

FIJI NATIONAL AVIATION SAFETY PLAN (NASP)

First Edition, September 2026



CIVIL AVIATION
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Enquiries or amendment suggestions regarding the content of this publication may be addressed to:

Standards & Compliance Department
Civil Aviation Authority of Fiji
Nadi Airport
FIJI
Email: compliance@caaf.org.fj

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FOREWORD

Fiji's National Aviation Safety Plan (NASP) sets out a clear, structured pathway for strengthening our aviation safety management capabilities and reducing the risk of safety occurrences across our national airspace. It gives effect to a national aviation safety strategy aligned with the global and regional frameworks established in the ICAO Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP) and the Asia Pacific Regional Aviation Safety Plan (AP-RASP).

The NASP complements Fiji's State Safety Programme (SSP), and together they form a comprehensive framework for aviation safety governance. Where the SSP establishes the systemic foundations for safety management, the NASP provides the operational roadmap; targeting high-risk occurrences, reducing fatalities and incidents, and driving continuous improvement in safety performance across all segments of civil aviation.

At its core, the NASP advances the effective implementation of safety oversight systems and a risk-based approach to safety management. It recognises that safety is not the responsibility of any single entity. It calls upon aviation authorities, service providers, operators, and all relevant stakeholders to contribute actively and collaboratively to a culture of safety that is proactive, data-informed, and oriented towards continuous improvement.

I commend this Plan to all stakeholders across Fiji's civil aviation sector and urge your full engagement with its objectives. Safeguarding the travelling public, aviation professionals, and the communities we serve depends on our collective commitment to the highest standards of aviation safety.



THERESA LEVESTAM

CHIEF EXECUTIVE





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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADS-B	Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast
APAC	Asia and Pacific Regions
AP-RASP	Asia Pacific Regional Aviation Safety Plan
APRAST	Asia Pacific Regional Safety Team
ARFFS	Aviation Rescue Fire Fighting Service
ATM	Air Traffic Management
CAAF	Civil Aviation Authority of Fiji
CE	Critical Element
CFIT	Controlled Flight into Terrain
CMA	Continuous Monitoring Approach
EI	Effective Implementation
FDAP	Flight Data Analysis Program
FIR	Flight Information Region
GA	General Aviation
GANP	Global Air Navigation Plan
GASP	Global Aviation Safety Plan
GNSS	Global Navigation Satellite System
HRC	High Risk Categories
IATA	International Air Transport Association
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organisation
ICAO PLO	ICAO Pacific Liaison Office
IOSA	IATA Operational Safety Audit
LOC-I	Loss of Control In-flight
MAC	Mid-Air Collision
MTCA	Ministry of Tourism and Civil Aviation
NASP	National Aviation Safety Plan
PASO	Pacific Aviation Safety Office
PQ	Protocol Question
RASG	Regional Aviation Safety Group
RASG-APAC	Regional Aviation Safety Group Asia Pacific
RASP	Regional Aviation Safety Plan
RAST	Regional Aviation Safety Team
RE	Runway Excursion
RI	Runway Incursion
RPAS	Remotely Piloted Aircraft System
SAR	Search and Rescue
SARP	Standards and Recommended Practices
SEI	Safety Enhancement Initiatives
SMS	Safety Management System
SPI	Safety Performance Indicator
SPT	Safety Performance Target
SSP	State Safety Programme
TAWS	Terrain Avoidance Warning System
UFR	Upper Flight Region
URPT	Upset Prevention and Recovery Training
USOAP CMA	Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme Continuous Monitoring Approach
WH	Wildlife Hazard

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Overview of the NASP

Fiji is committed to enhancing aviation safety and to the resourcing of supporting activities. Fiji's National Aviation Safety Plan (NASP) complements Fiji's State Safety Programme (SSP) and defines the strategy for improving safety within a 3-year timeframe from 2026–2028 through a series of Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs). This plan adopts a risk-based approach to managing safety, specifically targeting the top regional operational safety risks and organisational challenges identified for the 2026–2028 triennium.

Safety intelligence is needed to develop a data-driven plan, set goals and targets that address national safety issues; as well as to develop and monitor the effectiveness of the related SEIs. The purpose of the NASP is to continually reduce fatalities, and the risk of fatalities, through the development and implementation of a national aviation safety strategy. A safe, resilient, and sustainable aviation system contributes to Fiji's economic development and supports the growth of its industries.

Fiji's NASP promotes the effective implementation of a safety oversight system, a risk-based approach to managing safety, and a coordinated approach to collaboration between other States, regions, and industries. All stakeholders are encouraged to support and implement the NASP as a strategy for the continuous improvement of aviation safety.

Fiji's NASP is aligned with the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP, Doc 10004) and enables a systematic way of managing safety issues. It addresses operational safety risks presented in the ICAO GASP and the Asia Pacific Regional Aviation Safety Plan (APAC RASP), and in the absence of mature Safety Data Analysis (SDA) aspects, as described in the ICAO State Safety Programme Implementation Assessment (SSPIA) are addressed in the Safety Enhancement Initiatives.

To achieve the NASP goals, there is a need for sufficient resources and qualified technical personnel for the effective implementation of Fiji's SEIs. To mitigate the risk of fatalities, the High-Risk Categories (HRCs) of occurrences should be addressed. The selection of types of occurrences which are deemed as HRCs is based on causes of fatal accidents and the number of accidents so far as identified globally, regionally and at the national level. These safety issues have been prioritised in the NASP to eliminate or reduce the safety risks.

1.2 Structure of the NASP

This NASP presents the strategic direction for the management of aviation safety at the national level for a period of three (3) years. It comprises six chapters which covers the purpose of the NASP, Fiji's strategic direction for the management of aviation safety, the national operational safety risks identified for the 2026–2028 NASP, organisational challenges addressed in the NASP, and a description of how the implementation of the SEIs listed in the NASP is going to be monitored.

1.3 Relationship between the NASP and the State Safety Programme (SSP)

The NASP and the SSP work together to manage aviation safety in Fiji. The SSP establishes the systemic foundations for safety management, setting out how CAAF discharges its safety oversight responsibilities and how service providers implement their safety management systems. The NASP builds on those foundations, translating them into a targeted, time-bound plan of action.

This NASP addresses operational safety risks identified in Fiji through a series of Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs). It also addresses organisational challenges and aims to strengthen the organisational capabilities that underpin effective safety oversight. Together, the SSP and the NASP form a comprehensive framework for the continuous improvement of aviation safety at the national level.

1.4 Responsibility for the NASP development, implementation and monitoring

The Civil Aviation Authority of Fiji (CAAF) is responsible for the development, implementation and monitoring of the NASP, in collaboration with the Ministry of Tourism & Civil Aviation (MTCA), Fiji Airports, Fiji Airways, domestic airline operators and the national aviation industry.

The NASP was developed in consultation with national operators and other key aviation stakeholders, and in alignment with the 2026-2028 edition of the Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP) and the Asia Pacific Regional Aviation Safety Plan (AP-RASP).

1.5 National safety issues and goals and targets

The NASP addresses the following national safety issues:

a. Operational Safety Risks

- Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT)
- Loss of Control In-flight (LOC-I), including TURB
- Mid Air Collision (MAC)
- Runway Excursion (RE), including ARC
- Runway Incursion (RI)
- System/Component Failure (SCF-NP/PP)
- Wildlife Strike on and in the vicinity of international aerodromes

b. Organisational Challenges

- SSP implementation
- Safety oversight capabilities
- Aircraft Accident Investigation

To address the issues listed above and enhance safety at the national level, the NASP contains the following goals and targets:

GOAL: 1.0 Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks

Target 1.1:

By 2028, Fiji to maintain a 5-year moving average decreasing trend of national accident rate.

Target 1.2:

By 2028, Fiji to maintain a 5-year moving average decreasing trend of accidents and serious incidents for each national high-risk category of occurrence (N-HRC).

Target 1.3:

Reduce wildlife strikes at or near the vicinity of international aerodromes.

GOAL: 2.0 Strengthen Fiji's safety oversight capabilities

Target 2.1:

By 2028, Fiji will ensure that its civil aviation safety and security oversight system is supported by adequate financial resources and qualified technical personnel to effectively fulfil its safety and security oversight obligations.

Target 2.2:

By 2028, Fiji to improve its Effective Implementation (EI) score for qualified technical personnel (CE-4) for Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation (AIG) and for aerodromes and ground aids (AGA), respectively, with an EI score of 80% or not less than the baseline global average, whichever is the higher.

Target 2.3:

By 2028, Fiji to improve their EI score for the resolution of safety issues (CE-8) in AGA with a further commitment of EI score of 80% or not less than the baseline global average, whichever is the higher.

Target 2.4:

By 2028, Fiji to establish an independent Accident Investigation Commission (AIC) or engage another State's Accident Investigation Organisation or a Regional Accident Investigation Organisation (RAIO).

GOAL: 3.0 Establish and manage Fiji's State Safety Programme (SSP)**Target 3.1:**

By 2028, Fiji to assess the level of SSP implementation.

GOAL: 4.0 Strengthening collaboration at the regional and national levels to address safety issues.**Target 4.1:**

By 2028, Fiji to address highest priority safety issues based on the Effective Implementation (EI).

Target 4.2:

By 2028, Fiji will collaborate with the ICAO APAC office on the required assistance provided to APAC states as identified from Target 4.1 to address the highest priority safety issues.

Target 4.3:

By 2028, Fiji to provide safety information on operational safety risks and emerging issues for the purpose of aviation safety planning to the APAC office.

GOAL: 5.0 Strengthen aviation safety planning**Target 5.1:**

By 2028, Fiji to conduct a mid-term review of the NASP.

GOAL: 6.0 Expand the use of industry evaluation programmes and safety data sharing programmes**Target: 6.1:**

By 2028, stakeholders to maintain an increasing trend in its use of industry evaluation programmes and safety data sharing programmes in Aerodromes, Aircraft operations, ANSP and Ground Handling.

** The trend is calculated using year 2025 as a baseline.*

1.6 Description of State's operational context

There are 24 certified aerodromes in Fiji, including 2 international aerodromes. The airspace of Fiji is classified into Class G (outside control airspace -FL065 and below; and above FL600), Class D (FL065 to FL200) and Class A (FL200 to FL600). There were 17,000 movements of international flights in Fiji over the period of 2022 to 2023. There are currently 13 air operators' certificates (AOCs) issued by Fiji, and of those there is one (1) AOC that is issued to operators conducting international commercial air transport operations, with over 110 aircraft in our registry engaged in commercial air transport.

Fiji has over 500 licensed aviation personnel. There are 10 approved maintenance organisations, 17 foreign maintenance organisations, and 5 aviation training organisations.

Fiji has 10 operators, who operate domestic air services, primarily on turboprop aircraft, and 2 helicopter operators. There are 8 helicopter landing sites (HLS) and 3 Water Landing Sites that are registered in Fiji.

Common hazards and safety deficiencies in Fiji relating to its organisational (systemic) issues include the review of the primary aviation legislation, harmonisation of the secondary aviation legislation, and maintaining adequate qualified CAAF inspectorate staff.





2.0 PURPOSE OF FIJI's NASP

The NASP is the master planning document containing the strategic direction of Fiji for the management of aviation safety for a period of three (3) years (2026 to 2028). This plan lists national safety issues, sets national safety goals and targets, and presents a series of safety enhancement initiatives (SEIs) to achieve those goals.

Fiji's NASP has been developed using the safety goals and targets and high-risk categories of occurrences (HRCs) from both the GASP (www.icao.int/gasp) and the 2026-2028 APAC RASP. These are highlighted in the text, where applicable.

The SEIs listed in the NASP support the improvement of safety at the wider regional and international levels. The NASP includes several actions to address specific safety issues and recommended SEIs for individual States set out in the (2026-2028 APAC RASP).

Fiji has adopted these SEIs and has included them in this plan. Cross-references are provided to the 2026-2028 APAC RASP for individual SEIs where relevant.



3.0 FIJI'S STRATEGIC DIRECTION FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF AVIATION SAFETY

The NASP presents the SEIs that were developed based on the organisational challenges (ORG) and operational safety risks (OPS) roadmaps, as presented in the ICAO Global Aviation Safety Roadmap (Doc 10161), as well as State-specific issues identified by Fiji's SSP.

This plan is developed and maintained by the CAAF, in coordination with key aviation stakeholders and is updated at least every three years.

The NASP includes the following national safety goals and targets for the management of aviation safety, as well as a series of indicators to monitor the progress made towards their achievement. They are tied to the goals, targets and indicators listed in the GASP and the APAC RASP and include additional national safety goals, targets and indicators.

Goal 1.0: Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks.

TARGETS	INDICATORS	Link to GASP and RASP
Target 1.1 By 2028, maintain a 5-year moving average decreasing trend of accident rate.	- Accident rate (number of accidents per 150,000 movements). - Fatal accident rate (number of fatal accidents per 150,000 movements)	This goal is directly linked to Goal 1 and Target 1.1 of the GASP and linked to Goal 1 and Target 1.1 of AP-RASP.
Target 1.2 By 2028, to maintain a 5-year moving average decreasing trend of accidents and serious incidents for each high-risk category of occurrence.	- Accident rate by HRC. - Serious incident rate by HRC. - Percentage of accidents related to HRC compared to all accidents. - Percentage of serious incident related to HRC compared to all serious incident.	This goal is directly linked to Goal 1 and Target 1.2 of the GASP and linked to Goal 1 and Target 1.2 of AP-RASP.
Target 1.3: Reduce wildlife strikes at or near the vicinity of international aerodromes(Nadi and Nausori).	- Wildlife strike reporting rate e.g. No. of wildlife strikes reported / total aircraft movements × 10,000. - Timely submission of ICAO Bird Strike Information System (IBIS) reports e.g. No. of IBIS-compliant reports submitted on time / total reportable strikes × 100%. - Wildlife strike occurrence rate per aircraft movement e.g. No. of confirmed wildlife strikes / total aircraft movements × 10,000.	This goal is directly linked to Goal 1 and Target 1.2 of the GASP and linked to Goal 1 and Target 1.2 of AP-RASP.

Goal 2.0: Strengthen Fiji's safety oversight capabilities

TARGETS	INDICATORS	Link to GASP and RASP
Target 2.1 By 2028, Fiji will ensure that its civil aviation safety and security oversight system is supported by adequate financial resources and qualified technical personnel to effectively fulfil its safety and security oversight obligations.	Satisfactory rating for the Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) protocol question (PQ) 2.051; where EI score to be above global average of 65.41%.	This goal is directly linked to Goal 2 and Target 2.1 of the GASP and linked to Goal 2.1 of the AP-RASP.
Target 2.2: By 2028, Fiji to improve its Effective Implementation (EI) score for qualified technical personnel (CE-4) for Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation (AIG) and for aerodromes and ground aids (AGA), respectively, with an EI score of not less than the baseline global average.	- EI score of equal or greater than the baseline global average for CE-4/AIG. - EI score of equal or greater than the baseline global average for CE-4/AGA.	This goal is directly linked to Goal 2 and Target 2.2 of the GASP and linked to Goal 2.2 of the AP-RASP.
Target 2.3: By 2028, Fiji to improve their EI score for the resolution of safety issues (CE-8) in AGA with a further commitment of EI score not less than the baseline global average.	EI score for CE-8/AGA of equal greater than the baseline global average for CE-8/AGA.	This goal is directly linked to Goal 2 and Target 2.3 of the GASP and linked to Goal 2.3 of the AP-RASP.
Target 2.4: By 2028, Fiji to establish independent an Accident Investigation Commission (AIC) or engage another State's Accident Investigation Organisation or a Regional Accident .	Establish an Independent AIC or engage another State's AIO or engage a RAIO Investigation Organisation (RAIO).	This goal is directly linked to Goal 2 and Target 2.3 of the GASP and linked to Goal 2.3 of the AP-RASP.

Goal 3.0: Establish and manage Fiji's State Safety Programme (SSP)

TARGETS	INDICATORS	Link to GASP and RASP
Target 3.1: By 2028, Fiji to assess the level of SSP implementation.	Percentage of required CAPs related to the SSP foundation PQs completed.	This goal is directly linked to Goal 3 and Target 3.1 of the GASP and the AP-RASP.

Goal 4.0: Strengthening collaboration at the regional and national levels to address safety issues

TARGETS	INDICATORS	Link to GASP and RASP
Target 4.1: By 2028, Fiji to address highest priority safety issues based on the Effective Implementation (EI).	• Reports on addressing the highest priority safety issues based on the EI.	• This goal is directly linked to Goal 4 and Target 4.1 of the GASP and AP-RASP.
Target 4.2: By 2028, Fiji will collaborate with the ICAO APAC office on the required assistance provided to APAC states as identified from Target 4.1 to address the highest priority safety issues.	• Number of received assistance from ICAO APAC sought to address the highest priority safety issues.	• This goal is directly linked to Goal 4 and Target 4.2 of the GASP and AP-RASP.
Target 4.3: By 2028, Fiji to provide safety information on operational safety risks and emerging issues for the purpose of aviation safety planning to the APAC office.	• Number of reports submitted to ICAO APAC office on operational safety risks and emerging issues and validated.	• This goal is directly linked to Goal 4 and Target 4.3 of the GASP and AP-RASP.

Goal 5.0: Strengthen aviation safety planning

TARGETS	INDICATORS	Link to GASP and RASP
Target 5.1: By 2028, Fiji to conduct a mid-term review of the NASP.	• Reduction in accident rate • Reduction in serious incident rate	• This goal is directly linked to Goal 5 and Target 5.1 of the GASP and AP-RASP.

Goal 6.0: Expand the use of industry evaluation programmes and safety data sharing programmes

TARGETS	INDICATORS	Link to GASP and RASP
Target 6.1: By 2028, stakeholders to maintain an increasing trend in its use of industry evaluation programmes and safety data sharing programmes in Aerodromes, Aircraft operations, ANSP and Ground Handling. * The trend is calculated using year 2025 as a baseline.	• Number of service providers participating in the corresponding ICAO-recognized industry evaluation programmes • Number of service providers participating in industry safety data sharing programmes.	• This goal is directly linked to Goal 6 and Target 6.1 of the GASP and AP-RASP.

The SEIs in this plan are implemented through Fiji's existing safety oversight capabilities and the service providers' safety management systems (SMS). SEIs derived from the ICAO Global Aviation Safety Roadmap (Doc 10161) were identified to achieve the national safety goals presented in the NASP. Some of the national SEIs are linked to overarching SEIs at the regional and international levels and help to enhance aviation safety globally. The full list of the SEIs is presented in the appendix to the NASP.

The NASP also addresses emerging issues, which include concepts of operations, technologies, public policies, innovation, business models or ideas that might impact safety in the future, for which insufficient data exists to complete a typical data-driven analysis. Due to the lack of data, emerging issues cannot automatically be considered as operational safety risks. It is important that Fiji remain vigilant on emerging issues to identify hazards and safety deficiencies, collect relevant data and proactively develop mitigations to address any associated risks.





4.0 FIJI'S NATIONAL OPERATIONAL SAFETY RISKS

The NASP includes SEIs that address national operational safety risks, derived from lessons learned from occurrences and from a data-driven approach. These SEIs may include actions such as rule-making, policy development, targeted safety oversight activities, safety data analysis and safety promotion. Separate sections are provided to address commercial air transport and general aviation to make the information more accessible to stakeholders.

The summary of accidents and serious incidents that occurred in Fiji, and those for aircraft registered in Fiji involved in commercial air transport and aircraft involved in general aviation, is shown in the tables below.

AIRCRAFT WITH MAXIMUM TAKE-OFF WEIGHT (MTOW) ABOVE 5700 KILOGRAMS			
YEAR	FATAL ACCIDENTS	NON-FATAL ACCIDENTS	SERIOUS INCIDENTS
2020 - 2025	0	0	2

AIRCRAFT WITH MAXIMUM TAKE-OFF WEIGHT (MTOW) BELOW 5700 KILOGRAMS			
YEAR	FATAL ACCIDENTS	NON-FATAL ACCIDENTS	SERIOUS INCIDENTS
2020 - 2025	0	2	3

The following National High-Risk Categories of occurrences (N-HRCs) in the Fiji context were considered of the utmost priority because of the number of fatalities and risk of fatalities associated with such occurrences. They were identified based on analyses from mandatory and voluntary reporting systems, accident and incident investigation reports, safety oversight activities over the past 5 years, the SSP, as well as based on regional analysis conducted by RASG and APANPIRG on the operational safety risks described in the GASP.

These N-HRCs are in line with those listed in the 2026-2028 of the GASP, as well as the AP-RASP.

- HRC 1:** Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT)
- HRC 2:** Loss of Control In-flight (LOC-I), including TURB
- HRC 3:** Mid Air Collision (MAC)
- HRC 4:** Runway Excursion (RE), including ARC
- HRC 5:** Runway Incursion (RI)
- HRC 6:** System Component Failure (SCF), including NP and PP.
- HRC 7:** Wildlife Strike (WS) on and in the vicinity of international aerodromes

The aviation occurrence categories from the CAST/ICAO Common Taxonomy Team (CICTT) were used to assess risk categories in the process of determining national operational safety risks. The CICTT Taxonomy is found on the ICAO website at <https://www.icao.int/safety/airnavigation/AIG/Pages/Taxonomy.aspx>.

To address the national operational safety risks listed above, Fiji identified the following contributing factors leading to N-HRCs and will implement a series of SEIs, some of which are derived from the ICAO OPS roadmap, contained in the ICAO Global Aviation Safety Roadmap (Doc 10161):

HRC 1: Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT)

Is an in-flight collision with terrain, water or obstacle without indication of loss of control. CFIT occurs when an airworthy aircraft under the complete control of the pilot is inadvertently flown into terrain, water, or an obstacle. The pilots are generally unaware of the danger until it is too late.

Identified contributing factors, are as follows:

- a. Flight in adverse environmental conditions
- b. Inaccurate approach design and inadequate documentation (for approaches with vertical guidance (APV) or localizer performance with vertical guidance (LPV) approaches)
- c. Phraseology used (standard versus non-standard)

- d. Pilot fatigue, sensory illusion, and loss of situational awareness
- e. Global navigation satellite system (GNSS) radio frequency interference (RFI)

HRC 2: Loss of Control In-flight (LOC-I)

Refers to accidents in which the flight crew was unable to maintain control of the aircraft in flight, resulting in an unrecoverable deviation from the intended flight path. It is one of the most complex accident categories, involving numerous contributing factors that act individually or, more often, in combination. Reducing this accident category, through understanding of causes and possible intervention strategies, is an industry priority.

Identified contributing factors are as follows:

A. Human Factors

a. Pilot Error:

- Distraction
- Loss of situational awareness
- Pilot surprise or startle factor
- Automation dependency leading to degraded pilot proficiency in manual flying
- Inappropriate or inadequate pilot manipulative inputs in response to sudden awareness of an abnormal aircraft state (such as, bank angle, angle of attack or stall)
- Inadequate training or competency, experience for recovery from unusual aircraft altitudes
- Complacency
- Insufficient height above terrain for recovery

b. Crew Coordination:

- Ineffective communication
- Misinterpretation of information
- Lack of teamwork

B. Technical Factors

a. Aircraft and Operational Systems:

- Mechanical failures (e.g., engine failures, control system malfunctions, aging fleet)
- Inadequate standard operating procedures (SOPs) for effective flight management

b. ATC Issues:

- Miscommunication with ATC
- ATC clearances that lead to unsafe situations (e.g., Wake turbulence)

C. Environmental Factors

a. Adverse Weather Conditions:

- Turbulence
- Icing
- Low visibility

b. Terrain:

- Mountainous terrain
- Obstacles

HRC 3: Mid Air Collision (MAC)

Is defined as collisions between aircraft while both aircraft are airborne and can be due to loss of separation between aircraft. This accident category is rare in the APAC region and Fiji but when it occurs, it is catastrophic. Using the ADREP taxonomy, mid-air collisions are also separation-related occurrences caused by either air traffic control or cockpit crew, AIRPROX reports and genuine TCAS/ACAS alerts.

Identified contributing factors are as follows:

- a. Traffic conditions: considerations include traffic density, complexity, and the mixture of aircraft types and capabilities
- b. Air traffic control (ATC) performance: factors such as workload, competence, teamwork, and adherence to procedures. Additionally, the influence of the air navigation services provider's (ANSP) safety management system (SMS)
- c. Flight crew training and organisational (corporate) culture: aspects such as workload management, competence, teamwork, adherence to procedures, and the impact of the operator's SMS
- d. ATC systems: elements such as, flight data processing, communication systems, short-term conflict alert (STCA) systems, as well as the interaction between the human operators and the aircraft systems, and the procurement policies of ANSPs
- e. Aircraft equipment: considerations include autopilot systems, transponders and airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS), as well as aircraft performance characteristics (such as, rate-of-climb) and their physical dimension
- f. Navigation infrastructure and surveillance systems : both coverage and quality of surveillance technologies used to monitor aircraft position movements
- g. Flight plan processing: the efficiency and reliability of processes related to flight plan submission, approval, and distribution
- h. Airspace design: the complexity of airspace structure, route layouts, and the extent of controlled or uncontrolled airspace and proximity of military operational or training areas
- i. Flight in adverse environmental conditions that may influence conflict management and collision avoidance
- j. GNSS RFI

HRC 4: Runway Excursion (RE)

Is defined as a veer off or overrun off the runway surface and occurs when an aircraft departs the runway-in-use during take-off or landing run. The excursion may be intentional or unintentional. The high number of accidents resulting from runway excursions involving commercial air transport aeroplanes has led to several initiatives regarding runway safety.

Identified contributing factors are as follows:

- a. Ineffective SOPs
- b. Failure to adhere to the appropriate SOPs
- c. Long /floated/bounced/firm/off-centre/crabbed landing
- d. Inadequate approach procedures design
- e. Inadequate regulatory oversight
- f. Inadequate reporting of runway surface conditions
- g. Unstabilised approach
- h. ATC error and decision making
- i. Malfunction of instrument approach and/or landing aids

HRC 5: Runway Incursion (RI)

Is defined as any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take-off of an aircraft. Incursions produce an increased risk of collision for aircraft occupying the runway. Although statistically very few runway incursions result in collisions, there is a high fatality risk associated with these events.

Identified contributing factors are as follows:

- a. Operations in low visibility conditions
- b. Complex or inadequate aerodrome design, equipment and signage
- c. Diversity and complexity of traffic (such as, multiple simultaneous line-ups)
- d. Conditional clearances
- e. Simultaneous use of intersecting runways
- f. Late issue or late changes to departure clearances
- g. Phraseology use (e.g. non-standard vs. standard, call-sign confusion)
- h. Concurrent use of more than one language for ATC communications
- i. Inadequate manoeuvring area driver training and assessment program
- j. Low-level English Language proficiency
- k. Unintentional deviations from ATC clearance or instruction by flight and ground crew
- l. Ineffective coordination between air traffic controllers
- m. Radio malfunction
- n. Inadequate security control measures

HRC 6: System Component Failure, including Non-Power Plant and Power Plant.

SCF-NP

Failures involve aircraft systems other than the engine or powerplant. Examples include hydraulics, flight controls, landing gear, pressurization systems, electrical systems, avionics, and aircraft structure.

Identified contributing factors as follows:

- a. Repeated defect reports or recurring maintenance write-ups
- b. Hydraulic fluid leaks
- c. Electrical faults, circuit breaker trips, or intermittent power losses
- d. Abnormal vibrations in control surfaces or structures
- e. Corrosion, cracking, or structural fatigue findings
- f. Avionics anomalies or unreliable instrument indications
- g. Landing gear extension/retraction abnormalities
- h. Unusual noises, smells, smoke, or overheating from systems
- i. Deferred maintenance items (MEL/CDL) accumulating over time

SCF-PP

Failures involving the engine, propeller, rotor system, powerplant controls, reversers, gearboxes, and related propulsion components.

Identified contributing factors as follows:

- a. Increasing engine vibration trends
- b. Abnormal engine temperatures (EGT, CHT, ITT)
- c. Oil pressure fluctuations or low oil pressure
- d. Rising oil consumption
- e. Metal particles/chips found in oil filters or chip detectors
- f. Compressor stalls, surges, or unusual engine noises
- g. Fuel system anomalies affecting engine performance
- h. Repeated engine-related maintenance actions
- i. Exceedance events (over-temperature, over-speed, hard operation)

HRC 7: Wildlife Strike (WS)

On and in the vicinity of International Aerodromes:

A wildlife strike is a collision between an animal and an aircraft that is in flight or on a take-off or landing roll. Such events were initially described as bird strikes, since birds were by far the most common cause. However, the growth in the number of flights and airfields has, among other factors, led to an increase in collisions between aircraft and animals other than birds. Wildlife strikes may occur during any phase of flight but are most likely during the take-off, initial climb, approach and landing phases.

Identified contributing factors are as follows:

- a. Ineffective wildlife hazard management programme
- b. Inadequate waste disposal or poor management of nearby landfills
- c. Inability to manage wildlife attractants outside the aerodrome perimeter due to jurisdictional limitation or lack of cooperation from external agencies.
- d. Development of residential, agriculture or commercial areas within the vicinity of aerodromes without considering wildlife attractants
- e. Lack of study on wildlife habitat management outside the aerodrome boundary, which include the following:

Airport Environment

- Habitat suitability: Airports often provide suitable habitats for various bird species, such as open areas, water bodies, or food sources.
- Airport design: Certain airport features, like tall buildings or power lines, can attract birds.
- Waste management: Improper waste management can attract birds to airports.

Aircraft Operations

- Flight paths: Aircraft flying low or near bird habitats are at a higher risk.
- Landing and takeoff: The landing and take-off phases are particularly vulnerable due to low altitude and slow speed.

Bird Behaviour

- Feeding habits: Birds foraging for food near airports can increase the risk of collisions.
- Migration patterns: During migration periods, large flocks of birds may pass through airports.
- Breeding Behaviour: Birds defending their nests or young can be more aggressive and less likely to avoid aircraft.

Environmental Factors

- Weather conditions: Certain weather conditions, like fog or low visibility, can reduce a pilot's ability to detect birds.
- Seasonal changes: Seasonal changes can affect bird behavior and distribution.

Airport Management

- Bird control measures: Ineffective or inadequate bird control measures can increase the risk of bird strikes.
- Environmental management: Poor environmental management practices can attract birds to airports.





5.0 FIJI'S ORGANISATIONAL CHALLENGES

In addition to the national operational safety risks listed in the NASP, Fiji has identified organisational challenges and a series of SEIs, selected for the NASP, to address them. These are given priority in the NASP since they are aimed at enhancing and strengthening Fiji's safety oversight capabilities and the management of aviation safety at the national level.

The eight critical elements (CEs) of a safety oversight system are defined by ICAO. Fiji is committed to the effective implementation of these eight CEs, as part of its overall safety oversight responsibilities, which emphasise Fiji's commitment to safety in respect of its aviation activities. The eight CEs are presented in Figure 1 below.

The latest ICAO activities, which aim to measure the effective implementation of the eight CEs of Fiji's safety oversight system, as part of the ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP), have resulted in the following scores:






Figure 1:
Critical elements
of a State's safety
oversight system

El score by CE



El score by audit area²



The following organisational challenges in the Fiji context were considered of the utmost priority because they impact the effectiveness of safety risk controls. They were identified based on analysis from USOAP data, accident and incident investigation reports, safety oversight activities over the past 3 years, Fiji's SSP, as well as on the basis of regional analysis conducted by the AP-RASG and APANPIRG.

These issues are typically systemic in nature and relate to challenges associated with the conduct of States' safety oversight functions, implementation of SSP at the national level and the level of SMS implementation by national service providers. They take into consideration organisational culture, policies and procedures within Ministry of Tourism and Civil Aviation, Civil Aviation Authority of Fiji, and those of service providers. These organisational challenges are in line with those listed in the 2026-2028 of the GASP and the AP-RASP:

1. SSP PQ and Foundation PQs
2. State safety oversight capabilities
3. Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation (AIG) capabilities

To address the organisational challenges listed above, the Ministry of Tourism and Civil Aviation, the Civil Aviation Authority of Fiji, operators and service providers will implement a series of SEIs, some of which are derived from the ICAO ORG roadmap, contained in the ICAO Global Aviation Safety Roadmap (Doc 10161). The full list of the SEIs is presented in the appendix to the NASP.





6.0 FIJI'S AVIATION SAFETY ROADMAP SUMMARY

The aviation safety roadmap comprises an action plan of Fiji's SEI to help achieve Fiji's NASP safety goals and acceptable level of safety performance. It comprises the Operational and Organisational components that are in line with the GASP and the AP-RASP. A summary of Fiji's aviation safety roadmap is found in Table 1.

Each SEI comprises specific actions that Fiji intends to undertake to improve the State's safety performance.





7.0 MONITOR IMPLEMENTATION

Fiji will continuously monitor the implementation of the SEIs listed in the NASP and measure safety performance of the national civil aviation system to ensure the intended results are achieved, using the mechanisms presented in the appendix to this plan.

In addition to the above, Fiji will review the NASP every three (3) years or earlier, if required, to keep the identified operational safety risks, organisational challenges and selected SEIs updated and relevant. The Civil Aviation Authority of Fiji will periodically review the safety performance of the initiatives listed in the NASP to ensure the achievement of national safety goals. If required, Fiji will seek the support of APAC Regional Aviation Safety Group (RASG) to ensure the timely implementation of SEIs to address national safety issues. Through close monitoring of the SEIs, Fiji will adjust the NASP and its initiatives, if needed, and update the NASP accordingly.


Fiji will use the indicators listed in Section 3 of this plan to measure safety performance of the national civil aviation system and monitor each national safety target. A periodic National safety report will be published to provide stakeholders with relevant up-to-date information on the progress made in achieving the national safety goals, as well as the implementation status of the SEIs.

In the event that the national safety goals are not met, the root causes will be presented. If Fiji identifies critical operational safety risks, reasonable measures will be taken to mitigate them as soon as practicable, possibly leading to an unscheduled revision of the NASP.

Fiji adopted a standardized approach to provide information at the regional level and to report to the APAC RASG. This allows the region to receive information and assess operational safety risks using common methodologies.

Any questions regarding the NASP and its initiatives, and further requests for information, may be addressed to the following:

Civil Aviation Authority of Fiji
Private Mail Bag NAP 0354
Ph +679 8923155
www.caaf.org.fj
Email: compliance@caaf.org.fj



APPENDIX A

FIJI's NATIONAL OPERATIONAL SAFETY RISKS

HRC 1: Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT)
Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks:
Target 1.1: By 2028, Fiji to maintain a 5-year moving average decreasing trend of national accident rate. Target 1.2: By 2028, Fiji to maintain a 5-year moving average decreasing trend of accidents and serious incidents for each high-risk category of occurrence.
Global Aviation Safety Roadmap (Doc 10161): SEI-CFIT (States) – Mitigate contributing factors to the risk of CFIT. AP-RASP: https://www.icao.int/APAC/rasg/Library/AP-RASP

Safety enhancement initiative - Mitigate contributing factors to the risk of CFIT

ACTION	TIMELINE	RESPONSIBLE ENTITY	STAKEHOLDERS	METRICS	PRIORITY	MONITORING ACTIVITY
Adopt ICAO AP Model Advisory Circulars, Guidance Materials – CFIT	2027	CAAF	- Air Operators - CAAF	Number of GMs published on CFIT	High	AP Online Monitoring Portal APAC SEI Monitoring Tools
Consider the implementation of continuous descent final approaches (CDFA)	2027	- CAAF - Fiji Airports	- Air Operators - Fiji Airports	Percentage of review of IFP completed	High	IFP Checklist on CDFA and Baro-VNAV

and vertical navigation procedures (Baro-Vnav) ** Continuous descend operation is embedded when designing an instrument flight procedure.						
Ensure the timeliness of updates and accuracy of Electronic Terrain and Obstacle Data (eTOD)	2028	• Fiji Airports • Air Operators	• Fiji Airports • Air Operators	Reports of e-TOD review	High	AIS-AIM implementation progressive reports



HRC 2: Loss of Control Inflight (LOC-I)

Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks

Target 1.1: By 2028, Fiji to maintain a 5-year moving average decreasing trend of national accident rate.

Target 1.2: By 2028, Fiji to maintain a 5-year moving average decreasing trend of accidents and serious incidents for each high-risk category of occurrence.

Global Aviation Safety Roadmap (Doc 10161): SEI-LOC-I (States) – Mitigate contributing factors to the risk of LOC-I

AP-RASP: <https://www.icao.int/APAC/rasg/Library/AP-RASP>

Safety enhancement initiative - Mitigate contributing factors to LOC-I accidents and incidents

ACTION	TIMELINE	RESPONSIBLE ENTITY	STAKEHOLDERS	METRICS	PRIORITY	MONITORING ACTIVITY
Adopt ICAO APAC GM for LOC-I HRC occurrences. *** GM to include ATC training on LOC-I ****ATC to implement	2028	CAAF	- CAAF - Air Operators	Number of Guidance Materials published on LOC-I occurrences.	High	AP Online Monitoring Portal

HRC 3: Mid Air Collision (MAC)

Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks

Target 1.1: By 2028, Fiji to maintain a 5-year moving average decreasing trend of national accident rate.

Target 1.2: By 2028, Fiji to maintain a 5-year moving average decreasing trend of accidents and serious incidents for each high-risk category of occurrence.

Global Aviation Safety Roadmap (Doc 10161): SEI-MAC (States) – Mitigate contributing factors to the risk of MAC.

AP-RASP: <https://www.icao.int/APAC/rasg/Library/AP-RASP>

Safety enhancement initiative - Mitigate contributing factors to MAC accidents and incidents

ACTION	TIMELINE	RESPONSIBLE ENTITY	STAKEHOLDERS	METRICS	PRIORITY	MONITORING ACTIVITY
Adopt ICAO APAC GM for MAC HRC occurrences.	2027	CAAF	- CAAF - Air Operators	Number of Guidance Materials published on MAC occurrences.	High	AP Online Monitoring Portal
Ensure adherence to ACAS warning procedures.	2027	Air operators	- CAAF - Air Operators	Number of MAC accidents and incidents. <i>*ASB articles on MAC (target helicopter operators)</i>	High	Surveillance

Improve reliability and consistency of safety nets to provide early and dependable warning, and to reduce nuisance alerts.	2027	Fiji Airports	• CAAF • Fiji Airports • Air Operators	Number of MAC related accidents and incidents.	High	• Surveillance • MOR and VOR reports
Validate the effectiveness of the SEIs through the analysis of pilot and ATC reports** (apply safety management methodologies).	2027	CAAF	• CAAF • Fiji Airports • Air Operators	Number of MAC related accidents and incidents.	High	• Surveillance • MOR and VOR reports



HRC 4: Runway Excursion (RE)

Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks

Target 1.1: By 2028, Fiji to maintain a 5-year moving average decreasing trend of national accident rate.

Target 1.2: By 2028, Fiji to maintain a 5-year moving average decreasing trend of accidents and serious incidents for each high-risk category of occurrence.

Global Aviation Safety Roadmap (Doc 10161): SEI-RE (States)– Mitigate contributing factors to the risk of RE.

AP-RASP: <https://www.icao.int/APAC/rasg/Library/AP-RASP>

Safety enhancement initiative - Mitigate contributing factors to RE accidents and incidents

ACTION	TIMELINE	RESPONSIBLE ENTITY	STAKEHOLDERS	METRICS	PRIORITY	MONITORING ACTIVITY
Adopt ICAO APAC GM for RE HRC occurrences.	2027	CAAF	- CAAF - Air Operators	Number of Guidance Materials published on RE occurrences.	High	AP Online Monitoring Portal
Ensure that procedures to systematically reduce the rate of unstabilized approaches to runways are developed and used.	2027	Air Operators	- CAAF - Fiji Airports	Number of RE accidents and incidents.	High	- Surveillance - MOR and VOR reports

HRC 5: Runway Incursion (RI)

Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks

Target 1.1: By 2028, Fiji to maintain a 5-year moving average decreasing trend of national accident rate.

Target 1.2: By 2028, Fiji to maintain a 5-year moving average decreasing trend of accidents and serious incidents for each high-risk category of occurrence.

Global Aviation Safety Roadmap (Doc 10161): SEI-RI (States) – Mitigate contributing factors to the risk of RI.

AP-RASP: <https://www.icao.int/APAC/rasg/Library/AP-RASP>

Safety enhancement initiative - Mitigate contributing factors to RI accidents and incidents

ACTION	TIMELINE	RESPONSIBLE ENTITY	STAKEHOLDERS	METRICS	PRIORITY	MONITORING ACTIVITY
Refer ICAO AP Model Advisory Circular and GM – RI and adopt for Fiji.	2027	CAAF	- CAAF - Air Operators	Publication of GMs on RI	High	AP Online Monitoring Portal
AIP publication of hot spots at aerodromes and ensure suitable strategies to remove hazards or mitigate risks associated with identified hot spots are developed and executed.	2027	Fiji Airports	- CAAF - Air Operators	Publication of hot spots at aerodromes Number of RI accidents and incidents	High	MOR and VOR

HRC 6: SYSTEM COMPONENT FAILURE (Non-Powerplant and Powerplant)

Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks

Target 1.1: By 2028, Fiji to maintain a 5-year moving average decreasing trend of national accident rate.

Target 1.2: By 2028, Fiji to maintain a 5-year moving average decreasing trend of accidents and serious incidents for each high-risk category of occurrence.

Global Aviation Safety Roadmap (Doc 10161): SEI-SCF (States) – Mitigate contributing factors to the risk of SCF.

AP-RASP: <https://www.icao.int/APAC/rasg/Library/AP-RASP>

Safety enhancement initiative - Mitigate contributing factors to SCF accidents and incidents

ACTION	TIMELINE	RESPONSIBLE ENTITY	STAKEHOLDERS	METRICS	PRIORITY	MONITORING ACTIVITY
Refer ICAO AP Model Advisory Circular and GM –SCF and adopt for Fiji.	2027	CAAF	- CAAF - Air Operators	Publication of GMs on SCF.	High	AP Online Monitoring Portal
Implement Robust Reliability Programmes.	2027	Fiji Airports	Air Operators	Number of SCF accidents and incidents.	High	MOR Maintenance Findings FOQA data(where applicable) SPI.

HRC 7: Wildlife Strike

Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks.

Target 1.3: Reduce wildlife strikes at or near the vicinity of international aerodromes.

Safety enhancement initiative - Mitigate contributing factors to Wildlife Hazard

ACTION	TIMELINE	RESPONSIBLE ENTITY	STAKEHOLDERS	METRICS	PRIORITY	MONITORING ACTIVITY
Establishment of the National Wildlife committee.	2026	CAAF	- Fiji Airports - Fiji Airways - Govt Ministries	Periodic meetings of the National Wildlife Committee.	High	Meeting Reports.
Development and implementation of the wildlife management plan.	2027	Fiji Airports	- CAAF - Fiji Airports - All stakeholders	Implementation of the national wildlife plan.	High	Surveillance MOR.
Improve the Wildlife management process used at Fiji's international airports.	2028	Fiji Airports	- CAAF - Air Operators	Number of confirmed bird strike.	High	Surveillance MOR.

APPENDIX B

FIJI'S ORGANISATIONAL ROADMAP

ORGANISATIONAL CHALLENGE : Safety oversight capabilities
GOAL 2: Strengthen Fiji's safety oversight capabilities
Target 2.1: By 2028, Fiji will ensure that its civil aviation safety and security oversight system is supported by adequate financial resources and qualified technical personnel to effectively fulfil its safety and security oversight obligations. Target 2.2: By 2028, Fiji to improve its Effective Implementation (EI) score for qualified technical personnel (CE-4) for Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation (AIG) and for aerodromes and ground aids (AGA), respectively, with an EI score of 80% or not less than the baseline global average, whichever is the higher. Target 2.3: By 2028, Fiji to improve their EI score for the resolution of safety issues (CE-8) in AGA with a further commitment of EI score of 80% or not less than the baseline global average, whichever is the higher. Target 2.4: By 2028, Fiji to establish an independent Accident Investigation Commission (AIC) or engage another State's Accident Investigation Organisation or a Regional Accident Investigation Organisation (RAIO).
Global Aviation Safety Roadmap (Doc 10161): SEI (States) – Mitigate contributing factors to the risk of Organisational Challenge. AP-RASP: https://www.icao.int/APAC/rasg/Library/AP-RASP

Safety enhancement initiative - Consistent implementation of ICAO SARPS at the national level

ACTION	TIMELINE	RESPONSIBLE ENTITY	STAKEHOLDERS	METRICS	PRIORITY	MONITORING ACTIVITY
Work at the national level to address Significant Safety Concerns as a priority.	2027	CAAF	- CAAF - Fiji Airways - Fiji Airports - Fiji MET - Air Operators	EI score	High	ICAO USOAP OLF
100% completion of the CAPS implementation of all Protocol Questions (PQs).	2027	CAAF	- CAAF - Fiji Airways - Fiji Airports - Fiji MET - Air Operators	EI score	High	ICAO USOAP OLF

Safety enhancement initiative - Establishment of an independent Accident Investigation Commission consistent with ICAO Annex 13 – Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation

Establish an independent Accident Investigation Commission as per ICAO Annex 13 requirements, within the State or engage another State's Accident Investigation Organisation or a Regional Accident Investigation Organisation (RAIO).	2028	MTCA	• CAAF • All stakeholders	Establishment of AIC or engage another State's AIC or RAIO.	High	CAPs completion on AIG audit area.
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ORGANISATIONAL CHALLENGE : Effective Implementation of Fiji's SSP

GOAL 3: Establish and manage Fiji's State Safety Programme (SSP)

Target 3.1: By 2028, Fiji to assess the level of SSP implementation.

Global Aviation Safety Roadmap (Doc 10161): SEI (States) – Mitigate contributing factors to the risk of Organisational Challenge.
AP-RASP: <https://www.icao.int/APAC/rasg/Library/AP-RASP>

Safety enhancement initiative - Strategic collaboration with key aviation stakeholders to complete SSP implementation

ACTION	TIMELINE	RESPONSIBLE ENTITY	STAKEHOLDERS	METRICS	PRIORITY	MONITORING ACTIVITY
Work with key aviation stakeholders to execute the action plan for full implementation of Fiji's SSP.	2028	CAAF	- CAAF - Fiji Airways - Fiji Airports - Fiji MET - Air Operators	SSP EI score	High	ICAO USOAP OLF

ORGANISATIONAL CHALLENGE : Collaboration at the regional level and national level

GOAL 4: Strengthening collaboration at the regional and national levels to address safety issues

Target 4.1: By 2026, Fiji to address highest priority safety issues based on the Effective Implementation (EI)

Target 4.2: By 2028, Fiji will collaborate with the ICAO APAC office on the required assistance provided to APAC states as identified from Target 4.1 to address the highest priority safety issues.

Target 4.3: By 2027, Fiji to provide safety information on operational safety risks and emerging issues for the purpose of aviation safety planning to the APAC office.

Global Aviation Safety Roadmap (Doc 10161): SEI (States) – Mitigate contributing factors to the risk of Organisational Challenge

AP-RASP: <https://www.icao.int/APAC/rasg/Library/AP-RASP>

ACTION	TIMELINE	RESPONSIBLE ENTITY	STAKEHOLDERS	METRICS	PRIORITY	MONITORING ACTIVITY
Collaborate at ICAO APAC regional level to identify and address highest safety priority safety risks based on the effective implementation.	2027	CAAF	- ICAO APRAST - ICAO AP-RASG - All stakeholders	Number of reports submitted on operational safety risks and emerging issues and validated	High	APRAST and AP-RASG progress reports

ORGANISATIONAL CHALLENGE : Coordinated aviation planning						
Goal 5: Strengthen aviation planning						
Target: By 2028, Fiji to conduct a mid-term review of the NASP.						
Global Aviation Safety Roadmap (Doc 10161): SEI (States) – Mitigate contributing factors to the risk of Organisational Challenge. AP-RASP: https://www.icao.int/APAC/rasg/Library/AP-RASP						

ACTION	TIMELINE	RESPONSIBLE ENTITY	STAKEHOLDERS	METRICS	PRIORITY	MONITORING ACTIVITY
Review of NASP in consultation with stakeholders.	2028	CAAF	All stakeholders	Revised NASP	High	ICAO CAAF



ORGANISATIONAL CHALLENGE : Expansion of industry and safety data sharing programmes

Goal 6: Expand the use of industry evaluation programmes and safety data sharing programmes

Target: By 2028, stakeholders to maintain an increasing trend in its use of industry evaluation programmes and safety data sharing programmes in Aerodromes, Aircraft operations, ANSP and Ground Handling * *The trend is calculated using year 2025 as a baseline.*

Global Aviation Safety Roadmap (Doc 10161): SEI (States) – Mitigate contributing factors to the risk of Organisational Challenge.

AP-RASP: <https://www.icao.int/APAC/rasg/Library/AP-RASP>

ACTION	TIMELINE	RESPONSIBLE ENTITY	STAKEHOLDERS	METRICS	PRIORITY	MONITORING ACTIVITY
Increased trend in implementing Industry Evaluation Programmes and safety data sharing programmes in Aerodromes, Aircraft Operations, ANSP and Ground Handling.	2028	CAAF	• Fiji Airports • Aerodrome Operators • Air Operators • Air Terminal Services.	Increased percentage from 2025 on the completed industry evaluation programmes and data sharing programmes.	High	NASP Working Group







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