



Starting soon



Integrated Risk Management (IRM) Webinar

**INTERNATIONAL
CIVIL AVIATION
ORGANIZATION**

3 September 2026





Starting now




Integrated Risk Management (IRM) Webinar

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Please use the Chat function for comments and submitting your questions highlighted in the green box and arrow below.



Please mute your microphone and switch off your camera as highlighted in the red box and arrow above.

Presentation Overview

01

Introduction to IRM

Mr. Erwin Lassooij, ICAO, Senior Advisor Air Navigation Bureau

02

Progress on the Guide to IRM

Mr. Erwin Lassooij, ICAO, Senior Advisor Air Navigation Bureau

03

IRM in Practice: Examples from Different Perspectives

Dr. Michael Gerhard, Mr. Adam Borowski, Mr. Aigars Krastins, EASA; Mr. Michel Arnould, EUROCONTROL

04

Interactive IRM Exercise and Roadmap Feedback

All participants

05

Discussion and Questions

All participants

06

Closing Remarks and Next Steps

Mr. Erwin Lassooij, ICAO, Senior Advisor Air Navigation Bureau

Welcome and Housekeeping



Ms. Connie Hart

Integrated Risk Management and Resilience Consultant at ICAO;
Moderator for today's webinar



Mr. Erwin Lassooij

Senior Advisor Air Navigation Bureau,
Acting Chief Safety Management
Section, and IRM Secretariat
Coordinator at ICAO



Dr. Michael Gerhard

Safety Risk Management Section
Manager at EASA



Mr. Adam Borkowski

Senior Expert Aviation Security and
Intelligence at EASA




Mr. Aigars Krastins

Senior Aviation Safety Risk Manager
at EASA



Mr. Michel Arnould

Agency Risk Manager at
EUROCONTROL



**Join at slido.com
#1694495**



Which ICAO region are you joining from?



What type of organization do you represent?




In which area(s) do you work?



**In a few words, what does the term
"Integrated Risk Management (IRM)"
mean to you?**

01. Introduction to IRM

Background – Starting the IRM conversation



01. Introduction to IRM cont'd

Background – How risk management evolved

Reactive: wait for something to happen such as through accident reports

Proactive: not wait for accidents to happen and through safety intelligence where we analyze aviation data to anticipate potential safety and other aviation risks

Integrated Proactiveness: when one domain identifies a risk and develops treatment plans now coordinates with other domains for cross-domain impacts

01. Introduction to IRM cont'd

Practical risk examples

	Conflict Zones	GNSS RFI	Lithium Batteries	Cyber Attack	COVID-19
Economics	X	X	X	X	X
Environment	X				X
Facilitation			X	X	X
Safety	X	X	X	X	X
Security	X	X	X	X	X

The nature and significance of the impacts will vary by event and context

01. Introduction to IRM cont'd

Example: conflict zones (trade-offs across domains)



Airspace closures and rerouting due to geopolitical instability

SAFETY RISK:
increased flight
complexity,
congestion, and
fatigue risk


SECURITY RISK:
exposure to
hostile threats
and unlawful
interference

**ENVIRONMENT
RISK:** increased
emissions due to
extended flight
paths

ECONOMIC RISK:
higher fuel costs,
longer routes,
operational
inefficiencies

01. Introduction to IRM cont'd

Example: GNSS interference – RFI/spoofing/jamming (cascading impacts across systems)



Disruption or manipulation of satellite navigation signals


SAFETY RISK: loss
of navigation
accuracy and
situational
awareness

SECURITY RISK:
potential
intentional
interference or
malicious activity

ECONOMIC RISK:
operational
disruptions,
delays, and
inefficiencies

01. Introduction to IRM cont'd

Example: lithium batteries (risk transfer across domains)



Transport of lithium batteries (declared or undeclared cargo)

SAFETY RISK: risk of thermal runaway and in-flight fires

SECURITY RISK: concealment risks and potential misuse

FACILITATION RISK: screening, detection, and cargo handling delays

ECONOMIC RISK: economic costs due to extra screening and operating disruptions

01. Introduction to IRM cont'd

Example: cyber attacks (system-wide disruption)

Cyber incidents affecting aviation systems and infrastructure

SAFETY RISK:
disruption to
operational and
safety-critical
systems

SECURITY RISK:
breaches of critical
infrastructure and
data

FACILITATION RISK:
passenger
processing delays
and airport system
disruptions

ECONOMIC RISK:
financial loss,
delays, operational
impact

01. Introduction to IRM cont'd

Example: COVID-19 (entire system disruption across all domains)



Global public health crisis affecting aviation operations

SAFETY RISK:
operational
changes and
workforce
impacts

SECURITY RISK:
adjustments to
screening and
border controls

**FACILITATION
RISK:** travel
restrictions and
passenger
processing
disruptions

**ENVIRONMENT
RISK:** reduced
emissions during
downturn,
rebound effects
post-recovery

**ECONOMICS
RISK:** severe
financial impact
across the
aviation sector

01. Introduction to IRM cont'd

Why IRM matters



Aviation risks are interconnected:

Risks and their consequences can extend across multiple domains



Managing risks in isolation may create new risks:

A treatment in one area may transfer or increase risk elsewhere



Fragmentation limits coordinated decision-making:

Different structures, terminology, and methodologies can make coordination difficult



IRM reduces overall system risks:

IRM supports coordinated decisions that consider cross-domain impacts and potential trade-offs



01. Introduction to IRM cont'd

What is IRM?




IRM provides a coordinated approach to:

- identify risks and treatments that may affect multiple aviation domains
- connect existing domain and enterprise risk management arrangements
- involve affected domains in assessing cross-domain impacts
- support coordinated, risk-informed decisions
- preserve existing responsibilities, expertise, and approved methodologies

01. Introduction to IRM cont'd

Benefits of IRM



01. Introduction to IRM cont'd

January to June 2025: establishment of an IRM Study Group (IRM SG), IRM Secretariat Team, and three Working Groups (WGs)

Nominations
received from
25 States and
International
Organizations

- **States**

- Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Cuba, France, India, Oman, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States

- **International Organizations**

- ACAO, ACI, AFCAC, EASA, Eurocontrol, European Commission, IATA, IBAC, ICCAIA, IFALPA

WG1:
Terminology
and Benefits



WG2:
Risk
Management
and
Resilience

WG3:
Sharing and
Exchange of
Data and
Information

IRM Secretariat Team: experts from the Safety, Security, Environment, Facilitation, and Economics domains

01. Introduction to IRM cont'd

The IRM framework



Critical success factors: governance-led, common methodology, IRR, and cross-domain coordination

01. Introduction to IRM cont'd

What the Guide is intended to do



Provide a foundational and practical introduction to IRM

Connect and strengthen existing risk management arrangements


Support entities at different levels of risk management maturity

Enable progressive, scalable, and proportionate implementation

Preserve existing domain responsibilities, expertise, and methodologies


02. Progress on the Guide to IRM

Progress snapshot




Study Group Governance

Established and completed




IRM Framework

Developed and completed



Guide to IRM Drafted

Final review underway



Expert Group and Stakeholder Consultation

Comments being consolidated

On track for final review at IRM SG/3 and advanced unedited publication in November 2026

03. IRM in Practice: Examples from Different Perspectives



EASA
European Union Aviation Safety Agency

IRM in Practice: Examples from different Perspectives

EASA & EUROCONTROL

ICAO
Integrated Risk Management (IRM) webinar
03 September 2026



SUPPORTING EUROPEAN AVIATION



IRM in Practice: Examples from different Perspectives

EASA & EUROCONTROL

ICAO
Integrated Risk Management (IRM) webinar
03 September 2026

Table of content

EASAs Safety Risk Management process

Introduction how EASA manages at European level systemic safety risks and how IRM is applied

Building IRM capabilities within the organisation

EASA experience on how to gradually build up IRM capabilities in its governance, and some examples how IRM is relevant for managing safety risks

Better Understanding risk interdependencies

Specifically: EASA research Study on the Impact of Security Measures on Safety

Example: Conflict Zones

EASA application of IRM for Conflict Zones Risk Assessments

Example: GNSSI risks

European Approach to Monitoring and Responding to GNSS Interference

Example: Risk Register

EUROCONTROL practice to integrated risk management across 2 risk registers

IRM in EASAs Safety Risk Management Practice

IRM governance and examples of interconnected risks



Michael GERHARD

Safety Risk Management Section Manager




Safety Risk Management @ EASA

management of systemic safety risks at the level of all 27 EU MS + 4



Relevance of IRM in safety risk management

creating awareness - connecting data /information – collaborating - connecting processes – assessing holistically



Safety risk register
connect safety risks with risks identified in other domains; at least point out the interconnection


Monitoring 'effectiveness' of actions taken

monitor beyond safety performance: have the actions caused unintended consequences that need to be considered by other domains / perspectives?

- **Collection of safety information**
ensure access to any information that could cause a safety deficiency
- - the source, perspective or domain is irrelevant
- **Assessment of risk mitigation options**
when assessing the possible mitigation actions consider the impacts on other domains / perspectives; the best intervention reflects the entire system

How has EASA been gradually increasing its IRM capabilities?

- **Research** to better understand interdependencies between safety and security
- **SRM Process Review** in 2025 to
 - Expand access to relevant (and diverse) data and safety intelligence
 - Connect risk mitigation committees for a holistic approach and informed decision-making
 - Identify and manage top safety topics holistically
- **Collaborate** and form **cross-domain expert groups** to assess high-profile risks and mutually contribute to the other risk management process(es)
- **Joint action plans** with other organisations
- Conduct holistic **impact assessments** to determine the best intervention strategy



Examples of IRM in EASAs SRM practice

Risk mitigation in one area (or introduction of innovation / change) may create or exacerbate a risk in another

- Lockable cockpit doors
- Ban of laptops in the cabin
- Counter-UAS measures in vicinity of airports
- Introduction of SAF
- ...

Multifaceted risks

- Operations of UAS in vicinity of airports
- Cyberattacks
- GNSS interference
- ...

External risks

- Conflict zones
- (adverse) weather
- Space debris
- ...



Specific awareness

- Temporarily included in the SRP a dedicated COVID-19 portfolio

EASA Research Study - Impact of Security Measures on Safety

Adam BORKOWSKI

Senior Expert - Aviation Security and Intelligence

RESEARCH PROJECT EASA.2022.HVP.04

PROVISION OF TOOLS AND SOLUTIONS FOR INTEGRATED RISK
MANAGEMENT TO BE USED AT NATIONAL AND EU LEVEL D-4.2.2

Impact of Security Measures on Safety

Research conducted by:



Outcomes of the research study

- **Research study:** Impact of Security Measures on Safety
- **Safety and Security:** Different risks - one aviation system

What the research found:

- Different terminology and risk matrices
- Barriers to intelligence and information sharing
- Different organisational approaches and maturity levels
- Strong support for better safety - security alignment
- Need for guidance and sharing of good practices




What the research recommends:

- Assess the current level of integration
- Encourage integrated management systems
- Develop knowledge and capability
- Use interconnected tools to create a **common risk picture and support coordinated decision-making**



Integrated Management: linking safety and security



Key principle:

Safety and security risks remain assessed through their respective processes, while the impacts of risk treatment and mitigation are systematically assessed across both domains.

IRM in Practice: Conflict Zones

Adam BORKOWSKI

Senior Expert - Aviation Security and Intelligence

EU CONFLICT ZONES ADVISORIES


Official safety advisories for air operations
in conflict-affected areas worldwide.



Always consult the latest EU Conflict Zone
Information Bulletins (CZIBs) on

easa.europa.eu

Conflict Zones: Integrated risk management



IRM in Practice: European Approach to Monitoring and Responding to GNSS Interference


Aigars KRASTINS

Senior aviation safety risk manager



The safety issue and the Top Safety Topic

- The safety issue 'Impact of GNSS interference on civil aviation operations' (SI-0034), was identified since long in the EU Safety Risk Portfolio
- It has increased after the Russian Federation invasion of Ukraine, Middle East, and other conflict zones.
- The priority/risk is **high** per safety issue priority index (SIPI).
- It is a Top Safety Topic in the EU Safety risk management.




GNSS Interference: safety or security issue?


- Intentional action
- Most likely, the effect of Electronic Warfare (EW)
- Civil aviation not the primary target
- Interferences encountered in or close to Conflict Zones



Integrated risk management approach



Collaborative cross-domain risk management



Sharing of information across domains

- GNSSI is an example where risk management across domains ensures the protection of information necessary in one domain, whilst providing the information / intelligence necessary to assess risks in another domain
- While fully respecting information sensitivity, the sharing of security information relevant to flight safety helps to ensure risks are managed comprehensively and effectively

Conclusions

- Integrated management of the GNSSI risk – from both security and OPS safety sides – allow a proper risk understanding and mitigation to ensure safe flights for the benefit of passengers



SUPPORTING
EUROPEAN
AVIATION

Integrated Risk Management

An example of risk integration across 2 risk registers

Michel Arnould

Agency Risk Officer

03/09/2026



NETWORK
MANAGER



1. The Network Manager

- Role entrusted to EUROCONTROL by the European Commission
- Mission: Maximise the safe and efficient use of European airspace capacity
- The Network Manager Operations Centre (NMOC) coordinates traffic flows across Europe and supports around 30,000 flights per day.
- Main functions:
 - Air Traffic Flow and Capacity Management (ATFCM)
 - Design and utilisation of airspace structures
 - Scarce resources (radio frequency)
 - Infrastructure management, deployment and monitoring
 - Airspace and Aeronautical Data Management
 - Network Operations Planning
 - Crisis management through the European Aviation Crisis Coordination Cell (EACCC)
 - ...




Traffic

1,120,818

flights in July 2026 (ECAC area)

↑ 2.8 %



traffic compared to July 2025 (ECAC area)



2. Context



- Eurocontrol is maintaining two risk registers that cover the European Aviation Network:
 - The European Aviation **Network risks**
 - Definition and monitoring of actions European level. Main user: oversight function (Network Management Board)
 - Example: need to better coordinate adverse weather → definition of X-Border Weather (XBW) procedure to reduce the impact of the events
 - The European Aviation Crisis Coordination Cell (EACCC) risk register, used to document **Crisis risks**
 - Monitoring of the risks that may trigger a crisis
 - Example: should we increase the probability of a volcanic ash crisis further to the latest Etna eruption?

→ Different purposes: risk mgt vs crisis mgt




3. Problem statement

- How do we integrate those 2 risks registers?
- We want to:
 - Keep both risk registers, because they serve different purposes and have different audiences
 - All crisis risks should be in the network risks, but not the opposite
 - Understand the differences, and adapt the methodologies if deemed appropriate
 - Not align, but be able to justify the differences in methodology by the different purposes
 - Have an agreed process to integrate changes from one register to the other





4. Scenario analysis and scope of risk vs crisis mgt



- Let's take a risk of earthquake:
 - Several scenarios
 - Low → high intensity and scale,
 - Very high → very low probability
- From a risk mgt viewpoint:
 - HILL (High Impact, Low Likelihood) scenario
 - Covered by crisis mgt and resilience
- From a crisis mgt viewpoint,
 - Scenarios that would impact several countries
 - medium probability and likelihood
- This applies to all “disasters”

4. Scenario analysis and scope of risk vs crisis mgt

- Different granularity and different scores
 - Network risk H2 Disaster / pandemic covers more than 10 crisis risks:
 - Natural disasters: Volcano eruption, solar flare, earthquake, meteorite, flood,...
 - Man-made disasters: nuclear incident, large-scale power outage, space debris, chemical incident, war / civil unrest...
 - Pandemic
 - How did we approach these differences?
 - We recognised that different purposes justify the different scenarios
 - We aggregated the crisis risks into a single network risk (and it solves some confidentiality issues)



4. Scenario analysis and scope of risk vs crisis mgt

- Another example: GNSS interference (GNSS RFI):

- Different scores:

- In Network risks

Prb4

Imp3

→ 12

- In crisis risks

Prb2



Imp3

→ 6

- Why?



- Because GNSS RFI is an issue that needs to be addressed by the network (and is being addressed), even if the impact is local
- But it's not likely to create a network-wide crisis

→ The rating scales used reflect the purpose of the risk registers



4. Scenario analysis and scope of risk vs crisis mgt

- Done:
 - Understood the purpose of the functions:
 - ➔ Different risk scenarios
 - ➔ Different levels of granularity
- Next steps:
 - Make sure the methodologies cover:
 - Scenario analysis
 - Aggregation
 - Scoring
 - Have a closer look at terminologies used





EASA
European Union Aviation Safety Agency

THANK YOU

04. Interactive IRM exercise and roadmap feedback

Apply the Guide's concepts to a cross-domain decision

Scenario: coordinated response to a cyber disruption

A malicious cyber incident degrades airport passenger-processing and flight information systems during peak operations.

Cybersecurity proposes immediately disconnecting shared interfaces to contain the incident.


The action may affect check-in, passenger flow, operational information, dispatch, screening, safety and continuity.

Your task is to identify who must participate and how to reach a coordinated, time-bound decision.

Note: a treatment in one area may create or transfer risk elsewhere



Who needs to participate in this event? Select all domains and functions that should be involved. You may select multiple answers.




What should be addressed first? Rank the coordination activities.



**Which response best reflects IRM?
Select one answer.**

04. Interactive IRM exercise and roadmap feedback cont'd


IRM roadmap – from guidance to implementation



The Guide to IRM is the foundation – not the end point

04. Interactive IRM exercise and roadmap feedback cont'd

Parallel workstreams between IRM and Safety Management



Supported by enabling workstreams for ICAO and Regional Office coordination; terminology and information alignment; AI and IRM; practical knowledge; and maturity and performance



What should be ICAO's priority next? Select one or multiple implementation support priorities.

05. Discussion and Questions

Share your experiences, challenges, and opportunities

	What IRM experience and examples do you have at your organization?
	Where is cross-domain risk coordination most needed?
	How could IRM connect with existing arrangements?
	What may hinder progressive, proportionate implementation?
	What examples, tools, or support would add value?



**What does IRM mean to you now?
After today's webinar, answer again in a
few words.**

06. Closing Remarks and Next Steps

From guidance to implementation



Aviation risks are interconnected



The Guide provides a shared foundation for coordinated decision-making




Today's feedback will inform final review and future implementation support



IRM is not about managing risk - it is about managing risk better together

06. Closing Remarks and Next Steps cont'd

Immediate milestones



Thank You

