

BEA Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la sécurité de l'aviation civile



Le « SWISS CHEESE MODEL »

Emmanuel DELBARRE



Description

The *Swiss Cheese* model of accident causation, originally proposed by James Reason, compares human system defences to a series of slices of randomly-holed Swiss Cheese arranged vertically and parallel to each other with gaps in-between each slice.

Reason hypothesizes that most accidents can be traced to one or more of four levels of failure:

Organisational influences, Unsafe supervision, Preconditions for unsafe acts, and The unsafe acts themselves.



Le modèle du *fromage suisse* pour la causalité des accidents, initialement proposé par James Reason, compare les défenses du système humain à une série de tranches de fromage suisse perforées de manière aléatoire, disposées verticalement et parallèlement, avec des espaces entre chaque tranche. Reason émet l'hypothèse que la plupart des accidents peuvent être attribués à un ou plusieurs des quatre niveaux de défaillance suivants:


- Influences organisationnelles,
- Mauvaise supervision,
- Conditions prédisposantes aux actes dangereux,
- Les actes dangereux eux-mêmes.














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HFACS

Human
Factor
Analysis
and
Classification
System

Emmanuel DELBARRE
Aircraft Accident Investigator



HFACS

The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) was developed by Dr Scott Shappell and Dr Doug Wiegmann.

It can be used to investigate and analyse human factors aspects of aviation.

HFACS is heavily based upon James Reason's <u>Swiss cheese</u> model (Reason 1990).

The HFACS framework provides a tool to assist in the investigation process and target training and prevention efforts. Investigators are able to systematically identify active and latent failures within an organisation that led to in an accident.





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The HFACS framework describes human error at each of four levels of failure :


- 1 Unsafe acts of operators (aircrew, controllers et
- 2 Preconditions for unsafe acts,
- 3 Unsafe supervision, and
- 4 Organisational influences.




Within each level of HFACS, causal categories were developed that identify the active and latent failures that occur.

In theory, at least one failure will occur at each level leading to an adverse event. If at any time leading up to the adverse event, one of the failures is corrected, the event will not happen.









HFACS Level 1: Unsafe Acts

The Unsafe Acts level is divided into two categories - errors and violations - and these two categories are then divided into subcategories.

- Errors are unintentional behaviors,
- Violations are an intentional disregard of the rules and regulations.



HFACS Level 1: Unsafe Acts

Errors

Skill-Based Errors: Errors which occur in the operator's execution of a routine, highly practiced task relating to procedure, training or proficiency and result in an unsafe situation (e.g., fail to prioritise attention, checklist error, negative habit).

Decision Errors: Errors which occur when the behaviors or actions of the operators proceed as intended yet the chosen plan proves inadequate to achieve the desired end-state and results in an unsafe situation (e.g, exceeded ability, rule-based error, inappropriate procedure).

Perceptual Errors: Errors which occur when an operator's sensory input is degraded and a decision is made based upon faulty information.



HFACS Level 1: Unsafe Acts

Violations

- Routine Violations: Violations which are a habitual action on the part of the operator and are tolerated by the management /hierarchy.
- Exceptional Violations: Violations which are an isolated act, neither typical of the person, nor accepted by the management.



TABLE 1. Selected examples of Unsafe Acts of Pilot Operators (Note: This is not a complete listing)

ERRORS

Skill-based Errors

Breakdown in visual scan

Failed to prioritize attention

Inadvertent use of flight controls

Omitted step in procedure

Omitted checklist item

Poor technique

Over-controlled the aircraft

Decision Errors

Improper procedure

Misdiagnosed emergency

Wrong response to emergency

Exceeded ability

Inappropriate maneuver

Poor decision

Perceptual Errors (due to)

Misjudged distance/altitude/airspeed

Spatial disorientation

Visual illusion

VIOLATIONS

Failed to adhere to brief

Failed to use the radar altimeter

Flew an unauthorized approach

Violated training rules

Flew an overaggressive maneuver

Failed to properly prepare for the flight

Briefed unauthorized flight

Not current/qualified for the mission

Intentionally exceeded the limits of the aircraft

Continued low-altitude flight in VMC

Unauthorized low-altitude canyon running



HFACS Level 2: Preconditions for Unsafe Acts

The *Preconditions for Unsafe Acts* level is divided into three categories:

- Environmental factors
- Condition of operators
- Personnel factors.



BEA HFACS Level 2: Preconditions for Unsafe Acts

Environmental Factors

- ☐ Physical Environment: Refers to factors that include both the operational setting (e.g., weather, altitude, terrain) and the ambient environment (e.g., heat, vibration, lighting, toxins).
- ☐ Technological Environment: Refers to factors that include a variety of design and automation issues including the design of equipment and controls, display/interface characteristics, checklist layouts, task factors and automation.

BEAT HFACS Level 2: Preconditions for Unsafe Acts

Condition of the operator

- □ Adverse Mental State: Refers to factors that include those mental conditions that affect performance (e.g., stress, mental fatigue, motivation).
- ☐ Adverse Physiological State: Refers to factors that include those medical or physiological conditions that affect performance (e.g, medical illness, physical fatigue, hypoxia).
- Physical/Mental Limitations: Refers to the circumstance when an operator lacks the physical or mental capabilities to cope with a situation, and this affects performance (e.g., visual limitations, insufficient reaction time).



BEA HFACS Level 2: Preconditions for Unsafe Acts

Personal factors

- ☐ Crew Resource Management: Refers to factors that include communication, coordination, planning, and teamwork issues.
- ☐ Personal Readiness: Refers to off-duty activities required to perform optimally on the job such as adhering to crew rest requirements, alcohol restrictions, and other off-duty mandates



TABLE 2. Selected examples of Unsafe Aircrew Conditions (Note: This is not a complete listing)

SUBSTANDARD CONDITIONS OF OPERATORS

Adverse Mental States

Channelized attention

Complacency

Distraction

Mental fatigue

Get-home-itis

Haste

Loss of situational awareness

Misplaced motivation

Task saturation

Adverse Physiological States

Impaired physiological state

Medical illness

Physiological incapacitation

Physical fatigue

Physical/Mental Limitation

Insufficient reaction time

Visual limitation

Incompatible intelligence/aptitude

Incompatible physical capability

SUBSTANDARD PRACTICE OF OPERATORS

Crew Resource Management

Failed to back-up

Failed to communicate/coordinate

Failed to conduct adequate brief

Failed to use all available resources

Failure of leadership

Misinterpretation of traffic calls

Personal Readiness

Excessive physical training

Self-medicating

Violation of crew rest requirement

Violation of bottle-to-throttle requirement



The Unsafe Supervision level is divided into four categories.

- ☐ · Inadequate Supervision
- □ · Plan Inappropriate Operation
- □ · Fail to Correct Known Problem
- □ · Supervisory Violation



Inadequate supervision

The role of any supervisor is to provide their staff with the opportunity to succeed, and they must provide guidance, training, leadership, oversight, or incentives to ensure the task is performed safely and efficiently.



Plan inappropriate operation

Refers to those operations that can be acceptable and different during emergencies, but unacceptable during normal operation (e.g., risk management, crew pairing, operational tempo).



Fail to Correct Known Problem

Refers to those cases when deficiencies are known to the supervisor, yet are allowed to continue not corrected



Supervisory violation

Refers to those cases when deficiencies are known to the supervisor, yet are allowed to continue not corrected



TABLE 3. Selected examples of Unsafe Supervision (Note: This is not a complete listing)

Inadequate Supervision

Failed to provide guidance

Failed to provide operational doctrine

Failed to provide oversight

Failed to provide training

Failed to track qualifications

Failed to track performance

Planned Inappropriate Operations

Failed to provide correct data

Failed to provide adequate brief time

Improper manning

Mission not in accordance with rules/regulations

Provided inadequate opportunity for crew rest

Failed to Correct a Known Problem

Failed to correct document in error

Failed to identify an at-risk aviator

Failed to initiate corrective action

Failed to report unsafe tendencies

Supervisory Violations

Authorized unnecessary hazard

Failed to enforce rules and regulations

Authorized unqualified crew for flight



The Organisational Influences level is divided into three categories.

- > Resource Management
- > Organisational Climate
- > Operational Process



Resource management

Refers to the organisational-level decision-making regarding the allocation and maintenance of organisational assets (e.g., human resources, monetary/budget resources, equipment/facility recourse).



Organisational climate

Refers to the working atmosphere within the organization.



Operational process

Refers to organisational decisions and rules that govern the everyday activities within an organisation (e.g., operations, procedures, oversight).



Resource/Acquisition Management

Human Resources

Selection

Staffing/manning

Training

Monetary/budget resources

Excessive cost cutting

Lack of funding

Equipment/facility resources

Poor design

Purchasing of unsuitable equipment

Organizational Climate

Structure

Chain-of-command

Delegation of authority

Communication

Formal accountability for actions

Policies

Hiring and firing

Promotion

Drugs and alcohol

Culture

Norms and rules

Values and beliefs

Organizational justice

Organizational Process

Operations

Operational tempo

Time pressure

Production quotas

Incentives

Measurement/appraisal

Schedules

Deficient planning

Procedures

Standards

Clearly defined objectives

Documentation

Instructions

Oversight


Risk management


Safety programs




SUMMARY

HFACS Level 1: Unsafe Acts











USE OF FACTS



USE OF FACTS

HFACS provides a structure to review and analyze accident and safety data.

It enables the analyst to identify the factors that are associated with an unsafe event.

The HFACS framework may also be useful as a tool for guiding future accident investigations in the field and for developing better accident databases, both of which would improve the overall quality and accessibility of human factors accident data.

By using HFACS, an organisation can identify hazards and implement procedures to prevent these hazards which will result in improved human performance and decreased accident and injury rates.








EXERCICEs

Emmanuel DELBARRE
Aircraft Accident Investigator







THANK YOU
DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS?