REGIONAL AVIATION SAFETY GROUP – PAN AMERICA
RASG-PA

RASG-PA

CST

Guidance Material for Implementing a

Collaborative Safety Team (CST)

October 2026

This document provides States, service providers, and industry stakeholders with the framework and general principles for implementing a Collaborative Safety Team (CST).

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Purpose of a Collaborative Safety Team

As the demand and complexity of air travel increases, continually improving safety across the aviation system requires not only building on established approaches to risk identification and mitigation, but also adopting new tools and mechanisms that can further drive safety improvements. The Collaborative Safety Team (CST) concept is part of these safety tools, which states can utilize as guidance, adopt and/or implement according to their needs, with the support of the PA-RAST and the regional aviation safety community

At a strategic level, the overarching purpose of the CST concept is to foster collaboration between stakeholders towards the continuous improvement of safety. In particular, it establishes a framework for both regulator and industry stakeholders to collaborate on achieving continued improvements in their respective safety performance. Collaboration between aviation stakeholders enables sharing and analysis of safety intelligence from multiple sources which supports proactively identifying safety hazards and designing risk mitigation strategies that might not otherwise be identified when these sources are considered in isolation.

For the purpose of this guidance, safety intelligence refers to the integration of safety data, operational experience, expert judgment, and contextual information to support informed safety risk management decisions. Safety intelligence can be developed progressively, even when comprehensive data-sharing capabilities are not yet available.

CSTs vary in scope, complexity, degree of formality, can be created within a State, a group of States or a Region, and be tailored according to the operating context (e.g. national laws, safety culture, complexity of aviation system and volume of stakeholders).

Trust among participants is the foundation of a CST; with trust, a CST can eventually build capacity to share safety data. The availability of safety data, or of data-sharing infrastructure, is not a prerequisite for initiating collaboration. Implementing a CST — or a less formal collaboration initiative — remains meaningful even when data sharing is not immediately possible. Effective collaboration between aviation stakeholders is an incremental process that fosters trust and builds capacity through positive exchanges and experiences. As that capacity matures, the greatest benefits of a CST are realized through the sharing of safety data that ensures safety risk mitigation strategies are driven by robust safety intelligence and based on shared knowledge and information.

Consistent with the direction of RASG-PA/15 (Decision RASG-PA/15/D06), this guidance reflects the principle of collaboration first, structure second. A CST, by its very nature, implies a degree of formal structure — governance, terms of reference, confidentiality rules, and defined roles and processes. Collaboration, however, does not need to begin there. Informal and ad-hoc collaboration initiatives without formal governance structures or processes can allow trust and mutual gain to develop gradually while the parties work together on priority safety risks. As these initiatives prove successful, they tend to evolve into a CST over time. A formal CST is not the only path to collaboration, nor does it need to be the first step on the safety collaboration journey.

Alignment with ICAO Safety Management Principles

The *International Civil Aviation Organization's (ICAO) Annex 19 (third edition), Chapter 5 – Development of Safety Intelligence*, highlights four mechanisms for States to implement in order to ensure continued availability of safety data and safety information to support safety management activities:

- 5.2 Safety data collection and processing system;
- 5.3 Safety data and safety information analysis;
- 5.4 Safety data and safety information protection; and
- 5.5 Safety information sharing and exchange.

The first two mechanisms (5.2 and 5.3) relate to implementing systems for the collection and provision of safety data/information. These systems can be key contributors to support safety analysis activities of a CST. Safety data protection (5.4) is addressed later in the "Sharing and Protection of Safety Data/Information" section of this guidance document. The last mechanism (5.5) refers to Safety information sharing and exchange, specifically, ICAO Annex 19 paragraph 5.5.2 brings the following standard:

"5.5.2 States shall facilitate the establishment of means for timely safety information sharing or exchange to promote collaboration within the aviation community, provided that the proper measures are taken to ensure that safety information is only used for maintaining and improving safety."

The Note to paragraph 5.5.2 (Note 1 in the Annex) identifies collaborative safety teams, together with agreements, partnerships, forums and digital or physical platforms, as means through which such sharing or exchange may take place. Annex 19 paragraph 5.5.3 further recommends that States promote the sharing and exchange of relevant safety information and safety intelligence among service providers, provided that the proper measures are taken to ensure that it is only used for maintaining and improving safety.

Furthermore, the 2026-2028 Edition of the ICAO Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP), which puts forward a global strategy for the continuous improvement of aviation safety, identifies deficiencies in safety data and safety information collection, analysis and exchange, to support safety management activities, as one of five global organizational challenges. The GASP addresses this challenge through Goal 4, which calls on regions to strengthen collaboration at the regional and national levels to address safety issues, and whose targets call for regions to identify the States that need assistance to address that deficiency and to facilitate the assistance required. As set out in GASP paragraph 5.2.6, the targets under this goal are intended to empower the regions to identify and help individual States to put in place mechanisms to address safety issues. A CST is such a mechanism, established by the State and its industry, with the region acting in support


ICAO Annex 19 intend for aviation stakeholders to work together on safety risk management to enhance awareness, general knowledge of deficiencies and safety priorities, so that all stakeholders of an aviation system can take effective action to improve aviation safety. Implementing a CST is directly aligned with these safety standards and objectives; and provides a framework for regulator and industry to support such information sharing networks with the shared goal to enhance safety of their aviation system.

Guiding Principles for a Successful Collaborative Safety Team

In 2008, ICAO created a regional body, the Regional Aviation Safety Group - Pan America (RASG-PA) composed of an Executive Steering Committee (ESC), supported by the Pan-America Regional Aviation Safety Team (PA-RAST) to drive the region's safety agenda based on safety data shared from various stakeholders. RASG-PA can be considered a CST for the ICAO Pan-American Region.

Over the past 25 years, individual States have also initiated development of CSTs: United States Commercial Aviation Safety Team (US-CAST) in 1997, Costa Rica Safety Action Programme (PASO) group in 2010, Brazil Commercial Aviation Safety Team (BCAST) in 2012; and Canada's Collaborative Analysis Group (CAG) in 2020. The implementation of these CSTs, at various levels of development and maturity, continues to support national safety agendas and a data driven approach in the Pan America region.

Based on the collective experience in the operation of these CSTs, following are recommendations and guiding principles that have been identified as key success factors in implementing a sustainable CST:



1. Support to the State Safety Programme (SSP) but independent of State Oversight obligations

a. To enable regulator participation in CSTs and in the open dialogue with industry based on their safety data and underlying safety issues, activities of a CST should be conducted in isolation of a State's Safety Assurance-Surveillance obligations (i.e. Annex 19 3.4.1). CSTs do not overlap with or diminish the importance of the State's regulatory and oversight functions.

    i. Information shared in a CST is to be used to identify "system wide risks" and not to conduct individual investigations of incidents or events.

b. Risk identification and mitigation activities of a CST are complementary to the objectives of an SSP and can help set and achieve SSP safety objectives through a data and intelligence driven approach to the national or regional aviation system.

    i. A CST can be a key contributor to the achievement of the safety objectives identified in an SSP. A CST can be an instrument of the SSP in one sense: as a source of safety risks and safety intelligence identified collaboratively with industry, which the State can incorporate into its safety risk management and SSP priorities. This can extend to the SSP prioritizing the implementation of risk mitigations and safety enhancements identified in a CST. A CST is not an instrument of the SSP as a means of collecting operators' safety data; that is the role of the State's SDCPS (see 1.c). While a CST can be a recognized safety collaboration mechanism available to the SSP, it may not always be optimal to formally and/or officially integrate the CST as part of a State's SSP: concerns over the protection of shared data could significantly limit industry participation. To determine how a CST best interacts with the SSP, States should consider approaches that maximize and sustain industry participation in voluntary collaborative groups such as a CST.

c. A CST is not a data intake mechanism for the SSP. It should not be used to channel information shared by its participants into the State's safety data collection and processing system (SDCPS), nor to supplement or compensate for an SDCPS that is absent or not yet effective. The SDCPS remains a responsibility of the State under Annex 19 and should be developed in its own right.

    i. The contribution of a CST to the SSP is of a different nature. Through its participation in the CST, the State becomes informed of hazards, risks, trends and potential mitigations identified through the collaborative analysis of its participants — safety intelligence it would not otherwise have access to. That shared understanding can inform the State's safety risk management and the setting of SSP safety objectives and priorities, without the information shared by participants being transferred into the State's systems.

    ii. Preserving this distinction protects the trust on which a CST depends. Participants share information to understand and mitigate risk together,

not to supply the State's data systems; where information shared in a CST is perceived to flow into regulatory systems, voluntary participation is likely to decline.

iii. As a good practice, safety data contributed by operators remains under their control, or is held by an independent party trusted and agreed by all participants under agreed protections and guidelines. Participants, including the State, work from the resulting analyses and de-identified information; the underlying data is not transferred to the State.




Figure 1. Relationship between a CST and the State Safety Programme (SSP)

2. Establish relationships and build trust

   a. **What trust means in a CST.** In this guidance, trust means the reasonable expectation of each participant, the State and industry alike, that the others will act as agreed: shared information will be used only to improve safety, will not be used for punitive, enforcement or competitive purposes, and will be protected as the participants have agreed. It is a professional, working trust between organizations, not personal familiarity, and it is built through conduct over time. A CST does not need full trust to begin, only enough for the parties to engage. Structure (terms of reference, rules of engagement, confidentiality and data protection) is then developed to protect and sustain that trust.

   b. Given the traditional surveillance role of the regulator, and that interactions in those circumstances are not always conducted with a collaborative mindset, participants need to acknowledge past experience of stakeholders with the regulator and be ready to invest the time required to build the relationships and trust within the CST.

c. Any member selected to participate in a CST should have the right mindset (e.g. to collaborate on safety, not for gaining competitive advantage, not for taking punitive action), demonstrate a positive safety culture, and be supportive of the CST collaborative process.

3. Adopt a progressive and incremental approach

   a. Need to acknowledge the operating context, and adopt an appropriately incremental approach and processes that consider concerns such as lack of trust and limitations in protection of data (from disclosure and punitive action).

   b. Begin with collaboration, formalize later (collaboration first, structure second approach)

      a. Collaboration should not wait for structure. Parties can begin by working together on a specific, narrowly scoped safety issue through an informal State–industry collaboration initiative, without terms of reference, formal governance or data-sharing agreements. No party is under a formal obligation, yet everyone can contribute; these spaces allow parties to learn to trust one another and to understand the value of open communication.

      b. Prioritize actions that generate quick and tangible results ("early wins") to strengthen trust and credibility. Focus on manageable problems at the beginning, with a deliberately narrow scope and planned expansion, avoiding attempts to resolve excessively large systemic challenges without a phased roadmap.

      c. Formal structure — governance, terms of reference, confidentiality rules, defined roles and processes — should follow once collaboration has demonstrated value, providing the framework that allows cooperation to be sustained over time. A CST is not a pre-requisite to start collaborating, but it can be an effective model to formalize collaboration.

   c. Safety data/information sharing, and exchange are key to increasing the understanding of underlying safety conditions in the aviation system, and progressively strengthen the safety intelligence with which States and Regions achieve safety improvements. Trust among participants is the foundation for a sustainable CST, data sharing is the capability that matures upon it. Data availability is not an entry requirement: a phased strategy should start with available accident and serious incident information, followed by aggregated, non-sensitive information and gradually move toward greater granularity as clear rules for preventive use, need-to-know criteria and confidentiality guarantees are consolidated. .

      i. While, per Annex 19 5.5.2, the State shall facilitate the establishment of means for safety information sharing or exchange, such as a CST, and that ideally the regulator would be an active participant in such networks, it is understood that laws in certain jurisdictions may significantly limit the

effectiveness of these sharing networks should the regulator be a participant. If regulator participation prevents the creation of a CST, the regulator could nonetheless consider promoting implementation of a CST among users within the aviation system that do not have the same limitations, such as an industry-only CST. A CST, even without the regulator, can positively contribute towards improvement of safety.

4. Create clear and transparent processes

   Note: while it can be productive for one of the stakeholders (State or industry) in a CST to take the lead to develop draft processes and ToRs, this should only be a starting point for CST participants to co-develop and build a common, mutually agreed upon approach.

   a. Develop documentation that clearly describes how the CST will operate, confirm buy-in of all members to the CST processes.

   b. Establish rules of engagement to ensure that all members of the CST participate as equals and respectfully consider all viewpoints.

   c. Issues and limitations inherent to processes should be proactively communicated to ensure awareness of participants and prevent unintended consequences.

5. Protection of voluntarily shared data

   a. Work towards establishing protections of voluntarily shared safety information per protection principles outlined in ICAO Annex 19.

   b. In the absence of the necessary data protections, partners creating a CST can adapt their processes and mode of operation of the CST to address the concerns on the use of information from voluntary reporting and auto data capture systems.

6. Actions and decisions driven by the objective of improving aviation safety

   a. States, service providers, and industry should:

      i. Cooperatively develop a data–driven safety agenda prioritized by accidents and incidents that represent the greatest risk of fatalities.

      ii. Develop consensus–based voluntary risk mitigation strategies to reduce fatalities.

      iii. Establish a feedback mechanism to continuously measure the effectiveness of risk mitigation strategies. This can be done using proactive data, as well as opportunities to openly share information and data between the State and the operators under a protection framework that ensures no punitive actions will be carried through the use of information shared under the CST.

7. A CST is a coalition of the willing

a. The ideal situation is to have CSTs in which both State and industry stakeholders collaborate for the purpose of improving aviation safety.

b. Absence of State support should not prevent industry collaboration. When State support is not present, or conditions such as data protections or safety culture are not mature, industry stakeholders can still work together to create an industry-led CST in which State participation can eventually be considered.

Structure of a CST

Preliminary Collaboration Stage

Before creating a CST, stakeholders at the very early stages of State-Industry collaboration can rely on informal mechanisms to collaborate. At this preliminary stage, a collaboration initiative can focus on:

1. An informal exchange platform for dialogue between the Civil Aviation Authority and service providers on shared safety priorities, with no formal governance, terms of reference or data-sharing obligations. It requires safety information and a common understanding aimed at the continuous improvement of safety through the mitigation of priority risks — not vast volumes of data, formal structures, regulations or organizational charts.
2. Outputs: a shared vision of priority safety risks; early voluntary safety actions on narrowly scoped issues; and the trust and working relationships from which a CST can emerge. As the initiative proves successful, the parties may elect to formalize it under one of the models below.

Stakeholders within a State, group of States or Region should determine the CST model appropriate to their operating context, for example:


1. Ad-hoc CST (temporary, to address a specific issue)
    a. Outputs: voluntary industry safety enhancements
2. Industry-led CST
    a. Data/intelligence driven safety agenda developed based on industry members.
    b. Coordination and support from regulator where available, with or without regulator participation as observer based on national laws and trust level
    c. Outputs: voluntary industry safety enhancements
3. Co-lead Industry-Regulator CST
    a. Data/intelligence driven safety agenda cooperatively developed based on industry and regulator input
    b. Coordination and support from regulator, with or without formal data sharing and based on national laws and trust level

c. Outputs:

i. Voluntary industry safety enhancements

ii. Regulatory initiatives and safety enhancements (may be included in the National Aviation Safety Plan – NASP)

The selection of approach for any type of CST model should be supported by the level of trust that exists to support it. With trust, the parties themselves determine when, and how to formalize their collaboration. When the parties elect to formalize, a Declaration of Intent may be used to record the shared commitment of the State, its industry and RASG-PA to establish and sustain the CST (see Appendix G). The Declaration is a means of formalizing collaboration already under way; it is not a precondition for initiating collaboration.



CST Membership and Leadership

The key component to the structure and membership of a CST is the joint-collaboration in the membership, both for working and decision-making structures.

a) **Government representatives** (when enabled by national laws): States/territories and their aviation related agencies such as: Civil Aviation Authorities (CAA), Accident Investigation Board, Air Force, etc.
b) **Industry representatives**: Airline operators, national and international associations and organizations, professional organizations, maintenance and repair organizations, aircraft manufacturers, airport and air navigation service providers and any other related organizations/representatives.
c) **Leadership**: Since both government and industry actions can contribute and be key to improving safety in the aviation system, when feasible, it is recommended that the CST be co-chaired/co-lead by State and industry. This governance model ensures a balance in the directions and decisions of the CST, and can also be replicated at each sub-group, working group, team or task force created in support of the CST.

Note: States play a critical role in enabling collaboration between stakeholders in the aviation system. As such, even if a State is limited in its capacity to be an active participant in the ongoing activities of a CST, it should work to promote the establishment of such collaboration networks

Steering Committee

A Steering Committee serves as the decision-making body of the CST, and in general is based on the following principles:

1. Government and Industry representation (as feasible and applicable);
2. A diversity of interests and areas of expertise;
3. A manageable number of members to function effectively as an executive body;
4. The members must be at a high enough level within their agency or company to be able to influence decisions and allocate resources;
5. Serves to ensure the group remains focused on the achievement of safety targets and overall enhancement of the aviation system's safety performance.
6. Provides strategic direction to the CST sub-groups and working groups/teams.

Secretariat

To the extent possible considering national laws, a State typically assumes the secretariat role and can be responsible for providing administrative support and coordination of the CST, specifically:

1. Coordinating meeting logistics;
2. Developing meeting agendas in coordination with the CST co-chairs;
3. Ensuring meeting agendas, documentation, and summaries are provided to members;
4. Capturing action items and monitoring current status;
5. Maintaining communication between co-chairs and the members of the CST.

When the State cannot assume the role of the secretariat, or, for any reason does not participate directly in the CST, any of the members may fulfill these functions, in such a way that the minimum aspects of the organization and record keeping are carried out.

Working Teams and Sub-groups

In addition to a Steering Committee, to facilitate undertaking operational activities such as safety analysis, performing risk assessments, developing mitigations, etc, CSTs can create teams or sub-groups of experts in related aviation areas, such as commercial aviation, flight safety, air traffic control, maintenance, etc., and their composition can vary to suit the specific focuses of a particular aviation system. Within these teams, it is also important to designate at least one stakeholder to act as lead to coordinate the activities of the group as well as provide summary level information back to the steering committee.

These working sub-groups focus on different operational areas, such as: commercial aviation, helicopters, infrastructure, and general aviation. These will depend on the specific characteristics of the aviation system in focus of the CST, and when appropriate, in line with priorities or higher relevance areas outlined in a regional or national aviation safety plan.

CST Sub-groups provide the necessary information back to the CST Steering Committee on any work it was tasked with. Information should be detailed enough for the CST Steering Committee to make decisions (e.g. to allocate resources to undertake a project, to approve implementation of safety enhancement initiatives).

Sharing and Protection of Safety Data/Information

The capabilities described in this section represent the mature state of a CST. Collaboration can begin with the exchange of qualitative knowledge, operational experience and aggregated, non-sensitive information while data protections and governance are progressively developed. The absence of full data-sharing capability at the outset does not prevent a CST — or a preliminary State–industry collaboration initiative — from starting; it defines the direction of its maturation.

For a CST to fully function and act proactively, it must be able to leverage voluntarily shared safety information and operate in a safety culture that permits a non-punitive environment. To allow for this to happen, safety data/information shared in the context of the CST should be protected through clear governance and procedures to ensure information shared is only used as intended, to enable safety enhancements. It is unlikely that any CST participant will volunteer to share data/information unless it is clear that any shared data shall not be published or shared with the public, not be used by other members for commercial purposes or to gain a competitive advantage, not be used by the regulator for oversight activities or to take punitive or disciplinary actions against service providers or aviation professionals.

Data alone does not make a CST effective; its value comes from how participants work with it together. Sharing and analyzing safety information depends on collaboration, trust among participants, transparency on how information will be used and protected, and a shared commitment to improving safety. In-person meetings are particularly important when sensitive safety information is shared and analyzed: they provide a secure setting, help build the working relationships on which trust depends, and encourage the open discussion of events and hazards that effective mitigation strategies require. Remote meetings can support non-sensitive work, such as administrative updates and follow-up on agreed actions (see the Frequently Asked Questions).

Regardless of whether the CST is officially part of an SSP, States are key enablers to support a sustainable CST, in particular in working to establish mandatory and voluntary information systems (Safety Data Collection and Processing systems – Annex 19 Chapter 5.2 and 5.3) as well as to implement protections for voluntarily shared safety data and information (Annex 19 Chapter 5.4). A CST complements the SDCPS; it does not substitute for it (see Guiding Principle 1.c).

Examples of the type of data and/or information to be collected and analyzed can be found in ICAO Doc. 9859 - Safety Management Manual (SMM). The SMM provides guidance on safety data collection and analysis where the type of information to be collected and analyzed is

addressed in detail. It further differentiates between mandatory reporting and voluntary reporting systems where benefits are most often derived through non-punitive systems.

The ability to use aggregated, de-identified operator information adds value to the risk management process in the CST environment. Airline operators and air navigation service providers have collected a wealth of safety data and information in their respective SMS programs from both voluntary reporting and auto-data capture systems which can support CST activities by contributing safety information not captured by State mandatory safety reporting systems.

Note: It is not the intent of Annex 19 Chapter 5.4's information protection principles to make mandatory the submission of information usually provided voluntarily (e.g. incident reports, hazard identification reports, etc) but rather to accord the necessary protections so as to better facilitate voluntary sharing.

Safety Risk Management Process

As described previously, the overarching purpose of the CST is to foster collaboration between stakeholders towards the continuous improvement of safety. To achieve this objective, the CST should establish an agreed upon Safety Risk Management (SRM) Process for the identification and mitigation of safety risks. Risk mitigations seek to reduce the likelihood of an event occurring or to reduce the severity of the consequence should the event occur.

There are several different models of SRM that can be used in a CST, and many resources identify SRM approaches. For examples of SRM, the CST can refer to:

- ICAO's Safety Management Manual;
- ICAO and IATA Risk management courses;
- Other online resources on:
    - Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (HIRA)
    - Aviation Risk Management Solutions (ARMS) Operational Risk Assessment model
    - Skybrary

Selecting the right balanced SRM approach can be an iterative process in the initial development of the CST, where the group determines the best model for its needs. Some CSTs may initially opt to directly focus efforts on a known issue that is a known common concern to the CST participants so that they can coordinate action and achieve short term safety benefits, others may initiate a formal SRM process from the start. When applicable, the CST should also consider alignment with the SRM processes within the SSP.

Ultimately, the model selected for the CST should:

1. Be appropriate to the scale and scope of the CST;
2. Be structured and robust enough to provide meaningful repeatable results;

3. Avoid overly complex approaches that introduce burdensome processes that could actually prevent the group from achieving its intended outcomes;
4. Whenever possible and as much as possible, the SRM process should be intelligence-driven, and include proactive analysis of safety data/information from States, service providers, and industry representatives.

Note.— Where data availability is limited, the expert judgment and operational experience of participants constitute valid inputs for initial hazard identification and prioritization. The safety intelligence capability of the SRM process should be developed progressively as trust and data-sharing arrangements mature; limited data at the outset is not a reason to defer collaborative safety risk management.

The SRM process should be understood as a continuous cycle. Hazards are identified, risks are assessed, mitigation strategies are implemented, their effectiveness is monitored, and the results are used to continuously improve future safety actions.

Part of an effective SRM process is establishing safety performance targets that inform prioritization of actions to be undertaken. For example, a CST can set an overarching objective of fatality risk reduction in the aviation system, that would then support the CST prioritizing mitigation of identified hazards that present the highest fatality risk.

There are various methods to calculate fatality risk, Appendix B provides a basic definition. In addition, the most basic, and easiest risk estimation methodology uses past accident and incident data to predict future risk.

A CST should identify its own priority risk areas before proceeding with in-depth analysis on a given issue. Ideally, the priority risk areas of the CST, based on available data, provide some alignment with State, Region or Global Aviation safety plans (e.g. National, Regional and Global High Risk Categories).

Activities of the CST SRM process can be managed in a manner similar to that in the RASG-PA structure:

- PA-RAST identifies top risk areas through data and safety intelligence analysis
- RASG-PA steering committee prioritizes work on a given top risk area
- Safety Enhancement Teams (SET) within the PA-RAST focus on the analysis of data and other supporting safety intelligence related to each of the top risk areas and develop safety enhancement initiatives (mitigation strategies) presented in a detailed implementation plan (DIP).

Collaboration between ICAO RASG-PA and local CSTs

There is an opportunity to generate synergy and further safety benefits by having local CSTs collaborate with the Regional Aviation Safety Team (PA-RAST) of the ICAO RASG Pan-America. Any local CST can be an active partner of the PA-RAST. When applicable, PA-RAST can contribute available safety intelligence to evaluate safety issues, and help in the design and

implementation of local safety enhancements. Observations and conclusions can be reported back to PA-RAST for evaluating applicability of local strategies at the regional level.

Similarly, local or domestic safety issues identified by CSTs can be reported at the PA-RAST level, to facilitate identification of systemic issues across CSTs in the Region. CSTs may also liaise with PA-RAST to engage with appropriate stakeholders when they have identified safety issues that relate to risks observed with foreign operators operating within the CST's State, or in the context of the CST's domestic operators activities' in other States in the region. Enabling active safety intelligence efforts and interaction of aviation stakeholders at local and regional level are intended to provide additional safety benefits for States, and the entire region. Figure 2 illustrates this collaboration.

CST representation and attendance at PA-RAST in-person meetings are highly encouraged. Participation at in-person meetings can facilitate awareness, engagement and support between PA-RAST and individual CSTs as well as a platform to exchange best practices among safety experts.





Figure 2. Collaboration between PA-RAST and local CSTs

CSTs and local Runway Safety Teams (RSTs) are complementary mechanisms, and one does not replace the other. ICAO requires an RST at every aerodrome with international operations, and RSTs are audited under the ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme Continuous Monitoring Approach (USOAP CMA); the existence of a CST does not discharge that requirement. Where a CST already convenes the same stakeholders as the local RST, places runway safety on its agenda and produces an action plan, a separate meeting need not be held, provided the roles of each mechanism remain clearly identified. CSTs can strengthen the effectiveness of RSTs by including RST representation, so that systemic runway safety issues

identified at aerodrome level can be raised and discussed across the aviation system. The effectiveness of an RST should be judged by what it produces rather than by imposing additional measurement or reporting requirements on its members. An effective RST keeps its focus on runway safety, identifies the hazards present at its aerodrome, agrees a runway safety action plan, and implements and follows up the resulting actions; these outputs are the clearest evidence that it is active and effective. This mirrors the approach taken in this guidance for CSTs, which are judged by the safety enhancements they produce and implement. Figure 3 illustrates this relationship.



No RST can tell on its own whether an issue is local or systemic. The CST can.

Figure 3. Relationship between a CST and local Runway Safety Teams (RSTs). See Appendix H for detail.

RASG-PA Support

State, groups of States or industry members within the ICAO Pan America Region whom are interested in taking the path towards the creation of a CST are invited to reach out to the ICAO regional office in their respective region in order to establish contact on this topic with the PA-RAST and RASG-PA.

The objective is not to replicate a single model across all States, but to support each State in developing the level of collaboration that best fits its operational context, legal framework, and safety maturity.

This support extends to State–industry collaboration initiatives that have not yet formalized: RASG-PA may facilitate exchange platforms without the requirement of a formal structure, and recognizes progress in effective collaboration and risk mitigation beyond the nominal establishment of CSTs. Parties do not need an established CST, a data-sharing capability, or a

decision to formalize in order to request RASG-PA support. For a State and its industry that do decide to formalize, RASG-PA offers a Declaration of Intent (Appendix G) recording each party's commitments — RASG-PA's being to provide technical support and templates, share regional safety intelligence and High-Risk Category priorities, facilitate regional connectivity, and engage proactively with incoming CAA leadership so that the CST is sustained across administrative transitions.

Appendix A - Regional Aviation Safety Group–Pan America Reference Information

Regional Aviation Safety Group- Pan America (RASG-PA) Executive Steering Committee (ESC)

The ESC is comprised of representatives from four different States from the Caribbean/North American Regions, four different States from the South American Region as well as representatives from eight different international organizations and industry representatives, as follows: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Trinidad and Tobago, the United States of America, Latin American and Caribbean Air Transport Association (ALTA), International Air Transport Organization (IATA), the Civil Air Navigation Services Organization (CANSO), Embraer, Boeing, Airbus, ATR and the Flight Safety Foundation (FSF).

The ESC develops and approves the RASG-PA work plan, which includes objectives, priorities, indicators, as well as measuring targets to address aviation safety related issues in the NAM/CAR and SAM Regions. In addition, the ESC is responsible for overseeing activities of committees and working groups that fall under them. Finally, the ESC both approves and manages the budget set forth for RASG-PA.

Pan-America - Regional Aviation Safety Team (PA-RAST)

The PA-RAST is a group of experts comprised of members of the International Civil Aviation Authority ICAO), States/Territories, Civil Aviation Authorities, as well as international aviation stakeholders/industry representatives. As part of the work program, the team annually releases a safety report on the results of the analysis of regional aviation safety data that is provided to it by different groups. The report is used as a safety intelligence tool by highlighting the main aviation safety areas of interest within the Pan-American Region.

PA-RAST Information Sharing Enablers

Data–driven approach which form the foundation of a CST is utilized by PA-RAST and States/Countries. This is enabled through data sources like Flight Data eXchange (FDX) by IATA and the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) in the US. The voluntary sharing of data via the various programs to be processed under a common event definition, and presented to the final users as aggregated, de–identified information enables the system-wide view in analysing risk. To be able to use this information at the different CSTs, the US-CAST and IATA have signed memorandums of understanding (MOU) with each CST that ensure the protection of this safety information in support of the objectives of the CST.

PA-RAST Confidentiality Agreement Example

Pan America — Regional Aviation Safety Team Meeting (PA-RAST) of the Regional Aviation Safety Group — Pan America (RASG-PA)

This is not a public meeting; it is by invitation only. By registering, signing below you agree to the following Rules of the Road:

We will hold each participant accountable for the following:

1. The Participant will consider all information to be proprietary property of the presenting organization, since the information being disclosed is highly sensitive.
2. The Participant shall not use any information presented by another participating organization for commercial, competitive, punitive, or litigation purposes.
3. The Participant shall not share or disclose the proprietary information of participants with external parties without the written consent of the owner.
4. The Participant shall not record (audio or video) or take photographs of presentations, discussions or expositions.
5. The Participant shall not discuss or share information from this meeting using social media.
6. The Participant agrees to work to implement solutions to safety issues identified during this meeting with the help of the information presented.
7. The Participant shall treat all participants with equality, respecting all viewpoints as worthy of consideration.
8. The Participant agrees that the level and method of information sharing rests with the participants and it is expected that each participant will speak with honesty and candor
9. Anyone not following the Rules of the Road may be asked to leave and may not be allowed to attend any future meetings.

Name of Participant:

_____

Employer or Organization:

_____

Tittle:

_____

Address:

_____

Phone:

_____

Email:

_____

Appendix B - Fatality Risk definition and how to calculate it

Source: International Air Transport Association (IATA)

Definitions:
Fatality risk (FLE/million sectors): measures the exposure of a passenger or crew to a catastrophic accident with no survivors (full loss). More specifically, it provides the ratio of fatalities onboard for fatal accidents per million sectors. The calculation of fatality risk does not take into account aircraft size or how many were on board. What is measured is the percentage of fatalities among those onboard.

The key measure in the fatality risk calculation is the Full-loss equivalent (FLE): A full-loss equivalent is related to the percentage of people on board who perished.

- For each individual accident, the full-loss equivalent is a value between 0 and 1, representing the ratio number of people who perished over the total number of people on board the aircraft.
- For example, 50 out of 100 passengers onboard a flight perish following an accident represents an FLE of 0.50, 1 of 100 fatalities would be a FLE of 0.01.
- A Full-Loss Equivalent of 1 is the equivalent of a catastrophic accident where all people onboard died

Calculating the Fatality Risk:

1. Sum all the FLEs of each fatal accident for a given timeframe (e.g. one year)
2. The fatality risk is found by dividing the sum total FLE for the given timeframe by the number of flights during this same timeframe (e.g. # in millions of sectors.)
3. This calculation provides the fatality risk, being full-loss equivalents per 1 million sectors.

Illustration:
In 2019, 3 fatal accidents occur within a country. In that year, the country recorded 3 million flights/sectors.
Fatal accident 1: All 5 passengers perish, FLE=1
Fatal accident 2: 20 of 100 passengers perish, FLE=0.2
Fatal accident 3: 25 of 50 passengers perish, FLE=0.5

Total FLE in 2019 is 1+0.2+0.5 = 1.7 FLE

Fatality risk is 1.7 FLE divided by 3 million sectors = 0.57 per million sectors.

Appendix C - Additional Resources and Reference

Brazil

- BCAST: http://www.anac.gov.br/en/safety/bcast-2013-brazilian-commercial-aviation-safety-team

Flight Safety Foundation

- Flight Safety Foundation, Flight Safety Digest *Passenger-Mortality Risk Estimates Provides Perspective about Airline Safety*. 2000
- Barnett, Arnold. *Measure for Measure a Statistician Offers His Perspective on the Relative Usefulness of Different Ways of Measuring Aviation Safety*. 2007.

ICAO

- ICAO's 2020-2022 Global Aviation Safety Plan: https://www.icao.int/safety/Pages/GASP.aspx
- ICAO Annex 19 - Safety Management: https://www.skybrary.aero/articles/icao-annex-19-safety-management
- ICAO RASG-PA: https://www.icao.int/RASGPA/Pages/About.aspx
- RASG-PA Annual Safety Report: https://www.icao.int/RASGPA/Pages/ASR.aspx

IATA

- IATA Global Aviation Data Management (GADM): https://www.iata.org/services/statistics/gadm/Pages/index.aspx
- Flight Data eXchange (FDX): https://www.iata.org/services/statistics/gadm/Pages/fdx.aspx

Skybrary

- https://www.skybrary.aero/

United States

- CAST: https://www.cast-safety.org/apex/f?p=102:1
- White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security. Final Report to President Clinton. Washington, D.C. The Commission, 1997.
    - Available at: https://irp.fas.org/threat/212fin~1.html

Appendix D - Acronym List

ASIAS: Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing
BAIST: Brazilian Airport Infrastructure Safety Team
BAST: Brazilian Aviation Safety Team
BCAST: Brazilian Commercial Aviation Safety Team
BGAST: Brazilian General Aviation Safety Team
BHEST: Brazilian Helicopter Safety Team
CAA: Civil Aviation Authorities
CAG: Collaborative Analysis Group
CAST: Commercial Aviation Safety Team
CFIT: Controlled Flight into Terrain
CST: Collaborative Safety Team
DIP: Detailed Implementation Plan
ESC: Executive Steering Committee
FDX: Flight Data eXchange
FOQA: Flight Operations Quality Assurance
GAJSC: General Aviation Joint Steering Committee
IHST: International Helicopter Safety Team
JIMDAT: Joint Implementation Measurement and Data Analysis Team
JSAT: Joint Safety Analysis Team
JSIT: Joint Safety Implementation Team
LOC–I: Loss of Control–Inflight
MAC: Midair Collision
MOU: memorandums of understanding
NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
PASO: Safety Action Programme
RASG–PA: Regional Aviation Safety Group- Pan American
RE: Runway Excursion
SDAT: Safety Data Analysis Team
SE: Safety Enhancement
SMS: Safety Management Systems
SSP: State Safety Programs
TAWS: Terrain Awareness and Warning System
TCAS–RA: Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System–Resolution Advisory
UA: Unstable Approach

Appendix E – Frequently Asked Questions

This appendix responds to some frequently asked questions on implementing a Collaborative Safety Team.

Q: What are the main benefits of implementing a CST?
A: A CST fosters collaboration between aviation stakeholders, enables sharing and analysis of safety intelligence, proactive identification of safety hazards and risk mitigation strategies that would not be possible to identify when considered in isolation.

Q: Who has the experience and who can support the state when implementing a CST?
A: The Pan American Regional Aviation Safety Team (PA-RAST) is the primary support mechanism, complemented by ICAO, industry stakeholders, and specialized CST structures.

Q: Is it possible to conduct the work of a CST without data from airlines?
A:. Yes. The availability of safety data is not a prerequisite for initiating a CST or a State–industry collaboration initiative. Sharing knowledge, operational experience and awareness of safety hazards in the system provides meaningful opportunities to build the capacity to collaborate and to act on priority risks. The greatest benefits of a mature CST come from the capacity to share safety data so that mitigation strategies are driven by safety intelligence; that capacity is developed progressively as trust consolidates, and its absence at the outset should not delay the start of collaboration. Additionally, States should be able to contribute the data they collect through their Safety Data Collection and Processing Systems (SDCPS). There is a misconception that a CST needs airlines' data to operate when the truth is, once there is a data sharing agreement established, there are multiple contributors such as States, airlines and other service providers.

Q: Do we need a formal structure, terms of reference or agreements in place before we can begin collaborating?
A: No. Collaboration first, structure second. Parties can begin by working together on a specific, narrowly scoped safety issue through an informal State–industry collaboration initiative, without governance structures, terms of reference or data-sharing agreements. Formal structures do provide procedural clarity for all participants and re-enforce trust and can be considered once collaboration has demonstrated value, providing the framework that sustains cooperation over time. A CST does not need to be the starting point for collaboration, but it can often be the next logical step. When a State and its industry decide to take that step, RASG-PA offers a Declaration of Intent (Appendix G) through which the CAA, industry and RASG-PA record their respective commitments to establish and sustain the CST. Signing it is a way to formalize collaboration — not a requirement to begin.
Q: Is a CST part of the SSP?
A: A CST supports the SSP but is not part of the State's data collection. The State takes part in the CST alongside industry, bringing what its SDCPS shows, and together the participants identify safety risks and generate safety intelligence that the State can incorporate into its SSP.

Safety data shared by operators in the CST is not transferred to the State, and participation in a CST does not replace mandatory or voluntary reporting to the State (see Guiding Principle 1 and Figure 1).

Q: How can I be sure that the data I share will not lead to retaliation by the regulatory body?
A: The CST must have documented and transparent processes that clearly describe how the CST will operate, what are the rules of engagement, as well as what are the limitations of protections to ensure awareness of participants and prevent unintended consequences.

Q: Who can participate in a CST?
A: Regulators and industry stakeholders with an interest to collaborate on achieving continued improvements within the State/Country or region with local stakeholders leading/driving the CST.

Q: Can any civil aviation industry stakeholder participate in CST meetings?
A: Any related organization/representative who's mandate includes activities contributing to aviation safety can be appropriate participants. Typical industry stakeholders that participate in a CST are airline operators, national and international associations and organizations, professional organizations, maintenance and repair organizations, aircraft manufacturers, airport and air navigation service providers. The critical condition for selecting any member to participate in a CST is to ensure the group and member has the right mindset (e.g. to collaborate on safety, not for gaining competitive advantage, not for taking punitive action).

Q: How often should CST meetings be held?
A: There is no set timeframe for a CST to meet. The frequency of meetings should be determined based on actions needed, however as the aviation system is a dynamic environment that is in constant change, the CST steering committee should plan to meet at least annually to ensure that any new or emerging trends are identified as early as possible in order to take action. Sub-groups working on development of safety enhancements may require more regular meetings.

Q: The CST meetings are held in person or remote?
A: CST meetings should be held in person. To build trust, members need a safe environment where they feel comfortable sharing sensitive information and discussing critical events. A secure space encourages open dialogue, which is essential for developing effective mitigation strategies. Remote meetings can take place for non-sensitive matters, such as administrative updates.

Q: Who should do the work of standardizing the indicators (data) that will be shared?
A: The group or organization tasked with consolidating CST member data must be able to ensure that the information it holds will be protected from disclosure and punitive action.

Q: What types of resources are required to sustain a CST?
A: Time commitment from engaged stakeholders, information sources that support

development of safety intelligence for decision making, and an environment (location) enabling collaboration on sensitive safety information.

Q: What should States expect to have to budget for CST initiatives?
A: States should expect the possibility of travel costs to attend meetings and/or having to incur room rental costs to hold CST meetings when no appropriate facilities are available.

Q: Is the CST used for conducting investigations per Annex 13?
A: No, CSTs are not intended for this purpose. States already have formal mechanisms in place to conduct Annex 13 investigations. That said, CSTs can leverage intelligence and conclusions from accident investigations to inform CST proactive management of safety risks.

Q: How does a CST measure success?
A: Similar to project management, how the CST intends to measure success should be considered and identified at the onset. Success should be measured using a data-driven approach to determine baselines and overall goals.

Q: When sub-groups/teams are formed, are they permanent or temporary?
A: Sub-groups/teams can be formed for a specific targeted mandate that is limited in time or deliverable and/or can be ongoing or permanent in nature (in which case subject to periodic review).

Q: Does the leadership of a CST change? If so, how often?
A: The terms of reference of a CST should establish an expected duration of time for holding CST leadership roles within the CST (co-chairs and team leads). This not only offers other interested stakeholders an opportunity to rotate into a leadership role but also clarifies expected time commitment to whomever is considering the role.

Q: What are problems or issues that a CST aims to address?
A: A CST should aim at addressing systemic risk within its aviation system, identifying opportunities for improvement and developing/implementing applicable safety enhancements on a voluntary basis.

Q: What are the main goals of a CST?
A: The strategic objective of the CST concept is to foster collaboration between stakeholders towards the continuous improvement of safety. A CST should endeavor to prioritize the highest risk areas in its State/Country or region with the long-term objective of reducing safety risks (e.g. fatality or accident).

Appendix F – Collaborative Safety Team Implementation Checklist

This appendix provides a stage-by-stage checklist that States and their industry stakeholders may use to plan, sequence and self-assess the implementation of a Collaborative Safety Team. It operationalizes the guidance set out in the preceding sections and introduces no new requirements; each stage is cross-referenced to the section it implements.

The organizing principle is trust. Stages F.1 and F.2 build it, F.3 formalizes it, F.4 applies it to produce safety enhancements — the concrete expression of a CST's purpose — and F.5 connects the CST to the region. The stages are sequential in logic rather than in calendar time, and a State may remain at one stage for as long as necessary. A formal safety data exchange platform is the mature ideal, not a precondition: a CST is judged by the safety enhancements it produces and implements.
Where State participation is not yet possible (see Guiding Principle 7), industry stakeholders may use this checklist with the items that involve the CAA treated as applicable when available: an industry focal point leads the dialogue, the trust assessment at item 1.2 is made among the industry participants, and the items involving the CAA are revisited when State participation becomes possible.

An editable version of this checklist, including a completion-tracking column, is available on RASG-PA's website: https://www.icao.int/RASGPA

Phase 1 — Interest and trust baseline *(see Preliminary Collaboration Stage)*

Phase	Item	Description	Responsible	Completed (Y/N)
Phase 1 — Interest identification and trust baseline				
1.1	**Identify demonstrated interest**	Confirm that the CAA, or industry, or both have expressed a genuine interest in a State–industry safety collaboration. Document the source and nature of the interest.	CAA / RASG-PA Secretariat	
1.2	**Assess the CAA–industry trust baseline**	Make an honest assessment of the trust relationship: does industry engage with the CAA outside oversight contexts? Is there a history of voluntary information exchange? What is the non-punitive record? This assessment, not the structural readiness check, is the decisive gate for proceeding.	CAA + industry focal points	

1.3	**Identify safety opportunities**	Identify specific safety issues in the State where a collaborative approach would add value — e.g., operations-specific risks, recurrent event types, HRCs applicable in the State.	CAA / PA-RAST	
1.4	**Map stakeholders and appoint focal points**	Identify the core set of stakeholders: CAA units, accident investigation authority, airlines, ATS provider, major airports, industry associations. Designate ONE CAA focal point and ONE industry focal point to sustain the dialogue.	CAA + industry	
1.5	**Confirm legal protection baseline**	Verify what legal protections exist for voluntarily shared safety data. If none, industry must know this up front; without protections, exchange should be limited to what operators can contribute without legal exposure — typically their own derived safety information or aggregated non-sensitive data, not raw FDM/FOQA records.	CAA legal / policy	

Phase 2 — Building trust through a collaboration initiative *(see Preliminary Collaboration Stage; Guiding Principle 3)*

The purpose of this stage is not to solve a problem but to establish the habit of discussing safety issues together. Its central activity is converting data into safety information jointly. Operators are not asked to surrender raw FDM/FOQA records or event-level data; they contribute the safety information derived from them. Aggregated, non-sensitive exchange is an acceptable entry point where trust is low, but the requirement is the joint data-to-information work. Granularity expands as trust grows, not before.

Phase	Item	Description	Responsible	Completed (Y/N)
Phase 2 — State–industry collaboration initiative (THE TRUST PHASE, per WP/11)				
2.1	**Establish a recurring exchange platform**	A recurring forum — quarterly or better — where CAA and industry discuss safety priorities WITHOUT an obligation to share sensitive data. No ToRs required at this stage. The platform's purpose is not to solve a problem — it is to build the habit of talking about safety issues.	CAA + industry focal points	
2.2	**Agree on a narrow initial focus**	Pick ONE concrete safety issue — small enough to be solvable, visible enough to matter. Avoid the temptation to scope broadly. Agenda drift is fatal at this phase.	Platform participants	

2.3	**Turn data into safety information jointly**	The core Phase 2 activity is converting data into safety information together. A practical model is a working-group session in which each operator brings safety information derived from its own FDM/FOQA program to analyse one specific safety issue. Operators are not asked to surrender raw FDM/FOQA records or sensitive event-level data — they contribute the safety information derived from them. Aggregated, non-sensitive exchange is an acceptable entry point where trust is low, but it is not the requirement; the requirement is the joint data-to-information work. Granularity expands as trust grows, not before.	Operators / CAA	
2.4	**Deliver at least one 'quick win'**	Within 6–12 months, produce one tangible joint output — a safety bulletin, an agreed procedure change, a shared training artifact. Visible value is how trust is earned; without it, the platform stalls.	Platform participants	
2.5	**Maintain non-punitive practice under pressure**	When an incident or event tests the non-punitive commitment — and it will — the CAA's response is the trust-test. Consistent non-punitive practice in these moments is what moves the relationship forward.	CAA leadership	
2.6	**Document participation and outputs**	Keep lightweight records of who attended, what was discussed, and what was produced. This becomes the evidence base for progressing to Phase 3.	Rotating notetaker	
2.7	**Decision point: is trust sufficient to formalize?**	Before moving to Phase 3, the platform participants explicitly assess whether trust has been built to a level that will sustain a formal CST. If not, remain in Phase 2 until it is. A formal CST launched before trust is ready will fail.	Platform participants	

Phase 3 — Formal establishment of the CST *(see Structure of a CST)*

Model selection should be driven by the trust established at F.2 rather than by ambition, because the model determines what the CST can produce: Ad-hoc and Industry-led CSTs produce voluntary industry safety enhancements, while a Co-lead Industry–Regulator CST may additionally produce regulatory initiatives and safety enhancements for inclusion in the National Aviation Safety Plan (NASP).

Phase	Item	Description	Responsible	Completed (Y/N)
Phase 3 — CST formal establishment (only after trust gate is passed)				
3.1	**Select CST model — and understand its output type**	Based on national laws and the trust level built in Phase 2, choose: Ad-hoc CST, Industry-led CST, or Co-lead Industry–Regulator CST. Be explicit about what outputs the model can produce: Ad-hoc and Industry-led CSTs produce voluntary industry Safety Enhancements (SEs); Co-lead Industry–Regulator CSTs additionally produce regulatory initiatives and SEs that may be included in the National Aviation Safety Plan (NASP). Trust level, not ambition, should drive model selection.	CAA + industry	
3.2	**Designate the Steering Committee**	Members should be senior enough to allocate resources and make commitments. Government–industry balance as feasible.	CAA + industry	
3.3	**Draft and approve Terms of Reference**	ToRs must cover: purpose, scope, membership, leadership (terms and rotation), meeting cadence, decision-making, confidentiality, relationship with SSP, and data protection. Draft reflects the Phase 2 operating reality, not an aspirational template.	Steering Committee	
3.4	**Designate the Secretariat**	Typically the CAA. If not feasible, assign to a member organization. Responsibilities: logistics, agendas, documentation, action tracking.	CAA / designated member	
3.5	**Establish Working Teams / Sub-groups as needed**	Start with a minimal structure tied to the Phase 2 focus area. Working team mandates should include developing mitigations, per Impl. Guidance. Expand later by need, not by template.	Steering Committee	
3.6	**Formalize data-sharing and protection framework**	Agree the protections and handling rules appropriate to what is actually shared — which may be roundtable discussion of accident/incident data and operator-brought, data-based safety concerns. Define what is shared, by whom, under what protections, for what purposes; align with Annex 19 5.4. A formal technical data-exchange platform is the mature ideal, not a requirement for establishment and its absence is not a gap where SEIs are being produced.	Steering Committee + legal	

Phase 4 — CST in operation: producing safety enhancements *(see Safety Risk Management Process; Guiding Principles 1 and 6)*

This is the stage at which the CST delivers its purpose. The Safety Risk Management process is the engine that produces safety enhancements. Data intake may be roundtable-based, drawing on accident and incident information together with operator-brought, data-based safety concerns, and need not depend on a formal exchange platform. As noted in the Safety Risk Management Process section, some CSTs may initially address a known common concern directly to achieve short-term safety benefit rather than stand up a full SRM process at the outset.

Phase	Item	Description	Responsible	Completed (Y/N)
Phase 4 — CST operational: producing SEIs (the point of the CST)				
4.1	**Define and run the SRM process — the engine that produces SEIs**	Agree on a repeatable Safety Risk Management (SRM) process: data intake → prioritization (data-driven and, where possible, weighted by fatality risk) → analysis → consensus-based voluntary mitigation strategy development. Per CST Strategy 1.1, the purpose of this engine is to produce Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs). 'Data intake' may be roundtable-based — accident/incident data plus operator-brought, data-based safety concerns — and need not depend on a formal US-ASIAS-like platform; the platform is the mature ideal, not a requirement. Judge the CST by the SEIs produced and implemented. Per Implementation Guidance SRM Process, some CSTs may initially focus directly on a known common-concern issue to achieve short-term safety benefits rather than stand up a formal SRM process or platform from the start; accident and incident data is an accepted starting basis.	Working Teams	
4.2	**Set safety performance targets**	Establish measurable targets aligned with national, regional (RASP) and global (GASP) priorities. Baseline performance first. Targets guide SEI prioritization.	Steering Committee + Working Teams	
4.3	**Develop SEIs and package them in a Detailed Implementation Plan (DIP)**	Document each SEI with scope, owner, timeline, and expected safety benefit. Package SEIs in a DIP or equivalent living instrument so the Steering Committee can track, resource, and approve implementation. Output type must match CST model (voluntary industry SEs for Ad-hoc and Industry-led;	Working Teams + Steering Committee	

		regulatory SEs permissible for Co-lead, potentially in the NASP).		
4.4	**Establish an effectiveness feedback mechanism**	Per CST Implementation Guidance Guiding Principle #6(iii), the CST must be able to continuously measure whether mitigation strategies are actually working. Use proactive data and information shared under the protection framework to close the loop between SEI implementation and measured safety effect. Feed results back into prioritization and agenda-setting.	Working Teams + Secretariat	
4.5	**Maintain meeting cadence**	Meet at the cadence defined in ToRs/governance documents. Minutes, actions, and follow-up tracked by Secretariat.	Secretariat	
4.6	**Actively protect the trust earned**	Trust is perishable. Monitor for trust-erosion patterns: regulatory overreach using CST-shared information, punitive use of voluntary reports, leadership changes that reset the relationship. Treat these as urgent.	Steering Committee Co-chairs	
4.7	**Support the State Safety program (SSP) — without compromising independence**	Per CST Implementation Guidance Guiding Principle #1, the CST's risk identification and mitigation activities are complementary to the SSP and can help set and achieve SSP safety objectives through a data-driven approach. The CST should: (a) Align priorities with SSP objectives where possible — a CST's data-driven safety agenda should support SSP safety performance targets without being driven by oversight requirements. (b) Maintain independence from oversight — CST activities are conducted in isolation of the State's Safety Assurance–Surveillance obligations (Annex 19 3.4.1). Information shared in the CST is used for system-wide risk identification, never for individual investigations or enforcement. (c) Decide consciously whether to formally integrate the CST into the SSP — the CST Implementation Guidance (Guiding Principle #1) recognizes that a CST can be an instrument of the SSP as a source of collaboratively identified safety risks and safety intelligence, but never as a data intake for the SSP, and explicitly cautions that formal integration	Steering Committee	

		may not always be optimal. The State should weigh the impact on data protection and on sustained industry participation before formally integrating the CST into the SSP. Where doubt exists, complementarity without formal integration is the safer default — the CST can support SSP safety objectives without being structurally subsumed by the SSP. (d) Do not use the CST as a data intake for the SDCPS — the State benefits by being informed through its participation, not by transferring information shared in the CST into its systems (Guiding Principle 1.c).		

Phase 5 — Regional integration *(see Collaboration between ICAO RASG-PA and local CSTs; RASG-PA Support)*

Phase	Item	Description	Responsible	Completed (Y/N)
Phase 5 — Regional integration				
5.1	**Report into PA-RAST**	Share CST priorities, SEIs, and outputs with PA-RAST. Attend PA-RAST in-person meetings.	CST Representative	
5.2	**Contribute to regional priorities**	Align CST work with Regional Safety Action Plans (RSAs), Regional Safety Implementation Actions (RSIAs), and HRCs. Where appropriate, pilot regional initiatives locally.	CST Working Team Leads	
5.3	**Exchange with peer CSTs**	Participate in peer-exchange with other CSTs in the region (USCAST, CAG, BCAST, PCAST, etc.). Import and export best practices — including SEIs, trust-management practices, and effectiveness feedback approaches.	Steering Committee Co-chairs	
5.4	**Contribute to safety intelligence feedback to PA-RAST**	Provide local context to help interpret regional data; surface systemic issues that warrant regional attention.	CST Representative / PA-RAST	

Appendix G - Model Declaration of Intent for the Implementation of a Collaborative Safety Team

A Declaration of Intent is a formal expression of the shared commitment of a State's Civil Aviation Authority, its aviation industry stakeholders, and RASG-PA to establish, operationalize and sustain a Collaborative Safety Team. It records the intent of the parties, the commitments each undertakes, and the arrangements that allow that commitment to endure beyond changes in individual leadership.

The Declaration is intended for use when a State and its industry are ready to commit to establishing a CST — typically as informal collaboration matures and the parties elect to formalize it. It is not a prerequisite for beginning collaboration: as set out throughout this guidance, State–industry collaboration can and should begin informally, without governance structures, terms of reference or data-sharing agreements. A State ready to commit to the full path may sign the Declaration at the outset as an expression of that intent; a State beginning informally may adopt it later, once collaboration has demonstrated value. In either case, the Declaration formalizes collaboration rather than gating it.

The Declaration reflects that a CST is an instrument of the State and its industry. RASG-PA participates as a regional partner and technical supporter and does not direct the internal operations or priorities of the CST. The model text below may be adapted to the operating context and legal framework of each State; the associated templates provide a member confidentiality undertaking (Attachment 1), a reaffirmation to be executed on a change of CAA leadership (Attachment 2), and an implementation plan (Attachment 3).

DECLARATION OF INTENT

FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A COLLABORATIVE SAFETY TEAM (CST)

BETWEEN

THE REGIONAL AVIATION SAFETY GROUP – PAN AMERICA (RASG-PA)

AND

THE CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF [STATE NAME]

AND THE AVIATION INDUSTRY STAKEHOLDERS OF [STATE NAME]

Reference No.: RASG-PA/CST/DOI/[YEAR]/[NO.]

Date: _____

Place: _____

Valid From: Date of signature by all Parties

Review Cycle: Every three (3) years, or upon any change in CAA leadership

Framework: ICAO Annex 19 (Third Edition); RASG-PA CST Strategy (2026); RASG-PA CST Implementation Guidance (2026)

I. PREAMBLE

The Regional Aviation Safety Group – Pan America (RASG-PA), the Civil Aviation Authority of [State Name] (the "CAA"), and the undersigned aviation industry stakeholders of [State Name] (collectively, "the Signatories"):

ACKNOWLEDGING that the continuous improvement of aviation safety in the Pan-American region requires proactive collaboration between regulators and industry through the structured sharing and analysis of safety data and information;

RECOGNIZING that the Collaborative Safety Team (CST) concept, as described in the RASG-PA CST Implementation Guidance (2026) and the RASG-PA CST Strategy, provides a proven framework for State-industry collaboration on safety risk management;

AFFIRMING that ICAO Annex 19 (Third Edition), paragraph 5.5.2 requires States to facilitate the establishment of means for timely safety information sharing or exchange to promote collaboration within the aviation community, and that the Note to that paragraph identifies collaborative safety teams among such means;

NOTING that the sustainability of a CST depends on an institutional commitment that endures beyond changes in individual leadership, and that the obligations expressed in this Declaration attach to the Office of the Director General and to the CAA as a permanent regulatory entity;

UNDERSTANDING that this Declaration of Intent is a formal expression of shared political and institutional will, and while not legally binding in domestic courts, creates a public institutional commitment that new CAA leadership is expected to honor and reaffirm;

HEREBY DECLARE as follows:

II. SHARED INTENT AND PURPOSE

The Civil Aviation Authority and the aviation industry stakeholders of [State Name] hereby declare their intent to establish, operationalize, and sustain a Collaborative Safety Team (CST) within [State Name], as a State-industry mechanism for the voluntary sharing and analysis of aviation safety data and information, with the purpose of identifying systemic safety risks and developing consensus-based Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs). RASG-PA, as a regional partner, endorses and supports this intent and commits to facilitating its realization.

The CST shall be established and driven, jointly, by the CAA and the aviation industry stakeholders of [State Name]. The CAA shall support and champion the CST to the fullest extent permitted by applicable national laws; where legal or regulatory constraints limit direct CAA participation, the CAA shall nonetheless actively promote the establishment of the CST among aviation system users and provide appropriate support. RASG-PA's role is that of a regional partner and technical supporter: providing guidance, sharing regional safety intelligence, and facilitating the State's connection to the broader Pan-American region. RASG-PA shall not direct the internal operations or priorities of the CST.

The CAA and industry stakeholders affirm their commitment to pursuing the following core principles drawn from the CST Implementation Guidance (2026), which RASG-PA also endorses. The Signatories acknowledge that the application of these principles may be subject to the constraints of applicable national laws, and commit to working progressively toward their full realization within the State's legal framework:

- Support to the State Safety Programme (SSP) while remaining functionally independent of the CAA's regulatory oversight and enforcement obligations;
- Trust-building between the regulator and industry as the foundation for sustainable safety data sharing;
- A progressive and incremental approach consistent with the principle of collaboration first, structure second — beginning with informal information exchange and formalizing structure as collaboration demonstrates value;
- Clear and transparent processes, with rules of engagement agreed by all CST members;
- Protection of voluntarily shared safety data from disclosure and punitive use, consistent with ICAO Annex 19;
- Actions and decisions driven solely by the objective of improving aviation safety.

III. COMMITMENTS OF THE CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY

The Civil Aviation Authority of [State Name], acting through the Office of the Director General, declares the following institutional commitments:

3.1 Designation of CST Implementation Coordinator: The CAA shall designate a CST Implementation Coordinator within thirty (30) days of the date of entry into effect of this Declaration. The CST Implementation Coordinator shall serve as the primary operational point of contact for all CST implementation activities and shall be accountable to senior CAA safety leadership. The Director General shall be informed of the designation and shall ensure that the CST Implementation Coordinator has the institutional mandate and resources necessary to fulfil this role.

3.2 CST Implementation Plan: Within ninety (90) days of the date of entry into effect of this Declaration, the CAA shall, in consultation with aviation industry stakeholders, develop a CST Implementation Plan based on the template in Appendix C. The Implementation Plan shall identify initial stakeholders, outline a phased approach to CST establishment, and set

milestones for convening the inaugural CST meeting. The plan shall be shared with RASG-PA for technical observations within the same period.

3.3 Functional Firewall: The CAA commits to pursuing and maintaining, to the greatest extent permitted by applicable national laws, a clear operational separation between CST participation and its regulatory oversight and enforcement functions, ensuring that safety data shared voluntarily within the CST is not used for punitive or compliance purposes, except in cases of willful misconduct or gross negligence. The CAA acknowledges that achieving full functional separation consistent with ICAO Annex 19 (Third Edition), Chapter 5.4 (Safety data and safety information protection) may require legislative or regulatory action and commits to identifying and pursuing such measures as part of its CST implementation efforts.

3.4 Contribution to the State Safety Programme: The CST is not a data intake mechanism for the State Safety Programme (SSP). The CAA's participation in the CST informs it of hazards, risks, trends and mitigations identified through collaborative analysis, and that understanding may inform the State's safety risk management and SSP safety objectives and priorities. Information shared by participants within the CST shall not be transferred into the State's safety data collection and processing system or used to compensate for its absence. The CST shall serve as a complementary contributor to national safety efforts without being subsumed into the SSP, preserving the functional independence that enables industry participation.

3.5 Annual Progress Report: The CAA shall prepare and share with RASG-PA an annual progress report on the status of CST implementation, including the number of active SEIs and the operational continuity of the CST.

3.6 Continuity Through Leadership Transitions: The CAA acknowledges that this Declaration is an institutional commitment that survives changes in leadership. Upon any change in the Director General, the CAA commits to: (a) notifying RASG-PA within thirty (30) days; and (b) ensuring that the incoming Director General is briefed on the status of this Declaration and the CST within sixty (60) days of assuming office. The incoming Director General is expected to issue a written Reaffirmation of this Declaration within that period, using the template provided in Appendix B.

IV. COMMITMENTS OF THE AVIATION INDUSTRY STAKEHOLDERS

The aviation industry stakeholders of [State Name] signatory to this Declaration declare the following commitments:

4.1 Active Participation: Each signatory industry organization commits to designating a representative to participate actively in CST meetings and working groups, and to contributing relevant safety data and information in accordance with the agreed CST confidentiality and data protection framework, including the Confidentiality Agreement in Appendix A.

4.2 Confidentiality: Each signatory organization commits to protecting the confidentiality of safety data and information shared within the CST, and to ensuring that such data is used solely for safety improvement purposes and not for competitive advantage, litigation, or enforcement.

4.3 Safety Culture: Each signatory organization commits to fostering within its own organization a just and positive safety culture that supports open and voluntary reporting, free from the fear of punitive action, as the foundation for effective CST participation.

4.4 Continuity of Representation: Each signatory organization commits to ensuring continuity of its CST representation and to notifying the CST Implementation Coordinator of any change in its designated representative within thirty (30) days of such change.

V. COMMITMENTS OF RASG-PA

RASG-PA, acting through its Executive Steering Committee (ESC) under the auspices of ICAO, declares the following commitments in its capacity as regional partner and technical supporter:

5.1 Technical Support: RASG-PA shall provide the CAA and the CST with access to applicable CST implementation guidance, templates, tools, and technical assistance to support the establishment and operation of the CST.

5.2 Regional Safety Intelligence: RASG-PA shall share relevant regional safety information, High-Risk Category (HRC) priorities, and Safety Enhancement Initiatives from the Pan-American Regional Aviation Safety Team (PA-RAST) to support the CST's safety risk management activities.

5.3 Regional Connectivity: RASG-PA shall facilitate the participation of CST representatives in PA-RAST meetings and regional safety forums, enabling the State to contribute local safety intelligence to the regional safety agenda.

5.4 Leadership Transition Support: Upon notification of a change in CAA leadership, RASG-PA shall proactively engage the incoming Director General to provide a briefing on this Declaration and the status of CST implementation within thirty (30) days of receiving notification.

5.5 Non-Interference: RASG-PA shall not direct, impose priorities upon, or seek to control the internal operations of the CST. RASG-PA's role is advisory and supportive. The CST is an instrument of the State and its industry, not of RASG-PA.

VI. INSTITUTIONAL CONTINUITY AND REAFFIRMATION

The Signatories expressly recognize that the value of this Declaration depends on its durability across administrative cycles. Accordingly:

6.1 This Declaration is made by the CAA as a permanent regulatory institution. The commitments herein are attached to the Office of the Director General and are not extinguished by the departure of any individual signatory.

6.2 Upon any change in the Director General of the CAA, the incoming Director General shall, within sixty (60) days of assuming office, issue a written Reaffirmation using the template in Appendix B, confirming awareness of this Declaration and acceptance of the CAA's continuing commitments. A failure to issue a Reaffirmation shall be treated by RASG-PA as a triggering event for direct bilateral engagement with the incoming leadership.

6.3 This Declaration shall be reviewed jointly by the Signatories every three (3) years from the date of signature, or earlier upon a change in CAA leadership, to confirm its continuing relevance and update the implementation status.

6.4 The CAA shall include reference to this Declaration and the status of CST implementation in its official transition documentation whenever there is a change in the Director General or other senior official responsible for CST oversight.

VII. NATURE OF THIS DECLARATION

This Declaration of Intent is a formal expression of shared institutional and political will. It does not create legally binding obligations enforceable in domestic courts, nor does it constitute a treaty, contract, or financial commitment. Its force derives from the public and institutional commitment of the Signatories and from the procedures for reaffirmation and engagement set out in Section VI.

Participation in the CST established under this Declaration does not diminish, replace, or alter the regulatory authority of the CAA or the compliance obligations of any industry stakeholder under applicable national law.

VIII. ENTRY INTO EFFECT AND AMENDMENTS

8.1 This Declaration takes effect upon signature by all Parties.

8.2 Additional aviation industry stakeholders may join this Declaration at any time by signing a copy and notifying the CAA and RASG-PA in writing.

8.3 The text of this Declaration may be amended by written agreement of the CAA and RASG-PA, with notice to all industry signatories. Amendments that materially affect the commitments of the industry signatories, the governance of the CST, or the protection of shared safety data and information also require the written agreement of the industry co-chair of the CST, who signs on behalf of the industry signatories after obtaining their agreement. Until an industry co-chair is designated, the industry signatories designate a representative for this purpose. Amendments to the list of industry signatories do not require amendment of the Declaration text.

8.4 This Declaration is executed in English and Spanish. In the event of any inconsistency, the English text shall prevail, unless the Parties agree otherwise.

SIGNATURES

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, duly authorized on behalf of their respective organizations, hereby declare their intent as set forth above.

RASG-PA ESC STATE CO-CHAIR

Acting through the Executive Steering Committee (ESC), under the auspices of ICAO

Name:

Print full name

Signature:

Date:

RASG-PA ESC INDUSTRY CO-CHAIR

Acting through the Executive Steering Committee (ESC), under the auspices of ICAO

Name:

Print full name

Signature:

Date:

FOR THE CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF [STATE NAME]

On behalf of the Office of the Director General, as an institutional commitment of the CAA

Name:

Print full name

Signature:

Title:

Director General

Date:

Place:

AVIATION INDUSTRY STAKEHOLDERS OF [STATE NAME]

The following organizations, through their duly authorized representatives, join this Declaration as aviation industry stakeholders committed to the implementation of the CST.

Organization:	**Organization:**	**Organization:**
Representative Name:	**Representative Name:**	**Representative Name:**
Title / Date:	**Title / Date:**	**Title / Date:**
Organization:	**Organization:**	**Organization:**
Representative Name:	**Representative Name:**	**Representative Name:**
Title / Date:	**Title / Date:**	**Title / Date:**

[Additional signatory blocks may be appended on a continuation page as required.]

SUB APPENDIX A — MODEL CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT FOR CST MEMBERS

Each individual participating in [State] CST activities shall execute the following undertaking prior to attending any [State] CST meeting or receiving any safety data or information:

I, [Name], [Title], representing [Organization], hereby acknowledge and agree:

- That all safety data and safety information shared within the [State] Collaborative Safety Team (CST) is provided voluntarily and for safety improvement purposes only;
- That I will not use, disclose, or permit access to such data or information for any enforcement, punitive, litigation, or commercial purpose;
- That I will not attempt to identify, re-identify, or associate aggregated or de-identified data with any individual, operator, aircraft, or service provider;
- That these obligations survive my departure from the [State] CST or the termination of my organization's membership in the [State] CST;
- That I understand my obligations under the applicable provisions of ICAO Annex 19 and the national laws of [State Name] regarding the protection of voluntarily reported safety information;
- That I understand that failure to meet any of these obligations will result in termination of my participation, or my organization's participation, in the [State] CST.

Signature:

Name / Organization / Date:

SUB APPENDIX B — REAFFIRMATION OF DECLARATION OF INTENT (TEMPLATE)

[To be executed by the incoming Director General within sixty (60) days of assuming office, addressed to the RASG-PA ESC, as required under Sections 3.6 and 6.2 of this Declaration.]

[Date]

To: RASG-PA Executive Steering Committee (ESC)

Dear RASG-PA ESC,

I, [Full Name], having assumed the office of Director General of the Civil Aviation Authority of [State Name] on [Date], hereby formally acknowledge and reaffirm the commitments of the Civil Aviation Authority of [State Name] under the Declaration of Intent with RASG-PA for the Implementation of a Collaborative Safety Team, dated [Declaration Date], Reference No. [Reference No.].

I confirm that:

- I have received a briefing on the status of CST implementation as of [date of briefing];
- I am aware of the current CST Implementation Plan (Appendix C), including outstanding milestones and responsible parties;
- I accept the continuing commitments of the CAA under this Declaration of Intent and commit to supporting the continued establishment and operation of the CST;
- The designated CST Implementation Coordinator for [State Name] is [Name, Title, Contact Details].

I look forward to continued collaboration with RASG-PA in advancing aviation safety in [State Name] and the Pan-American region.

Signature:

Name / Title / Date:

SUB APPENDIX C — CST IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (TEMPLATE)

[To be developed by the CAA in consultation with aviation industry stakeholders within ninety (90) days of the date of entry into effect of this Declaration, then shared with RASG-PA for technical observations. This template provides the minimum structure. Target dates are suggestions only: the State and industry members of the CST set their own timeline according to their operating context, and no date is prescribed.]

Phase	Milestone / Activity	Suggested Target Date	Responsible Party
Phase 1 Informal Exchange	Identify initial CST stakeholders and agree on scope and objectives of the CST	Month 3	CAA / Industry
Phase 1	Convene inaugural CST meeting	Month 4	CAA / Industry
Phase 1	Develop first informal SEI proposal (if applicable)	Month 6	CST Working Group
Phase 2 Formalization	Adopt Terms of Reference (ToR) and Safety Risk Management (SRM) process for CST operations	Month 9	CAA / CST Members
Phase 2	Agree on initial non-sensitive HRC focus area for data discussion, based on adopted ToR	Month 10	CST Members
Phase 2	Execute Confidentiality Agreements (Appendix A) for all members	Month 9	CAA
Phase 2	Submit first Annual Status Report to RASG-PA	Month 12	CAA
Phase 3 Mature Sharing	Optional: where participants agree and conditions allow, expand safety data sharing to include operational data such as FDM/FOQA. Not every CST will reach this stage, and a CST can remain effective without it.	Month 18+ (if pursued)	CST / Operators
Phase 3	Conduct first joint review with RASG-PA	Month 24	CAA / RASG-PA

KPIs shall be established by the CAA and CST industry members during Phase 1 and documented as an addendum to this Implementation Plan. The Implementation Plan may be updated by written agreement of the CAA and RASG-PA, with the agreement of the industry co-chair of the CST (or, until one is designated, the representative designated by the industry signatories), without requiring amendment of the Declaration of Intent. RASG-PA shall be notified of any material updates.

Appendix H – Relationship between a Collaborative Safety Team and local Runway Safety Teams

This appendix expands Figure 3. It shows what RSTs can bring to a CST, what the CST can bring back to each aerodrome, and how the two mechanisms work together.




Figure 4. Relationship between a CST and local RSTs: detail