



C-DEC 234/11
4/04/25

COUNCIL — 234TH SESSION

ELEVENTH MEETING

(COUNCIL CHAMBER, WEDNESDAY, 26 MARCH 2025 AT 1000 HOURS)

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

OPEN MEETING

Recurring GNSS Radio Frequency Interference and Their Implications on the Safety and Security of International Civil Aviation

1. The Council considered this item on the basis of C-WP/15690 presented by the Republic of Korea, which reported on recurring GNSS Radio Frequency Interference (RFI) on the Korean Peninsula originating from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the resulting risks to air navigation safety and security of international civil aviation.
2. Following consideration, the Council:
 - a) recalled and reaffirmed its serious concerns regarding the harmful impact of GNSS RFI on the safety and security of international civil aviation, which went against the principles enshrined in the *Convention on International Civil Aviation* (Chicago Convention) and its Annexes;
 - b) noted, with grave concern, that despite the Council's previous decisions of 18 June 2012, 31 May 2016, and 14 June 2024, these incidents of GNSS RFI originating from the DPRK had continued to recur in the intervening period and had been ongoing since 2 October 2024, jeopardizing the safety of international air navigation in the Incheon FIR;
 - c) strongly urged the DPRK to fully implement the aforementioned Council decisions of 18 June 2012, 31 May 2016, and 14 June 2024, and strictly comply with its obligations under the Chicago Convention;
 - d) reiterated its call to the DPRK to ensure that similar occurrences did not recur in the future;
 - e) requested the President of the Council to send a letter to the Minister responsible for civil aviation in the DPRK to communicate the Council's present decision;
 - f) also requested the Secretary General to issue a State letter informing Member States of the Council's decision on this subject;
 - g) considering the serious and continuous risk posed to international civil aviation as a

result of these recurring incidents of GNSS RFI originating from the DPRK, agreed to give further consideration to the reporting of this matter in accordance with Article 54(k) of the Chicago Convention to the 42nd Session of the Assembly during the 235th Session;

- h) agreed that a press release should be prepared and issued informing of this decision of the Council;
- i) considering the implications of the ongoing GNSS RFI in the Incheon FIR for the safety and security of international civil aviation in the region, requested the ICAO Asia Pacific Regional Office to continue its efforts to engage with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea specifically on this issue; and
- j) requested that the Council continues to be kept closely apprised of any developments in this regard.

Report on Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Radio Frequency Interference

3. The Council considered this item on the basis of an oral report from the Secretary General, which pursuant to C-DEC 233/7, provided information related to the ongoing risks posed by GNSS Radio Frequency Interference (RFI), and the progress of ICAO's ongoing activities in this area, particularly with respect to mitigation measures aimed at reducing the likelihood and impact of GNSS interference on aviation operations.

4. Following consideration, the Council:

- a) recalling its previous decisions on this matter (C-DEC 232/8 and C-DEC 233/7, refer), noted, with concern, the rising number of GNSS RFI incidents and the resulting increased risk to global flight operations, and in that connection, welcomed the Secretariat's efforts to raise Member States awareness of the serious impact on air navigation systems, and to promote a comprehensive and harmonized approach for identifying and effectively mitigating such interference;
- b) recognized that, beyond jeopardizing air navigation safety, GNSS RFI also threatens aviation security, requiring a coordinated and holistic response, and in that regard, emphasized the importance of the One ICAO approach to facilitate cooperation and align efforts across Bureaux on this issue;
- c) took note of the ongoing coordination between ICAO, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), including their joint statement emphasizing the critical need to protect GNSS from harmful interference, as well as the Organization's engagement with the United Nations Secretary-General to support and promote the actions outlined therein;
- d) encouraged the Secretariat to pursue outreach to Member States and partner organizations to mobilize resources for the development, validation and deployment of the new iPack for the mitigation of GNSS RFI, capacity building and the exchange of best practices for detecting, preventing and reporting GNSS RFI, and in that connection, expressed appreciation to the Government of France for its commitment to contribute to this important initiative;
- e) recognized the work of the Air Navigation Commission and its expert groups to address this issue, including the development of new guidance material and the creation of new NOTAM codes for GNSS RFI;

- f) underlined the importance of developing and implementing effective mechanisms for detecting, preventing and reporting occurrences of GNSS RFI, as an essential means to mitigate risks posed by such interference, where possible;
- g) encouraged Member States to consider, as appropriate and practical, retaining or implementing a Minimum Operational Network (MON) of ground based navigation and surveillance infrastructure to ensure operational safety as well as sufficient airspace capacity during times of GNSS interference, and to explore equipping aircraft with GNSS-independent systems, where feasible;
- h) encouraged further collaboration with industry stakeholders with a view to urgently implementing existing, and developing new, solutions that enhance the resilience of GNSS receivers to jamming and spoofing;
- i) recognized that the use of Multiple GNSS constellation, augmented and upgraded to dual frequency, can provide redundancy and additional robustness;
- j) requested the Secretariat to prepare a roadmap outlining short-, medium- and long-term actions to address GNSS RFI, including immediate mitigation measures and long-term strategies to build an air transport system resilient to such interference;
- k) invited the Secretariat to prepare a working paper for consideration by the 42nd Session of the Assembly outlining the scope, risks, and potential consequences of GNSS RFI, to be presented to the Council during the 235th Session;
- l) requested that the Secretariat continue to keep the Council apprised of further developments in this regard, for further action, as may be required; and
- m) noted the importance of ensuring that sufficient resources are allocated in the 2026–2028 Regular Budget to support the Organization’s continued efforts to address GNSS RFI, and emphasized that this should be duly considered in the context of the Council’s ongoing deliberations on the Budget scenarios.

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