these runway incursion countermeasures, it is also necessary to address operational safety risks such as runway excursions and mid-air collisions, as well as organizational challenges such as strengthening safety oversight and collaborating in sharing the results of these efforts with other states and regions.

In order to commit to our continuous efforts to eliminate various safety issues, Japan will develop the National Aviation Safety Plan (NASP) in alignment with the ICAO Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP) and the Asia-Pacific Regional Aviation Safety Plan (AP-RASP).

Miyazawa Koichi

Director-General, Civil Aviation Bureau

SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Overview of the NASP

Japan is committed to enhancing aviation safety and supporting those activities. The purpose of this National Aviation Safety Plan (NASP) is to continuously reduce fatal accidents and safety risks through the development and implementation of a national aviation safety strategy. A safe, resilient, and sustainable aviation system contributes to the economic development of Japan and its industries. The NASP promotes the effective implementation of Japan's safety oversight system, a risk-based approach to managing safety, as well as a coordinated approach to collaboration between Japan and other States, regions and industry. Service providers are encouraged to support and implement the NASP as the strategy for the continuous improvement of aviation safety.

There are 107 certified aerodromes and 13 heliports in Japan, including 38 international aerodromes. The airspace of Japan is classified into Class A, B, C, D, E controlled airspace and Class G uncontrolled airspace. The number of the movements of Japanese air carriers in the past 10 years are as the following.

Year	Number of domestic flights	Number of international flights
2015	844,636	130,085
2016	839,689	147,415
2017	845,622	155,061
2018	845,004	154,583
2019	859,785	156,959
2020	589,173	68,670
2021	579,045	74,012
2022	821,738	82,177
2023	862,699	111,604
2024	855,548	130,251



There are currently 70 Air Operator Certificates (AOCs) issued by Japan, and of those, there are 13 issued to operators conducting international commercial air transport operations. Japan also has 36 helicopter operators.

1.2 Structure of the NASP

This NASP presents the strategic direction for the management and improvement of aviation safety at the national level for a period of approximately three years (2026–2028) and comprises five sections. In addition to the foreword, sections include: the introduction, the purpose of the NASP, the national operational safety risks, the organizational challenges, and the monitoring implementation.

1.3 Definitions

(1) Civil Aviation Safety Authority
The divisions and office of the Japan Civil Aviation Bureau of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (including Regional Civil Aviation Bureaus) that are responsible for oversight to ensure the safety of civil aviation.

(2) Service Provider
An organization that is required to establish an SMS for the implementation of instructions and support services related to aircraft operations, such as a domestic air carrier, an approved maintenance organization, an approved training organization, a public aerodrome, and air traffic control.

(3) Aviation Stakeholder
A party that engages in activities related to or in direct support of aircraft operations. (Only parties engaged in civil aviation.)

(4) Safety
The state in which risks associated with aviation activities, related to, or in direct support of the operation of aircraft, are reduced and controlled to an acceptable level.

(5) Safety oversight
A function performed by a State to ensure that individuals and organizations performing an aviation activity comply with safety-related national laws and regulations.

(6) State safety programme (SSP)
An integrated set of laws, regulations, policies, objectives, processes, procedures and activities aimed at managing safety, at the State level.

(7) Safety management system
A systematic approach to managing safety, including the necessary organizational structures, accountability, responsibilities, policies and procedures.

(8) Safety performance
A State or a service provider's measurable effect on safety achievement.

(9) Hazard
A condition or an object with the potential to cause or contribute to an aircraft incident or accident.

(10) Safety risk
The predicted probability and severity of the consequences or outcomes of a hazard.

(11) Safety data
A defined set of facts or values collected for reference, processing or analysis, which could be used to maintain or improve safety.

(12) Safety information
Safety data processed, organized or analysed in a given context to support safety management and the development of safety intelligence.

(13) Safety enhancement initiative (SEI)
One or more actions to eliminate or mitigate operational safety risks or to address organizational challenges.

(14) Critical element (CE)
The critical elements of a safety oversight system encompass the whole spectrum of civil aviation activities. They are the building blocks upon which an effective safety oversight system is based. The level of effective implementation of the CEs is an indication of a State's capability for safety oversight.

(15) Accident

An accident that meets any of the criteria of Article 76, paragraph (1) of the Civil Aeronautics Act.

(16) Serious incident

A situation in which the pilot in command has recognized during flight that there was a possibility of collision or contact with another aircraft, and any other event specified by Ordinances of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism under Article 76-2 of the Civil Aeronautics Act.

1.4 Relationship between the NASP and the State Safety Programme (SSP)

The State Safety Programme (SSP) is an integrated set of laws, regulations, policies, objectives, processes, procedures and activities aimed at managing safety at the State level. The SSP enables the identification and mitigation of operational safety risks, facilitates access to safety information, supports the consistent and proactive management of aviation activities, allows for the measurement of the safety performance of the civil aviation system, and provides the means to address identified hazards and safety deficiencies.

The National Aviation Safety Plan (NASP) is a planning document that translates, within a defined timeframe, the strategic approaches required to achieve the safety objectives established in Japan's SSP document. The NASP is one of the key documents that supplements Japan's SSP documentation. It serves as a means to define and drive the implementation of Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs) developed through the SSP processes and aligned with the ICAO Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP) and the Asia-Pacific Regional Aviation Safety Plan (AP-RASP).

1.5 Responsibility for the NASP development, implementation and monitoring

The Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB) is responsible for the development, implementation and monitoring of the NASP, in collaboration with the national service providers. The NASP was developed in consultation with service providers and other stakeholders, and in alignment with the GASP and the AP-RASP.

SECTION 2. PURPOSE OF JAPAN'S NATIONAL AVIATION SAFETY PLAN

The purpose of the NASP is to eliminate and/or reduce safety issues identified by analyzing the recent accidents and serious incidents in Japan and organizational challenges within the aviation safety authorities and industries to set safety goals, targets, indicators, and series of safety enhancement initiatives (SEIs) as a strategic approach. The NASP has been developed using the safety goals, targets, and High-Risk Categories of Occurrences (HRCs) from the GASP, as well as the AP-RASP.

Safety issues are classified into operational safety risks and organizational challenges. Operational safety risks are further classified into National High-Risk Categories of Occurrences (N-HRCs) and national other safety risks, by taking into account the number of fatalities and those risks.

SECTION 3. NATIONAL OPERATIONAL SAFETY RISKS

In selecting operational safety risks, trends in accidents and serious incidents are considered. The summary of accidents and serious incidents that occurred in Japan, those for aircraft registered in Japan involved in commercial air transport and aircraft involved in general aviation, is shown in the MLIT website.

Among the operational safety risks, the following five National High-Risk Categories of Occurrences (N-HRCs) in the Japan context were considered of the utmost priority because of the number of fatalities and risk of fatalities associated with such occurrences. They were identified based on operational safety risks and in alignment with the global high-risk categories described in the GASP.

(1) Runway Incursion (RI)
(2) Runway Excursion (RE)
(3) Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT)
(4) Loss Of Control In-Flight (LOC-I)
(5) Mid-Air Collision (MAC)

In addition to the N-HRCs listed above, the following national other safety risks have been identified:

(6) Turbulence encounter (TURB), limited to fatality or injury cases of persons on board
(7) Abnormal runway contact (ARC)
(8) System/component failure or malfunction (non-powerplant) (SCF-NP)

In order to address the National Operational Safety Risks listed above and enhance aviation safety, Japan established a goal in line with the GASP and a quantitative target to achieve these goals and an indicator for Monitoring Implementation as defined in Section 5. of the NASP, which is shown in the table below.

Goal	Target	Indicator	Link to GASP
1. Achieve a continuous reduction of	1.1 By 2028, decrease the rate of accidents	1.1.1 Number of fatal accidents related to N-HRC per million flights	GASP Goal 1

operational safety risks	and serious incidents for each N-HRC	1.1.2 Number of accidents related to N-HRC per million flights 1.1.3 Number of serious incidents related to N-HRC per million flights	
	1.2 By 2028, decrease the rate of accidents and serious incidents for national other safety risks	1.2.1 Number of fatal accidents related to N-OSR per million flights 1.2.2 Number of accidents related to N-OSR per million flights 1.2.3 Number of serious incidents related to N-OSR per million flights	

To achieve the goals and targets above, Japan will implement a series of SEIs, some of which are derived from the ICAO Global Aviation Safety Roadmap (Doc10161). The full list of the SEIs is presented in the Appendix to the NASP.

SECTION 4. ORGANIZATIONAL CHALLENGES

Organizational Challenges are given priority in the NASP since they are aimed at enhancing and strengthening Japan's safety oversight capabilities and the management of aviation safety at the national level.

The eight critical elements (CEs) of a safety oversight system are defined by ICAO. Japan is committed to the effective implementation of these eight CEs, as part of its overall safety oversight responsibilities, which emphasize Japan's commitment to safety in respect of its aviation activities. The eight CEs are presented in the figure below.



Critical elements of a State's safety oversight system

Based on an analysis of the current status of Japan's safety oversight activities,

the following four safety issues have been identified as structural challenges that should be treated as the highest priority, given their impact on the effectiveness of safety risk management. These issues are typically systemic in nature and related to challenges associated with the conduct of States' safety oversight functions, implementation of SSP by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, and the level of SMS implementation by the service providers. These organizational challenges are in line with those listed in the GASP.

(1) Strengthen safety oversight capabilities
(2) Effective implementation of the SSP
(3) Sharing safety-related issues with ICAO and other States
(4) Effective implementation of the NASP and improvement of the SSP

To address these organizational challenges, Japan established goals in line with the GASP and quantitative targets to achieve these goals and indicators, which are shown in the table below.

Goal	Target	Indicator	Link to GASP
2. Strengthen States' safety oversight capabilities	2.1 Establishment of a safety oversight framework to support the implementation of safety risk-based surveillance	2.1.1 Number of areas with established safety risk assessment processes	GASP Goal 2
	2.2 Enhancement of the safety oversight capabilities of authority personnel	2.2.1 Number of areas in which personnel capability development was undertaken to support the implementation of safety risk-based surveillance	
3. Effective implementation of the SSP	3.1 Enhancement of data-driven hazard identification, safety risk management and safety performance assessment through the establishment of an advanced safety management system	3.1.1 Number of new national measures implemented as risk mitigation actions (e.g., revisions of notices/circulars and issuance of guidelines)	GASP Goal 3

	3.2 Promotion of a positive safety culture and enhancement of safety information sharing through proactive safety promotion activities	3.2.1 Number of voluntary safety reports by area 3.2.2 Number of area-specific forums for dialogue aimed at promoting safety culture and enhancing safety information sharing	
4. Sharing safety-related issues with ICAO and other States	4.1 Sharing of safety issues identified through SSP processes at the national and global levels	4.1.1 Existence of cases where national initiatives introduced by the aviation safety authority for risk mitigation led to new safety actions by aviation stakeholders 4.1.2 Existence of cases where proposals made by the aviation safety authority at ICAO or other international fora for safety improvement and risk mitigation led to new initiatives	GASP Goal 4
5. Effective implementation of the NASP and improvement of the SSP	5.1 Strengthening cooperation with industry through the NASP to achieve safety improvements and enhance the SSP	5.1.1 Existence of improvements in SSP and NASP initiatives resulting from proposals or feedback provided by service providers	GASP Goal 5

To achieve the goals and targets above, Japan will implement a series of SEIs, some of which are derived from the ICAO Global Aviation Safety Roadmap (Doc10161). The full list of the SEIs is presented in the Appendix to the NASP.

SECTION 5. MONITORING IMPLEMENTATION

Japan will continuously monitor the safety performance of the national civil aviation system using the mechanisms presented in the Appendix to this plan, in order to ensure that the intended results are achieved. Furthermore, Japan will regularly review safety performance by using the indicators listed in Chapters 3 and 4, so as to ensure the achievement of the national safety goals and targets.

In addition to the above, JCAB will take the necessary actions, through detailed monitoring of the Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs), to ensure that the identified safety issues and the corresponding SEIs remain current and appropriate. JCAB will also review this plan approximately every three years. In particular, if the goals and targets are not met, the root causes should be explored. If Japan identifies critical operational safety risks, reasonable measures must be taken as soon as practicable, including the amendment of the NASP, such as by establishing additional SEIs.

DETAILED SEIs: NATIONAL OPERATIONAL SAFETY RISKS

National High-Risk Category of Occurrences (N-HRC): Runway Incursion (RI)						
Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks Target 1.1: By 2028, decrease the rate of accidents and serious incidents for each N-HRC						
SEI	Action	Timeline	Responsible Entity	Stakeholders	Metrics	Monitoring Activity
1. Eliminate or mitigate RI related safety risk	1A. Ensure the establishment and implementation of the Runway Safety Action Plan and Runway Safety Teams (RSTs)	Q2 2026 to Q4 2028	JCAB	· Aerodrome operator · Air carrier · Air navigation service provider	Number of RST meetings held	JCAB monthly meetings and SSP meeting
	1B. Study the development status of onboard technologies that enhance pilot situational awareness			Aircraft users, including air carrier	Status of the development of materials on the status of technology development	
	1C. Identify aerodrome hotspots and develop strategies to remove hazards or mitigate risks associated with hotspots published in the Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP)			· Aerodrome operator · Air carrier · Air navigation service provider	Number of hot spots for which mitigation strategies were examined	
	1D. Develop ground-taxiing videos for aerodromes with frequent small aircraft operations			All pilots, excluding pilots engaged primarily in IFR operations for air carriers	Number of aerodromes where videos have been developed	
	1E. Promote the expanded implementation (initiation of deployment) of Runway Status Lights (RWSL)			· Air navigation service provider · Aerodrome operator	Number of aerodromes where implementation has commenced	

	1F. Promote studies and research aimed at enhancing Runway Incursion Detection Systems and advancing air traffic management modernization			· Air navigation service provider	Number of studies and research projects conducted	
	1G. Establish mandatory Crew Resource Management (CRM) training	June 2026 to Q4 2028		All pilots not currently subject to mandatory CRM training	Number of personnel trained in CRM	

National High-Risk Category of Occurrences (N-HRC): Runway Excursion (RE)						
Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks Target 1.1: By 2028, decrease the rate of accidents and serious incidents for each N-HRC						
SEI	Action	Timeline	Responsible Entity	Stakeholders	Metrics	Monitoring Activity
1. Eliminate or mitigate RE related safety risk	1A. Ensure the establishment and implementation of the Runway Safety Action Plan and Runway Safety Teams (RSTs)	Q2 2026 to Q4 2028	JCAB	· Aerodrome operator · Air carrier · Air navigation service provider	Number of RST meetings held	JCAB monthly meetings and SSP meeting
	1B. Promote the installation of arresting systems, if a Runway End Safety Area (RESA) cannot be met			Aerodrome operator	Number of aerodromes implementing these measures	
	1C. Establish mandatory CRM Training	June 2026 to Q4 2028		All pilots not currently subject to mandatory CRM training	Number of personnel trained in CRM	

National High-Risk Category of Occurrences (N-HRC): Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT)						
Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks Target 1.1: By 2028, decrease the rate of accidents and serious incidents for each N-HRC						
SEI	Action	Timeline	Responsible Entity	Stakeholders	Metrics	Monitoring Activity
1. Eliminate or mitigate CFIT related safety risk	1A. Establish mandatory CRM Training	June 2026 to Q4 2028	JCAB	All pilots not currently subject to mandatory CRM training	Number of personnel trained in CRM	JCAB monthly meetings and SSP meeting

National High-Risk Category of Occurrences (N-HRC): Loss of Control In-flight (LOC-I)						
Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks Target 1.1: By 2028, decrease the rate of accidents and serious incidents for each N-HRC						
SEI	Action	Timeline	Responsible Entity	Stakeholders	Metrics	Monitoring Activity
1. Eliminate or mitigate LOC-I related safety risk	1A. Introduce and effectively implement the Upset Prevention and Recovery Training (UPRT) requirements	Q2 2026 to Q4 2028	JCAB	· Air carrier · Aerial work service operator · Approved training organization	· Number of UPRT courses conducted by JCAB · UPRT implementation rate among applicable Air carriers · UPRT implementation rate among applicable approved training organizations	JCAB monthly meetings and SSP meeting
	1B. Disseminate safety promotion materials, including videos, leaflets, through safety operation seminars and other events organized by JCAB			All pilots, excluding pilots engaged primarily in IFR operations for air carriers	Number of dissemination activities conducted	

National High-Risk Category of Occurrences (N-HRC): Mid-Air Collision (MAC)						
Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks Target 1.1: By 2028, decrease the rate of accidents and serious incidents for each N-HRC						
SEI	Action	Timeline	Responsible Entity	Stakeholders	Metrics	Monitoring Activity
1. Eliminate or mitigate MAC related safety risk	1A. Promote the effective utilization and further enhancement of communication capabilities through systems such as Controller Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC)	Q2 2026 to Q4 2028	JCAB	Air navigation service provider	Modification of air traffic control systems required for functional expansion, and message types expanded	JCAB monthly meetings and SSP meeting
	1B. Establish mandatory CRM Training	June 2026 to Q4 2028		All pilots not currently subject to mandatory CRM training	Number of personnel trained in CRM	

National other safety risk: Turbulence Encounter (TURB)						
Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks Target 1.2: By 2028, decrease the rate of accidents and serious incidents for national other safety risks						
SEI	Action	Timeline	Responsible Entity	Stakeholders	Metrics	Monitoring Activity
1. Eliminate or mitigate TURB related safety risks, limited to cases of fatality or injury of person on board	1A. Implement awareness-raising and safety promotion activities for passengers and other persons on board including the encouragement of continuous seat belt use while the seat belt sign is off and injury prevention measures against unexpected aircraft motion when out of seats	Q2 2026 to Q4 2028	JCAB	Passengers and other persons on board	Number of awareness-raising and safety promotion activities conducted	JCAB monthly meetings and SSP meeting
	1B. Implement safety promotion activities, including guidance on information sharing between flight crew and cabin crew on turbulence-related aircraft motion and injury mitigation measures during aircraft motion			Air carriers (limited to those operators conducting operations using aircraft on which cabin crew members are carried)	Number of instructional safety promotion activities conducted	
	1C. Continuously provide meteorological information related to the occurrence of turbulence		Japan Meteorological Agency	· Air carrier · Air navigation service provider	Number of Domestic Significant Weather Analysis Charts and Domestic Significant Weather Prognostic Charts issued	

National other safety risk: Abnormal Runway Contact (ARC)						
Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks Target 1.2: By 2028, decrease the rate of accidents and serious incidents for national other safety risks						
SEI	Action	Timeline	Responsible Entity	Stakeholders	Metrics	Monitoring Activity
1. Eliminate or mitigate ARC related safety risks	1A. Implement safety briefings and awareness-raising activities at safety operation seminars organized by the JCAB, including the presentation of recent ARC occurrences (accidents and serious incidents) and the issuance of safety alerts	Q2 2026 to Q4 2028	JCAB	All pilots, excluding pilots engaged primarily in IFR operations for air carriers	Number of dissemination activities conducted	JCAB monthly meetings and SSP meeting
	1B. Establish mandatory CRM Training	June 2026 to Q4 2028		All pilots not currently subject to mandatory CRM training	Number of personnel trained in CRM	

National other safety risk: System/Component Failure or Malfunction (Non-Powerplant) (SCF-NP)						
Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks Target 1.2: By 2028, decrease the rate of accidents and serious incidents for national other safety risks						
SEI	Action	Timeline	Responsible Entity	Stakeholders	Metrics	Monitoring Activity
1. Eliminate or mitigate SCF-NP related safety risk	1A. Develop a guideline to clarify the processes for collection, analysis and correction, etc. of unsafe occurrences arising from design and manufacturing of Japanese state of design aircraft, in cooperation with type certificate holders and other relevant organizations in order to properly correct them	Q2 2026 to Q4 2028	JCAB	Type certificate holders in Japan	Status of the development of guideline to clarify processes for collection, analysis resolution etc. of unsafe occurrences	JCAB monthly meetings and SSP meeting

Organizational challenges: Strengthen States' safety oversight capabilities						
Goal 2: Strengthen States' safety oversight capabilities Target 2.1: Establishment of a safety oversight framework to support the implementation of safety risk-based surveillance (SRBS)						
SEI	Action	Timeline	Responsible Entity	Stakeholders	Metrics	Monitoring Activity
1. Establishment of a safety oversight framework to support the implementation of SRBS	1A. Establish mechanisms, in collaboration with service providers, for the systematic collection of information required to develop safety risk profiles for the implementation of SRBS	Q2 2026 to Q4 2028	JCAB	· JCAB · Service providers	Number of relevant regulations reviewed or newly established	JCAB monthly meetings and SSP meeting
	1B. Establish mechanisms to identify and monitor the levels of exposure to safety risks through the use of safety risk profiles			JCAB	Status of mechanisms development	
	1C. Establish mechanisms to adjust the scope and frequency of surveillance activities based on levels of exposure to safety risks and to reflect these adjustments in surveillance activities			JCAB	Status of establishment of mechanisms	

Organizational challenges: Strengthen States' safety oversight capabilities						
Goal 2: Strengthen States' safety oversight capabilities Target 2.2: Enhancement of the safety oversight capabilities of authority personnel						
SEI	Action	Timeline	Responsible Entity	Stakeholders	Metrics	Monitoring Activity
1. Continuous enhancement of safety oversight personnel capabilities	1A. Consider the enhancement of the training framework to support the implementation of SRBS	Q2 2026 to Q4 2026	JCAB	JCAB	Status of consideration	JCAB monthly meetings and SSP meeting
	1B. Develop written instructions, procedures, and requirements in order to establish, maintain, and retain training records systematically	to Q4 2027			Number of procedures and related documents developed	
	1C. Implement specialized training aligned with revised inspection guidance based on ICAO provisions (including Annex 19, ICAO Docs and PANS), as well as with the introduction of new frameworks such as SRBS and safety intelligence				Number of training programmes enhanced	
	1D. Identify areas requiring further improvement in training for SRBS	to Q4 2028			Number of items identified	

Organizational challenges: Effective implementation of the SSP						
Goal 3: Effective implementation of the SSP Target 3.1: Enhancement of data-driven hazard identification, safety risk management and safety performance assessment through the establishment of an advanced safety management system						
SEI	Action	Timeline	Responsible Entity	Stakeholders	Metrics	Monitoring Activity
1. Enhancement of safety risk management through an advanced safety management system	1A. Expand the set of data elements to be collected by establishing an advanced safety management system to support hazard identification, risk management, and safety performance assessment	Q2 2026 to Q4 2028	JCAB	Service providers	Number of expanded data collection elements	JCAB monthly meetings and SSP meeting
	1B. Enhance and expand the methodological approaches to reinforce the state-level safety risk management by identifying hazards across the national aviation domains, employing safety performance indicators and leveraging information collected through the safety management advancement system, supplemented by other methods where appropriate			JCAB	Number of analytical methodologies expanded	

Organizational challenges: Effective implementation of the SSP						
Goal 3: Effective implementation of the SSP Target 3.2: Promotion of a positive safety culture and enhancement of safety information sharing through proactive safety promotion activities						
SEI	Action	Timeline	Responsible Entity	Stakeholders	Metrics	Monitoring Activity
1. Strengthening the availability and accessibility of safety data and safety information to support State SMS activities	1A. Promote voluntary reporting by service providers through sharing examples of voluntary reports that led to specific safety improvement measures	Q2 2026 to Q4 2028	JCAB	Service providers	Number of improvement actions implemented based on voluntary reports	JCAB monthly meetings and SSP meeting
	1B. Organize seminars and other forums, including government-industry information exchange and safety culture topics, to promote safety culture initiatives across industry				Number of seminars conducted	
	1C. Disseminate information that contributes to raising safety awareness of service providers, such as best practices identified by JCAB through safety oversight activities across the different aviation domains and leading practices presented at international meetings and conferences including ICAO events				· Number of best practices and advanced international initiatives identified by JCAB · Number of safety information disseminated to enhance safety	

Organizational challenges: Sharing safety-related issues with ICAO and other States						
Goal 4 : Sharing safety-related issues with ICAO and other States Target 4.1: Sharing of safety issues identified through SSP processes at the national and global levels						
SEI	Action	Timeline	Responsible Entity	Stakeholders	Metrics	Monitoring Activity
1. Enhancement of safety information sharing at the regional level	1A. Collect safety information provided by ICAO, foreign civil aviation authorities and international industry organizations, and disseminate such information to relevant domestic stakeholders	Q2 2026 to Q4 2028	JCAB	Service providers	Number of safety information items collected from overseas and disseminated domestically by the aviation safety authority	JCAB monthly meetings and SSP meeting
	1B. Disseminate best practices and other safety-related information collected and reviewed at the national level to ICAO, foreign civil aviation authorities and aviation industry organizations				Number of domestic best practices presented at international meetings (e.g., number of working papers)	

Organizational challenges: Effective implementation of the NASP and improvement of the SSP						
Goal 5: Effective implementation of the NASP and improvement of the SSP Target 5.1: Strengthening cooperation with industry through the NASP to achieve safety improvements and enhance the SSP						
SEI	Action	Timeline	Responsible Entity	Stakeholders	Metrics	Monitoring Activity
1. Strengthening cooperation with service providers	1A. Confirm that SPIs of individual service providers are aligned with those defined in the SSP and continuously address identified issues	Q2 2026 to Q4 2028	JCAB	Service providers	Number of SPIs aligned between the aviation safety authority and service providers	JCAB monthly meetings and SSP meeting
	1B. Regularly review NASP implementation status within the SSP meeting, improve as necessary, and share the meeting outcomes with service providers, including the receipt of their feedback			・Service providers ・Japan Meteorological Agency ・Japan Transport Safety Board	・Number of SSP meetings held ・Number of dialogue opportunities with industries on NASP-related matters	
	1C. Establish and operate a framework for government-industry collaboration, and improve its operation as necessary			Service providers	・Establishment of the framework ・Number of operations of the framework	

Abbreviations

AP-RASP	Asia-Pacific Regional Aviation Safety Plan
ARC	Abnormal Runway Contact
CEs	Critical Elements
CE-1	Primary aviation legislation
CE-2	Specific operating regulations
CE-3	State system and functions
CE-4	Qualified technical personnel
CE-5	Technical guidance, tools and provision of safety-critical information
CE-6	Licensing, certification, authorization and approval obligations
CE-7	Surveillance obligations
CE-8	Resolution of safety issues
CFIT	Controlled Flight into Terrain
GASP	Global Aviation Safety Plan
HRCs	High-Risk Categories of Occurrences
IFR	Instrument Flight Rules
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
LOC-I	Loss Of Control In-flight
MAC	Mid-Air Collision
N-HRCs	National High-Risk Category of Occurrences
NASP	National Aviation Safety Plan
RE	Runway Excursion
RI	Runway Incursion
SCF-NP	System/Component Failure or Malfunction (Non-Powerplant)
SEI	Safety Enhancement Initiatives
SMS	Safety Management Systems
SPI	Safety Performance Indicator
SSP	State Safety Programme
TURB	Turbulence Encounter