



ICAO

**SEVENTH MEETINGS OF THE SAT IMPLEMENTATION MANAGEMENT GROUP (SAT IMG/7)
AND
SAT SAFETY OVERSIGHT GROUP (SAT SOG/7)**

Dakar, 6-10 April 2026

Agenda Item 6: Monitoring and Safety events reporting

AFI ATS Event Analysis 2023-2024

(Presented by AAMAC)

SUMMARY	
<p>This paper provides information on the outcomes of the AFI ATS events analysis carried out in 2025, by the AFI ATS Events Analysis Group (AEAG), for the reference years 2023 and 2024. It emphasizes the events recorded in AFI FIRs portion of airspace over the south Atlantic area and highlights some outstanding challenges relating to the conduct of the analysis.</p>	
<p>Action by the Meeting at paragraph 3.</p>	
<i>Strategic goals</i>	A-Every Flight is safe and secure
<i>Reference</i>	APIRG/27 & RASG-AFI/10 report AEAG/1 Report

1 INTRODUCTION

- 1.1 The AFI ATS Events Analysis Group (AEAG) was established by the joint session of APIRG/27 and RASG-AFI/10 through conclusion 6/04. AEAG is coordinated by AFI RSOOs (AAMAC, BAGASOO, CASSOA, SASO) and ICAO Regional Offices ESAF and WACAF and is mandated to collect reports of air traffic incidents investigation from AFI States and conduct an analysis for their classification as per the regional safety risk register.
- 1.2 The first meeting of the AEAG took place in October 2025 in Libreville, Gabon. The AEAG/1 recorded and analyzed 321 ATS events for 2023 and 134 for 2024 from 16 out 31 FIRs in the AFI region.
- 1.3 ATS events are classified as: ATS incident, inflight contingency, ATC contingency and non-event. Incomplete or inconsistent data also led to classification as inconclusive.

2. DISCUSSION

- 2.1 Out of 321 events reports recorded for 2023, 57 were submitted by Dakar FIR (GOOO) and 8 by Sal FIR (GVSC); while in 2024, 8 events reports were submitted by GOOO and 10 by GVSC.
- 2.2 Of the 65 ATS events recorded in GOOO, 4 occurred in the oceanic sector with (02) classified as ATS incident LHD-B (Climb/descent without ATC clearance) and (02) classified as ATS incident LHD-E (Coordination errors in the ATC-to-ATC transfer).
- 2.3 Of the 18 ATS events recorded in GVSC, (06) were classified as ATS incident LHD-E and (01) classified as Airprox.
- 2.4 The event distribution confirms that ATS-related operational occurrences constitute the main area of safety exposure, particularly during en-route operations.
- 2.5 **Key risk patterns and contributing factors**
The analysis of ATS incidents reveals a concentration of **human and coordination-related factors**, structured as follows:

a) Coordination deficiencies

- Incomplete or incorrect coordination between adjacent units
- Incorrect assumptions regarding coordination status
- Delays or omissions in coordination processes

These issues are particularly critical in **multi-FIR oceanic environments**, where coordination constitutes a primary safety barrier.

b) Procedural non-compliance and execution gaps

- Non-adherence to ATS regulations and ATC instructions
- Errors in flight data processing (e.g. incorrect estimates, omission of coordinated level in XFL field)
- Clearance misinterpretation or confusion

These elements indicate **limitations in procedural discipline and standardization**.

c) Human performance limitations

- Loss of situational awareness
- Inadequate monitoring of traffic and conflict situations
- ATC judgment errors and inadequate planning

These factors reflect **cognitive and workload-related constraints**, particularly in procedural control environments.

d) Monitoring and situational control weaknesses

- Failure to adequately monitor aircraft behaviour
- Inadequate assessment of separation minima effectiveness
- Incorrect identification of aircraft requesting clearances

These issues highlight **limitations in maintaining an accurate traffic picture**, which is critical in oceanic ATS operations.

- 2.6 Despite effort made by AFI FIRs in releasing incident reports, the current dataset remains insufficient to support robust and representative safety trend analysis across the SAT area. Variations in reporting between years and across FIRs indicate that data availability is not yet consistent enough to reflect actual operational safety performance.
- 2.7 The analysis confirms that operational risks in oceanic ATS environments—particularly related to coordination, communication and human performance—are present within the SAT area. However, the primary constraint to effective safety management lies in the insufficient and uneven reporting of safety events, which limits the ability to:
- identify systemic trends;
 - prioritize risk mitigation actions;
 - support evidence-based decision-making at regional level.
- 2.8 Strengthening the consistency, completeness and regularity of safety data submission is therefore essential to enable meaningful regional safety analysis and improve operational safety outcomes

3 ACTION BY THE MEETING

- 3.1 The meeting is invited to
- a) note the information provided.
 - b) encourage SAT FIRs to ensure regular and structured submission of ATS safety event data through designated focal points.
 - c) analyse mechanisms for the coordination and incorporation of the results of AFI ATS events analysis, pertaining to the SAT area, in the collision risk assessment of the SAT as deemed appropriate.