

Incidents and reporting systems

An example

ICAO/IFATCA Safety Culture Workshop

19-22.05.2026

Some Reporting Systems Fundamentals

- Investigation unit outside the Operational Department
- ICAO annex 13
 - Just/Safety culture environment
 - Relations with Accident Investigation Board and Regulator
- You need Investigators with domain know-how
 - Training of investigators.

You can learn or you can blame

A LINE IN THE SAND



Dilemmas that Define Us

ICAO Manual on Safety Management:

Establishing a reporting culture

The requirements of a positive reporting culture are

- The reporting system is simple and user-friendly.
- Management encourages the reporting of safety occurrences
- The treatment of staff who submit reports is seen to be just
- Each occurrence report received is investigated
- Feedback is provided to the originator of the report.
- Staff see that the submission of reports results in corrective action to prevent recurrence.
- Confidentiality is maintained, insofar as possible, in relation to disclosure of information concerning individuals.
- Lessons learned are disseminated to all staff to enable them to learn from other's errors.

**1
Motivation and
promotion**

Information about the
reporting system

**2
Build up trust
and secure
independence**

Safety and reporting
policies

Commitment to
safety

**3
Detection and
ease of reporting**

Information about
what to report

Understandable
reporting form

**4
Selection for
deeper analysis**

Selection by the
Investigator

Selection by the
department

**5
The investigation**

Explain instead
of judging

It is the reporters
Report!

**6
Contributing factors
Emerging consid.**

Underlying Factors
second stories

Data collection

Severity

**7
Underlying factors
and patterns of
failure**

Examination of
patterns of failure

**8
Learning from
failure**

What to repair

Creation of
communication

**9
Feedback
and Dissemination**


Narratives

Refreshers

**10
Implementation
and monitoring**

Close monitoring of
implemented changes

Revise the risk
portfolio



zürich acc

date	c/s	unit		Frequency-separation	Handover process	Airspace structure	Weather	Work load	unfrequent task	Training	Technical aspects + maintenance
15.01.05	RYR4198 DLH5PU	U	B								
27.01.05	CFG538 SE-DLB	U / E	C								
09.02.05	A1607 EZY5262	MIL / M4	A								
14.02.05	PLF101 GWI764	APE	A								
23.02.05	LTU841 RJA115	M4	B								
03.03.05	D-IAJK SUI336	ARFA	E								
04.03.05	RYR2003 A0075	ARFA	A								
24.03.05	AZA565 DLH5LY	S / U	-								
31.03.05	OE-KRT HB-PHU	ADC	A								

zürich acc continued

date	c/s	unit		Frequency-separation	Handover process	Airspace structure	Weather	Work load	unfrequent task	Training	Technical aspects + maintenance	
17.04.05	FHE6750 GWI824	U / S	C									
20.04.05	OK-PRA SE-GPD	ARFA	C									
03.05.05	SWZ321 DLH3766	DEP / APW	B									
21.05.05	SWR085U BERO150	W / DEL	B									
22.05.05	TAP927 SWR8741	W	C									
01.07.05	DLH4PF NJE529W	S / W	C									
16.07.05	SPW35A ECA923	S / U	A									
02.09.05	N282CJ NJE8WD	S / U	B									

Example of change with, *Two or more A/C's on different frequencies while providing radar separation*

- ATCO understanding and participation
 - Creation of "Best Practice"
 - Communication about reports and safety
- Procedures,
 - Outbound LFSB going to Rhein via Sector East
 - Outbound Stuttgart requesting FL 250+ and send direct to Sector U
 - West and South Sector separation for A/Cs inbound to Zürich
 - Handling of A/Cs transporting parachute jumpers, in general
 - Transits in lower Airspace are coordinated with Sector North and South
 - Inbound and the opposite outbound A/Cs on Sector West, South and East
 - Outbound LSZH – LFSB – LSZB in Sector West

Outbound LSZH – LFSB –
LSZB in Sector West

Departures outbound
LSZH  140 to the East
Sector without
coordination with Sector
South

Outbound LIM.  240 to
Sector U

Outbound LSGG  240 to
Sector U

To be continued

Technical support

HMI

New tools

Organizational issues

Capacity

Training

Political influence