



THE CAYMAN ISLANDS

NATIONAL AVIATION SAFETY PLAN

Issue 1.0

September 2026

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Record of Amendments

Issue	Date	Notes
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Amendments in the latest version are identified by a black side line in the margin adjacent to the revised text.

Abbreviations

The following abbreviations and associated meanings apply throughout this document:

AAIB	Air Accidents Investigation Branch
ANS	Air Navigation Services
ANO	Air Navigation Order
AN(OT)O	Air Navigation (Overseas Territories) Order
ANSP	Air Navigation Service Provider
AOU	Air Operations Unit
ALoSP	Acceptable level of Safety Performance
ASSI	Air Safety Support International Limited
ATM	Air Traffic Management
ATS	Air Traffic Services
CAA	Civil Aviation Authority (UK)
CAE	Cayman Airways Express
CAL	Cayman Airways Limited
CAT	Commercial Air Transport
CE	Critical Element (of an SSO System)
CFIT	Controlled Flight in to Terrain
CICG	Cayman Islands Coast Guard
CIFS	Cayman Islands Fire Service
CIAA	Cayman Islands Airports Authority
CINWS	Cayman Islands National Weather Service
DGCA	Director-General of Civil Aviation
DfT	Department for Transport (UK)
FIR	Flight Information Region
GASP	Global Aviation Safety Plan
GHRC	Global High-risk Category of Occurrence
GS	Ground Safety
HRC	High-risk Category of Occurrence
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organisation
iSTARS	Integrated Safety Trend Analysis and Reporting System
LOC-I	Loss of Control - In flight
MAC	Mid-Air Collision
MOR	Mandatory Occurrence Report
NASP	National Aviation Safety Plan
NACC	North American, Central American and Caribbean
NHRC	National High-risk Category of Occurrence
OLF	(USOAP) On-line Framework
OTs	Overseas Territories
OPS	Aircraft Operations (USOAP Audit Area)
ORG	Civil Aviation Organisation (USOAP Audit Area)
OTAA	Overseas Territories Aviation Authorities
OTAC	Overseas Territories Aviation Circular
OTAR	Overseas Territories Aviation Requirement

PAOC	Police Air Operators Certificate
OTSPC	Overseas Territories Safety Performance Council
RASP	Regional Aviation Safety Plan
RCIPS	Royal Cayman Islands Police Service
RE	Runway Excursion
RI	Runway Incursion
RHRC	Regional High-risk Category of Occurrence
RPAS	Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems
SAR	Search and Rescue
SARPs	(ICAO) Standards and Recommended Practices
SEI	Safety Enhancement Initiative
SMS	Safety Management System
SPI	Safety Performance Indicator
SRM	Safety Risk Management
SSC	Significant Safety Concern
SSO	State Safety Oversight
SSP	States Safety Programme
TMA	Terminal Manoeuvring Area
TCAS	Traffic Collision and Avoidance System
UK	United Kingdom
USOAP	Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme
WS	Wildlife Strike

Stakeholders and Distribution

This National Aviation Safety Plan (NASP) has been developed by the Civil Aviation Authority of the Cayman Islands in consultation with relevant national and international aviation stakeholders whose activities contribute to the safety performance of the Cayman Islands aviation system and aircraft registered in the Cayman Islands operating internationally. Stakeholder engagement forms an important component of the State Safety Programme (SSP) and supports a collaborative and coordinated approach to the management of aviation safety.

The following table identifies the principal stakeholders consulted during the development of the NASP and those to whom the document will be distributed following publication. These stakeholders include Government entities, aviation service providers, aircraft operators, aerodrome operators, emergency response agencies, and other organisations with responsibilities relevant to aviation safety oversight, safety management, and the implementation of the Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs) contained within this plan.

Distribution List

Civil Aviation Authority of the Cayman Islands
Office of the Governor
Cabinet of the Cayman Islands Government
Ministry responsible for Civil Aviation
Ministry responsible for Airports
Ministry responsible for Tourism
Cayman Islands Airports Authority
Cayman Airways / Cayman Airways Express
Hazard Management Cayman Islands
Air Safety Support International
CAACI Air Operator Certificate Holders
CAACI Approved Maintenance Organisations
CAACI Continuing Airworthiness Management Organisations
Cayman Islands Fire Service
Royal Cayman Islands Police Service
Cayman Islands National Weather Service
Cayman Islands Coastguard

Definitions:

The following definitions apply to the identified terms used in this document:

Critical Element

The ICAO Critical Elements of a safety oversight system are the eight building blocks upon which an effective safety oversight system is based. The level of effective implementation of the CEs is an indicator of a State's safety oversight capability.

Effective Implementation

ICAO's measure of a State's safety oversight capability, calculated for each Critical Element, each audit area, or as an overall measure. EI is expressed as a percentage.

High-risk Categories of Occurrence

A category of occurrence that, based on actual fatalities from past accidents, high fatality risk per accident or the number of accidents and incidents, is likely to generate a high risk of fatalities.

Risk Mitigation

The process of incorporating defences, preventative controls or recovery measures to lower the severity of and/or likelihood of a hazard's projected consequence.

Safety

The state in which the risks associated with aviation activities, related to, or in direct support of the operation of an aircraft, are reduced and controlled to an acceptable level.

Safety Data

A defined set of facts or values collected, for reference, processing or analysis which could be used to maintain or improve safety.

Safety Enhancement Initiative

One or more actions to eliminate or mitigate operational safety risks or to address an identified safety issue.

Safety Information

Safety data processed, organised or analysed in a given context to support safety management and the development of safety intelligence

Safety Management System

A systematic approach to managing safety, including the necessary organisational structures, accountability, responsibilities, policies and procedures.

Safety Oversight

A function performed by a State to ensure that individuals and organisations performing an aviation activity comply with safety related national laws and regulations.

Safety Performance

A State or a service provider's measurable effect on safety achievement.

Safety Performance Indicators

A metric used to measure and monitor a State or a service provider's safety performance, including the progress towards achieving a safety objective.

Safety Performance Target

The State or service provider's planned or intended target for a safety performance indicator over a given period.

Safety Risk

The predicted probability and severity of the consequences or outcomes of a hazard.

Significant Safety Concern

Occurs when a State allows the holder of an authorisation or approval to exercise the privileges attached to it, although the minimum requirements established by the State and by the Standards set forth in the Annexes to the Convention are not met, resulting in an immediate safety risk to international civil aviation.

State Safety Programme

An integrated set of regulations and activities aimed at improving safety.

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Foreword

As a British Overseas Territory, the Cayman Islands is committed to upholding the highest standards of aviation safety, in line with the United Kingdom's responsibilities as an original signatory to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (the Chicago Convention). This commitment includes striving to meet, and where possible, exceed, the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) established by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).

Aviation is vital to the Cayman Islands. It serves as a lifeline for our community, connecting our people to essential goods, services, and opportunities. It is also a critical enabler of key economic pillars such as tourism and financial services. Ensuring a safe, resilient, and sustainable aviation system is, therefore, fundamental to our national development and prosperity.

The Cayman Islands is dedicated to enhancing aviation safety through proactive risk management, regulatory oversight, and collaboration with national and international stakeholders. The National Aviation Safety Plan (NASP) 2026-2031 reflects this commitment by establishing a strategic framework aimed at reducing the risk of fatalities and serious incidents within our aviation system.

Developed in alignment with ICAO's Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP) and the Regional Aviation Safety Plan (RASP) for the North American, Central American and Caribbean (NACC) region, this NASP outlines key safety objectives, priorities, and initiatives tailored to the unique operational context of the Cayman Islands. It supports the continued maturity of our State Safety Programme and promotes a data-driven, risk-based approach to safety management.

The successful implementation of this plan depends on the shared commitment of all aviation stakeholders. Collaboration, transparency, and continuous improvement are essential as we work together to uphold and advance aviation safety in the Cayman Islands.

P.H. Richard Smith, MBE, FRAeS, Cert. Hon.
Director-General Civil Aviation
February 2026

SECTION 1 OVERVIEW OF NASP

INTRODUCTION

1.1 OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL AVIATION SAFETY PLAN (NASP)

Resolution A40-1 of the 40th Session of the ICAO Assembly, held in 2019, urges all Contracting States to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (the Chicago Convention, 1944) to develop, implement, and regularly update a National Aviation Safety Plan (NASP). The NASP serves as a strategic document that outlines a State's national safety objectives, risks, and initiatives in alignment with the ICAO Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP).

While the United Kingdom (UK) is the Contracting State and signatory to the Chicago Convention, its Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories (OTs) are expected to support the UK's international obligations under the Convention. Given the diversity in size, scope, and complexity of civil aviation activities across the OTs, it is appropriate for each Territory to develop its own NASP that reflects its specific operational context and safety risks. These plans contribute to the overall UK State Safety Programme (SSP) and UK NASP framework.

Accordingly, the Cayman Islands has developed its own National Aviation Safety Plan (NASP), which sets out the strategic direction for the management of aviation safety within the Territory. This NASP covers a period of five years from its issue date and will be reviewed and updated at the end of that cycle to ensure continued relevance and effectiveness.

The plan has been developed in consultation with Air Safety Support International (ASSI), which is responsible to the UK Department for Transport (DfT) for supporting and assessing civil aviation regulatory oversight in the Overseas Territories. It is reviewed periodically by the Overseas Territories Safety Performance Council (OTSPC), which convenes biannually to monitor progress and performance across the OTs.

The Cayman Islands NASP is aligned with ICAO's Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP) and the Regional Aviation Safety Plan (RASP) for the North American, Central American, and Caribbean (NACC) region, ensuring consistency with global and regional safety priorities and targets.

1.2 STRUCTURE OF THE NASP

This NASP presents the strategic direction for the management of aviation safety at the national level for a period of five years (2026-2031). It comprises six sections. In addition to the introduction, sections include: the purpose of the NASP, the national operational safety risks, the national organizational challenges, Cayman's strategic direction for the management of aviation safety, and a description of how the implementation of the safety enhancement initiatives (SEIs) listed in the NASP is going to be monitored.

1.3 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NASP AND THE SSP

Through the safety data analysis capabilities of the SSP, The Cayman Islands has the ability to use its hazard identification and safety risk management process as a source of safety

information to identify hazards and safety deficiencies, and determine national operational safety risks and organizational challenges for inclusion in the NASP. The SSP provides safety information to the NASP. The SSP allows Cayman to manage its aviation activities in a coherent and proactive manner, measure the safety performance of its civil aviation system, monitor the implementation of the NASP's SEIs and address national safety issues. The NASP is one of the key documents produced as part of Cayman's SSP documentation. It is the means by which the Cayman Islands defines and drives the implementation of SEIs determined through SSP processes and drawn from the ICAO Global Aviation Safety Roadmap (Doc 10161) and the North American, Central American and Caribbean Regional Aviation Safety Plan. It also allows the Cayman Islands to determine initiatives to strengthen the SSP or otherwise needed to achieve its safety objectives. Safety information gathered through the SSP also contributes to other national plans. Further information on Cayman's SSP can be found at <https://www.caacayman.com>

1.4 PROCESS FOR THE NASP DEVELOPMENT, IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING

The CAACI is responsible for the development, implementation and monitoring of the NASP, in collaboration with the stakeholders listed below and with the national aviation industry. The NASP was developed in consultation with national operators and other key aviation stakeholders, and in alignment with the 2026-2028 GASP and the NACC RASP. Its implementation requires a collaborative approach to achieve the national safety strategy. To ensure its relevance, this plan is maintained by the CAACI, in coordination with key stakeholders and is updated at least every five (5) years.

Civil Aviation Authority of the Cayman Islands (CAACI) Regulatory Divisions Responsible for:

- a) Aerodrome Certification and Operations oversight;
- b) Air Navigation Services oversight;
- c) Airworthiness oversight;
- d) Flight Operations oversight.

1.4.1 Cayman Islands Airports Authority (CIAA) as:

- a) the holder of the Aerodrome certificates for Owen Roberts and Charles Kirkconnell International Airports (MWCR and MWCB respectively);
- b) the provider of:
 - i) Aeronautical Information Services (AIS);
 - j) Air Traffic Services (ATS);
 - k) Communications Navigation and Surveillance Services (CNS).

1.4.2 Cayman Airways Limited (CAL) as:

- a) the holder of the AOC for Cayman Airways;

- b) the holder of the AOC for Cayman Airways Express;
- c) the de-facto operator of the uncertified Edward Bodden Airfield (MWCL), Little Cayman.

1.4.3 Ground Handling Agencies

The Cayman Islands Airports Authority (CIAA) outsources ground handling and refuelling services to third-party providers, including support for the general aviation sector.

1.4.4 Ministry of Financial Services and Commerce

Whose portfolio includes the Civil Aviation Authority of the Cayman Islands.

1.4.5 Ministry of Tourism and Trade Development

whose portfolio includes:

- a) Cayman Airways and Cayman Airways Express Ltd.

1.4.6 Ministry of Planning, Lands, Agriculture, Housing & Infrastructure

Whose portfolio includes:

- a) Cayman Islands Airports Authority.

1.4.7 Additional Resources

When necessary or deemed appropriate, the NASP Working Group may co-opt additional members to support its activities. These may include representatives from customer airlines, the Cayman Islands Fire Service (CIFS), the Cayman Islands Coast Guard (CICG), the Royal Cayman Islands Police Service (RCIPS) Air Operations Unit (AOU), and the Cayman Islands National Weather Service (CINWS), and, Hazard Management Cayman Islands (HMCI).

1.4.7 Reporting

In addition to the NASP development team identified above, the Director-General of Civil Aviation will report the progress on the development, implementation and the achievements of the NASP to The Governor and to Air Safety Support International (ASSI) through the Overseas Territories Safety Performance Council (OTSPC) annually.

1.5 NATIONAL SAFETY ISSUES, GOALS AND TARGETS

The NASP addresses the following national safety issues:

1. Runway Incursion (RI)
2. Runway Excursion (RE)
3. Mid-Air Collision (MAC)
4. Ground Safety (GS)

5. Wildlife Strike (WS)
6. Commercial Air transport into uncertified aerodromes
7. SSP implementation gaps & Organisational Challenges

To address the issues listed above and enhance aviation safety at the national level, the 2026-2031 NASP identifies the goals and targets in Section 3:

In addition to currently identified risks, the NASP accounts for emerging safety issues – those that may impact aviation safety in the future but for which insufficient data is currently available to conduct a full risk assessment.

Emerging issues considered in this edition of the NASP include:

- Cybersecurity risks to aviation systems;
- The increasing use of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) near airports;
- Cayman Islands Government policies on remuneration alignment with the wider public sector, and their potential effect on the CAACI's ability to recruit and retain technical staff for the purpose of regulatory aviation oversight.

These areas will continue to be monitored and reassessed as further information and data become available.

1.6 OPERATIONAL CONTEXT

1.6.1 Introduction

The Cayman Islands is a group of three islands, Grand Cayman, Cayman Brac and Little Cayman, situated in the Caribbean, south of Cuba and west of Jamaica. The population of the Islands total some 85,000 with the majority, approximately 75,000 living on the main island of Grand Cayman (MWCR).

The national carrier, Cayman Airways Limited, (CAL) operates a fleet of nine aircraft, four Boeing 737-8, serving international routes together with two Saab 340 and three DHC-6 aircraft serving the domestic routes of Cayman Brac (MWCB) and Little Cayman (MWCL) respectively.

The Cayman Islands aviation system comprises three main elements, its airspace and airports, its aircraft register and the associated maintenance and support organisations.

1.6.2 Cayman Islands Airspace

The Cayman Islands Terminal Manoeuvring Area (TMA) is situated within the Kingston Flight Information Region (FIR). The TMA is active and controlled by Cayman Islands Air Traffic Services (ATS) during the operating hours of Owen Roberts International Airport (MWCR). When MWCR is closed control of the airspace reverts to Jamaica ATS.

The TMA airspace extends from sea level to FL245(24,500ft) within the prescribed boundaries. Within the TMA the airspace is divided as follows:

Surface level up to 1,499 ft - Class G (but Class D within 10NM of MWCB and MWCR)
 1500ft up to 10,500ft - Class D
 10,500ft up to FL 245 - Class A

Full details of the Cayman Islands airspace including the MWCB and MWCR control zones and the associated categories can be found in the Cayman Islands Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) ENR 2.1-1 and 2.1-2.

1.6.3 Cayman Islands Airports

The Cayman Islands has two certified, international airports, Owen Roberts International Airport (MWCR) on Grand Cayman, serving as the gateway to the Islands and Charles Kirkconnell International Airport (MWCB) on Cayman Brac.

Both airports are owned and operated by the Cayman Islands Airports Authority (CIAA), a statutory authority enabled by the Cayman Islands Airports Authority Law (2005 Revision). The CIAA airports are certified in accordance with ICAO ANNEX 14 SARPS. Regulatory safety oversight is provided by the CAACI.

A third, uncertified facility, Edward Bodden Airfield (MWCL) serves Little Cayman. The airfield is operated by Cayman Airways Express, under an Exemption issued by the CAACI, to support its essential, scheduled DHC-6 Twin Otter, inter-islands services.

During the year ending 31 December 2025, the three airports generated 36,509 aircraft movements and handled around 1 million passengers.

1.6.4 Cayman Islands Aircraft Register

The Cayman Islands aircraft register is a global operation with aircraft operating under approvals issued by the CAACI in accordance with OTAR Part 121, OTAR Part 125, OTAR Part 135 and ICAO Article 83*bis*.

In addition, there are aircraft in Controlled Environments, managed by assigned and approved Continuing Airworthiness Management Organisations (CAMOs). These are project aircraft known as Transition Aircraft and are not regularly operated.

As at 31 December 2025 there was a total of 221 aircraft on the Cayman Islands Aircraft Register in the following categories:

Commercial	42
Private	129
Transition	50
Total	221

The operators of aircraft on the Cayman Islands Aircraft Register are certificated and approved in accordance with the appropriate regulations. They are subject to an audit and inspection programme undertaken by qualified Airworthiness Surveyors and Flight Operations Inspectors employed by the Authority.

1.6.5 Maintenance Support Organisations

The Cayman Islands Aircraft Register is supported by a global network of maintenance support organisations. For the purposes of this Section, Maintenance Support Organisations includes Aircraft Maintenance Organisations (AMO) - OTAR Part 145 Organisations, and Continuing Airworthiness Maintenance Organisations (CAMO) - OTAR Part 39 Organisations.

The total number of AMOs and CAMOs approved by the CAACI as at 31 December 2025 was:

AMOs	205
CAMOs	91
Total	296

These maintenance organisations are approved by the CAACI in accordance with OTAR 145 and OTAR 39, as appropriate, and are subject to an audit and inspection programme undertaken by qualified Airworthiness Surveyors employed by the Authority.

1.6.6 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS)

In addition to the three main elements of the aviation system, there is a growing interest in the operation of RPAS. Currently, there are approximately 20 registered operators deploying aircraft weighing under 25kgs. There is also some interest from operators in larger systems and also in the ability to operate beyond visual line of site.

There is also believed to be a fairly large community of hobbyists and there have been a small number of reports suggesting illegal activity.

SECTION 2 PURPOSE OF THE CAYMAN ISLANDS NASP

2.1 OVERVIEW

In accordance with the United Kingdom's obligations as a signatory to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (the Chicago Convention), each Overseas Territory is expected to develop and implement a State Safety Programme (SSP) proportionate to the size and complexity of its civil aviation system. Within this framework, the Cayman Islands is committed to promoting an Acceptable Level of Safety Performance (ALoSP) that reflects both international expectations and the Territory's own high standards.

The Cayman Islands seeks to maintain an aviation environment where:

- i) There are no accidents involving commercial air transport operations resulting in serious injury or fatalities, and;
- ii) There are no serious injuries or fatalities to third parties as a result of civil aviation activities.

In support of ICAO's aspirational safety goal of zero fatalities in commercial aviation by 2030 and beyond, the Cayman Islands has adopted a proactive and data-informed approach to safety management that integrates local operational realities with global and regional priorities.

2.2 PURPOSE AND DURATION OF THE NASP

The Cayman Islands National Aviation Safety Plan (NASP) serves as the Territory's master planning document containing the strategic direction of the Cayman Islands for the management of aviation safety for a period of five (5) years (2026 to 2031). This plan lists national safety issues, sets national safety goals and targets, and presents a series of safety enhancement initiatives (SEIs) to achieve those goals.

Where appropriate, elements of the Cayman Islands NASP will be integrated into broader national planning frameworks, including the Cayman Islands Airports Master Plan 2041. This ensures alignment between aviation safety objectives and long-term infrastructure, operational, and economic development goals.

The NASP has been developed in alignment with the safety goals, targets, high-risk occurrence categories, and organisational challenges identified in the Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP) and the NACC Regional Aviation Safety Plan (RASP). The Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs) included in the NASP form the action plan supporting the national safety strategy and contribute to safety improvements at both regional and international levels. The Cayman Islands has adopted the relevant SEIs identified in the NACC RASP and incorporated them into this plan to address specific safety issues. Cross-references are provided to the NACC RASP for individual SEIs where relevant. (<https://www2023.icao.int/NACC/Documents/RegionalPlans/NACCRASP-En.pdf>)

SECTION 3 NATIONAL OPERATIONAL SAFETY RISKS

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The vision of the GASP is to achieve and maintain the goal of zero fatalities in commercial operations by 2030 and beyond. To do so, operational safety risks need to be identified and addressed. In line with the vision of the GASP, national operational safety risks are listed in this section of the NASP. They addressed through the action plan presented in Section 5 of this document.

3.2 SAFETY DATA ANALYSIS – AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS AND SERIOUS INCIDENTS

The summary of accidents and serious incidents that occurred in the Cayman Islands, together with those involving Cayman Islands-registered aircraft engaged in commercial air transport and general aviation operations, is presented in the tables below. The data reflects occurrences as reported to the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) over a ten-year period from 2014 to 2024, with statistics for the most recent year (2025) presented separately for completeness.

<i>Year</i>	<i>Fatal accidents</i>	<i>Non-fatal accidents</i>	<i>Serious incidents</i>
Commercial air transport occurrences in the Cayman Islands			
2014 to 2024	0	0	4
2025	0	0	0
General aviation aircraft occurrences in the Cayman Islands			
2014 to 2024	0	0	2
2025	0	0	0

<i>Year</i>	<i>Fatal accidents</i>	<i>Non-fatal accidents</i>	<i>Serious incidents</i>
Occurrences involving commercial air transport aircraft registered in the Cayman Islands			
2014 to 2024	0	0	7
2025	0	0	0
Occurrences involving general aviation aircraft registered in the Cayman Islands			
2014 to 2024	0	0	1
2025	0	0	0

The occurrence data presented above provides a consolidated overview of accident and serious incident trends within the Cayman Islands aviation system and among aircraft registered in the Cayman Islands. While the data reflects a generally stable safety record, it highlights areas of recurring exposure and operational complexity that warrant continued attention through the State Safety Programme (SSP). The information has been used to support the identification of national operational safety risks and organisational challenges within this National Aviation Safety Plan (NASP), and to inform the development of targeted goals, safety targets, and Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs). Ongoing monitoring and analysis of occurrence data will remain a key component of the State's safety assurance activities, ensuring that emerging trends are identified in a timely manner and that risk mitigation strategies remain proportionate, evidence-based, and aligned with global and regional aviation safety priorities.

The information available does not indicate a trend or provide any information from which to identify national safety issues.

3.3 SAFETY DATA ANALYSIS – WILDLIFE HAZARD REPORTS

Data derived from submitted birdstrike reports for the period 2021-2025 is tabulated below.

Year	MWCB	MWCL	MWCR	Local Total	Overseas	Total
2021	8	0	9	(17)	34	51
2022	14	2	10	(26)	16	42
2023	33	1	7	(41)	3	44
2024	9	1	33	(43)	4	47
2025	17	0	54	(71)	7	78
TOTAL	81	4	113	198	64	

From the data provided above, there have been no serious wildlife strike occurrences during the period. While this suggests that existing control measures remain effective, wildlife hazards are inherently dynamic and therefore require ongoing monitoring and periodic review to ensure sustained safety performance in accordance with ICAO risk-based oversight principles. An increase in reported wildlife strike occurrences over time does not necessarily signify a rise in safety risk; rather, it may reflect a strengthening safety reporting culture, enhanced surveillance, and a more mature and proactive safety management and oversight system, consistent with the principles of the State Safety Programme (SSP).

3.4 IDENTIFICATION OF NATIONAL AVIATION SAFETY RISKS

The National Operational Safety Risks have been identified based on the limited safety data currently available but primarily on the intention of reducing the perceived risks in areas which might generate the highest level of fatalities or injuries. They are repeated below as follows:

- a) Mid-Air Collision;
- b) Ground Safety

- c) Runway Incursions
- d) Runway Excursions
- e) Risk of Wildlife Hazards;
- f) Commercial Air Transport operations using uncertified airports;

This document seeks to explain the rationale behind the selection of these risks and to provide goals, targets and SEIs to address them.

In developing the NASP, the Authority has taken the opportunity of including a number of existing initiatives, resulting from its on-going safety oversight activities. Their inclusion in the NASP formalises them within the initial plan of an overall strategy to reduce its operational safety risk.

3.5 RISK OF MID-AIR COLLISION

3.5.1 Rationale

Air traffic separation within the Cayman Islands Terminal Manoeuvring Area (TMA) is currently provided using procedural separation, which relies on air traffic controllers maintaining an accurate and continuously updated mental picture of the airspace based on pilot position reports. This method is inherently dependent on sustained human performance and effective communication, and any lapse in attention or breakdown in coordination by either air traffic controllers or flight crews can significantly increase the risk of loss of separation or mid-air collision.

As air traffic volumes continue to increase year on year, controller workload and cognitive demands also increase, placing additional pressure on situational awareness and decision-making. To maintain an acceptable level of safety and efficiency in line with international expectations, it is essential that the Cayman Islands Airports Authority (CIAA) invests in enhanced air traffic management capabilities, including improved resources, training, and long-term airspace management strategies, to support the safe, orderly, and efficient operation of the airspace.

3.5.2 Goal

To reduce the risk of mid-air collision within the Cayman Islands airspace through enhanced operational supervision, improved situational awareness, optimised airspace design, and consistent application of standard separation procedures.

This goal seeks to minimise the likelihood of mid-air collisions through proactive safety management and targeted, strategic improvements to air traffic services. It emphasises the establishment and maintenance of effective ATS operational supervision, the strengthening of ATS capabilities, and adherence to ICAO separation standards, supported by the appropriate use of airborne collision avoidance systems (ACAS). Key elements include enhanced pilot and controller training in situational awareness and conflict resolution, improved coordination between civil, military, and general aviation operations, and regular review and updating of

airspace structures and procedures to reflect evolving traffic volumes and operational complexity. Through targeted Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs), the CAACI, in collaboration with aviation stakeholders, will work to progressively reduce residual collision risk, particularly in controlled and high-density airspace.

3.5.3 Targets

1. By 31 December 2026, the Cayman Islands Airports Authority (CIAA) will have established and implemented arrangements to ensure the continuous provision of operational Air Traffic Services (ATS) supervision whenever ATS is provided, in accordance with applicable regulatory requirements.
2. By 31 December 2027, the Cayman Islands Airports Authority (CIAA) will fully meet Task Resource Analysis (TRA) requirements through the provision of an adequate number of appropriately qualified and licensed air traffic controllers.
3. By 31 December 2028, the Cayman Islands Airports Authority (CIAA) will commission and maintain an operational air traffic surveillance system to enhance situational awareness and support effective conflict detection.

3.5.4 Safety Enhancement Initiatives

1. Establish and implement formal arrangements to ensure continuous operational Air Traffic Services (ATS) supervision whenever ATS is provided. This initiative will include defining supervisory roles and responsibilities, establishing qualification and competency requirements for ATS supervisors, and ensuring that supervision arrangements are documented, resourced, and subject to ongoing regulatory oversight and review.
2. Develop and implement a structured ATS staffing and competency plan aligned with Task Resource Analysis (TRA) outcomes. This initiative will address recruitment, training, validation, and retention of appropriately qualified and licensed air traffic controllers, ensuring staffing levels and competency are sufficient to safely manage current and projected traffic demands.
3. Plan, procure, commission, and maintain an operational air traffic surveillance system to enhance situational awareness and support effective conflict detection. This initiative will include system integration, controller training, maintenance arrangements, and the development of supporting procedures to ensure the effective and safe use of surveillance data within ATS operations.

3.6 RISK OF GROUND INCIDENT

3.6.1 Rationale

Ground safety encompasses the prevention of accidents, incidents, and injuries occurring during aircraft ground operations, including movements on runways, taxiways, aprons, and other airside areas, as well as ground servicing and vehicle operations. Recent international safety data and ICAO safety priorities continue to demonstrate that a significant proportion of aviation occurrences arise during ground operations, including runway incursions, aircraft ground collisions, apron incidents, and airside vehicle conflicts. These risks are further amplified by increasing traffic volumes, mixed aircraft operations, complex aerodrome layouts, and the interaction between aircraft, vehicles, equipment, and personnel.

Reflecting this heightened international focus, the Air Safety Support International (ASSI) has recently introduced OTAR Part 190, which includes specific regulatory provisions addressing ground servicing and vehicle operations. The introduction of these requirements reinforces the need for States and Overseas Territories to strengthen oversight of ground safety activities and to ensure that robust controls, procedures, training, and supervision are in place to manage these risks effectively.

Given the global and regional emphasis on ground safety, it is imperative that the Cayman Islands formally recognises ground safety as a national aviation safety risk within the NASP. Addressing this risk supports a proactive and systematic approach to hazard identification, risk mitigation, and continuous safety improvement, consistent with ICAO's GASP and associated guidance material.

As with all nationally identified safety risks, ground safety considerations extend beyond operations conducted within the Cayman Islands. This risk also applies to aircraft registered in the Cayman Islands and operated internationally in other States, where effective ground handling, servicing, and vehicle control remain critical to safe operations. Including ground safety as a national risk therefore supports the CAACI's responsibility for oversight of both domestic aerodrome operations and the safe global operation of aircraft on the Cayman Islands Aircraft Registry.

3.6.2 Goal

To reduce the risk of ground-related accidents and incidents involving aircraft, vehicles, equipment, and personnel through strengthened oversight, effective implementation of ground servicing and vehicle operation requirements, and a proactive, data-driven safety management approach.

This goal aims to enhance ground safety performance by promoting consistent application of ICAO Standards, ASSI OTAR Part 190 requirements, and national procedures governing ground servicing, apron operations, and airside vehicle movements. It focuses on improving operational supervision, competency-based training, and coordination among aerodrome operators, aircraft operators, and ground service providers. Key elements include the systematic identification and mitigation of ground safety hazards, the effective use of occurrence reporting and safety data, and the continuous review of procedures to reflect operational complexity and evolving risk.

Through targeted Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs), the CAACI, in collaboration with industry stakeholders, will work to reduce residual ground safety risk both within the Cayman Islands and for Cayman Islands-registered aircraft operating internationally, thereby supporting safe, orderly, and efficient ground operations in line with global aviation safety priorities.

3.6.3 Targets

1. By 31 December 2028, the CAACI will implement a structured, risk-based oversight programme for ground safety, including routine surveillance of aerodrome operators, ground handling organisations, and aircraft operators, with documented findings and corrective actions tracked to closure.
2. By 31 December 2029, aerodrome operators, Cayman-based Ground Handling Service Providers and operators of aircraft on the Cayman Islands Aircraft Registry, will have established and implemented competency-based training programmes for ground servicing personnel and airside vehicle operators, aligned with ICAO guidance and OTAR Part 190 requirements, and subject to regulatory oversight.
3. By 31 December 2030, the CAACI will establish and utilise ground safety performance indicators, supported by occurrence reporting and safety data analysis, to monitor trends, identify emerging risks, and inform targeted Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs).
4. By 31 December 2031, the CAACI will demonstrate sustained improvement in ground safety performance through effective implementation of regulatory oversight, reduction in the rate and severity of ground-related occurrences, and continuous alignment with ICAO Standards and ASSI OTAR Part 190 for both domestic operations and Cayman Islands-registered aircraft operating internationally.

3.6.4 Safety Enhancement Initiatives

1. Develop and issue national guidance material, inspector handbooks, and surveillance checklists to support the implementation of ASSI OTAR Part 190 requirements relating to ground servicing and airside vehicle operations. This initiative will ensure that regulatory expectations are clearly communicated to aerodrome operators, aircraft operators, and ground service providers, and that inspectors apply consistent oversight practices.
2. Establish and implement a risk-based oversight programme focused on ground safety, including inspections, audits, and surveillance of apron operations, ground handling activities, and airside vehicle movements. Oversight activities will prioritise higher-risk operations and ensure that identified findings are documented, addressed through corrective actions, and monitored to closure.
3. Promote and oversee the development of competency-based training and qualification programmes for ground servicing personnel and airside vehicle operators, in accordance with ICAO guidance and OTAR Part 190. This initiative will include verification of initial and recurrent training, authorisation processes, and ongoing competency assessments as part of routine regulatory oversight.
4. Enhance the collection, analysis, and use of ground safety occurrence data to identify trends, systemic issues, and emerging risks. This initiative will support the development of ground safety performance indicators and enable data-driven decision-making to inform targeted safety interventions and regulatory actions.
5. Conduct periodic reviews of ground safety regulatory effectiveness, incorporating lessons learned from oversight activities, occurrence analysis, and international best practices. This initiative will ensure sustained improvement in ground safety performance and continued alignment with ICAO Standards and ASSI OTAR Part 190, including oversight of Cayman Islands-registered aircraft operating internationally.

3.7 RISK OF RUNWAY INCURSION

3.7.1 Rationale

Runway incursions remain a persistent and internationally recognised aviation safety risk, with ICAO identifying them as a key High-Risk Category (HRC) due to their potential to result in catastrophic outcomes. While the runway incursion events recorded within the Cayman Islands over the past 24 months have been assessed as non-critical, their frequency is a cause

for concern and indicates underlying systemic vulnerabilities that require proactive intervention.

Runway incursions typically arise from a combination of factors, including human performance limitations, inadequate situational awareness, procedural non-compliance, ineffective communication, airside vehicle control weaknesses, and aerodrome layout or marking deficiencies. Increasing traffic complexity, mixed aircraft and vehicle operations, and constrained operating environments further elevate the likelihood of runway safety events if not effectively managed.

ICAO continues to place strong emphasis on runway safety through the Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP), the Runway Safety Programme framework, and guidance material such as ICAO Doc 9870 (Manual on the Prevention of Runway Incursions). Central to this approach is the establishment of effective Runway Safety Teams (RSTs), systematic analysis of runway incursion data, and the implementation of targeted mitigations based on local risk profiles.

Given the recent runway incursion occurrences, it is imperative that the Cayman Islands formally recognises runway incursion risk as a national safety concern within the NASP. Doing so ensures a structured, data-driven approach to prevention, reinforces accountability across stakeholders, and supports continuous improvement in runway safety performance for both domestic operations and Cayman Islands-registered aircraft operating internationally.

3.7.2 Goal

To reduce the frequency and severity of runway incursions through strengthened runway safety governance, improved situational awareness, consistent procedural compliance, and proactive risk management across all aerodrome operations.

This goal aims to ensure that runway operations are conducted in a safe, predictable, and controlled manner by enhancing coordination between air traffic services, aerodrome operators, aircraft operators, and airside vehicle users, in line with ICAO runway safety principles.

3.7.3 Targets

1. By 31 December 2026, the Runway Safety Team (RST) at ORIA/CKIA will be strengthened and maintained to operate effectively, meeting regularly to review runway safety performance, analyse runway incursion data, and monitor the implementation and effectiveness of agreed mitigation measures.

2. By 31 December 2027, all relevant aerodrome stakeholders will demonstrate consistent compliance with runway operating procedures, supported by enhanced training, awareness programmes, and documented local runway safety initiatives.
3. By 31 December 2028, the CAACI will implement a structured runway incursion monitoring framework, including safety performance indicators and trend analysis, to support continuous reduction in runway incursion occurrences and severity.

3.7.4 Safety Enhancement Initiatives

1. CIAA to strengthen the Runway Safety Teams at ORIA/CKIA in accordance with ICAO guidance, ensuring regular meetings, defined terms of reference, participation from key stakeholders, and documented review of runway incursion events, contributing factors, and mitigation actions.
2. Develop and maintain aerodrome-specific runway safety action plans based on local risk assessments, runway incursion data, and operational characteristics. Action plans will include targeted mitigations, assigned responsibilities, and timelines, and will be reviewed periodically for effectiveness.
3. Industry to enhance runway safety training and awareness programmes for air traffic controllers, pilots, ground handlers, and airside vehicle operators, with emphasis on situational awareness, standard phraseology, hot spot identification, and human factors contributing to runway incursions.
4. Conduct periodic reviews of runway and taxiway markings, signage, lighting, and aerodrome layout to identify and address any deficiencies or design factors that may contribute to runway incursions, prioritising improvements based on risk.
5. Strengthen the collection, classification, and analysis of runway incursion data in alignment with ICAO definitions, enabling the CAACI to monitor trends, identify systemic issues, and implement targeted regulatory or operational interventions to reduce residual risk.

3.8 RISK OF RUNWAY EXCURSION

3.8.1 Rationale

Runway excursions, defined as events in which an aircraft departs the runway surface during take-off or landing, are recognised by ICAO as a significant safety risk due to their potential to result in serious injury, loss of life, and substantial damage to aircraft and infrastructure. Globally, runway excursions continue to be among the most frequent categories of aviation

accidents, often influenced by a combination of factors including runway length and surface condition, weather, aircraft performance, and human decision-making.

Although the Cayman Islands has not experienced any recent runway excursion events, historical occurrences demonstrate that this risk is credible and relevant. On 11 October 1991, a Cayman Airways jet overran the runway at Owen Roberts International Airport (ORIA) and came to rest in the North Sound beyond the runway end. A serious incident occurred on January 15, 2014, involving a Cayman Airways Boeing 737-300 (VP-CKY). After an unstable approach to a wet runway, the aircraft floated and eventually touched down late, coming to a stop with only 139 meters of runway remaining. In addition, on 27 January 2015, a Convair 580 cargo aircraft chartered by Cayman Airways and operated by IFL Group experienced a lateral runway excursion at ORIA, veering off the side of the runway into the grass during the final landing roll. While neither event resulted in loss of life, both highlight the potential consequences associated with runway overruns and veer-offs and underscore the importance of robust runway safety defences.

At present, the Runway End Safety Areas (RESA) at ORIA and CKIA meet the ICAO Annex 14 standard minimum length of 90 metres but do not meet the ICAO recommended length of 240 metres. ICAO recommendations are intended to provide an enhanced safety margin to mitigate the consequences of runway excursions, particularly overruns. United Kingdom aviation policy, which informs the regulatory framework applicable to the Cayman Islands, applies ICAO Recommendations as de facto Standards where practicable, reflecting a precautionary and risk-based approach to runway safety.

Given the continued international focus on runway excursion prevention, the presence of historical local runway excursion events, and the limitations associated with existing RESA dimensions, it is appropriate that runway excursions be formally recognised as a national aviation safety risk within the National Aviation Safety Plan (NASP). Addressing this risk through proactive planning, infrastructure assessment, operational controls, and safety performance monitoring supports a systematic approach to risk reduction. As with other nationally identified safety risks, runway excursion considerations apply not only to operations conducted within the Cayman Islands, but also to Cayman Islands-registered aircraft operated internationally, reinforcing the Authority's responsibility to promote runway safety both domestically and globally.

3.8.2 Goal

To reduce the likelihood and potential consequences of runway excursions by strengthening runway safety defences, enhancing monitoring and risk assessment, and improving operational and infrastructure measures across all runway operations.

This goal focuses on proactive identification of excursion risks, reinforcement of runway safety margins, consistent application of runway safety procedures, and effective utilisation of safety data to inform mitigation strategies.

3.8.3 Targets

1. By 31 December 2026, the CIAA to complete a comprehensive aeronautical study addressing runway excursion risk, including an assessment of existing Runway End Safety Areas (RESA), identification of feasible mitigation measures, and the development of an implementation plan with defined timelines, in accordance with ICAO recommendations and national safety risk assessments.
2. By 31 December 2027, aerodrome operators, aircraft operators, and air traffic services will have established, promulgated, and implemented runway excursion prevention procedures, including stabilised approach criteria, landing performance assessment, and runway surface condition reporting.
3. By 31 December 2029, the CAACI will implement runway excursion performance indicators and trend analysis within its safety data monitoring framework to support ongoing risk assessment and targeted safety interventions.

3.8.4 Safety Enhancement Initiatives

1. Conduct a formal risk assessment of existing runway end safety areas at ORIA and CKIA to identify the cost-effective and operationally feasible level of improvement needed to reduce excursion consequences. Develop implementation plans for RESA enhancements, engineered materials arrestor systems (EMAS), or other runway overrun protection measures where practicable.
2. Develop and promulgate procedures for runway excursion prevention that address approach stabilisation criteria, landing distance assessment, brake action reporting, and go-around decision making. Ensure these procedures are incorporated into aerodrome operations manuals, flight crew operating manuals, and ATS instructions, and are agreed with stakeholders.
3. Enhance runway surface condition reporting practices, including adoption of friction measurement procedures where practicable, clear guidance on contaminants, and timely dissemination of runway condition reports (RE, RWYCC) to flight crews and ATS.
4. Provide targeted runway excursion risk awareness training for controllers, pilots, and aerodrome operations personnel, including human factors contributing to excursions,

stabilised approach criteria, runway surface condition interpretation, and go-around decision criteria.

5. Implement runway excursion safety performance indicators and integrate them into the national safety data collection and analysis process. Use this data to monitor trends, identify causal factors, and prioritise mitigation actions on a data-driven basis.
6. Coordinate with operators of Cayman Islands-registered aircraft globally to share best practices for runway excursion prevention, including performance calculations, stabilised approach policies, and lessons learned, thereby reinforcing safety culture both domestically and internationally.

3.9 RISK OF WILDLIFE STRIKE

3.9.1 Rationale

Wildlife strikes pose a recognised hazard to aviation safety, with the potential to cause significant damage to aircraft, engines, and critical systems, particularly during take-off and landing phases. ICAO identifies wildlife hazard management as an essential element of aerodrome safety, requiring a proactive, systematic approach to risk identification, mitigation, and monitoring.

Within the Cayman Islands, there have been no serious wildlife strike occurrences involving domestic operations or Cayman Islands-registered aircraft during the past five years and beyond. In addition, the Cayman Islands Airports Authority (CIAA) has established and maintains a wildlife hazard management programme, which has contributed to effective risk control to date. While this positive safety performance indicates that current measures are effective, the dynamic nature of wildlife hazards—driven by environmental conditions, seasonal patterns, and land-use changes—necessitates continued vigilance.

International experience demonstrates that wildlife strike risk can increase rapidly if control measures are relaxed or not regularly reviewed. As such, the continued monitoring and effectiveness assessment of wildlife management programmes remains essential to ensuring sustained safety performance. Recognising wildlife strike risk within the National Aviation Safety Plan (NASP) supports a proactive, preventive approach and aligns with ICAO's emphasis on continuous safety assurance and risk-based oversight.

As with other nationally identified safety risks, wildlife strike considerations extend beyond domestic aerodrome operations and apply equally to Cayman Islands-registered aircraft

operating internationally. Maintaining effective oversight and monitoring ensures that wildlife hazard risks remain controlled and that early indicators of emerging risk are identified and addressed.

3.9.2 Goal

To maintain a low level of wildlife strike risk through effective wildlife hazard management, continuous monitoring, and proactive oversight of aerodrome and aircraft operations.

This goal focuses on sustaining current safety performance, ensuring that existing mitigation measures remain effective, and strengthening data-driven monitoring to detect and address any emerging wildlife-related risks.

3.9.3 Targets

1. By 31 December 2027, the CAACI will have completed a review of the effectiveness of existing wildlife hazard management programmes at applicable aerodromes, ensuring continued alignment with ICAO requirements and best practices.
2. By 31 December 2028, the CAACI will implement enhanced monitoring and trend analysis of wildlife strike data within its safety data management framework to support early identification of emerging risks.
3. By 31 December 2030, the CAACI will demonstrate sustained low wildlife strike risk through continued oversight, absence of serious wildlife strike occurrences, and timely corrective action where necessary.

3.9.4 Safety Enhancement Initiatives

1. Conduct periodic reviews of the CCAA's wildlife hazard management programme to assess effectiveness, including habitat management, active control measures, staff training, and coordination with environmental stakeholders. Ensure findings are documented and any recommended improvements are tracked to closure.
2. wildlife strike reporting, data collection, and analysis processes to ensure accurate classification, trend identification, and timely dissemination of information to relevant stakeholders. Use data outputs to inform risk assessments and targeted mitigations.
3. Integrate wildlife hazard management into routine regulatory surveillance activities, including inspections and audits of aerodrome operations, to verify continued compliance and effectiveness of control measures.

4. Promote ongoing awareness of wildlife strike hazards among aerodrome operators, air traffic services, and aircraft operators, and encourage the sharing of best practices and lessons learned to support continuous improvement.

3.10 RISK TO COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORT OPERATIONS USING UNCERTIFIED AIRPORTS

3.10.1 Rationale

The aerodrome on Little Cayman remains uncertified while supporting scheduled commercial air transport operations. Historically, the aerodrome served a small local population and was operated by aircraft configured for a maximum of nine passenger seats, consistent with the provisions of Article 156(3)(b) of the Air Navigation (Overseas Territories) Order 2013 (AN(OT)O 2013). Over time, growth in population and demand for air services has resulted in the introduction of larger aircraft types operating into the aerodrome.

The route is now served by DHC-6 aircraft with a certified seating capacity of 19 passengers, operating under an Exemption issued by the Civil Aviation Authority of the Cayman Islands (CAACI). Although the Exemption is subject to annual review and renewal, it has remained continuously in effect for an extended period. Exemptions are intended to provide a temporary and proportionate mechanism to facilitate continued operations where full compliance with certification requirements cannot be immediately achieved. They are not designed to function as a permanent alternative to aerodrome certification, nor do they remove the inherent safety risks associated with operating commercial air transport services at an uncertified aerodrome.

The long-term reliance on an Exemption to support scheduled commercial operations therefore presents an ongoing safety risk and limits the level of safety assurance that can be achieved through formal certification. This risk is further compounded as aircraft size, passenger numbers, and operational complexity increase. Recognising and addressing this risk within the National Aviation Safety Plan (NASP) supports a structured, risk-based approach to enhancing safety oversight and ensuring that commercial air transport operations are conducted in a manner that remains consistent with evolving regulatory expectations and international best practice.

3.10.2 Goal

To secure commitment from the Cayman Islands Government to the planning, construction and management of a certifiable aerodrome on Little Cayman, supported by defined milestones and continuous progress toward full aerodrome certification, thereby reducing the long-term safety risk associated with commercial air transport operations at an uncertified aerodrome.

3.10.3 Target

1. The Cayman Islands Government has formally committed to the planning, construction, and long-term management of a certifiable aerodrome on Little Cayman, including confirmation of intent to progress the project in accordance with applicable aerodrome certification standards and regulatory requirements.

Following this commitment, the Cayman Islands Government will provide a structured set of project milestones outlining the key phases for delivery of the aerodrome, including feasibility and options analysis, design development, funding approval, construction, and progression toward aerodrome certification. These milestones will include indicative timelines and will be used to demonstrate continuous progress toward achieving a fully certifiable aerodrome.

2. By an agreed target date, the Cayman Islands Government will progress the development of a certifiable aerodrome on Little Cayman in accordance with applicable aerodrome certification standards and regulatory requirements. Progress toward this objective will be demonstrated through the agreement of a target date for delivery, the commencement of construction activities, and the eventual certification of the aerodrome by the Civil Aviation Authority of the Cayman Islands (CAACI).

3.10.5 Safety Enhancement Initiatives

1. Establish a coordinated engagement and governance framework between the Civil Aviation Authority of the Cayman Islands (CAACI), the Cayman Islands Government, and relevant stakeholders to support the commitment, planning, and delivery of a certifiable aerodrome on Little Cayman. This initiative will include the provision of regulatory guidance to inform feasibility, design, and construction activities, ongoing engagement to ensure alignment with aerodrome certification standards, and the monitoring of agreed milestones to demonstrate continuous progress toward certification. The SEI will support informed decision-making, facilitate early identification of regulatory risks, and ensure that safety considerations remain central throughout the project lifecycle.

SECTION 4 NATIONAL ORGANISATIONAL CHALLENGES

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The CAACI remains committed to the continuous reduction of operational safety risk across the national aviation system. Achieving and sustaining this objective requires the ongoing effective implementation of the State Safety Programme (SSP), supported by reliable and comprehensive safety data. This data is drawn from a range of sources, including industry operational experience, findings from the Authority's audit and inspection activities, and both mandatory and voluntary safety reporting systems. Together, these inputs support the

identification of organisational challenges, enable risk-based oversight, and inform continuous improvement of aviation safety performance.

4.2 ORGANISATIONAL CHALLENGE

A significant organisational challenge for the Cayman Islands lies in identifying and addressing gaps in the effective implementation of the State Safety Programme (SSP). Closing these gaps is essential to strengthening national safety performance, improving regulatory effectiveness, and ensuring that aviation safety risks are systematically identified, assessed, and managed at the State level.

To address this challenge, the CAACI is focused on enhancing its internal oversight capabilities and ensuring that relevant legislation, manuals, procedures, and policies are developed, reviewed, and amended in alignment with the SARPs of ICAO. This includes strengthening governance, regulatory processes, and safety assurance mechanisms that support effective SSP implementation.

A critical enabler of effective safety oversight is the availability of suitably qualified, experienced, and resilient technical personnel. The Authority therefore recognises the need to develop and implement a strategic workforce plan that incorporates succession planning, targeted recruitment, and retention strategies for technical staff whose expertise is essential to the effective regulation and oversight of aviation safety. Addressing workforce sustainability is fundamental to maintaining continuity of oversight, preserving institutional knowledge, and supporting the long-term effectiveness of the SSP.

Progress in implementing the SSP and strengthening safety oversight is monitored through the outcomes of the ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP), with particular emphasis on Priority Protocol Questions (PPQs) and Protocol Questions (PQs). These form the basis for assessing the effectiveness and sustainability of the State's safety oversight system. A summary of the Cayman Islands' current levels of effective implementation against these elements is provided in Appendix B.

In addition to the national operational safety risks identified in this NASP, the Cayman Islands has identified a set of national organisational challenges that warrant prioritisation within the NASP. These challenges are specifically aimed at enhancing and strengthening the State's safety oversight capabilities and improving the management of aviation safety at the national level.

ICAO defines eight Critical Elements (CEs) of a safety oversight system, which collectively represent the foundation of effective State safety oversight. The Cayman Islands is committed to the progressive and sustained implementation of all eight Critical Elements as part of its statutory safety oversight responsibilities, demonstrating its ongoing commitment to aviation safety across all aviation activities. The eight Critical Elements are presented in Appendix C.

The NASP also addresses civil aviation oversight across the audit areas defined by ICAO within the USOAP Continuous Monitoring Programme, as set out in ICAO Doc 9735. Recent ICAO activities, aimed at measuring the effectiveness and sustainability of the Cayman Islands'

safety oversight system, have resulted in consolidated performance outcomes that are presented in the form of a national “Heat Map,” providing a visual representation of strengths and areas requiring further improvement.

4.2.1 The Goal

To strengthen the effective implementation of the State Safety Programme (SSP) in order to systematically identify, assess, and mitigate the national operational safety risks identified in the NASP, while enhancing regulatory oversight capability, governance, safety data management, and workforce sustainability in line with ICAO requirements.

4.2.2 Target

1. By 31 December 2027, the CAACI will close identified gaps in SSP implementation, as measured through improvements in ICAO USOAP Protocol Questions (PQs) and Priority Protocol Questions (PPQs) related to safety management, safety assurance, and safety oversight.
2. By 31 December 2027, the CAACI will complete a structured review and update of all core aviation safety oversight manuals, procedures, and policies to ensure alignment with applicable ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs), with documented implementation and staff awareness.
3. By 31 December 2027, the CAACI will develop, approve, and commence implementation of a strategic workforce plan for technical oversight functions, incorporating succession planning, targeted recruitment, and retention strategies for critical safety oversight roles.
4. By 31 December 2027, the CAACI will strengthen its safety assurance framework to ensure that safety data from audits, inspections, occurrence reporting, and risk assessments is systematically analysed and used to support evidence-based regulatory decision-making and SSP performance monitoring.

4.2.3 Safety Enhancement Initiatives

1. Conduct a comprehensive SSP gap analysis using ICAO SSP implementation guidance and USOAP findings, and develop a prioritised SSP improvement action plan linked to NASP targets.
2. Establish a rolling review programme for all technical and safety oversight manuals, procedures, and guidance material, including defined ownership, review cycles, and approval processes to ensure regulatory currency and consistency.
3. Develop a multi-year workforce plan identifying critical technical roles, succession risks, competency requirements, recruitment timelines, and retention measures to ensure continuity of safety oversight capability.

4. Implement structured onboarding, handover, and knowledge-transfer processes for new technical staff and managers to preserve institutional knowledge and support consistent application of regulatory requirements.
5. Enhance the integration of safety data sources (occurrence reports, audit findings, risk registers, and oversight outcomes) into a central safety monitoring framework to support SSP performance assessment and trend analysis.
6. Introduce regular SSP management review meetings to assess safety performance indicators, organisational risks, and progress against NASP targets, ensuring senior management oversight and accountability.

5. SECTION 5 STRATEGIC DIRECTION FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF AVIATION SAFETY

The NASP includes the following national safety goals and targets for the management of aviation safety, as well as a series of indicators to monitor the progress made towards their achievement. They are tied to the goals, targets and indicators listed in the GASP and the NACC RASP, and include additional national safety goals, targets and indicators.

Goal	Target	Indicators	Responsible Entity	Link to GASP & RASP
Reduce the risk of mid-air collision through enhanced ATS capability, effective supervision, and improved situational awareness.	MAC-1: By 31 Dec 2026, CIAA will ensure continuous operational ATS supervision whenever ATS is provided.	Number of Supervisors Meet the TRA requirement.	CIAA (oversight by CAACI)	GASP: Airspace safety, ATS effectiveness NACC RASP: ATS capacity and surveillance enhancement
	MAC-2: By 31 Dec 2027, CIAA will meet TRA requirements with sufficient qualified ATCOs.	Number of controllers meet the TRA requirement.	CIAA (oversight by CAACI)	GASP: Human factors, staffing adequacy NACC RASP: ATC staffing and training

Goal	Target	Indicators	Responsible Entity	Link to GASP & RASP
	MAC-3: By 31 Dec 2028, CIAA will commission and maintain an operational ATS surveillance system.	• Surveillance System Commissioned and Implemented.	CIAA (oversight by CAACI)	GASP: Surveillance and separation assurance NACC RASP: Surveillance implementation
Enhance ground safety by reducing the risk of aircraft damage and personnel injury during ground operations.	GS-1: By 31 Dec 2027, ground safety procedures aligned with OTAR 190 are implemented.	• Number of ground incidents.	Aerodrome Operators / Service Providers (oversight by CAACI)	GASP: Ground operations safety NACC RASP: Ground handling risk reduction
Reduce runway incursion risk through effective runway safety governance and stakeholder coordination.	RI-1: By 31 Dec 2026, existing RSTs will operate effectively with regular meetings and mitigation oversight.	• Number of RI MORs	CIAA / Aerodrome Operators (oversight by CAACI)	GASP: Runway safety NACC RASP: Runway incursion reduction
Reduce runway excursion risk through infrastructure assessment, mitigation, and performance monitoring.	RE-1: By 31 Dec 2026, an aeronautical study addressing RESA limitations is completed with mitigations and timelines.	• Aeronautical study completed and Approved.	CIAA / Aerodrome Operators (approval by CAACI)	GASP: Runway excursion prevention NACC RASP: Infrastructure risk mitigation

Goal	Target	Indicators	Responsible Entity	Link to GASP & RASP
	RE-2: By 31 Dec 2029, runway excursion SPIs and trend monitoring are implemented.	• Number of sub-standard braking action reports. • Long-term plan for 240m RESA approved.	CAACI	GASP: Safety data and performance monitoring NACC RASP: Data-driven safety management
Maintain wildlife strike risk at an acceptable level through effective wildlife hazard management.	WS-1: By 31 Dec 2026, wildlife hazard management effectiveness is reviewed and monitored.	• Number of wildlife strikes that damage aircraft or affect its flight.	CIAA / Aerodrome Operators (oversight by CAACI)	GASP: Wildlife hazard management NACC RASP: Wildlife strike prevention
Reduce the long-term safety risk associated with commercial air transport at uncertified aerodromes.	UA-1: CIG has committed to deliver a certifiable aerodrome on Little Cayman.	• Receipt of Formal written commitment.	Cayman Islands Government (supported by CAACI & CIAA)	GASP: Aerodrome certification and safety assurance NACC RASP: Infrastructure compliance
	UA-2: By an agreed target date, develop a certifiable aerodrome on Little Cayman	• Aerodrome certified	Cayman Islands Government (supported by CAACI & CIAA)	GASP: Risk-based oversight NACC RASP: Oversight of non-standard operations
Strengthen the effective implementation of the State Safety Programme	SSP-1: By 31 December 2027, make progress on closing known SSP Gaps	The number of Satisfactory ICAO USOAP SSP-related PQs and PPQs.	CAACI	GASP: State Safety Programme implementation NACC RASP: Safety oversight capability strengthening

SECTION 6 MONITORING IMPLEMENTATION

Cayman will continuously monitor the implementation of the SEIs listed in the NASP and measure safety performance of the national civil aviation system to ensure the intended results are achieved, using the mechanisms presented in the appendix to this plan.

In addition to the above, Cayman will review the NASP every two years or earlier, if required, to keep the identified operational safety risks, organisational challenges and selected SEIs updated and relevant. The CAACI will periodically review the safety performance of the initiatives listed in the NASP to ensure the achievement of national safety goals. If required, CAACI will seek the support of the Cayman Islands Government to ensure the timely implementation of SEIs to address national safety issues. Through close monitoring of the SEIs, CAACI will adjust the NASP and its initiatives, if needed, and update the NASP accordingly.

CAACI will use the indicators listed in Section 5 of this plan to measure safety performance of the national civil aviation system and monitor each national safety target. A periodic biennial safety report will be published to provide stakeholders with relevant up-to-date information on the progress made in achieving the national safety goals, as well as the implementation status of the SEIs.

In the event that the national safety goals are not met, the contributing factors will be presented. If CAACI identifies critical operational safety risks, reasonable measures will be taken to mitigate them as soon as practicable, possibly leading to an unscheduled revision of the NASP.

CAACI adopted a standardized approach to provide information at the regional level by reporting to the ICAO NACC Regional Office. This allows the region to receive information and assess safety issues using common methodologies.

Any questions regarding this NASP its associated goals, targets, and SEIs; or, any further requests for information, may be emailed to: civilaviation@caacayman.com

Appendix A CAYMAN ISLANDS STATE SAFETY POLICY

The Civil Aviation Authority of the Cayman Islands (CAACI) is committed to developing and implementing effective strategies, regulatory frameworks and processes to ensure that aviation activities for which it has oversight responsibilities achieve the highest practicable level of safety performance. To this end the CAACI shall:

- 1) Support the UK's Acceptable Level of Safety Performance (ALoSP) which the Authority will strive to achieve throughout its aviation system.
- 2) Comply with all applicable national and international regulatory requirements.
- 3) Deliver an effective oversight programme that meets the United Kingdom's obligations to international safety standards.
- 4) Implement data driven performance-based regulation, that is visibly risk based.
- 5) Proactively identify adverse risk trends within our aviation system and take action to mitigate them.
- 6) Provide the necessary resources to support the development and effective implementation of the Cayman Islands State Safety Programme (SSP) and the National Aviation Safety Plan (NASP).
- 7) Ensure the CAACI Safety Management procedures, and implemented regulation remains effective through continuous monitoring of key Safety Performance Indicators, safety initiatives, industry sector feedback, and from OTAA aviation Safety aggregates.
- 8) Collaborate and consult with aviation industry sectors to foster and promote Just Culture, to regularly address safety matters in partnerships with an aim to continuously enhance aviation safety.
- 9) Promote sound safety practices and a positive safety culture within the industry sectors based on established safety management principles.
- 10) Encourage safety information collection, analysis and exchange within the aviation system with the sole purpose of improving aviation safety.
- 11) Provide its staff with a safe working environment and equip them with proper skills, expertise and sufficient financial and human resources to discharge their safety oversight and management responsibilities effectively and competently.


Appendix B EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION


Effective Implementation is assessed by determining whether each of the 8 Critical Elements is not only established in regulation, but implemented in practice, monitored through oversight, and demonstrably effective in managing aviation safety risks. Effective Implementation does not mean absence of improvement areas, it means the system is capable of identifying and managing them. The key concept is functioning and controlled, not “perfect.”

The tables and charts below represent the Authority’s internal assessment of Effective Implementation (EI) and remain subject to formal validation through audit by ICAO.

Status of Effective Implementation of ICAO Critical Elements

CE-1	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
CE-2	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
CE-3	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
CE-4	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	N/A	100%	100%
CE-5	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	N/A	100%	100%
CE-6	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	N/A	100%	100%
CE-7	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	N/A	100%	100%
CE-8	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	N/A	100%	100%
	LEG	ORG	PEL	OPS	AIR	AIG	ANS	AGA






The CAACI has assessed the EI score as 98.98% - subject to formal assessment by ICAO

Appendix C EIGHT CRITICAL ELEMENTS

ICAO - EIGHT CRITICAL ELEMENTS OF A SAFETY OVERSIGHT SYSTEM.



CE-1. Primary Aviation Legislation.

The provision of a comprehensive and effective aviation law consistent with the environment and complexity of the State's aviation activity and compliant with the requirements contained in the Convention on International Civil Aviation.

CE-2. Specific Operating Regulations.

The provision of adequate regulations to address, at a minimum, national requirements emanating from the primary aviation legislation and providing for standardized operational procedures, equipment and infrastructures (including safety management and training systems), in conformance with the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) contained in the Annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation.

Note: The term "regulations" is used in a generic sense to include but is not limited to instructions, rules, edicts, directives, sets of laws, requirements, policies, and orders.

CE-3. State Civil Aviation System and Safety Oversight Functions.

The establishment of a Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) and/or other relevant authorities or government agencies, headed by a Chief Executive Officer, supported by the appropriate and adequate technical and non-technical staff and provided with adequate financial resources. The State authority must have stated safety regulatory functions, objectives and safety policies.

Note: The term “State civil aviation system” is used in a generic sense to include all authorities with aviation safety oversight responsibility which may be established by the State as separate entities, such as: CAA; Airport Authorities; Air Traffic Service Authorities; Accident Investigation Authority; and Meteorological Authority.

CE-4. Technical Personnel Qualification and Training.

The establishment of minimum knowledge and experience requirements for the technical personnel performing safety oversight functions and the provision of appropriate training to maintain and enhance their competence at the desired level. The training should include initial and recurrent (periodic) training.

CE-5. Technical Guidance, Tools and the Provision of Safety-Critical Information.

The provision of technical guidance (including processes and procedures), tools (including facilities and equipment) and safety-critical information, as applicable, to the technical personnel to enable them to perform their safety oversight functions in accordance with established requirements and in a standardized manner. In addition, this includes the provision of technical guidance by the oversight authority to the aviation industry on the implementation of applicable regulations and instructions.

CE-6. Licensing, Certification, Authorization and Approval Obligations.

The implementation of processes and procedures to ensure that personnel and organizations performing an aviation activity meet the established requirements before they are allowed to exercise the privileges of a licence, certificate, authorization and/or approval to conduct the relevant aviation activity.

CE-7. Surveillance Obligations.

The implementation of inspections, audits, and other surveillance activities to ensure that licence, certificate, authorisation, and approval holders continue to meet established requirements and maintain the competency and safety standards required by the State. This includes oversight of personnel performing safety oversight functions on behalf of the CAA.

CE-8. Resolution of Safety Concerns.

The implementation of processes and procedures to resolve identified deficiencies impacting aviation safety, which may have been residing in the aviation system and have been detected by the regulatory authority or other appropriate bodies.